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Abstract 
This thesis explores how China’s narratives of legitimacy and history condition the 
ways in which the state frames and approaches “real” and perceived terrorism 
challenges. Rooted in the Chinese political context and historical continuities, China’s 
counter-terrorism agenda prioritises the concept of national unity, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity. This agenda is justified through the narratives of the Century of 
Humiliation, and is underpinned by the friend/enemy division that was inherited from 
the Mao era. Anxious about the impact of democratisation on regime stability, 
Chinese political elites and scholars are highly sensitive to the sympathy of the 
international community towards dissident groups that have a separatist agenda. To 
ensure political conformity, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has established a 
regime of “truth” by controlling the framing and discourse of counter-terrorism. To 
maintain its legitimacy and mobilise the public, the CCP has complemented the highly 
centralised counter-terrorism system with a revival of the Mass Line strategy which 
was central to Mao’s governance but faded from view for much of the post-Mao era. 
The desire to maintain control has resulted in various problems in counter-terrorism 
policy and practice, which raise questions about – or even threaten to undermine – 
the government’s ability to demonstrate the legitimacy and efficacy of its counter-
terrorism strategy.  
In exploring the peculiar characteristics of China’s counter-terrorism approach, this 
thesis makes original contributions in five respects: 1) it draws on a wide range of 
Chinese-language sources that have been under-explored in the study of China’s 
perception of its security threats. Introducing these sources, this thesis brings 
forwards domestic “insider” debates to a wider non-Chinese-speaking audience 
interested in the concept of security, unity, separatism, and terrorism in China. 2) It 
provides an in-depth analysis of China’s usage and manoeuvring of the frames, 
narratives, and labels in the construction of its counter-terrorism discourse, which 
offers an interesting insight into how the Chinese state and security apparatus works. 
3) It analyses the evolution of the friend/enemy distinction in the Chinese political 
discourse and how it is embedded in the counter-terrorism discourse. 4) It contributes 
to terrorism research by examining the under-studied case of China, which is often 
neglected in mainstream “Western” terrorism research. 5) Finally, the thesis 
contributes to China studies by investigating how China responds to “real” and 
perceived terrorist threats.  
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A note on translation 
 
Most of the quotes from Chinese texts are translated by the author of this thesis. In 
these cases, the title in Chinese is provided in the bibliography. In some cases, the 
translation of official documents is provided by the Chinese state media or scholars, 
and the translators are credited at the end of the quotes.  
For Chinese names, surnames are written before the first names. 
In terms of the Romanisation of Mandarin Chinese, the entire thesis uses Hanyu Pinyin, 
the official Romanisation system used in mainland China, to transliterate Chinese 
names, geographical names, slogans, and documents. Nouns that are already known 
by the international audience in alternative spelling, such as Sun Yat-sen and Urumqi 
will be spelt in their well-known form. To maintain consistency with original texts, 
names of Uyghurs from Chinese text will be transliterated from Mandarin Chinese, 
rather than Uyghur language, except those already known in other forms, such as 
Ilham Tohti and Dolkun Isa. There are different ways (Uyghur, Uighur, and Ughur) in 
use to refer to the Uyghur groups in modern documents, and this thesis adopts 
“Uyghur”. In addition, “Turkistan” is used instead of alternatives such as “Turkestan”. 
The exceptions of these spellings are where alternative spellings appear in quotes and 
the names of organisations. Some articles published in Chinese journals also have 
their own translation of the titles.  
In addition, the author has attempted to be sensitive to the political connotations 
attached to the labelling of certain incidents. In order to avoid the appearance of 
political judgment, the thesis chooses relatively neutral terms to address controversial 
incidents, for example, the Tian’anmen Square Protest, rather than “Tian’anmen 
massacre”, the “2009 Urumqi Riot” rather than “Urumqi Massacre”. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Contextualising China’s approach to terrorism 
Why does China seek to legitimise its counter-terrorism discourse, policy and 
practice? The discourse of terrorism constructed through China’s historical narratives 
is embedded in its counter-terrorism policy at multiple levels. China’s counter-
terrorism approach manifests a strong presence of the role of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in the construction of the counter-terrorism discourse as a source of 
legitimacy for its counter-terrorism practice. As a regime that is characterised by a 
high level of control and limited political freedoms, the CCP is seldom constrained by 
the need to justify its accountability and commitment to the rule of law. Why, then, 
does the CCP consider it necessary to legitimise its counter-terrorism policies and 
discourse?  
Putting this question into a wider context, China’s counter-terrorism approach is an 
important part of its overall strategy to maintain social control in the context of the 
greater challenges that have accompanied its “rise”, and the importance of national 
consolidation and unity. Considering other ambitious national programmes, such as 
the Belt and Road Initiative and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, the CCP’s ever-increasing assertiveness – both in terms of more 
active participation in international affairs and the efforts to prevent external 
interference in its domestic affairs – have caused some to speculate that China desires 
and has the capacity to challenge the established world order. Indeed, the shift in 
Chinese foreign policy from “keeping a low profile” towards “striving for 
achievements” (X. Yan 2014) seems to have provided some ground for such 
speculation.  
In this context, it is important to understand China’s behaviour by examining its 
security mindset. Constructed as one of the major security threats that requires a 
“people’s war”, “terrorism” provides a case that could generate important insights 
into China’s quest for legitimacy in its security policy. China’s approach to terrorism 
highlights its desire to maintain regime stability and demonstrates a tendency towards 
stronger control in response to real and perceived threats that are often 
contextualised in the political discourse of friend and enemy. This thesis reveals 
important aspects of how the country functions by highlighting the linkages between 
China’s approach to terrorism and its quest for legitimacy through frames, 
assumptions, narratives and labels.  
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The question that arises is how political elites perceive, frame, and respond to 
terrorism. More specifically, how do Chinese political elites and scholars perceive 
“unity” and “separatism”?  How does the CCP frame, define, and deal with 
“terrorism”? How does the CCP respond to the Xinjiang political violence? 
Categorised as an authoritarian regime, the CCP, like its democratic counterparts, 
seeks to justify its actions and maintain its legitimacy. As Holbig (2013, 63) points out, 
“any exercise of power”, regardless of regime type, “requires legitimation”. It is 
generally considered that economic growth has been one of the sources for the CCP’s 
legitimacy (Holbig and Gilley 2010, 396). However, it also brings China a “performance 
dilemma” (Holbig 2009, 43) – a variation of Samuel Huntington’s “king’s dilemma” 
(1970, 177). In this scenario, in which the power of the CCP may be undermined, 
reforms improve economic performance and thus breed demands for political 
participation and democratic freedom, which are not met. The focus on economic 
performance also involves a potential contradiction between the CCP’s claim of an 
ultimate communist goal and its quasi-capitalist economic policies (Zeng 2016, 8). This 
contradiction, in addition to the fact that the economic growth is losing its 
momentum, forced the CCP to seek legitimation from other sources.  
Since the drafting of the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2014, China’s counter-terrorism has 
entered a new stage. The escalation of violence in 2014 prompted political leaders to 
describe the Xinjiang problem in the context of “new circumstances” (Klimeš 2018).1 
Entering into Xi’s second term, the new regime is increasingly characterised by 
tightened control over religious and ethnic affairs domestically, and an increasing 
presence in the international arena, exemplified by the Belt and Road Initiative, the 
Asian Development Bank and China’s involvement in international peace building. 
China’s increasing power and the accompanying responsibility make it no longer 
appropriate for China to ignore conflicts, civil wars and regime changes in another part 
of the world (Donyan Li 2010). The stringent control by the government creates a 
political climate where the dissemination of anti-government materials is closely 
monitored. Given the curtailment of civil liberties, China’s counter-terrorism approach 
is categorised as typically authoritarian (Pokalova 2013a). Recent reports on huge 
expenditure on public security (Buckley 2011), mass surveillance (Associated Press 
2011), increased police presence (Zenz and Leibold 2017), and biodata collection from 
Uyghurs have further demonstrated the authoritarian characteristics of China’s 
counter-terrorism approach.  
                                                      
1 new circumstances: 新形势 
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To justify its heavy-handed approach, the CCP embed its counter-terrorism discourse, 
policy and practice in narratives that prioritise unity, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. The CCP itself has based its legitimacy on history and developmentalism 
(Ruan 2015). In addition to economic development, scholars have identified ideology, 
nationalism, and a certain degree of tolerance in regard to social and economic 
freedom (Holbig 2013; Harding 1987). Zeng Jinghan (2016) criticises the argument that 
ideology is obsolete, emphasising its role in the legitimation of the CCP. Chu Yun-han’s 
(2013, 23) empirical analysis indicates that although factors such as economic 
performance, provision of social stability, and nationalist sentiment are significant, 
“their explanatory power is not as strong as many Western China watchers would 
expect”. Chu’s research highlights the importance of traditional values as sources of 
legitimacy, including “a belief in the priority of the state … over individual rights and 
interests”. This research goes further and examines how this belief is indoctrinated 
through the framing of the counter-terrorism discourse in the first place.  
Analysing the ideas and the process of production of meanings through frames, 
narratives, assumptions, and labels, this thesis reveals that the indoctrination of the 
“correct” ideas plays an important role in China’s quest for legitimacy. Contrary to 
Fukuyama’s prediction (1989, xi) of the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution”, 
China is witnessing a firm hold of ideology as a source of legitimacy.  
Facing the challenge of legitimation, China seeks to strike the right balance between 
state security and civil liberties in different ways. David Beetham’s (2013, xv) 
categorisation of legitimating elements captures some key elements of China’s 
approach to terrorism – the form of Anti-Terrorism Law is a codification of collective 
will, that is, the collective interests of national unity, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity; the source of authority comes from the CCP’s monopoly of truth and 
representation, which is evident throughout this thesis in the CCP’s efforts to maintain 
the “correct” ideas and views of the history, ethnicity and the state; the mode of 
public affirmation is characterised by mass mobilisation, which is evident from the 
implementation of the Mass Line strategy.  
As the following chapters will demonstrate, the CCP is concerned about legitimacy in 
order to create a stable environment, which it sees as essential to sustain its rule. It 
seeks to embed its counter-terrorism discourse, policy and practice in historical 
narratives which provide legitimacy for its claims regarding national unity, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. The discourse of terrorism derived from historical continuities 
of the Century of Humiliation, making it distinctively underwritten by the CCP’s 
accounts of morality – the “imperialist them” are evil, and the “socialist us” are the 
innocent victim of their evil conduct. Throughout contemporary history, the targets 
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that have defined “them” have changed a number of times, from “bourgeois 
liberalists” and “hostile forces” to “three forces” and “East Turkistan forces”, but this 
underlying friend/enemy distinction remains central to China’s security outlook.  
This thesis provides an alternative approach to understanding China’s rationale for 
counter-terrorism. It does not directly focus on the human rights implications or 
controversies that often accompany the discussion of China’s counter-terrorism 
approach. Instead, it focuses on the way that state behaviour is conditioned by the 
quest for legitimacy. Reconceptualising China’s counter-terrorism approach in the 
context of the CCP’s quest for legitimacy, this thesis presents China’s approach to 
terrorism as part of its growing assertiveness in the international community. As 
China’s increasing engagement in international affairs accompanies its commitment as 
a “responsible power” (F. Gao 2018), counter-terrorism could be an important area 
for possible international cooperation, especially considering that the official Anti-
Terrorism Law (2015) has given the state the power to respond to attacks overseas 
militarily. However, because of the divergence of attitude on issues such as human 
rights and separatism between China and many liberal democracies, such cooperation 
has not gained momentum. The exception of the cooperation within the framework of 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation contributes to, rather than reduces the dichotomy 
between the West and the rest because it stresses the shard interest in targeting 
separatist organisations that are not usually designated as terrorism in the West.   
1.2 Background 
China is a unitary state in which a strong central government and administrative 
divisions exercise power on its behalf. The central government of China is divided 
among the legislative branch, the executive branch, the military branch, the 
supervisory branch, and the judicial branch (National People’s Congress 2004). The 
division of these state organs emphasises the differentiation of responsibilities, rather 
than the separation of powers (People’s Congress 2007). The Communist Party holds 
the ruling position, and another eight democratic parties participate in consultation 
through the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (The State Council 
Information Office 2007). In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping put forward the notion of 
separation between Party and government, but since Xi took over, the CCP has begun 
to criticise this notion and re-emphasise the leadership of the CCP in almost 
everything (Gao 2017). The institutional restructuring in recent years signals the 
further concentration of power by the Party under Xi Jinping (Xinhua 2017; Xinhua 
2018a). 
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The increased ability of the CCP to control the central government has enabled it to 
monopolise the discourse of terrorism. As this thesis will demonstrate, the central 
government is struggling to share power with the judicial branch and local 
government in terrorism designation, but after several rounds of deliberation, officials 
in the executive branch are still the de facto decision-makers. Challenging the “correct” 
ideas put forward by the CCP is considered “betrayal”. The reports on “terrorist” 
incidents must be aligned with the state media, and Uyghur separatist narratives are 
inaccessible because of censorship and self-censorship.  
The central government delegates political power to local governments through 
devolution. The central government appoints the governors of China’s provinces and 
autonomous regions. An autonomous region has the power to enact regulations in the 
light of the local conditions with the approval of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress (National People’s Congress 2004). Since the 
establishment of Xinjiang as an autonomous region in 1955, political elites of the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have always been loyal to the Party, 
despite infighting and their alliance with different leaders. It is worth mentioning that 
although the Chairman of the XUAR government has always been a Uyghur, the 
person who has actual power – the Party Secretary – has always been a Han Chinese. 
Three Party Secretaries, Wang Lequan, Zhang Chunxian and Chen Quanguo are known 
for their heavy-handed measures to maintain Xinjiang’s stability. The absolute loyalty 
of the governor of the XUAR enables Beijing to consolidate its control over a region 
2,500 kilometres away.  
Xinjiang is home to 11.27 million Uyghurs (Statistic Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region 2016), Turkic-speaking Muslims who identify with the Turkic 
culture. Bordering Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and India, Xinjiang is located at the crucial Eurasian frontier, and is of 
strategic importance to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Despite the fact 
that the association between Xinjiang and “terrorism” is a recent creation, Uyghurs’ 
resentment towards the CCP’s rule has always been one of the major concerns for 
political elites in Beijing. The growing number of terrorist incidents since 2008 has 
further attracted the attention of Chinese political elites.  
A major cause of the ethno-separatist sentiments among Uyghurs since 1949 is 
associated with demographic changes. The Sino-Soviet split in 1962 drove some 
Uyghur farmers to flee in fear. To consolidate the border defence against the Soviet 
Union and strengthen control in remote farms that had been left idle, the central 
government began to send Han Chinese from other provinces to cultivate the farms. 
As a result, Xinjiang saw a rapid increase in Han during 1953 and 1964 (Ma 2000). 
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According to the white paper on the Xinjiang Production Construction Corps (XPCC), 
its population increased from 175,500 in 1954 to 1,485,4000 in 1966 (State Council 
Information Office 2014). By 2013, the XPCC’s population accounted for 11.9% of 
Xinjiang’s population (State Council Information Office 2014). At the time, Xinjiang’s 
total Han population reached 37.94% (Statistic Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Reigon 2015). According to the most recent Census, Uyghurs account for 
45.21% of the population in Xinjiang (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s 
Republic of China 2010). Although its activities have caused widespread resentment, 
the CCP was reluctant to dismantle it. As the XPCC “has serves as a symbol of the 
PRC’s imagined beneficence to the Uighurs, so dismantling it would be tantamount to 
revising the official history of PRC policies there” (Nathan and Gilley 2003, 222).   
 
Figure 3 China, with Xinjiang in the northwest 
The change in Xinjiang’s demographics had a tremendous impact on its ethnic 
relations. In line with the developmental approach to security, the CCP encouraged 
Han migration in the hope that economic development would improve its leadership 
in Xinjiang and reduce Uyghur dissent (Mackerras 2004; Sautman 1998; Boehm 2009, 
86). Indeed, Xinjiang’s GDP soared from 39.07 billion in 1978 to 10920.09 billion in 
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2017 (Statistic Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 2016; T. Sun and Gu 
2018).  
With rapid economic development comes heightened inequality. Many Uyghurs were 
discontented with the unequal job opportunities brought by large-scale development 
projects. Wiemer (2004, 188) and Becquelin (2000) observes that jobs created by 
construction have largely gone to Han immigrants rather than local minorities due to 
low wages and discrimination. 
Uyghur nationalism grew as Uyghurs felt that their culture, language, and identity 
were under threat. Rebiya Kadeer, a Uyghur activist designated as a terrorist by the 
CCP, said that  
Uighurs have suffered for decades under a regime that seeks to eliminate 
a unique culture to placate paranoid leaders in Beijing. Our religion, a 
moderate form of Sunni Islam vital to Uighur ethnic identity, has been 
fiercely repressed. The Uighur language is disappearing from East 
Turkestan's schools. Hundreds of thousands of government-sponsored 
Han Chinese migrants are brought to East Turkestan, while locals struggle 
with unemployment and poverty (Kadeer 2008). 
Considered the “spiritual mother” of Uyghurs by many Uyghur dissidents abroad, her 
words represent their concerns regarding the elimination of Uyghur identity under the 
CCP.  
The history and discussion surrounding Uyghur separatism and “terrorism” is highly 
politicised. Different sources have very different assessments of the nature and scope 
of “terrorism” in China. As Bovingdon (2013) argues, the Uyghurs’ claims that they 
have always been distinct from the Chinese must be scrutinised as much as the CCP’s 
claims that Xinjiang has been part of China since ancient times. The assessments of 
“terrorism” in China by different sources are inevitably fused with their own political 
agenda. Therefore, it is imperative to lay out major sources that have reported and 
commented on “terrorism” in China.  
According to different types of political agenda, these sources can be divided into 
three groups. Chinese official sources generally agree that terrorism is a considerable 
threat, but it is under control because of the efforts of the CCP in regard to stability 
maintenance; when it is not under control, it is because external enemies are 
masterminding the attacks outside China. The second type of sources is Western 
media and human rights groups. Despite their diverse interests and political agendas, 
they share an assumption that “terrorism” is controllable for now, but the heavy-
handed counter-measures and human rights abuse will exacerbate the problem. Some 
media, such as CNN and BBC, seek to present themselves as unbiased sources, even 
though their selection of information reflects an underlying bias that projects a 
 
 
 
 
9 
morality in which the Western model of democracy is a better form of government. 
Other media such as Radio Free Asia have a more critical stance against the CCP due 
to their legacy of anti-communist propaganda in the 1960s. The third type of sources 
is Uyghur dissidents. In their attempts to achieve independence, they often work with 
human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. 
The stated goal is to improve the human rights situation of the Uyghurs, but many of 
these groups call Xinjiang “East Turkistan” which implies their disapproval of the CCP’s 
sovereignty over the region. These groups see terrorism as a result of the CCP’s 
repression. The 2009 Urumqi Riots, which are designated as terrorist attacks by the 
CCP, were believed to be a “genocide” against Uyghurs by these dissidents (Kadeer 
2009). As the discussion on the number of foreign fighters demonstrates, some 
Uyghur dissidents frame terrorism as a considerable threat due to the suppression of 
the CCP, while others frame it as an imagined threat that is constructed by the CCP to 
justify its suppression. 
Despite the “ontological instability” (Jackson 2011, 119) exemplified by the above 
sources and their different assessments of the scope of “terrorism” in China, there 
have been some efforts to evaluate the problem in comparison to other countries.  
 
Figure 1 Number of terrorist events and casualties from 1989 to 2016 in China. Source: 
Global Terrorism Database 
Maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism at the University of Maryland, College Park in the US, the Global Terrorism 
Database provides a relatively “objective” description of the scope of terrorism in 
China between 1989 and 2016. After the Tian’anmen protest in 1989, there was an 
increase in the number of terrorist events until a series of separatist incidents broke 
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out in Yining (also known as Ghulja). The number of events increased in 2001 and 
2008, coinciding with the 9/11 attacks and the Beijing Olympic Games respectively. 
The most recent spike is seen between 2013 and 2015 which coincided with Xi’s 
power grab.  
Considering factors including the number of incidents, fatalities and injuries, and the 
amount of property damage as a result of terrorist incidents, the Global Terrorism 
Index provides more evidenced for this trend. In 2017, China scores 5.543, meaning 
the country experienced a medium-high impact from terrorism. In comparison, Iraq 
was the most impacted country, with a score of 10. China ranks 31 out of 163 
countries. 
 
Figure 2 China’s Global Terrorism Index score from 2003 to 2017. Source: Vision of 
Humanity 
The above statistics provide a relatively “objective” representation of the terrorism 
threat. However, such a representation alone does not explain China’s attitude 
towards terrorism, how it navigates competing security priorities, how its behaviour is 
embedded in its political narratives of legitimacy and historical continuities, and the 
relationship between the growing “terrorist” threat and state violence. “Terrorism” 
could be the reason for the repressive response by the state; it could also be the result 
of long-term repression. Therefore, the number of terrorist attacks alone does not 
directly lead to a conclusion about the state in which they take place.  
In addition, the different ways in which events are framed reveals the difference in 
contextualising violent events in different cultural contexts. An example is that the US 
was reluctant to frame the attacks in Kunming 1 March 2014 as “terrorism” (Tiezzi 
2015), while the White House did not hesitate to frame the Boston Marathon 
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bombing as an act of terrorism before a full round of investigations into the attack 
(CNN Library 2018).  
This difference highlights the importance of this thesis – a state’s approach to 
terrorism must be understood in the political context of the country in question. 
Without the information on how the discourse and framing of terrorism are 
constructed in the political context and historical continuities, even the most basic 
concept – terrorism itself – is uncertain. This “ontological instability”, as Jackson 
(2011, 119) describes it, can only be mitigated by placing terrorism and counter-
terrorism in a broader context of political discourse, and approaching “terrorism” as a 
socially constructed concept, rather than a given fact.  
1.3 Originality and contribution 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of states’ responses to real and perceived 
terrorist threats beyond the West. Self-defined as a socialist country “with Chinese 
characteristics”, China developed its security outlook from a complex political context 
and historical continuities. The simplistic generalisation of China as an authoritarian 
state and the assumptions following from this fall short of explaining the complicated 
reality of its counter-terrorism approach. Specifically, the contribution of this thesis is 
in the following five aspects.  
Examining a distinctively non-West counter-terrorism approach, this thesis presents 
original data from Chinese official and academic sources. Using original official 
documents and scholarly works, this thesis reveals how China’s counter-terrorism 
policy and practice are embedded in the framing and discourse of counter-terrorism 
approach. The Chinese-language sources help to understand the friend/enemy 
grouping and the use of concepts such as national unity, sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity in the legitimisation of its counter-terrorism. In addition, this data provides 
in-depth information on how the CCP perceives “terrorist” threats, and how it frames 
the threat and appropriates labels such as “hostile forces”, “three forces” and “East 
Turkistan forces” to maintain legitimacy. This thesis also draws on empirical evidence 
from Chinese official and academic sources to present a clear outline of how Chinese 
officials and intellectuals manipulate the friend/enemy distinction to serve its counter-
terrorism agenda. The data contributes to build a picture of how the perception of the 
“enemy” among political elites, local officials, and scholars has evolved since the Mao 
era. While the data is publicly available, there has been little in-depth exploration of 
the data to explain the CCP’s counter-terrorism approach.  
In order to understand the quest for legitimacy that underpins its counter-terrorism 
approach, this thesis uses a large number of Chinese-language official documents and 
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scholarly works. While some of the important official documents have been translated 
into English, the Chinese-language versions are irreplaceable for two reasons. First, 
words containing cultural connotations might be compromised in order for the 
content to make sense in English translations. As the CCP became more active in 
promoting its image through the medium of English, it began to adjust the tone of its 
language to cater for the English-speaking audience. Second, symbols and labels have 
different cultural connotations in different cultural contexts. For example, the 
metaphor of terrorists as “rats” makes more sense in the cultural context in which 
individuals have experienced the “Eliminating the Four Pests” campaign.2 
The concept of terrorism is central to the understanding of China’s counter-terrorism 
approach. Alex Schmid (2011, 39) summarises some similar attributes from over 250 
definitions of terrorism. These attributes include the use of violence, political goals, 
and civilian targets. However, despite the ostensible similarity in the definitions of 
terrorism in use, governments vary greatly in terms of the ways in which they make 
and justify counter-terrorism policies. Because “terrorism” has been used, officially or 
unofficially, in so many ways and contexts, the definition of terrorism has been 
appropriated so that it no longer has the defining power that can provide a clear-cut 
answer for the designation of terrorist individuals and organisations. As “terrorism” 
becomes a label, a “rhetorical device” (A. P. Schmid 2011, 40), it is problematic to 
uncritically accept a particular definition of terrorism without interrogating the 
underlying political dynamics. It undermines the understanding of the issue of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism and reproduces a discourse that is constructed by the 
defining agency for its own political agenda.  
Acknowledging “terrorism” as a rhetorical device that serves a particular political 
agenda, this thesis highlights the importance of situating the study of counter-
terrorism within the political context in which a line between “friends” and “enemies” 
had already been drawn. Political violence and separatist movements have been 
framed in a manner in which one cannot conjecture who the “terrorists” are without 
the prior knowledge of the friend/enemy grouping in the Chinese political discourse. 
This thesis contributes to the conceptualisation of terrorism as a rhetorical device 
embedded in China’s political discourse in which the notion of “terrorism” has been 
appropriated and used as a label to justify China’s counter-terrorism agenda. The 
notion of “terrorism” as a rhetorical device is central to the understanding of China’s 
discourse and framing of terrorism and counter-terrorism challenges in its political 
context. Labels such as “hostile forces”, “three forces” and “East Turkistan forces” are 
strategically deployed in order to maintain greater legitimacy. The manipulation of the 
                                                      
2 Eliminating the Four Pests: 除四害 
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existing discourse of the enemy shifts the boundary between “us and them” in order 
to gain more support from the public. 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of terrorism by examining the usage of 
“terrorism” as a rhetorical device in Chinese counter-terrorism discourse, policy, and 
practice. It demonstrates not only how China’s counter-terrorism rhetoric is 
influenced by its quest for legitimacy, which prioritises national unity, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity, but also the extent to which the frames of counter-terrorism 
discourse and the underlying friend/enemy grouping are manipulated by the CCP in 
order to consolidate power.  
A key theme running throughout the development of China’s counter-terrorism 
approach is its friend/enemy grouping. While the “us and them” dichotomy has been 
studied extensively in the discourse of terrorism, particularly in regard to the War on 
Terror waged by the US and its allies, there has been little in-depth analysis of the 
friend/enemy distinction in the context of China’s counter-terrorism approach. This 
thesis presents the underlying friend/enemy distinction in a non-Western context. It 
discusses the ways in which the Chinese officials and intellectuals define the “friends” 
and “enemies” through accounts of historical events, law-making, policy-making, 
attribution of blames, counter-narratives and mass mobilisation. Carl Schmitt’s (2006, 
96) friend/enemy distinction is often seen in Chinese politics, be it the mobilisation 
against the imperialist invasion since the First Opium War, or the fight against the 
bourgeoisie during the Cultural Revolution. This thesis highlights the continual use of 
the friend/enemy grouping in Chinese politics over time. The historical continuities 
that have propelled the evolution of the friend/enemy distinction capture the key 
difference between it and a non-Western counter-terrorism discourse. 
The contribution to terrorism research has two dimensions. First, this thesis 
contributes to the relationship between authoritarian states and terrorism. The 
relationship between democracy and terrorism has been studied in great detail. Some 
believe that the lack of constraints to state power, legal norms and complex 
institutions allows authoritarian regimes to crackdown on terrorist activities more 
effectively with little regard for the consequences of using extraordinary methods. 
However, empirical evidence from non-democratic regimes is relatively less explored, 
with a few exceptions (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012; Pokalova 2013a; Wilson and 
Piazza 2013; Ogden 2005). This thesis presents China’s counter-terrorism as an 
example of a non-Western counter-terrorism approach. It contributes to this debate 
by demonstrating China’s efforts to maintain the stability of the regime which reflects 
Gerschewski’s (2013) “three pillars of stability” in sustaining autocratic regimes. The 
case of China provides an important addition to the understanding of counter-
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terrorism beyond the West. As the following chapters of this thesis will demonstrate, 
China shares the concerns for due process in legitimating its counter-terrorism 
practice to some extent, but these concerns are deemed secondary compared to the 
priority of national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. In depicting China’s 
struggle between effective counter-terrorism measures and individual freedom, this 
thesis deepens our understanding of an important non-Western counter-terrorism 
approach.  
Second, this thesis contributes to the debate on the “critical” and “orthodox” schools 
of terrorism research. The debate surrounding Critical Terrorism Studies provides an 
important critical lens through which to examine the problems facing the terrorism 
research field. Although some of the criticisms levelled at the so-called “orthodox 
terrorism studies” are debatable, the critical reflection of the terrorism research field 
provides a useful approach to identify the problems of the terrorism research field in 
the context of China’s counter-terrorism discourse, policy, and practice.  
This thesis seeks to address four critiques put forward by Richard Jackson (2007) as its 
main contribution to terrorism research. First, to tackle the methodological and 
analytical shortcomings, the argumentation of this thesis is built upon empirical 
evidence obtained from publicly available Chinese sources, as well as interview data. 
The empirical data demonstrate in detail the ways in which the counter-terrorism 
rationale is linked with the recurring theme of “friends and enemies” in political 
history.  
Second, to counteract the state-centric approach of “orthodox terrorism studies”, this 
thesis reconceptualises “terrorism”, and the related “hostile forces” and “East 
Turkistan forces” as rhetorical devices that can help uncover the power relations and 
political agenda underlying China’s official counter-terrorism discourse. Treated as 
rhetorical devices, these labels reveal how China’s political discourse prioritises 
national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity over other democratic values such 
as due process, human rights, and the rule of law.  
Third, the state and academia are largely inter-linked in China due to the recent re-
emphasis upon, and increasingly stronger state control over, ideology since Hu Jintao 
(Holbig 2009). This thesis challenges the status quo in which some scholars take the 
official designation of terrorism for granted, and highlights the similarity between the 
terrorism studies in Chinese and the state’s discourse and framing of terrorism. It also 
highlights the fact that some scholars avoid addressing the difficult questions 
regarding the political dynamics from which Uyghur separatist sentiments emerged, 
as well as their uncritical acceptance of the conflation of separatism and terrorism.  
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Fourth, this thesis acknowledges the limitations of “problem-solving theory” (Cox 
1981, 129) and aims to challenge the status quo that aggravates the “problem of 
terrorism” through the examination of the power relations between the executive and 
the judiciary, and between the state and community. Section 5.6 will explain how 
preferential policies in education and language policy that aim to solve the “problem” 
of ethnic tensions result in further segregation and estrangement. Chapter 7 will 
demonstrate how the officials’ understanding of the lack of education as a cause of 
radicalisation is translated into policies that might worsen anti-Han sentiment and 
entrench existing divisions, such as “re-education camps”.  
This thesis contributes to the scholarship of China studies in five aspects. Firstly, it 
provides empirical evidence that helps to explain the ways in which Chinese officials 
and scholars perceive the issue of terrorism in China’s political discourse. Extant 
literature provides a detailed explanation of the various causes of, and implications for 
political violence in Xinjiang. However, recent developments in the policies aiming at 
strengthening internet control raise new questions regarding the ways in which the 
counter-terrorism propaganda competes with the ethno-separatist discourse.  
Secondly, it indirectly addresses the link between development policies and the 
counter-terrorism agenda by providing empirical evidence that highlights the counter-
terrorism rationale underlying development policies. There have been some attempts 
to explain the link between development policies and the security agenda (Mackerras 
2004; Sautman 1998), but the political context in which the link is embedded has yet 
to be fully explored, in order to understand the ways in which counter-terrorism 
propaganda makes meaning.  
Thirdly, it provides new insights into the ways in which Chinese political elites and 
intellectuals frame ethnic and social integration. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, their 
understanding of the Chinese integration model is crucial to understanding their 
perception of, and response to the threats to unity. However, this has been omitted in 
the extant literature on integration and terrorism research. The relationship between 
integration models and counter-terrorism has been studied in some depth (Horvat 
2010, 11; Palumbo-Liu 2006, 11; Abbas 2007; McGhee 2008; Modood 2005, 7). The 
lack of evidence from China becomes an impediment to the understanding of the non-
Western counter-terrorism rationale as China emerges as an increasingly important 
player with a large Muslim population.  
Fourthly, this thesis identifies the Mass Line strategy as a key tenet running 
throughout China’s security discourse. Emphasising the reliance on the masses as a 
principal source of legitimacy, the current leadership has facilitated a revival of this 
approach, which was central to Mao’s governance. The inclusion of the Mass Line 
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principles in Anti-Terrorism Law and de-radicalisation policies demonstrates how this 
old notion is used to temper the new security policies. Embedding the Mass Line 
approach in its counter-terrorism policy, China seeks to transform its citizens from 
passive beneficiaries of security to active participants of counter-terrorism practice.  
Lastly, this thesis also contributes to the understanding of China’s response to 
terrorism in terms of hard and soft approaches. In the Chinese political context, the 
hard and soft approaches correspond with Mao’s theory of two types of 
contradictions. According to this theory (as Section 4.3.1 will explain), the state should 
differentiate between “enemies” and “friends” when fighting against terrorism. The 
“enemies” can be treated with a hard approach, while the “friends” who are usually 
deceived or forced to join terrorist groups should be educated, persuaded and 
supported in order to re-integrate into society. As will be discussed in Section 6.4.1, 
the CCP believes that only a very small group of individuals hiding among the general 
population can be classified as the “enemies”, while a large percentage of those who 
are radicalised follow the “enemies” blindly because of a lack of education and 
unemployment. This explains the CCP’s developmental approach to security, which 
aims at improving the living standard, education level and employment for the 
majority of the local population in Xinjiang. However, at the same time, these “soft” 
measures also cause problems because they are rooted in China’s political discourse in 
which only the official ideology is considered “correct”. In this context, the 
commitment of Muslims to their identity and their culture becomes a source of the 
wider anxiety in terms of the regime’s security. 
1.4 Chapter outline 
Chapter 2 will start with a discussion of the conceptual questions that are central to 
this thesis. It will explain how the analysis in this thesis contributes to and identifies 
connections between two fields – terrorism research and China studies. The 
disambiguation of the definition of terrorism tackles the first obstacle to a rigorous 
understanding of the issue of terrorism. The discussion of the definitional problem will 
help to understand the function of “terrorism” and other labels such as “hostile forces” 
as “rhetorical devices” in the following chapters. It will also highlight the importance 
of placing “terrorism” and other labels in the political discourse and historical 
continuities. Engaging in the debate over the “orthodox” and “critical” terrorism 
studies and Richard Jackson’s four critiques of “orthodox terrorism studies”, this 
chapter will explain the critical lens that puts China’s counter-terrorism discourse, 
policy, and practice under scrutiny.  
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In the field of China studies, this chapter focuses on three issues – political violence in 
Xinjiang, development policy and the Chinese integration model. It draws on the 
works of “China experts” working outside China regarding the causes and the impact 
of political violence in Xinjiang. As the discussion on the intimate ties between the 
Chinese scholarship and state power demonstrates, the discussion of this subject in 
China is inevitably value-laden. Therefore, the Chinese-language scholarship will be 
studied as part of the political rhetoric in pursuit of greater legitimacy in the following 
chapters. In this section, English-language scholarship will be used as a point of 
reference against which the Chinese-language sources can be examined.  
Chapter 3 will focus on the methodology. It will explain the application of frame 
analysis and discuss the analytical model used in this thesis in the examination of the 
discourse of the Century of Humiliation as a master frame, and a series of assumptions 
and labels that derive from the master frame. These ready-made assumptions and 
labels have enabled the CCP to reproduce the friend/enemy distinction without 
explicitly providing information on the identity of the “enemy”. Derived from the 
frame-theories of Snow, Benford (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000) and 
Gamson (1989, 157), the analytical model provides a framework for a structured 
understanding of the relationship between concepts such as unity, separatism, and 
the friend/enemy distinction. This chapter also provides detailed information on the 
research methods and fieldwork, and considerations of the limitations of the research 
design.  
Chapter 4 will provide a foundation of China’s political context and demonstrate how 
its legacy conditions the contemporary security policy. Highlighting the homogeneity 
of the friend/enemy distinction in history, this chapter will illustrate the links between 
the political ideas used in ancient and modern China and the current security policy. It 
will explain the evolution of the concept of “unity” in China’s political discourse, how 
it has been intertwined with the history of humiliation and how it enables scholars 
such as Fei Xiaotong to envision the integration model that prioritises “unity” over 
“diversity”. The concept of “unity” is essential as it provides information about how 
“separatism” is conceived in China’s political discourse. It is within this context that 
the CCP justifies its legitimacy based on its commitment to safeguarding national 
unity. 
Linked with “unity”, the state has developed its understanding of “enemies” – those 
who undermine China’s national unity. Termed “hostile forces”, the notion of the 
“enemy” is an important part of the political discourse in contemporary history. 
Despite slight changes in the specific meaning of “enemies”, each generation of 
leadership has used the notion of the “enemy” to justify the legitimacy of their 
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security policies. Underpinned by the underlying assumptions of “unity” and the 
notion of the “enemy”, the CCP has developed a serious of untold assumptions about 
the “correct outlook” on history, ethnicity, and the state (CPC News 2015). These 
assumptions will be analysed against Edward Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan’s (1989, 
37–38) criticisms of the state bias in the counter-terrorism discourse.  
Chapter 5 will delve into the overall counter-terrorism strategy to find connections 
between counter-terrorism discourse, policy and practice, and China’s quest for 
legitimacy. Guided by the Overall Security Outlook, China’s security policy is highly 
state-centric. The discourse of counter-terrorism is embedded in a series of ready-
made assumptions that antagonise the “West”. The legal framework serves to ensure 
the power of the state in designating terrorism with more emphasis on the role of the 
executive over the judiciary. In its implantation, the vagueness of the definition causes 
local officials to target a broad range of expressions and activities as radical. The 
discussion on the domestic and international actors involved in China’s counter-
terrorism policy will further highlight the state-centric nature of China’s counter-
terrorism institution and the underlying friend/enemy distinction in China’s 
cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation framework.  
This chapter will also demonstrate how development and religious policies are 
affected by the concerns for security. The measures that aim to assimilate – or in the 
words of the CCP, to “sinicise” – Muslims, contribute to a dilemma in which the 
implementation of these measures might lead to the consolidation of the Uyghur 
identity, and the same result might be inevitable if the CCP does not do so.  
Chapter 6 will focus on the evolution of the Mass Line approach in China’s quest for 
legitimacy and the application of the Mass Line principles in counter-terrorism. 
Drawing support from the masses, the current leadership sought to gain support from 
and mobilise both the Han and Uyghurs. It will also demonstrate how the CCP has 
encouraged young people to go out into the local communities to spread the “facts” 
about terrorist incidents.   
Chapter 7 will discuss the de-radicalisation discourse, policy and practice that are 
underpinned by the Mas Line principles. It will demonstrate how the CCP legitimises 
its de-radicalisation approach by embedding the official views in various channels of 
propaganda. In doing so, it has sought to facilitate political conformity and ensure the 
dominance of the “correct” ideology in Chinese society. It will also highlight the CCP’s 
failed attempts to differentiate between hard and soft approaches, which are 
exemplified in the light of recent reports on “re-education camps”. The intolerance 
towards diversity and the promotion of elites’ narrow understanding of the Uyghurs 
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reflect the monopoly of the state on the discourse of counter-terrorism, and the 
heavy-handed measures that have followed at the local level.  
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Chapter 2 Conceptual framework 
This chapter will discuss some conceptual questions that underpin this thesis. This 
thesis examines concepts and issues that sit across two overlapping disciplines, 
terrorism research and China studies. The chapter is therefore divided into two main 
sections. The discussion of key conceptual questions in both terrorism research and 
China studies will help us to situate the analysis of this thesis in a broader body of 
literature in regard to political violence. The concepts that will be discussed in this 
chapter, including terrorism, authoritarianism, legitimacy and radicalisation provide 
the foundation to analyse China’s approach to terrorism. The extant literature on 
China’s separatist movements, development policy and integration model highlights a 
gap that forestalls a more comprehensive understanding of the context in which 
Chinese political elites and intellectuals perceive, frame, and respond to terrorism.    
The discussion in the first section is structured around four questions. First, in what 
way does the difficulty in defining terrorism highlight the context-contingent nature of 
the concept of terrorism? Second, how does this thesis address the criticisms levelled 
at the traditional terrorism research field? Third, how do authoritarian states respond 
to terrorism? Fourth, how can the categorisation of hard and soft approaches and 
previous studies on radicalisation help to understand China’s response to terrorism? 
The answer to these questions will highlight the challenge of balancing efficacy and 
legitimacy regardless of regime type, and China’s response to this challenge, which is 
characterised by authoritarianism.  
The second section will focus on the research in China studies on political violence in 
Xinjiang, development policy and the Chinese integration model. It will provide the 
point of reference for the analysis of the empirical evidence in the following chapters. 
Scholars’ (mostly Western) understanding of the history, causes and implications of 
political violence will be introduced. Then, their observations can be examined against 
the Chinese officials and intellectuals’ perception. The impact of development policy 
on ethnic tensions has been studied, but the rationale for the developmental 
approach to security has yet to be explored in the context of China’s counter-
terrorism strategy. The relationship between the integration model and the counter-
terrorism effect has been studied in detail in the West, but the case of China remains 
under-explored.  
This section will focus on scholarly works that are largely produced outside China. As a 
result of the language barrier, ideological differences and distinctive academic ethos, 
the communication between academia within and outside China is insufficient – 
especially on this topic, which is so controversial that even the very definition of the 
subject matter is in question. Consequently, there has been an inevitable gap in the 
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body of knowledge delineated along the language line. This section functions to 
establish the knowledge outside of Chinese-language academia as an object of 
reference, which helps to situate China’s counter-terrorism approach in the following 
chapters.   
2.1 Terrorism research 
2.1.1 Definition of “terrorism” 
The focus on counter-terrorism means that this study draws on studies relating to the 
response of the state to perceived and real terrorist threats; the ways in which the 
state responds to, and intervenes in, the process of radicalisation, instead of the 
motivations, organisation or tactics of the individuals or groups that resort to violence 
in an attempt to achieve a political goal. However, to understand counter-terrorism, 
some basic concepts in terrorism studies need to be clarified. A state’s attitude 
towards these concepts forms the basis for its response to terrorism. For example, the 
ways in which the definition of terrorism is formulated may affect terrorism 
designation and proscription, and more directly, the legitimacy of a particular 
organisation. The problem of the definition is amplified when considered in the 
context of counter-terrorism practice. The violence that a state uses could turn 
counter-terrorism measures into a form of state terrorism, as Jarvis and Lister have 
discussed in their criticism of the denial of state terrorism (2014, 44).  
Alex Schmid (2011, 39) has examined 250 definitions of terrorism and identifies a 
number of patterns in the use of the term around the actors, targets, and motivations 
of perpetrators. Terrorism usually refers to an act that uses violence as a means to 
launch attacks against non-combatant targets. An act of terrorism could be 
provocative. The direct victim may not be the intended target, as the fear generated 
by the killing of a few can be spread to influence wider audiences. In the information 
age, the dissemination of the message of terror has been made particularly effective 
by the decentralisation of the media. The ability of ordinary citizens to post 
information on social media means that it is increasingly costly for governments to 
control the discourse and they must compete with its opponents for legitimacy and 
the credibility of their narratives. 
States behave differently in the face of terrorist threats, despite the similar definitions 
they adopt. The reason for the divergence goes beyond the list of attributes of 
terrorism that are written in legal and policy documents. Because official definitions of 
terrorism reflect the political agenda of a certain government, the definition of 
terrorism cannot be studied in isolation. Those who do the defining set the political 
agenda by ascribing right or wrong (Sederberg 1989, 3). The term “terrorism” has 
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been used in so many different contexts, to the extent that its usage has become 
blurred (English 2009b, 2), and simply rendered meaningless. The term is no longer 
the sum total of the attributes of terrorism, but a convenient word given to a group of 
meanings underwritten by a set of peculiar assumptions in a certain political context, 
in an attempt to serve a political purpose. “Terrorism” is used to refer to different 
ideologies or activities, depending on the agenda of the defining agency, as will be 
discussed in the following chapters. In these cases, “terrorism” is used as a moral 
judgement and a label (A. P. Schmid 2011, 40), in order to give meaning to a counter-
terrorism policy that is otherwise less likely to be accepted by the public.  
The term has thus becomes a “rhetorical device” (A. P. Schmid 2011, 40) that is used 
justify the morality of the defining agency. The definition of terrorism ironically lacks 
defining power, as the list of attributes of terrorism provided in the definition of 
terrorism does not lead the public to an informed judgement on the nature of 
“terrorist” individuals or organisations, and subsequently on the legitimacy of the 
corresponding measures taken by the government. The lack of defining power of the 
term, or using Jackson’s words, the “ontological instability” of terrorism, means that in 
spite of the over-abundance of definitions, different defining agencies label events 
differently to suit their own interests based on unwritten assumptions. Therefore, 
uncritically accepting the label of terrorism without considering its political context 
amounts to reproducing the discourse that the defining agency has constructed for its 
own political agenda. 
The contestation between different defining agencies is particularly salient in the case 
of the separatist movements in Xinjiang. Competing for public support, both the CCP 
and the Uyghur community in exile provide their own accounts of the violent incidents 
that have taken place in Xinjiang. Whether or not an incident can be defined as a 
“terrorist attack” is contingent upon the interests of the defining agencies. For 
example, the CCP framed the Urumqi Riots in July 2009 as a “premeditated, organised 
violent crime”, which was “instigated, masterminded and directed by the World 
Uighur Congress headed by Rebiya” (Liao, Xu, and Li 2009); while Rebiya Kadeer 
framed the incident as an initially “peaceful demonstration” that reflected the 
Uyghurs’ long-suppressed anger and frustration with regard to the CCP (Kadeer 2009). 
The former narrative prevails in the Chinese media, while the latter gained some 
popularity outside of China. Labelling the incident as a terrorist attack allowed the CCP 
to justify putting the World Uyghur Congress on its counter-terrorism agenda. 
Combining the ensuing Special Action against Online Terrorist Audio and Video and 
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the Great Firewall3 to defend China’s “cyber sovereignty”, the CCP has created an 
environment in which the public has little access to alternative accounts provided by 
its opponents. In doing so, the CCP has been able to justify to its domestic audiences 
the use of extraordinary measures to reduce the alleged threat posed by the 
separatist movements against the stability of the regime.  
The position of the state is replicated in Chinese academia. The close ties between 
academia and the state in China prevent the latter from engaging in a discussion that 
might potentially be seen as hostile by government officials. Due to the self-alignment 
with the party line, Chinese scholars seldom challenge the state definition of terrorism. 
Even those who set out to re-examine the definition of terrorism do not go as far as to 
challenge the designation of the “East Turkistan forces” as terrorists (Mo and Ye 2005; 
Zhanjun Li 2003). The scholarly works written in the Chinese language are largely 
prescriptive based on the established assumption that the “East Turkistan” separatist 
forces are terrorists (Jie Zhang 2005; G. Pan 2004; Benxian Li and Mei 2015). Scholars’ 
self-alignment with the Party line makes Chinese scholarship on terrorism a good 
example of Robert Cox’s “problem solving theory” (Cox 1981, 129). They take the 
situation as they find it, and work to make the established relationships and 
institutions work smoothly by offering specific suggestions on how to deal with 
“terrorism” without considering the underlying political implications of labelling.  
The unsolved problems with the definition affect terrorism designation. The latter 
translates an intangible discourse of terrorism into documents that have legal 
ramifications. As the following chapter will demonstrate, China adopts a “double-track” 
system of terrorism designation which relies on the executive more heavily than the 
judiciary. The flexibility that the Anti-Terrorism Law provides to the executive is a 
typical example of the malleable nature of the concept of terrorism, and the ways in 
which it is used to suit the political agenda of the defining agency.  
This thesis acknowledges the complicatedness of the definition of terrorism and 
explore the concept of terrorism not as a given fact, but as a rhetorical device, a label 
that ascribes right or wrong, an instrument that reinforces or shifts the existing 
boundary between “friends” and “enemies”. This assumption allows the researcher to 
examine China’s counter-terrorism approach in its quest for legitimacy and historical 
continuities. It reveals the commonality among states in politicising the discourse of 
terrorism, and the distinctive ways in which China embeds the discourse of terrorism 
in its quest for legitimacy and historical continuities.  
                                                      
3 The Great Firewall of China combines a series of legislative actions and technologies to 
strengthen control over public opinions online within China.  
 
 
 
 
24 
2.1.2 Critical Terrorism Studies 
This thesis draws on Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) to examine the existing power 
relations embedded within the Chinese discourse on terrorism. The criticisms of CTS in 
regard to what it calls the “orthodox terrorism studies” offer some useful insights to 
uncover the interaction between the ways in which terrorism is framed in official and 
academic settings and the security agenda of the CCP. Terrorism-related information 
in the official and academic discourse is carefully selected and organised to represent 
a reality that is conducive to the CCP maintaining political stability. Although some of 
CTS’s claims are described as “overstated” (Horgan and Boyle 2008), the series of 
critiques offered by the CTS can help examine the status of the terrorism research 
field in the context of China’s counter-terrorism discourse, policy and practice.  
Richard Jackson (2007) lays out four main critiques of what he and other CTS scholars 
call “orthodox terrorism studies” (Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning 2009, 1). First, there is 
a series of methodological and analytical shortcomings in the traditional terrorism 
studies (Jackson 2007). Some of these shortcomings are particularly pertinent to the 
study of terrorism in China. The over-reliance on secondary data, as Zulaika and 
Douglass (1996, 149–50) and Silke (2004) point out, is also prevalent in the Chinese 
scholarship. The wording and information regarding terrorist individuals and 
organisations in the academic literature can be traced to official documents, such as 
“‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity” (State Council 
Information Office 2002a) and the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, 
Separatism and Extremism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China 2001). Relevant research is highly repetitive; the same body of historical 
research is used as the source for the analysis of the historical roots of the violence in 
Xinjiang (Xiaoxiao Liu 2004; W. Xie and Wang 2002; Yuemin and Lifang 2004; Bin Xu 
and Pu 2002). Only a few scholarly works involve actual primary research. An example 
is a Doctoral thesis on the Islamic movement in China (W. Yan 2006). Several Chinese 
scholars indicated to the researcher that there might be a large number of studies 
conducted by researchers at several counter-terrorism research centres across China, 
but most of that research is not open to the public due to the confidentiality of the 
primary data they have accessed. This observation was further confirmed in an 
interview with two researchers at the Peking University and the Counter-terrorism 
Research Centre at the Northwest University of Political Science and Law.  
In this thesis the researcher did not seek to access classified information on counter-
terrorism. Instead, publicly available information was used as the primary data with 
which to examine China’s counter-terrorism discourse, policy and practice. Because a 
discourse must be conveyed to the public in order to serve its political purpose, the 
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lack of classified information does not constitute an impediment to the understanding 
of the discourse.  
Second, according to Jackson (2007, 245), the traditional approach to terrorism 
studies is limited by state-centric priorities. Such priorities result from the root of 
terrorism research in traditional security studies and counter-insurgency studies, 
where there is an established paradigm to study the nature and causes of political 
violence, and the response of the state. In this paradigm, “knowledge” is little more 
than a reproduction of the discourse of “terrorism” made up of myths (Jackson 2007, 
245). Some of these myths, as summarised by Stohl (2008), are highly relevant to the 
study of terrorism in China. The terrorism discourse in China assumes that political 
violence in Xinjiang is the activity of non-governmental actors. Terrorists are “evil” 
criminals. All terrorist attacks involve support from “external hostile forces”. The 
myths about terrorism in China and its ties to external supporters are rooted in its 
quest for legitimacy and historical continuities, as the following chapters will 
demonstrate. The ties between domestic terrorism and external supporters are not 
entirely imagined given the incapability of domestic individuals to launch attacks due 
to the stringent social control. However, it is difficult to convince those who do not 
live in China that the real threat is caused by others. As Debata (2010) points out, 
considering the increasingly important role that China plays in the international 
community, very few countries would be willing to confront China in regard to its 
internal affairs. Upon critical examination of these myths, this thesis highlights the 
affinity between the “knowledge” of terrorism and the official terrorism discourse in 
China. The cases of religious and education policy in Chapter 5 demonstrate how the 
reproduction of the terrorism discourse in academia in turn feeds into policy-making.  
Third, Jackson (2007, 245) points out that the boundary between the scholarship and 
state-linked policy studies is blurred due to the close ties between the terrorism 
researchers and state institutions. This criticism is particularly pertinent when 
studying China’s counter-terrorism approach. All of the counter-terrorism research 
centres in China are affiliated with public universities, which are funded by the state. 
One of the major think tanks, the China Institute of International Studies, is under the 
direct leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As discussed earlier, the official 
position on the “East Turkistan forces” is often replicated in scholarly works published 
in China. Because of the alignment with the official position, scholars take the state’s 
terrorism designation for granted, and seldom question the political context from 
which the separatist sentiments emerged. Some scholars treat “East Turkistan forces” 
as if this grouping were self-evident, requiring no further efforts to discern “terrorism” 
from separatism (see Yuemin and Lifang 2004; Xuewu Liu 2013). As Schmid and 
Jongman (1988, 1) suggest, the “we-know-it-when-we-see-it” attitude of many 
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authors could easily lead to double standards, which feed into bad science and bad 
policies. In China, the close ties between academics and the state have resulted in a 
bias among Chinese scholars; they avoid some key issues related to the negative 
impact of counter-terrorism measures and, in doing so, they avoid challenging the 
legitimacy of China’s counter-terrorism policy. Considering the implications of 
scholarship on the legitimacy of these state policies, many Chinese scholars tend to 
replicate the state discourse of terrorism, portraying China as an innocent victim of 
terrorism, and avoid framing the CCP or its policy as escalating factors for ethnic 
tensions (see W. Xie and Wang 2002; Yuemin and Lifang 2004; Bin Xu and Pu 2002).  
Fourth, borrowing Robert Cox’s criticism of “problem-solving theory”, Jackson (2007, 
245) questions the ways in which traditional terrorism studies treat the hierarchies 
and operation of power that are implicated in the “problem” of terrorism. CTS thus 
advocates the challenge against the status quo that contributes to the “problem of 
terrorism” (Gunning 2007, 370). Like early terrorism research in the West, relevant 
studies in China are highly policy-oriented. The self-alignment and self-censorship limit 
these studies so that they function to reinforce the existing power relations. In doing 
so, the academic discourse follows the official discourse in ignoring the historical 
processes that produced the “problem” of terrorism and simply proposes solutions 
that would smoothen the “existing relationships and institutions”. 
This thesis uses CTS as a lens through which to examine the existing power relations in 
the discourse of terrorism in China. However, as Horgan and Boyle (2008), Lutz (2010) 
and Heath-Kelly (2010) point out, CTS is not without limitations. According to Horgan 
and Boyle (2008, 52) in setting up the “orthodox terrorism studies” as a “straw man”, 
CTS “creates just the kind of dualism that critical theory was designed to challenge”. 
Heath-Kelly (2010, 245) echoes this argument, and states that the declaration of an 
explicit normative function for reason of a particular theory does not make itself 
better than a non-explicit one, if one was to conduct “value-free” research. According 
to her (2010, 235), the “pearl fishing” method is flawed in the sense that “a section of 
a philosophical position is appropriated without regard for the whole”. Projecting a 
normative vis-à-vis “problem-solving” dichotomy per se goes against the critical 
commitment to conduct value-free research (Heath-Kelly 2010). 
Furthermore, narrowly depicting terrorism studies as a monolithic body of uncritical 
literature risks losing sight of alternative approaches outside the mainstream journals 
(Horgan and Boyle 2008, 55). Lutz (2010, 33) adds that CTS’s claims against the lack of 
attention to state violence is unfounded and lists a number of studies on repressive 
governments. Many established scholars have gone to great lengths to engage in the 
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definitional debates and take issue with “non-critical” approaches to terrorism (Baker-
Beall, Heath-Kelly, and Jarvis 2015, 3). 
Critical Terrorism Studies have undergone a series of critical reflections and 
developments and have become increasingly robust in their claims and diverse in their 
scope. The special issue regarding the practice, limits and experience of critical 
terrorism studies stands as evidence of this trend (Heath-Kelly, Jarvis, and Baker-Beall 
2014; Jackson et al. 2018).  
Employing CTS does not mean that this thesis dismisses the rest as “uncritical” just 
because mainstream terrorism scholars are not necessarily using the language of 
critical theories, but rather because the questions CTS scholars have posed are 
particularly relevant to terrorism studies in China. Taking the criticisms of CTS into 
consideration, this research does not dismiss the existing mainstream terrorism 
research entirely, simply because of a lack of explicit normative commitment.  
2.1.3 Legitimacy, regime type and terrorism 
The concept of legitimacy is closely associated with regime type. Würtenberger (1982, 
680-81, cited in Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017, 2) defines legitimacy as “a form of 
political rule that was justified by the absence of despotism and tyranny and was, 
instead, characterized by the rule of law”. According to this narrow definition, 
legitimacy is not a proper concept when discussing a non-democratic regime due to 
the lack of rule of law.   
However, many studies have shown that non-democratic regimes do, and use various 
tactics to establish and maintain legitimacy. Examining Central Asian countries, Schatz 
(2006, 268-9) argues that “claims to legitimacy establish plausible … links between 
ruler and ruled”. Regardless of the regime type, no ruler would refuse what legitimate 
rule brings: enhanced order, stability, and effectiveness (Beetham 1991, 25-37). 
Legitimacy, together with repression and co-optation, sustain autocratic rule 
(Gerschewski 2013). Legitimacy is particularly important, as the CCP is transforming 
itself from a revolutionary force into a ruling party, and the extreme friend/enemy 
distinction during the revolutionary era is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the 
public today.  
Regime type does not make a considerable difference to whether or not a state 
pursues legitimacy. However, it does play a role in how a state is influenced by, and 
respond to terrorism. The debate on the relationship between regime type and 
terrorism has generated a substantial amount of academic work. Scholars disagree on 
whether democracy encourages or constrains terrorism. Eyerman (1998) divides the 
scholarship into the “strategic school” and the “political access school”. The former 
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contends that the higher level of freedom in democracies lowers the cost of violence, 
thus exposing democracies more to potential attacks. The latter argues that the 
opportunities of political participation that democracies provide offer peaceful 
alternatives to express political grievances, reducing the likelihood that discontented 
groups will resort to violence.  
Schmid (1992, 18–20) summarises several weaknesses of democratic regimes in 
dealing with terrorism. First, freedom of movement allows immigrants and political 
refugees to mobilise international terrorism from abroad. Second, it is more difficult 
to convince the public to accept the trade-off between civil liberties and state 
security, which creates obstacles for intelligence collection. Third, the counter-value 
nature of terrorists means that open societies provide an abundance of targets. 
Fourth, legal constraints make it difficult for a democratic government to prosecute an 
individual without solid proof.  
In contrast, authoritarian governments are less constrained by these democratic 
values (Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 420). According to Pape (2003, 350), authoritarian 
police states are less restrained in curtailing civil liberties, making it more difficult for 
suicide attacks to be organised or gain publicity. Crenshaw (1981) and Eubank and 
Weinberg (1994) suggest that the lack of legal norms and complex institutions in non-
democracies allows for relatively more efficient counter-terrorist measures. As 
totalitarian regimes are not under pressure to follow the due process and 
demonstrate procedural justice, they are less restrained in terms of using extreme 
measures. In extreme cases, with the monopoly of armed forces, totalitarian regimes 
can effectively use state terror to exert control and persecute political enemies 
(Wilkinson 2001, 17). As Lutz and Lutz (2010, 63) illustrate, totalitarian regimes have a 
record of eliminating dissidents abroad, as is evident from Nazi Germany and the KGB 
in the Soviet Union. 
Although empirical research (Gurr 2003, 202; A. P. Schmid 1992; Laqueur 2001, 122) 
demonstrates a generally positive correlation between the level of freedom and 
terrorist incidents, it would be an over-simplification to suggest a causal link between 
regime type and terrorism, regardless of other factors. Wilson and Piazza (2013, 941) 
argue that whether a certain regime type is more prone to terrorism is contingent on 
“complex institutional differences that go beyond the democracy-autocracy divide”. 
Indeed, non-regime factors cannot be ignored in understanding the causes of 
terrorism. Savun and Phillips (2009) argue that it is the type of foreign policy 
democracies tend to pursue that makes them vulnerable to transnational terrorism. 
Ogden (2005, 247) argues that it is not authoritarianism per se, but poor governance, 
that has led to the aggravation of the grievances of the Uyghurs. 
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China seems to be particularly resilient to democratisation, according to Andrew J. 
Nathan (2003), due to its succession mechanism, meritocratic considerations that 
balance factional considerations in promotions, evolution towards the separation of 
the responsibilities and spheres of authority between the Party and government, and 
ability to rehabilitate its legitimacy. However, the four aspects that Nathan discusses 
have changed dramatically during President Xi Jinping’s terms in office. First, the CCP 
has amended the Chinese Constitution to remove the term limits (Griffiths and 
Schwarz 2018), and its increasingly firm grip on power makes it less likely that we will 
see a peaceful succession to the next generation of leaders. Second, Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign rewrote the rules of Chinese politics (The Economist 2015a). As 
many observers (Fiol-Mahon 2018; Schmitz 2017; Skidmore 2017) argue, Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign, aimed at removing his political rivals, has reshaped factional 
politics, and brought factional considerations back to the forefront. Third, the 
institutional restructuring in 2018 (Xinhua 2017; Xinhua 2018a) signals a regression of 
institutional differentiation. Although the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law indicated 
some attempt to accord power to the judiciary, the executive remains dominant in the 
designation, evidence collection, and rehabilitation processes in counter-terrorism 
practice. Fourth, terrorism can erode legitimacy and trust within a democracy 
(Crelinsten 1989), but what is the impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism on 
legitimacy in an authoritarian regime like China? How does the CCP rehabilitate its 
legitimacy in the face of heavy-handed counter-terrorism policy and practice?   
This thesis contributes to the broader enquiry in regard to how authoritarian regimes 
respond to terrorism. While some believes that authoritarian regimes “differ from 
each other as much as they differ from democracy” (Geddes 1999, 121), others see 
commonalities among these regimes in regard to their legitimation mechanisms. 
Dukalskis and Gerschewski (2017, 3) have distilled four legitimation mechanisms, 
namely, indoctrination, performance, passivity, and democratic-procedural.  
Examining the links between China’s counter-terrorism approach and its quest for 
legitimacy and historical continuities, this thesis demonstrates similarities and 
differences between China and liberal democracies. The CCP shares the concerns for 
the legitimacy of its approach to terrorism, and it seeks to legitimise it through a 
number of tactics that have been studied by scholars, such as Gerschewski and 
Dukalskis, as typically non-democratic.  
To maintain stability and sustain the CCP’s rule, three processes, as identified by 
Gerschewski (2013), can be seen from China’s counter-terrorism discourse, policy and 
practice, namely, legitimation, repression, and co-optation. The framing of terrorism-
related incidents is built upon an array of ready-made assumptions that originated 
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from the narratives of the Century of Humiliation, which serve to establish and 
maintain the legitimacy of China’s security agenda, which prioritises national unity, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The Strike Hard campaign, as well as the 
restrictions put on education, religion, and ideology, serves to repress activities, ideas 
and views that are deemed “wrong”. The increase of ethnic minorities in the political 
system4 and the engagement with community members – mainly seen in the 
mobilisation of the “patriotic believers”, “opinion leaders”, and “cultural workers” – 
reflect the CCP’s attempt to tie relevant actors to the Party and facilitate frame 
alignment among the Uyghurs through the voice from within.  
To legitimise its approach to terrorism, the CCP has employed various tactics, which 
can be categorised according to Dukalskis and Gerschewski’s (2017) analysis of four 
legitimation mechanisms. Indoctrination, which is evident from the important role of 
the Department of Propaganda, has always been ingrained in China’s contemporary 
politics. Since the reform and opening up era, the CCP’s legitimacy has been sustained 
by a hidden social contract whereby individuals give up part of their freedom in 
exchange for rapid economic growth. The latter has also enabled the CCP to 
demobilise the population so that they do not challenge the regime’s goals. Moreover, 
the regime is under pressure to persuade its citizens that it is at least making efforts to 
respect democratic procedures.  
This thesis highlights the CCP’s struggle to seek to establish a counter-terrorism 
strategy that by and large respects democratic procedures. First, the revision of the 
definition of terrorism shows, albeit very limited, attempts to live up to the 
commitment to freedom of expression. Second, the revised Anti-Terrorism Law gave 
power to the judiciary to designate terrorist individuals and organisations, which 
indicated some concern for due process and procedural justice. However, the power 
of the executive is still not constrained, and the terrorism designation process is still 
problematic, with very little support for the reviewing and delisting process. Without 
an independent body to examine the designation issued by the State Counter-
terrorism Leading Organ, the current designation mechanism still leaves the door 
open for power abuse. These factors show that China’s counter-terrorism approach is 
constrained by authoritarian characteristics such as highly concentrated power, 
limited freedom, and a general lack of due process, even though there have been 
some efforts to resist these characteristics. 
                                                      
4 According to the White Paper “Human Rights in Xinjiang – Development and Progress” 
(2017), the number of ethnic minority officials in Xinjiang increased from about 3,000 in 
1950 to 91,076 in 2016 which accounts for 40 % of the population at the time.  
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This thesis also highlights the coexistence of the four legitimation mechanisms that 
Dukalskis and Gerschewski (2017, 3) have identified – the regime did not abandon 
indoctrination when China’s rapid economic growth allowed it to do so, although it 
arguably has relied much less on the friend/enemy distinction as a source of 
legitimacy.  
Moreover, this thesis further explores the politicisation of the past and the use of 
history as a source of legitimacy. As Lary (2008, 131) observes, the Chinese 
government has always considered the past as a key factor that provides the CCP’s 
right to rule. Compiling an official version of histories is a national project 
underwritten by the political considerations of gaining legitimacy by presenting the 
“correct” version of history. The history of Xinjiang is an example where the 
manipulation of history is obviously geared towards establishing the CCP’s right to rule. 
Section 4.3 demonstrates how the official history of Xinjiang has been controlled by 
the CCP, how the alternative accounts of the past have been labelled “nihilism”, and 
how it functions as a propaganda tool to support the CCP’s claims about the nature of 
terrorism in Xinjiang.  
2.1.4 Responses to terrorism 
This thesis focuses on the state response to terrorism. Having laid out some basic 
issues surrounding the conceptualisation of terrorism in China, this section will discuss 
two aspects of the state’s response – hard vs. soft approaches and (de-)radicalisation.  
A horizontal comparison between the liberal/democratic model of counter-terrorism 
and China’s approach reveals some similarities. Among others, they share the concern 
to justify their counter-terrorism policy. A democratic government is expected to 
justify its counter-terrorism strategy to its citizens. If a counter-terrorism policy is 
counter-productive or does not do justice to the money spent on defending the state 
from terrorist threats, the legitimacy of the government will be thrown into crisis. The 
government will then be held accountable for its failure to ensure security. Therefore, 
it is important that a democratic government is able to justify its counter-terrorism 
policy.  
Similarly, in China, political elites are aware of the need to maintain public support as 
a source of legitimacy. As the following chapters will demonstrate, the CCP has 
developed a series of ready-made narratives, assumptions and labels to be used in its 
counter-terrorism propaganda.5 However, China’s approach shows some limitations. 
As a single-party state, China does not need to compete with alternative accounts of 
incidents. Indeed, the CCP has closed the door to competing narratives by deploying 
                                                      
55 counter-terrorism propaganda: 反恐宣传 
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the Great Firewall and the concept of cyber sovereignty. Therefore, its counter-
terrorism propaganda is hardly convincing, especially from the perspective of those 
outside China. As the only legitimate voice, the CCP is relying on government officials 
from within and self-aligned scholars to identify problems. As a result, its counter-
terrorism propaganda is inevitably outdated, despite some developments, which will 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
This section focuses on the research on the responses to terrorism in the English-
language scholarship. The Chinese-language scholarship does provide some 
recommendations on improving the human rights standards in counter-terrorism, but 
such a discussions usually refer to the human rights violations of countries such as the 
US and the UK (see Fei Zhao and Zhao 2006; A. Liu 2010). Some scholars (Tuerxun 
2014) discuss the human rights violations of the “terrorists” and frame the Chinese 
counter-terrorism strategy as the protector of human rights. Very few scholars 
challenge the human rights standard of the counter-terrorism measures in China 
directly, with some exceptions (X. Yu 2014; S. Yin 2008) which offer some mild 
criticism. Based on the assumption that the American understanding of human rights 
from a bourgeoisie perspective and the Chinese understanding of human rights from a 
Marxist perspective are incompatible, Pan and Tian (2002) argue that the essence of 
the human rights issues is the intervention of the US in other countries’ internal affairs.  
2.1.4.1 Hard vs. soft approach 
When examining a state’s response to terrorism, it is useful to categorise it into hard 
and soft approaches. A counter-terrorism strategy can be seen as a combination of 
hard and soft approaches. According to Rineheart (2010, 37), the hard approach – in 
other words, the war model or military model – deals with terrorism as a form of 
enemy-centric war, conducted mainly by the armed forces of a state, involving 
primarily offensive tactics, methods such as special forces operations, increased 
policing and intelligence operations. The soft approach, or the criminal justice model, 
provides a framework, preferably underpinned by the rule of law and democratic 
values, for the government to deal with terrorism, which usually involves population-
centric methods, including efforts towards capacity building, economic development 
and counter-radicalisation (Rineheart 2010, 37). Rineheart also points out the 
limitations of each approach. The hard approach is more straightforward, but it is also 
more likely to violate human rights and the rule of law, whereas the soft approach is 
less aggressive, but little evidence can be found to show that it is really addressing the 
root causes of terrorism. The 9/11 attacks prompted many states to treat terrorism as 
a matter of emergency and an exceptional threat that requires a militarised strategy in 
addition to the criminal justice model (see Hocking 2003, 358). The clandestine nature 
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of terrorism makes it particularly difficult to collect information and present it as 
admissible evidence in court.  
The negative impact of the hard approach has been discussed in great detail. Many 
scholars have repeatedly addressed the ineffective and counter-productive aspects of 
force-based counter-terrorism approaches (Jackson, Jarvis, et al. 2011, 232). The over-
use of force can potentially alienate local populations and in turn feed into the 
recruitment of terrorist groups (Jones and Libicki 2008, xvii). What is euphemistically 
called “collateral damage” may “erode sympathy among decisive populations”, and 
tends to validate terrorists’ critical claims about the government (Burleigh, 2008 pp. 
114–15, cited in English, 2009a p. 129). The erosion of human rights standards 
through the hard approach is seen in many liberal democracies (Crelinsten 2009; 
English 2009a, 102). It is difficult to strike the right balance between civil liberty and 
state security when the government needs to separate terrorist targets from the 
general population based on limited means of discrimination relating to how they are 
defined (race, age, religion, and nationality and so on). The efforts to profile terrorists, 
particularly in terms of their religion and ethnicity, has “diminished due process 
standards”, “enhanced interrogation techniques”, and solidified the already 
entrenched distrust among the decisive populations who might otherwise provide 
useful information for law enforcement (Adams, Nordhaus, and Shellenberger 2011, 
5). Without respect for the rule of law, the war on terror risks losing the moral high 
ground by undermining “the very value that it presumes to protect” (Hoffman 2004, 
932). 
Some elements of the Chinese counter-terrorism strategy are clearly in line with a 
“war model”. To start with, the Chinese response to terrorist threats is branded the 
“people’s war on terror” (C. Zhang 2014a), and portrays terrorists as “panic-stricken 
rats” (Xinhua 2014b).6 By mobilising the people into its war on terror, the CCP seeks to 
gain public support for heavy-handed crackdowns and to downplay the potential 
erosion of human rights violations. The war narratives also justify the draconian 
“Strike Hard” campaign. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), a 
local semi-military organisation, and the People’s Armed Police were involved in 
stability maintenance during the campaign (Pokalova 2013a, 286). The institutional 
restructuring in 2018 has placed the Armed Police Force under the control of the 
Central Military Commission7 (Xinhua 2017), indicating that stability maintenance in 
China has been further militarised.  
                                                      
6 people’s war on terror: 反恐的人民战争 
7 Before 2018, the Armed Police Force was under duel leadership of the State Council and the 
Central Military Commission. 
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The soft approach also causes concerns over the balance between civil liberty and 
state security. On the one hand, the erosion of civil liberty does not necessarily benefit 
counter-terrorism practice. Taking an example of counter-terrorism in the US, the 
expanded investigative and surveillance powers in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 
have made it harder for security agencies to gather useful intelligence (Adams, 
Nordhaus, and Shellenberger 2011, 5). On the other hand, the curtailment of civil 
liberties may have a negative impact. Long-term repressive measures may undermine 
the credibility of a government, and intensify the division between political parties. In 
the UK, for example, the ways in which terrorism and radicalisation have been linked 
to the idea of identity, integration, segregation and multiculturalism have led to 
biased judgements against Muslim youth (Lynch 2013, 241).  
Some governments focus on social cohesion as part of their soft approach, as 
evidence (Wiktorowicz 2005) shows that discrimination against, and social and 
political marginalisation of Muslims can be used as a propaganda tool to mobilise 
Muslims in Western Europe. The ways in which the discourse of social cohesion 
overlaps with the discourse of terrorism may result in jeopardising the credibility of 
the officials who deal with social cohesion (Wiktorowicz 2005). After the 9/11 attacks 
and the 7/7 bombings, new counter-terrorism policies were quickly introduced (Alam 
and Husband 2012, 137). The xenophobic and racist sentiments accompanying far-
right movements exacerbate the tensions against Muslims caused by the profiling of 
terrorists along ethnic and religious lines. In this context, the commitment of Muslims 
to their culture and identity might become a source of a wider anxiety in societies that 
value multicultural openness (Alam and Husband 2012, 142). 
The central government in the UK has developed a community cohesion policy 
focused on the Muslims population of Britain (Alam and Husband 2012, 136). The 
interactive ways in which these two distinct policies have been implemented have 
been criticised by Alam and Husband (2012, 138) for creating a climate in which British 
Muslims were exposed to a “public level of scrutiny and hostility” in the context of 
post-attacks anti-Muslim sentiment. According to Abbas (2007, 287), the 
implementation of the anti-terrorism legislation has intensified the Islamophobia in 
British society.  
It can be seen, therefore, that even the policies designed to promote cohesion can 
have a negative impact, as they highlighted the Self/Other dichotomy in British society, 
emphasised the differences of the Others and revealed an underlying intolerance for 
the Others who live and act differently (Alam and Husband 2012, 153). When such 
differences of Others became perceived as alien to British society, policy-makers 
considered it necessary to carry out measures to “aid their social cohesion into the 
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fabric of society as a whole” (Alam and Husband 2012, 153). Moreover, the de-
radicalisation programmes PREVENT and CHANNEL have been questioned for their 
narratives, which may lead to the criminalisation of many Muslims in the UK (Qureshi 
2015, 181).  
“Soft” measures to curb domestic radicalisation and terrorism may result in the 
alienation of certain groups, according to some scholars. The discrimination, 
repression, stigmatisation and alienation directed at certain groups may even bolster 
terrorist narratives (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011, v). Some scholars use the notion of 
“suspect community” when discussing the communities that tend to be the focus of 
national counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation programmes. The term was coined by 
Hillyard (1993) to refer to Irish Catholics who were specifically targeted for state 
surveillance. Pantazis and Pemberton (2009, 646) developed the notion in the context 
of the post-9/11 “war on terror”, arguing that UK legal and political developments had 
designated Muslims as the “enemy within” and facilitated the construction of Muslims 
as a “suspect community”. Although the notion itself is criticised as a fallacy of 
composition – using the experience of some Muslims to talk about the treatment of 
the entire Muslim community (Greer 2010, 1177) – it does raise awareness of the 
potential negative impact on social cohesion in a multi-ethnic state.  
The discourse of terrorism can also be seen as part of the soft approach – the 
construction of a series of assumptions, narratives and labels to serve the counter-
terrorism agenda of a country. In order to justify the legitimacy of counter-terrorism 
policies, a discourse that demonises terrorism might lead to the creation of its own 
reality. Zulaika and Douglass’s (J. Zulaika and Douglass 2009; J. Zulaika 2003) writings 
detail how the discourse of terrorism, which is filled with an imagined description of 
monstrous violence, and sometimes baseless threats, creates the very reality that it 
sets out to eliminate. The discursive construction of such imaginary monsters leads to 
a change in the perception of the policy-makers, and thus the counter-terrorism 
policies could potentially foster more terrorism (J. Zulaika 2003, 195). 
Such a constructed discourse can provoke the state into overreacting, which is the 
very aim that terrorist groups seek to achieve. Provocation has been studied as a 
“classic, well-established strategy of terrorism, but it is frequently ignored by 
governments in the heat of the moment”. A government can be induced to respond 
with indiscriminate repression against the population, which may lead to further 
radicalisation of the population in question (Kydd 2006, 51). The over-reaction of the 
state may feed into the framing of the status quo as a contestation between the 
“aggressive and guilty” state and the “defensive and innocent” operatives by terrorist 
groups.  
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In China, a number of policies can be linked explicitly or implicitly to the counter-
terrorism strategy. As the CCP adopts a developmental approach to security, its 
security policy is closely intertwined with its development policy, and the link between 
the two is often seen as self-evident, requiring no further illumination. This results in a 
gap in relation to how the Chinese government links counter-terrorism with 
development policy. Chapter 5 will elaborate the conflation of the development and 
security agendas in the Chinese counter-terrorism strategy in more detail. Due to such 
a conflation, the boundary between hard and soft approaches in China is not always 
clear. Despite the lack of an explicit link between the security agenda and 
development policies, some of these policies clearly fall into the category of the soft 
approach to counter-terrorism. A focus only on the hard approach, such as the Strike 
Hard Campaign, leads to an impartial assessment of the overall counter-terrorism 
strategy. In the Chinese political context, policies on development, religion, education, 
integration, employment also contribute greatly to stability maintenance and the 
justification of the counter-terrorism rationale. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, these 
policies are designed to improve social cohesion by tackling the roots of socio-
economic grievances, but their implementation does not always do justice to the 
intensions. Although little evidence is found to suggest a direct link between these 
policies and the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism strategy, the omission of these 
policies may lead to a partial understanding of Chinese counter-terrorism strategy. 
Without efforts to improve the socio-economic conditions for the Uyghurs, the Strike 
Hard campaign would have pushed the level of discontent to a point where the loss of 
control over Xinjiang became inevitable. Therefore, development policy plays an 
important role in tempering the heavy-handed hard approach to keep the counter-
terrorism strategy from falling apart. 
As Rineheart (2010, 38) points out, the state seldom functions according to a single 
model. A counter-terrorism strategy is always a combination of both hard and soft 
approaches. The categorisation of hard and soft approaches is helpful in linking the 
rationale for China’s counter-terrorism with Mao’s two types of contradictions – the 
“contradictions among the people” can be treated with a soft approach as persuasion 
and education, while the “contradictions between ourselves and the enemy” should 
be treated with a hard approach such as coercion (Z. Mao 1957, 1949). This explains 
the rationale for differentiating between counter-terrorism propaganda and the 
“Strike Hard” campaign.  
It is worth noting that the “soft approach” used by Chinese government officials does 
not necessarily fall into Rineheart’s categorisation. For example, the governance of 
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Xinjiang under Zhang Chunxian, the then Party Secretary of Xinjiang, was branded a 
“soft approach” (W. Wang 2010).8 The relatively “soft” measures are referred to in 
contrast to the more draconian control in Xinjiang in the aftermath of the 2009 
Urumqi Riots under Wang Lequan. However, Zhang’s resolute repression of terrorists 
and his method of the people’s war (People’s Daily Online 2014a) are not 
fundamentally different from Wang’s approach as both officials prioritised state 
security and emphasised collective political stability.  
2.1.4.2 Radicalisation and de-radicalisation 
Radicalisation has been studied in great detail and depth. It is defined as “the social 
and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist 
political or religious ideology” (Horgan 2009, 152). It also refers to the personal 
process through which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious 
ideals and aspirations that justify the use of indiscriminate violence (Wilner and 
Dubouloz 2010, 31; Randy Borum 2011a). 
Some scholars question the very existence of the phenomenon known as 
“radicalisation” (Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2009; Furedi 2009). As the definition of 
“terrorism” itself is problematic, as discussed in the Section 2.1.1, the pathway 
towards “terrorism”, which is contingent upon how one defines it, inherits the same 
problems. “Radicalisation” is, therefore, a controversial term, the meaning of which 
varies among different people (A. Schmid 2004, 375; Randy Borum 2011a). The 
academic activities in the five years after the London bombings offered no “consistent 
notion of what is meant by ‘radicalization’” (A. Richards 2011, 143). Heath-Kelly (2013, 
397) further challenges the concept of radicalisation by interrogating the process 
through which the radicalisation discourse has emerged and “how it engenders the 
performance of risk governance within British counter-terrorism”. The problem of the 
lack of clarity would not have been so salient, had it not been so intertwined with 
counter-terrorism policy. As Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly, and Jarvis (2015) observe, 
whenever there is a new terrorist attack, the media immediately follows with an 
investigation into how the perpetrators were “radicalised”. The ensuing pressure for 
the government to provide solutions exacerbates the problem of conceptual 
ambiguousness.  
In response to the attempts to dismiss radicalisation as a myth, Neumann (2013, 873) 
argues that the term does have meaning, and that the ambiguity of the term is rooted 
in the conflation of two overlapping notions, “cognitive radicalisation” and 
“behavioural radicalisation”. The disambiguation of the two notions reveals the 
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fundamental problem underwriting many de-radicalisation policies – conflating 
extremist beliefs and extremist behaviours risks undermining the commitment to 
freedom of thought.  
However, it is not easy to draw a clear line between radicalisation as a non-violent 
ideology and radicalisation as violent political behaviour. In order to provide a solution 
to the problem posed by extremist ideology, it is natural to seek to understand the 
mindset of the “enemies” by understanding the ways in which violence is justified as a 
legitimate response (see Habeck, 2006; Borum, 2003). However, focusing on ideology 
alone in preventing radicalisation may result in biased observations regarding the 
pathways to terrorism.  
There have been several attempts to understand the process of radicalisation through 
various analytical models. The following section will discuss some of the attempts to 
conceptualise radicalisation. It can be seen from the following discussion that most of 
the existing analytical models are policy-oriented, aiming at indoctrinating the 
radicalisation process to manageable phases. Although the Chinese de-radicalisation 
policies are not built upon any existing models, the discussion of the latter provides a 
baseline for the study of the former.  
Borum (2003) proposed a four-stage conceptual model to study the “terrorist 
mindset”. This model focuses on the process through which grievances and 
vulnerabilities are transformed into hatred of a target group, before being 
transformed into a justification for violence (R Borum 2003, 7). According to Borum, 
an undesirable event or condition (It’s not right) is identified as being unjust (It’s not 
fair). Then a person or a group is blamed for this injustice (It’s your fault), before the 
injustice is labelled as “evil” (you’re evil). This model was initially published for training 
purposes on the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, and has a visible policy-orientation. 
 
Figure 3 Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset (R Borum 2003, 8; Randy Borum 
2011b, 39) 
The model of Jihadi-Salafi radicalisation proposed by the New York Police 
Department's (NYPD) Intelligence Division is one of the most widely circulated models 
(Randy Borum 2011b). Written for law enforcement practitioners, it presents a 
consistent trajectory of radicalisation in a terse and explanatory style (Hofmann 2012). 
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This model describes the four phases of radicalisation, beginning with the 
environmental and social factors (pre-radicalisation), and then moving on to the self-
identification of individuals with extremist ideology, before further seeking evidence 
to support the individuals’ religious beliefs through indoctrination, and finally reaching 
the last phase, Jihadisation, when the individuals accept their duty to participate in 
jihad and identify themselves as mujahedeen (Mitchell D. Silber and Bhatt 2007).  
 
Figure 4 NYPD Model of Jihadi-Salafi Radicalisation (M. D. Silber and Bhatt 2007) 
Precht (2007) provides a description of the typical radicalisation pattern in a report 
funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice. The four overlapping phases towards 
terrorism are shown in the graph below. Precht’s categorisation of the background 
factors, trigger factors and opportunity factors are particularly relevant to Chinese de-
radicalisation policies. For example, the opportunity factors in the first and second 
phases, according to Precht (2007, 34), include the mosque, internet, school, family 
and prison, sports activities, and friends. Chinese de-radicalisation propaganda is 
present in all of these places. As Chapter 5 will discuss, Chinese scholars believe that 
the number of mosques in China has outgrown the actual religious need of the Muslim 
population, which leads to religious policies that aim at limiting the growth of Islam. 
The de-radicalisation propaganda cultural event the “Little Apple” dancing 
competition is also held in front of a local mosque.  
 
Figure 5 Typical pattern of radicalisation (Precht 2007, 34) 
Veldhuis and Staun (2009, 5–6) point out the selection bias and statistical 
discrimination in the phase models. They propose a more comprehensive model, 
looking at the dynamics at the micro, meso and macro levels. As Chapter 5 will 
demonstrate, at the macro level, in building legitimacy through the narratives of the 
Century of Humiliation, the CCP portrays China as an innocent victim of imperialism 
that continues in the form of peaceful evolution in today’s international relations. The 
assumptions derived from these narratives enable political elites and scholars to 
promote an integration model that prioritises “unity” over diversity. At the meso level, 
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the CCP carries out large-scale development programmes in order to firstly address 
poverty, despite that the inequality between ethnic groups accompanying economic 
growth has worsened ethnic relations. At the micro level, local authorities visit 
individual families under the “Visit, Benefit and Gather” programme (Chapter 6), and 
employ a variety of tactics to keep individual Uyghur students from dropping out 
(Chapter 7).  
 
 
 
Figure 6 Veldhui and Staun’s Root Model (2009, 24) 
As discussed earlier, the issue with many radicalisation policies lie in the conflation of 
“cognitive radicalisation” and “behavioural radicalisation” (Neumann 2013, 873). 
Taking the PREVENT strategy in the UK as an example, its focus on ideology is criticised 
by opponents of the War on Terror (Mohammed and Siddiqui 2013). Mohammed and 
Siddiqui (2013, 6) argue that eliminating an ideology does not prevent politically 
motivated violence, especially when Western policy and occupations are part of the 
key concerns behind the struggle. Borum (2011a, 8) argues that radicalisation as an 
ideology, or in Neumann’s words, “cognitive radicalisation”, should be seen as a part 
of the focus, while the process of how people actually move from the justification of 
violence to violent activities is equally important to combat violent extremism. Similar 
to Neumann, Borum (2011a, 30, 2011c, 2) advocates the differentiation of 
“radicalisation” (as an ideology) and “action pathways”. Both scholars emphasise that 
extremist ideologies do not always lead to engagement in terrorist activities.  
The differentiation between ideology and behaviour is particularly relevant to Chinese 
de-radicalisation policies. The conflation of “cognitive radicalisation” and “behavioural 
radicalisation” is at the core of the debate over China’s Anti-Terrorism Law. The term 
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jiduanhua is the corresponding word for radicalisation in Chinese; it means the 
process by which an individual or a group increasingly identifies with an extremist 
ideology.9 Under Xi Jinping, the government began to re-emphasise the importance of 
ideology to regime security (see CPC News 2013c). Correspondingly, through de-
radicalisation policies, the government attempts to intervene at an early stage of 
radicalisation when individuals start to have access to “terrorist” propaganda 
materials. This is evident from the “Special Action against Online Terrorist Audio and 
Video” in 2014. 10 The intention to incorporate ideological control into the counter-
terrorism strategy is evident in the development of Anti-Terrorism Law (Section 5.4). 
After being widely criticised, in the amended Anti-Terrorism Law, “thoughts” had to 
be deleted as a form of terrorism from its official definition of terrorism. However, 
ideological control is by no means ignored in practice. In fact, it is one of the tactics 
used in the overall counter-terrorism strategy, which will be discussed in Section 6.2.  
2.2 Concepts related to counter-terrorism in China 
The discussion of political violence, development policy and the integration model in 
this section will help to understand the rationale and perception of Chinese political 
elites and scholars. As the following chapters will demonstrate, they attribute the 
causes of unrest in Xinjiang largely to external influences, and to a lesser degree 
underdevelopment. The discussion of political violence provides the foundation for 
understanding the exaggeration of external factors and the omission of domestic 
factors in the counter-terrorism discourse.  
The exploration of development policy highlights the CCP’s developmental approach 
to security. It highlights the complexity of the problem of counter-terrorism in terms 
of the relationship between development and stability. The example of migration and 
birth control policies demonstrates that the divergence of views on the relationship 
between development and ethnic tensions has led the CCP to adopt its current 
approach to counter-terrorism. It also underscores the necessity of viewing 
development policy as part of China’s overall counter-terrorism approach.  
The introduction of the concept of the integration model in examining China’s 
counter-terrorism approach brings a new perspective based on counter-terrorism 
studies in the West. Drawing a parallel with multiculturalism in the UK, it highlights 
the gap in understanding China’s approach to the relationship between the 
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42 
integration model and the counter-terrorism rationale. It paves the way for the 
analysis of the concept of “unity” in the following chapters.  
2.2.1 Political violence in Xinjiang 
The ineluctable binary opposition between the academic works produced by scholars 
in mainland China and those who are working outside China creates obstacles to 
understanding political violence in Xinjiang. At the same time, it provides useful 
information for examining the underlying ideological and political considerations in 
which the counter-terrorism discourse is embedded. As can be seen from the 
discussion in Section 2.1.2, scholars’ ties with the political circles have a more visible 
impact on the research conducted by Chinese scholars, as is evident from the absence 
of some sensitive topics such as human rights. This section, therefore, draws mainly 
on the research conducted by those working outside China. Most of these scholars are 
from the US, Australia, the UK or other European countries, and they are usually 
considered as parts of the monolithic “West” by the CCP. In the eyes of the Chinese 
officials and academics, those scholars build their research on “Western” values, and 
is inevitably a reproduction of the hegemonic pursuit of the “West” (Q. Wu 2017; B. 
Chen 2015). This is what Chinese scholars call “discourse hegemony” (B. Chen 2015).11 
In attempting to resist this discourse hegemony, the Chinese-language scholarship 
often has a different focus, using different sources and approaches that are 
underwritten by its quest for legitimacy. Therefore, the Chinese-language scholarship 
will be examined as part of the data to trace its roots in China’s political history, while 
the English language scholarship will be used as a reference point for the discussion in 
the following chapters.  
Political violence was ongoing long before the discourse of terrorism was adopted to 
describe the political unrest in Xinjiang. Continuous tensions were caused by the 
competition for control, clashes between religion and the state, and the clash 
between the traditional Han culture and Muslim culture, which was compounded by 
political movements during the Cultural Revolution and the influence of the Soviet 
Union, as well as the more recent Islamist-inspired extremist ideology (Becquelin 
2000; Shichor 1994; J. a Millward 2004; Clarke 2010).  
Although separatist sentiment existed throughout the history of Xinjiang, it did not 
turned violent until after 1986 (Bhattacharya 2003, 373). After the founding of the 
PRC, and during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution that followed, 
radical communist policies have generated fear and anger and undermined the 
economic structured across China. In the following Reform and Opening-Up era, a 
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series of relatively relaxed religious policies were implemented, giving rise to a 
massive religious revival (Lambert 2001, 122). Despite the short period of relaxed 
control, Islam in China has always been under state control (Potter 2003a; Shichor 
2005, 125). In addition to religion, the control and suppression of other aspects of life, 
such as ethnic language, cultural cuisine and garb intensified the sense of injustice 
against ethnic minorities and posed challenges for regime legitimacy (Davis 2008b; 
Potter 2003b). As the suppression is not only directed at religion, some of the Uyghur 
nationalists tend to be secular in their orientation (Gladney 2003, 19). According to 
Gladney (2003, 19), the issues they raise include not only religious freedom, but also 
environmental degradation, nuclear testing, over-taxation, and birth control policy. 
Furthermore, the rapid growth of network information technology has opened up a 
new arena for competing narratives of nationalism (Culpepper 2012). The 
contestation between Han nationalism and Uyghur nationalism in cyber space 
contributes to the growing self-awareness of the Uyghurs (Bhattacharya 2003, 357–
58). The virtual communities that have formed on the internet have raised the 
awareness of the issues that were previously less accessible to the general public in 
China (Gladney 2003, 16).  
The improving access to the internet poses new challenges for the CCP in two aspects 
in the context of the counter-terrorism discourse. First, it exerts pressure on the CCP 
to improve its own propaganda in order to compete with the alternative discourse 
provided by the exiled Uyghur communities. Second, it forces the CCP to make more 
stringent policies to regulate the use of the internet to block the contents that might 
destabilise the regime, as is evident from the introduction of the Great Firewall and 
the concept of “cyber sovereignty”. In response to the dissemination of “terrorist” 
ideology, the local government published the Notice on Prohibiting the Dissemination 
of Terrorist Audio and Video, which targeted online “terrorist” ideology (Jingang 
Huang 2016). During the fieldwork in Xinjiang, many important venues such as train 
stations, custom offices and museums were seen to be staffed by police, who were 
checking cell phones.  
In order to strengthen control over ideology, the CCP promotes the “correct” outlook 
on ethnicity, religion and the state to counteract the “Western” and separatist 
ideologies. In attempting to exclude the separatist discourse from China, the CCP 
conflates separatism and terrorism so that separatism can be punished under the 
Anti-Terrorism Law. The CCP uses the phrase “three forces”, conveniently bracketing 
terrorism, separatism and extremism together as security threats (see Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2001). The conflation of these three 
notions has led some scholars (Bhattacharya 2003; Boehm 2009; Beina Xu, Fletcher, 
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and Bajoria 2014) to question the actual threats posed by the Uyghur separatists. 
Some (Clarke 2008, 293; Shichor 2006, 90) suggest that the alleged ties between the 
East Turkistan Islamic Movement and Al-Qaeda are substantiated with very little 
evidence beyond Chinese sources. Shichor (2006, 90) argues that at least some part of 
the “evidence” provided by the CCP is fabricated and some of the so-called “terrorist 
acts” are “no more than ordinary crimes”. Alternative accounts of the “terrorist acts” 
are eliminated by the CCP to ensure the dominance of the official terrorism discourse 
(Pokalova 2013b, 288). Executing its power as a defining agency, the CCP reframed the 
1990 Baren uprising and 1997 Yining ethnic riots as terrorist violence (Pokalova 2013b, 
288).  
While some (Clarke 2008) acknowledge that the political violence in Xinjiang is 
motivated by both domestic socio-economic problems and the external dynamics of 
Islamic radicalism, others question the very existence of what the government has 
called “external factors”. Debata (2010) detailed the official responses by various 
countries and international organisations, indicating that considering the increasingly 
important role China plays in the international community, many states and 
organisations are reluctant to confront China by raising the Uyghur issue.  
However, it can be seen from the emphasis on the “ideological work” under Xi 
Jingping (Jingyue Xu and Hua 2013) that the CCP considers the Western sympathy 
towards the separatist movement in Xinjiang as a real threat. The perception of the US’ 
willingness to contain China by supporting the separatist movements in Xinjiang and 
Tibet is confirmed by the context of recent cases of Western intervention. As the 
following chapters will demonstrate, the anxiety among political elites about a 
possible Kosovo-style intervention is obvious in the counter-terrorism discourse and 
policy.  
2.2.2 Development policy 
The CCP adopts a developmental approach to security (F. Zhong 2015, 116), 
emphasising development as the precondition for security. Chinese scholars have 
sought to theorise this approach as a “China solution” to international peace (Yin He 
2017). 12 He (2017) takes issue with the existing Western model of peacekeeping, 
underpinned by liberalism and proposes the developmental peace as the alternative 
“China solution”. The CCP has established development and peace as the themes of 
the present times, and states that development is both the condition for, and 
consequence of peace (Yin He 2017, 24). This development-oriented approach is in 
contrasts with to the robust and coercive approach of humanitarian intervention that 
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underwrites the Western model of peacekeeping (Lei Xue 2018). Steven Kuo (2015, 
166) rejects the ways in which the nascent Chinese peace is mistaken as a “model” or 
a “finished product”. According to Kuo, China’s approach to peacekeeping should not 
be understood as one side of the two competing models. Rather than challenging the 
Western liberal model, Kuo (2015, 166) argues that Beijing’s intention is to promote 
its own brand of peacekeeping to serve its interests and project its soft power.   
This understanding of development and security is an inseparable part of China’s 
foreign policy and national strategy. When it comes to conflict resolution, Li Dongyan 
(2010) argues that China’s rationale is to maintain national unity, territorial integrity 
and ethnic solidarity, which contrasts sharply with the Western model of curbing 
violence and build peace through division and separation, as exemplified in the 
Western approach to Eritrea, Kosovo and South Sudan. According to China’s rationale, 
peace building should focus on social and economic development, instead of the 
exporting Western liberal approach (Dongyan Li 2010).  
This rationale has prompted the CCP to resort to economic development in order to 
reduce the unrest in Xinjiang (Mackerras 2004; Sautman 1998). As there is a visible 
correlation between economic backwardness and social unrest, the CCP expects that 
economic prosperity could, in theory, reduce the Uyghurs’ dissent (Boehm 2009, 86). 
However, the terrorist attacks in 2013 and 2014, when Xinjiang retained a high 
economic growth rate, show that this rationale is clearly an over-simplification that 
does not capture the complexity of the causes of political unrest in Xinjiang. As a 
result, some policies have in fact exacerbated the very problem that they set out to 
mitigate.  
Some criticise the efficacy of the development policy for the political agenda. For 
example, Clarke (2007, 325) argues that apart from functioning as a regional 
development strategy, the Great Western Development also serves as a national 
strategy concerning the political, strategic and cultural significance of the region, or 
state security, rather than societal security.13 
Some (Bovingdon 2004, 5; Mackerras 2004; Sautman 1998) believe that the failure of 
such a strategy to improve societal security lies in the lack of attention paid to ethnic 
inequality. Clarke (2008, 278) criticises the large-scale Han immigration that started in 
1953 (R. Ma 2000, 2) for exacerbating the ethnic tensions as the wealth created by 
development projects benefited different ethnic groups unequally. Clarke’s (2007, 
326–30) analysis of the discourse of the Great Western Development indicates that 
efforts to improve the economy of the “West” (referring to Xinjiang in this context) 
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were made on the condition of “national unity” and “social stability” in a country 
where the majority Han population leads the way. In this context, the discourse is, in 
fact, contributing to the dynamics of insecurity in Xinjiang (Clarke 2007, 330). 
Bovingdon (2004, 5) argues that the Han migrants were treated with favouritism, and 
placed in a more advantaged position compared to the local Uyghurs. Wiemer (2004, 
188) believes that a large number of job opportunities brought by the economic 
development projects went to Han immigrants, which further intensified the ethnic 
inequality and anti-Han sentiment.  
However, attributing political violence to the CCP also risks over-simplifying the causes 
of the violence. A relatively recent study (Howell and Fan 2011a) provides a different 
perspective on the Han-minority inequality. Based on a survey in Urumqi, the study by 
Howell and Fan (2011a) indicates that the Uyghurs do not seem to be disadvantaged 
compared to the Han migrants. In fact, they (2011a, 136) argue that the Uyghur 
migrants from southern Xinjiang to Urumqi are younger, more educated, and more 
likely to have higher incomes than their Han counterparts. This study suggests that the 
role of Han migration in causing the economic grievances of the Uyghurs might have 
been over-exaggerated. It also highlights the complexity of the causes of the political 
unrest in Xinjiang.  
Language policy is another example that reveals the complexity of development policy. 
Language policy has always been criticised by dissidents and observers outside China. 
Rebiya Kadeer (2011, 3) herself blames the CCP for eradicating her people’s “religion, 
language and identity” in the Human Rights Council Forum on Minority Issues in 2011. 
The institutionalisation of the Chinese language, according to Smith’s (2002, 158) 
ethnographic study, partly contributed to the “marginalisation in a new urban social 
hierarchy created by Han Chinese for Han Chinese in developed urban areas”, which 
ultimately led to the intensified tensions between the Uyghurs and Han Chinese.  
However, the impact of language policy on radicalisation cannot be analysed in 
isolation. For Chinese political elites and scholars, bilingual education is the very 
solution to the low employment rate among the young Uyghurs. This assumption 
regarding the relationship between language skills and the employment rate is 
confirmed by some Chinese scholars (Jiabin Han and Yu 2009, 75). This knowledge in 
turn feeds into the government policy that promotes bilingual education, regardless of 
the criticisms. This reveals three features of the study of China’s counter-terrorism. 
First, academia is an important part of the reproduction of the official discourse 
constructed by the political circles. Second, ignoring the rationale for the development 
policies, such as bilingual education, risks overlooking other important aspects such as 
the relationship between language skills and the employment rate. Third, the 
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popularity of the criticism of China’s development policy in the West, in the eyes of 
Chinese political elites and intellectuals, is an evidence of the “discourse hegemony” 
aimed at undermining China’s ideological security (F. Chen 2018; Wenlin Tian 2017).  
Similarly, birth control policy is often seen as another source of the grievances of the 
Uyghurs. Lurid stories (J. Ma 2013; The Economist 2012; Hoshur 2013) of imposed 
“brutal abortion” effectively raised the awareness of the international community of 
the treatment of Uyghur women. The World Uyghur Congress (2009) blamed the CCP 
for allowing Han Chinese to have more than one children as part of the strategy to 
assimilate “East Turkistan” into China. Boehm’s (2009, 81) study also echoes the 
claims of the Uyghur activists that some Uyghurs fear that the CCP is attempting to 
end the very existence of their ethnicity through birth control.  
However, these claims need to be scrutinised against the actual policies implemented 
in Xinjiang. The Han Chinese in Xinjiang were not granted the right to have two 
children until 2012, and this new policy was a response to the Uyghur birth rate, 
which is four times the national average (The Economist 2015b). According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics (2010), the Muslim population has rose from 17.6 million 
in 1980 to 20.3 million in 2000, at a growth rate of 42.31%, which is three times higher 
than the growth rate of the national population. In 1975, the central authority 
initiated the birth control policy targeted at the Han Chinese, which resulted in a 
slower increase in the Han population from 1980 to 1995 (see Figure 8 below). It was 
not until 1989 that the CCP started the birth control policy for the ethnic minorities in 
Xinjiang (L. An 2011, 24). From 1975 to 1983, mandatory birth control was imposed on 
the Han population (Sautman 1998, 89).  
 
Figure 7 Han and Uyghur populations in Xinjiang from 1978 to 2014 (Statistic Bureau 
of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 2016) 
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As little evidence can be found to show that the one-child policy targeted the Uyghurs 
in particular, it cannot be argued that this policy in isolation has contributed to anti-
Han sentiment. Indeed, the one-child policy resulted in grievances across the country, 
and the policy, in conjunction with other factors, may have exacerbated the anti-Han 
sentiment among the Uyghurs. However, taking separatists claims for granted also 
risks undermining the ability to understand China’s approach to counter-terrorism. 
The empirical chapters will explain Chinese political elites’ and scholars’ conceived 
causes of the Uyghur separatism.  
Some other large-scale development programmes have not been studied in much 
detail. Visit, Benefit and Gather, a recent development project that involves sending 
over 200,000 cadres to local levels, remains unexplored. The empirical chapters will 
provide the empirical evidence to show the rationale for these programmes and how 
it led to policies such as Visit, Benefit and Gather. These policies are closely linked to 
the stability maintenance of Xinjiang and they have had a profound impact on ethnic 
relations. However, the relationship between these policies and the rationale for 
China’s counter-terrorism remains a gap, which will be addressed in Chapter 5.  
2.2.3 Chinese integration model 
Some countries have already started to address the link between the integration 
model and terrorism. The impact of integration models such as multiculturalism on 
ethnic relations in the context of counter-terrorism has been studied in some depth 
(see, for example, Abbas 2007, 2005; Barley 2013; Choudhury 2011; Gabriel, Gomez, 
and Rocha 2012; Joppke 2004; Meer and Modood 2009; Modood and May 2001). 
Scholars and government officials in the UK have begun to pay more attention to the 
ways in which different ethnic groups integrate and how integration prevents or 
deepens ethnic divisions, considering the threat posed by so-called “home-grown” 
terrorists, such as the perpetrators of the 7/7 London bombings. The policy shift 
towards “community cohesion” in the UK underlines the growing concern about the 
relationship between the increasingly assertive Muslim identity and radicalisation 
(Choudhury 2011, 107). A best-selling book in 2006 Londonistan: How Britain is 
Creating a Terror State Within (Phillips 2006), explicitly links the causes of terrorism 
with the policy of multiculturalism.  
Liberal democratic states have developed distinctive approaches to accommodate 
cultural diversity. Multicultural policies in the UK are called into question in terms of 
the excessive space they provided for cultural plurality which has led to a failure in 
creating a “common set of values of sense of nationhood”; while assimilationist 
policies in France treats individuals in the same way regardless of their ethnic or 
cultural identity, which might also intensify their feeling of being marginalised (Malik 
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2015). Concerns over the division of the society also led the Dutch government to 
abandon its model of a multicultural society (Kern 2011). A Finnish politician even 
called multiculturalism a “nightmare” that needs to be “defeated” (Winneker 2015).  
Compared with European countries, China does not have a written doctrine on its 
integration model. Rather, its vision for social integration is embedded in its ethnic 
policy, derived from the discourse of the Century of Humiliation. As Chapter 4 will 
demonstrate, the “humiliation” narratives carry the connotation of “unity”, which is a 
reference used to define “separatism”. The notion of “unity” brings clarity to the 
friend/enemy distinction in the discourse of terrorism/separatism. 
Therefore, the Century of Humiliation is a key concept that lays the foundation for the 
discussion of China’s integration model in the following chapters. The period of 
intervention by colonial and imperialist powers between 1839 and 1949 (Kaufman 
2010) is also known by other emotionally provoking terms – “the history of tragedy”, 
“the history of resistance”, “the history of sacrifice”, “the history of awakening”, “the 
history of independence” and “the history of victory” (China Daily 2015, 1).  
The concept of humiliation has a political function in contemporary Chinese politics. 
Humiliation has been an essential part of the construction of Chinese nationalism 
(Callahan 2004, 200), and it has been effectively used for mass mobilisation (Zheng 
Wang 2014, 4; Callahan 2004, 200). As a recurring theme in contemporary Chinese 
history, the ambition to blot out humiliation is a motivating factor for Chinese political 
elites (S. Zhao 2004a, 12). The periodical commemoration of national humiliation has 
shaped the mindset of a nation once it had become rhetoric, and thus it continues to 
exert an influence over the people (B. Xiong 2013, 173). According to Wang Zheng 
(2008, 804), the history of humiliation is so dominant that even talk of new 
achievements in recent years serves to demonstrate the end of past humiliations. 
The Century of Humiliation is seen as a politically constructed notion. Elliott (2002, 
143) questions the prevalence of the feeling of “humiliation” because most of the 
Chinese people were living outside the territories occupied by the imperialist powers 
and were not interrupted by their intervention in China’s political and economic 
system. However, despite some diplomatic call for China to move forwards (Schell and 
Delury 2013), the CCP has continued to reproduce the relationship between China as 
the victim and the imperial powers as the perpetrator, thus reinforcing the 
friend/enemy grouping between China and the “West”. In doing so, the CCP is able to 
justify the present security agenda by recounting the past.  
In China, the discussion of ethnic relations is situated within the broader context of 
the China versus the “West” dichotomy, while some scholars frame China’s ethnic 
policy in the context of the colonial relations between the central authority and the 
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Uyghurs. This explains the hostility of Chinese political elites and scholars towards 
Western supporters of separatist claims. Some scholars (Dreyer 1976; Heberer 1989; 
Mackerras 1994) question the extent to which ethnic minorities enjoy real autonomy 
under the minzu regional autonomy policy. Some (Bachman 2004; Gladney 1998; 
Bovingdon 2004, 26) suggest a colonial relationship between the CCP and what it 
called the “New Frontier” (the literal translation of Xinjiang). Sending tides of Han 
migrants into Xinjiang, together with other policies, was seen as an act of 
“colonisation” by scholars such as Boehm (2009, 84), Shichor (1994, 77), Gladney 
(Gladney 1990, 11), Kung (2006, 379), Howell and Fan (2011b, 121), Becquelin (2004b, 
360), and Bhattacharya (2003, 362). Their works echoes Erkin Alptekin, the then 
president of the World Uyghur Congress, who claimed that “[the] Chinese want to 
replace us with their own people as colonists, and assimilate those of us who remain, 
wiping out our culture” (cited in Schwartz 2004). 
Such a framing undermines the friend/enemy distinction that is embedded in the 
narratives of the Century of Humiliation. In the eyes of Chinese officials and 
intellectuals, the alignment between these Western scholars and the Uyghurs’ 
separatist claims demonstrates how the Western discourse hegemony serves to de-
legitimise the CCP (F. Chen 2018; Wenlin Tian 2017). As the following chapters will 
demonstrate, the CCP has always blamed the Western support for groups that have 
separatist agendas for the sustained conflict in Xinjiang. In this context, human rights 
activists who support separatist groups are also blamed. An example is the CCP’s 
response to the mass DNA collection in Xinjiang, in which it claimed that the Human 
Rights Watch always makes “untrue” statements about China (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2017). 
2.3 Conclusion 
The discussion of the key concepts used in this thesis highlighted some similarities and 
differences in terrorism studies (broadly defined) between liberal/democratic and 
authoritarian countries. This chapter functioned to situate the analysis of this thesis in 
a broader body of literature. It drew on the debate over concepts such as terrorism, 
legitimacy, authoritarianism, and radicalisation to construct a conceptual framework 
through which to analyse how China’s political elites and intellectuals perceive, frame, 
and respond to terrorism. The discussion of the controversies accompanying 
“terrorism” illustrated the importance of perceiving “terrorism” as a “rhetorical 
device”, rather than a given fact. Acknowledging the “ontological instability” enabled 
the researcher to focus on the underlying narratives and assumptions and the 
function of the labels that underpin China’s approach to terrorism. Informed by 
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Critical Terrorism Studies, this thesis takes seriously the ties between the state and 
scholars. It examines how scholarly works function to reproduce the state’s discourse 
and how they help to understand the underlying assumptions of the friend/enemy 
distinction in China’s terrorism discourse.  
This chapter also highlighted the ways in which the analysis of this thesis contributes 
to the debate over legitimacy, regime type and terrorism. The discussion of the 
concept of legitimacy laid the foundation for the answer to why the CCP considered it 
necessary to build and maintain legitimacy during its transition from a revolutionary 
party to a ruling party (Nathan and Gilley 2003, 232). Building on Gerschewski and 
Dukalskis’s works, this thesis presents the CCP’s approach to terrorism as an example 
of how non-democracies pursue legitimacy and how they sustain their rule.  
The discussion of radicalisation provided a context for China’s response to terrorism. It 
drew links between China’s approach and Western experience. In particular, the 
categorisation of hard and soft approaches helped to examine China’s differentiation 
and treatment of friends and enemies according to two types of contradictions. This 
discussion also helped to examine the conflation of cognitive and behaviour 
radicalisation, which laid the foundation for the analysis of the sweeping counter-
terrorism measures that target ideas that challenge the “correct” view promoted by 
the CCP. 
The second half of this chapter focused on existing research on the causes and 
implications of the political violence in Xinjiang, the developmental approach to 
security and the integration model in China. The discussion not only helped to situate 
terrorism in China in the broader literature, but also helped to understand the process 
through which the CCP perceives and frames the “Xinjiang problem”. According to 
scholars outside China, political violence in Xinjiang is caused by a mix of ethno-
nationalist sentiments, socio-economic grievances and a sense of deprivation as a 
result of language and birth control policies. In contrast, the official discourse of 
terrorism has obviously oversimplified these causes and blamed “external forces” for 
its failure in counter-terrorism policy. Based on the assumption of a causal link 
between development and stability, the CCP has adopted a developmental approach 
to security. Such efforts have been centred on large-scale economic projects and 
further job trainings, which have become highly controversial in the light of recent 
reports on cadres’ visiting Uyghurs’ homes and the incarceration in the name of “job 
training”. This section also highlighted the gap in regard to the CCP’s perception of the 
integration model and terrorism. The narratives of the Century of Humiliation and the 
assumptions and labels derived from them have enabled the CCP to prioritise national 
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unity over diversity, and establish a set of “correct” ways in which the Uyghurs are 
expected to think and behave. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
This chapter provides the methodology that has been applied in this thesis to analyse 
China’s approach to terrorism. The interpretivist assumption, which emphasises the 
social construction of the reality, lays the foundation for the methodology used in this 
thesis. Given the political nature of the concept of terrorism, the scientific methods 
that are applied to natural sciences are inadequate to address the political context in 
which the discourse of terrorism is embedded. Assuming that the truth consists of 
social facts, rather than brute facts (Jackson 2011), this thesis examines mainly how 
“shared ideas”, rather than “material forces”, construct the “structure of human 
association” (Wendt 1991, 1). The discursive process of the construction of the reality, 
identities and interests is an important aspect that explains the behaviour of the state 
and non-state actors involved in “terrorism” or counter-terrorism. To understand this 
process, this thesis relies on the political, historical and social context to make sense 
of China’s approach to terrorism.  
Informed by Critical Terrorism Studies, this thesis adopts a critical lens and 
acknowledges China’s counter-terrorism approach as a social construction based on a 
series of assumptions inherited from the narratives of the Century of Humiliation. The 
assumptions about unity, separatism, and peaceful evolution reveal an underlying 
friend/enemy distinction in China’s political discourse. In the context of counter-
terrorism, the labels “hostile forces”, “three forces” and “East Turkistan forces” are 
used to identify the “enemies”.  
3.1 Analytical model 
This section provides a description of the analytical model that is used to explain how 
the CCP has legitimised its approach to terrorism. This thesis examines a wide range of 
attitudes, beliefs and sentiments based on the social construction of the collective 
memory of the Century of Humiliation. These attitudes, beliefs and sentiments give 
order and meaning to China’s counter-terrorism policy and practice by laying out the 
underlying assumptions and rules for how “terrorism” should be perceived and dealt 
with.  
The history of China as a weak and divided country is constructed as a strong 
motivating factor to prioritise national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity in 
China’s security agenda. Political elites and intellectuals envision a situation where 
different ethnic groups enjoy a degree of freedom on the condition that they 
acknowledge that the “unity” of the state must transcend the “diversity” of ethnic 
groups. The absolute importance of “unity” in the Chinese political discourse makes it 
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possible to extend state power to deal with “separatism”. Historically constructed, the 
concepts of both “unity” and “separatism” have been broadened. As “unity” is linked 
to the security of both the state and the Chinese people based on the narratives of the 
Century of Humiliation, the concept of “separatism” is also broadened to include 
peaceful separatist expression and demonstration. In this context, all those who 
sympathise and support the separatist claims are regarded as the “enemy”, and are 
labelled “hostile forces”, “three forces” and “East Turkistan forces”.  
China’s counter-terrorism policy, which is embedded in such a context, reflects the 
overriding concerns for national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 
anxiety about separatist ideology can be seen from the overall security discourse, the 
anti-terrorism legal framework, and the actors involved in its counter-terrorism policy. 
The differentiation between hard and soft approaches reflects Mao’s theory of “two 
types of contradictions” – the “contradiction between ourselves and the enemy” 
should be treated with the hard approach, while the “contradiction among the people” 
should be treated with the soft approach. 
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Figure 8 Analytical model 
This thesis also examines development and religious policy as part of the overall 
counter-terrorism approach. The former reflects Chinese officials’ and intellectuals’ 
perceptions of the causes of political violence, and the latter reflects the concerns for 
the ideological challenges posed by the Islamic revival.  
This thesis also explores the use of the Mass Line approach as a framework for de-
radicalisation. The recent revival of the Mass Line approach under President Xi Jinping 
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reflects the anxiety about the foundation of legitimacy. Seeking support from the 
people, both the central and local authorities initiated a series of tactics to engage 
people from the Uyghur community.  
Furthermore, this thesis looks at two ways in which de-radicalisation is approached 
through education. Overall, the de-radicalisation through education reflects the CCP’s 
intention to treat radicalisation as the “contradiction among the people”. The CCP’s 
prevention and rehabilitation efforts reflect its strong propensity to maintain control 
in different stages of radicalisation.  
This thesis also investigates how the government embeds the rationale for its counter-
terrorism into the governance of Xinjiang. Various political slogans, such as “five keys” 
“four identifies”, and “three cannot do withouts”, reflect the government’s attempt to 
maintain control over all aspects of social life.  
In terms of practice, this thesis examines how the government responds to the “East 
Turkistan forces”. The official counter-narratives on hijrat demonstrates how the state 
media compete with “terrorist” narratives. The case study also illustrates how the 
rationale for “hard and soft” approaches affects the de-radicalisation policy, with two 
examples of de-radicalisation propaganda.  
The analysis of the framing of China’s counter-terrorism discourse relies on the frame-
alignment model of Snow, Benford and others (Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 
2000). “Frame alignment is a necessary condition for movement participation, 
whatever its nature or intensity” (Snow et al. 1986, 464). According to Snow and 
others (1986, 464), frames help an individual or a group organise experience and 
guide them to act, by providing a series of assumptions based on which the events are 
meaningful (Snow et al. 1986, 464). When a painting is framed in a certain way, some 
elements of it – colours, patterns or composition – are highlighted (Kuypers 2009, 
181). By making some elements more salient than others through placement, 
repetition, or association with culturally familiar symbols (Entman 1993, 53), frames 
enable individuals to filter their perceptions of certain events in particular ways 
(Kuypers 2009, 181). For Gamson (1989, 157), “[f]acts have no intrinsic meaning. They 
take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organises them 
and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasise while ignoring others”.  
The methodology facilitates the analysis of how political elites and intellectuals situate 
events in the context of existing friend/enemy divisions, establish legitimacy and 
mobilise the public. In order to do so, some assumptions are reinforced, while others 
are omitted. The methodology involves identifying how counter-terrorism is framed in 
this way, and how this discourse demonstrates key linkages with China’s elite 
discourse and historical continuities. The reinforcement and omission collectively 
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constitute the discourses surrounding the counter-terrorism strategy that perpetuate 
the existing hierarchy within the state system.  
It is important to understand the language used to examine the ways in which the 
government has responded to perceived and real terrorist threats and justified its 
counter-terrorism strategy. To identify frames, interpretive commentaries that 
surround news reports are sometimes more important than the informational content 
(Gamson 1989, 158). Official documents are often written in a concise and succinct 
manner, while commentaries on the state media provide more information on the 
assumptions that underpin the official statements and official attitude. In addition, 
“Metaphors, catchphrases and other symbolic devices” are important tools to detect 
the underlying narratives (Gamson 1989, 158). The metaphor of “rats” is an example 
of how the metaphor reveals the underlying narratives and gives meaning to the 
political slogan about terrorism.  
The methodology also highlights how the use of labels and narratives reflects the 
underlying friend/enemy distinction. In Jackson’s (2006, 3) words, labels are used to 
“describe agents or actors, behaviour, scenes, qualities or purposes within the public 
vocabulary”, and narratives are used to provide “coherence and consistency to the 
scenes, characters and themes that guide the moral conduct of a society and which 
provide meaning to the lives of the community’s members”. Labels and narratives 
together “function to select, interpret and reframe past events” (Jackson 2006, 3). 
As the discussion in the following chapters will demonstrate, the labels “hostile 
forces”, “three forces” and “East Turkistan forces” function to identify the actors and 
the nature of the acts. By labelling an event, the CCP is exercising its power as a 
defining agency to ascribe right and wrong. Linking terrorist incidents with Western 
supporters, the CCP exercises its power as a defining agency to ascribe right and 
wrong, and use the friend/enemy distinction to explain current events. The narratives 
of the Century of Humiliation provide coherence and consistency with the theme of 
unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The collective memory of the great loss of 
territory in the face of colonial and imperial powers constructed through the recount 
of historical events enables the CCP to justify its rationale for strengthening state 
control over its bordering territories. Chinese intellectuals see the cases of the colour 
revolution in the Middle East as evidence of the “peaceful evolution”, and the prelude 
to the intervention in China. These labels and narratives function to select, organise, 
and interpret the events and occurrences to construct and reconstruct the ways in 
which “terrorism” is understood in China.  
In this process, the antagonist against the alleged enemy serves to highlight the 
imaginary boundary between friends and enemies. As Carl Schmitt (2006, 96) 
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observes, “[t]he political is the most intense and extreme antagonist…In its entirety, 
the state as an organized political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy 
distinction”. Following his line of argument, words such as sovereignty, national unity 
and territorial integrity would not make complete sense without the understanding of 
against whom or what the unity is to be protected. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, 
“terrorism” is such a loaded term that the concept of the enemy in the discourse of 
counter-terrorism is particularly vague. As Dillon (2002, 74) pointed out, fuelled by 
fierce currents of nationalism and militarism, the friend/enemy distinction is being 
highlighted “to the point where no one can tell us what this particular terrorism is, 
how many terrorists there are and what resources are required to defeat them” 
(author’s emphasis). The contestation between the artificially reinforced identity, or 
“imagined communities”, using Anderson’s (2004) words, is highlighted by using these 
labels, and the political context from which they originated.  
The frame-alignment approach provides not only a tool with which to examine the 
condition for movement participation (the participation in the People’s War on Terror), 
but also the degree of alignment (Ketelaars, Walgrave, and Wouters 2014, 504). 
Ketelaars and others argue that treating it as a precondition creates the dichotomy 
between “aligned” and “non-aligned”, while in fact most people in real life experience 
a certain degree of alignment and very few are fully aligned to a particular frame. 
Therefore, the alignment is better treated as a spectrum (Figure 10), whereby the 
counter-terrorism discourse gradually changes the mindset of individuals and ingrains 
the friend/enemy grouping into the ways in which they respond to the terrorist 
attacks and counter-terrorism measures of the CCP. The phrase “People’s War on 
Terror” reflects the very intention to situate the war on terror in China’s political 
discourse, which has a tradition of mass mobilisation. The Mass Line approach 
provides a guideline for the engagement of community members in fighting against 
terrorism.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Spectrum of frame-alignment 
As Ketelaars and others (2014, 504) point out, many individuals are only partially 
aligned, and they are the target of multiple competing frames. In the Chinese context, 
Ordinary citizens                                          Participants of the People’s War on Terror 
non-alignment                         partially aligned                           fully aligned 
Counter-terrorism discourse 
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the frames that compete with the official discourse are proposed by the Uyghur 
dissidents overseas, who are calling for the independence of “East Turkistan”. When 
talking about this topic, individuals are constantly seeking to find their position on this 
spectrum (Figure 11). As the ethno-separatist discourse is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, only the responses that are relevant will be discussed in the following chapters.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Competing frames on terrorism and counter-terrorism in China 
As Figure 11 shows, two major sets of frames are competing for influence among 
ordinary citizens. In China, the ubiquity of the CCP’s discourse is particularly salient 
due to the strict control over ideology. Adopting the Mass Line approach for mass 
mobilisation, individuals within Chinese territory are overwhelmingly affected by the 
official discourse. The dominance of the official discourse is further reinforced by the 
Great Firewall and the National Cybersecurity Strategy (National Internet Information 
Office 2016) which formalised the CCP’s control over its cyber sovereignty, 
unequivocally highlighting the determination to “prevent, stop and punish according 
to law any act of treason, secession, sedition, subverting or inciting others to subvert 
the legitimate state power of the people's democratic dictatorship” (National Internet 
Information Office 2016). In this context, the CCP ensured the scale of its ounter-
terrorist propaganda, despite the limited credibility of the propaganda materials, as 
the discussion of counter-terrorism propaganda in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will 
demonstrate. As “public attention is highly selective”, people tend to “rely upon and 
accept information that is easily accessible” (Kuypers 2009, 181). Therefore, the 
monopoly of the official discourse, regardless of the quality of the propaganda 
materials, plays an important role in the mass mobilisation in China.  
There is an overarching set of frames in China’s counter-terrorism discourse that 
constitutes the “master frames”. A policy document may contain only a fragment of 
the master frames, or the “specific collective action frames” derived from the master 
frames (Snow and Benford 1992, 138). Interpretations of the assumptions in the 
specific frames may vary in different contexts, but some basic assumptions remain the 
essence of all of these specific frames. The master frames in China’s counter-terrorism 
discourse concern the challenges to its national unity, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. More specifically, the master frames involve an array of assumptions about 
the “enemies’” intentions to weaken China by fomenting disunity among the Chinese 
China’s counter-terrorism discourse                                                       ethno-separatist 
discourse 
fully aligned                                                partially aligned                                              fully 
aligned  
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people. These assumptions give consistency to the behaviour of other countries, and 
help the CCP to interpret the Western support for separatist movements in the 
context of a continued friend/enemy antagonism. Specific collective action frames 
concern the separatist movements of the “hostile forces”, “three forces” and “East 
Turkistan forces”, and how the external support has sustained the problem of 
terrorism in China. These narratives function as the “schemata of interpretation” that 
enable their users to “locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number 
of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (Goffman 1974, 21). 
To analyse how the master frames work, some assumptions of the master frames are 
summarised as follows: 
• The CCP is the legitimate government for the Chinese people because it has 
made great efforts in achieving the independence of the Chinese nation after 
an arduous war against the imperialist invaders.  
• National unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity are the most fundamental 
rights that the Chinese people are entitled to. All of the ethnic groups in China 
enjoy a degree of freedom and autonomy on the condition that they 
acknowledge the priority of “unity” over “diversity”. 
• Attempts to separate China along ethnic lines are an unacceptable 
infringement upon the country’s sovereignty.  
• Attempts to undermine the CCP’s leadership in the name of human rights are 
part of the grand strategy of the “West” to “Westernise and divide” China by 
peaceful means. Although the “peaceful evolution” is no longer used as an 
official policy in the US, Western countries continue to undermine the 
Communist regime by promoting liberal/democratic values.  
• It is difficult to eliminate terrorism in China because separatist groups such as 
the World Uyghur Congress receive support from Western countries. They 
support separatists as proxies so that they are not directly involved in the 
hostilities.  
The above assumptions are based on the existing friend/enemy division in the Chinese 
political discourse. The counter-terrorism discourse reproduces and entrenches such a 
division. These assumptions feed into the diagnostic framing that justifies the use of 
extraordinary measures in dealing with the “enemies” designated by the state. The 
state then is able to propose a solution, such as the introduction of the Anti-Terrorism 
Law and mass mobilisation to engage ordinary citizens in the People’s War on 
Terrorism.  
It can be seen from the summary of the master frames that China’s counter-terrorism 
discourse prioritises national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Compared 
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with liberal/democratic countries, the counter-terrorism discourse in China reflects 
the emphasis on collective interests (national unity and state security) over civil 
liberties and human security in China’s political context.  
Although the master narratives of the ethno-separatist discourse are not the focus of 
this study, they help to understand the different accounts of the same topic produced 
by the CCP and the overseas Uyghur dissidents respectively. It would be an over-
simplification to assume that the latter are a monolithic group. However, it is 
important to make some generalisations to understand the difference between the 
competing frames. The ethno-separatist discourse portrays the CCP as an extremely 
repressive government, a perpetrator of countless human rights violations. The 
separatist claims are based on a set of assumptions regarding how the CCP deprived 
Uyghurs of their rights to development, rights to life and rights to national self-
determination. 
It is worth noting that when the users reproduce the friend/enemy dichotomy by 
adopting the symbolic devices of a set of frames, they do not necessarily understand 
the entire framework, but this does not mean that they cannot apply the symbolic 
devices (Goffman 1974, 21). For example, the use of “hostile forces” does not always 
point to an actual actor that is seeking to undermine the CCP. But its vagueness does 
not preclude political elites or academics from using it. On the contrary, the vagueness 
provides the convenience the users need to attribute the blame without pointing to 
an actual political entity.  
3.2 Sampling criteria, and reflection on objectivity 
The data selection mechanism in this thesis was designed to examine China’s counter-
terrorism discourse, policy and practice, aiming at understanding the key linkages 
between its counter-terrorism approaches and its quest for legitimacy. The primary 
aim of this thesis is to examine the counter-terrorism discourse. This is supplemented 
by a discussion of how the policy and practice are also informed by the quest for 
legitimacy that is embedded in the discourse. The analysis of the counter-terrorism 
discourse is based on doctrine documents, articles and commentaries in the 
mainstream media. White papers such as “The History and Development of Xinjiang” 
(The Information Office of the State Council 2003) are also used to illustrate the links 
between China’s counter-terrorism approaches and the ways in which the history of 
Xinjiang is presented. Responses of the Foreign Ministry spokespersons and speeches 
of political elites are important sources in regard to how current political elites frame 
the issue of terrorism. As official documents tend to be succinct, some of the links are 
elaborated in more detail in the commentaries and scholarly works. For example, the 
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official discourse does not draw a very explicit link between the colour revolutions in 
the Middle East, but the scholarly works, especially in terms of political implications 
and their policy recommendations, clearly indicate the anxiety among the political and 
academic circles about the Western intervention in the democratisation process in 
China.  
The process of frame alignment can be divided into 3 overlapping phases – the 
friend/enemy grouping, mobilisation and prescription. The texts are analysed for their 
underlying assumptions regarding who the enemy is, who is mobilised, and what 
should be done. The friend/enemy grouping enables the CCP to make decisions on the 
nature of the violence, and take measures accordingly. The mass mobilisation, 
inherited from the Mao era, is designed to help the CCP maintain public support and 
reduce the cost of credibility in the face of human rights violations in counter-
terrorism practice. The alignment process, in turn, reinforces the integration model 
that prioritises unity over diversity.  
Before the 9/11 attacks and before the CCP coined the term “three forces”, political 
unrest was usually labelled as a “counterrevolution” (Tanner and Bellacqua 2016). The 
Chinese public were not familiar with the notion of “terrorism”. The reference to 
“hostile forces”, the “West” and “ulterior motives” helps the public to link the new 
term “terrorism” with the old narratives that the CCP has always been using to make 
sense of the conflicts that have taken place within Chinese terrorises.  
Policy documents and the academic interpretations of these documents are used to 
explain how the official discourse of counter-terrorism is translated into practice. As 
discussed in Section 3.1, the discourse is used to describe the actors and the acts and 
make sense of the nature of the attacks. In contrast, policy documents show how 
diagnostic framing is translated into prognostic framing. These documents are 
important to analyse the ostensible disjuncture between the counter-terrorism 
policies and counter-terrorism discourse. The CCP adopts a developmental approach 
to security, which assumes that security problems can be solved by economic 
development. However, this assumption is not always explicated in many of the de-
radicalisation policies. Integration, economic and education policies are not linked 
directly with the root causes of terrorism in the official counter-terrorism discourse. 
The examination of the policy documents in this thesis indicates that many of the 
development policies are closely inter-linked with the considerations for stability and 
security.  
In addition to the discourse and policy, the thesis also examines how the counter-
terrorism practice reflects the CCP’s struggle between efficacy and justice. As a single-
party state, the CCP’s counter-terrorism practice is seldom criticised within China. 
 
 
 
 
63 
Therefore, this thesis draws on reports and statements from the US, the UK, the 
European Union, the United Nations, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch 
in regard to their criticisms of China’s counter-terrorism practice. The triangulation of 
sources based on Chinese official sources, Uyghur dissidents and the international 
community provides information about the different ways in which they interpret 
violent incidents. For instance, the CCP frames the Urumqi Riots in 2009 as terrorist 
attacks (Xinhua 2009c). Rebiya Kadeer, the leader of the Uyghur dissident community, 
asserts that the incidents started as a peaceful protest (Kadeer 2009). When reports in 
the mainstream media in the West favour the dissident group, the CCP accuses the 
“West” of maintaining double standards in regard to “terrorism”.  
This thesis identifies a large number of Chinese-language sources to illustrate the key 
linkages between China’s counter-terrorism discourse and its quest for legitimacy. The 
Chinese-language documents include the Anti-Terrorism Law, policy documents of 
local governments, and propaganda materials.14 They are supplemented with statistics 
from the national and local Bureau of Statistics of China. Except a few political 
speeches and some of the national level policies, many of these documents do not 
come with an English translation. Even when there is an English version, the meaning 
of the term might be compromised. In some cases, the English version of an official 
text is provided by the official media. To make it more accessible, the English version 
not only paraphrases the text, but also alters the language to cater for an 
international audience. The friend/enemy dichotomy is toned down to avoid causing 
resentment among the “Western” audience. In some cases, the translation is 
inaccurate. For example, sangu shili is translated as “three evils” (see Roney 2013; Aris 
2009) while “shili” per se does not contain the same pejorative connotation that “evil” 
does.15 The translation of “evil” distorts the degree of objectivity of the official 
discourse of terrorism. In order to mitigate the limitations of using translated texts, 
this thesis analyses the original texts published on Chinese websites.  
In addition, using original texts allows the researcher to examine the symbolic 
meaning of a metaphor against historical continuities. For example, Xi’s metaphor of 
terrorists as rats (Xinhua 2014b) can be better understood in the Chinese context. The 
collective memory of killing rats during the political movement “Eliminating the Four 
Pests” encourages the participation of the people in the War on Terror. Linking 
counter-terrorism with a past experience of killing rats helps to make sense of 
terrorism and reduce the fear caused by it.  
                                                      
14 Chinese policy documents are usually titled opinions, regulations, ordinances, measures, 
provisions according to the different legal effects. 
15 Sangu shili: 三股势力 
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The criteria used for the selection of data are listed below:  
• whether it provides an official account of an event or counter-terrorism 
generally; 
• whether it provides an official commentary in mainstream media (the official 
commentaries of news agencies often appears without an author, thereby 
representing the political stance of the agency); 
• whether it provides a counter-terrorism or de-radicalisation narrative that is 
part of the master narrative; 
• whether it contains any labels related to terrorism (e.g. “hostile forces”); 
• whether it addresses the socio-economic grievances of the communities that 
might be affected by the counter-terrorism strategy; 
• whether it responds to the international criticisms about the impact of 
counter-terrorism on civil liberty; 
• whether it offers an interpretation of the current policies or policy 
recommendation;  
• whether it shows different perceptions of the security threat between central 
and local governments and between the Uyghur and Han. 
This non-random sampling mechanism was designed to focus on the perceptions of 
the CCP and Chinese officials. This thesis seeks to expose the logic of friend and 
enemy in China’s counter-terrorism discourse, policy and practice. Commentaries and 
academic sources supplement the government statements, which tend to be general 
and succinct. Some academic articles have been written by police officers or the 
researchers working at a police college. Their writings are important data to analyse in 
terms of the reproduction of the official discourse and interpretations that shed light 
on the underlying assumptions of the official counter-terrorism discourse.  
The selection of the Chinese official sources was based on the consideration of the 
monopoly of the voice of the state media. According to the “iron rule” of Chinese 
media, reports on sensitive issues such as terrorism must cite official sources (see H. 
Shao and Du 2006). The ways in which terrorist incidents are reported are 
monopolised by the major state-owned media such as Xinhua, People’s Daily, China 
Daily, Huanqiu (also known as Global Times), China News Service, China Radio 
International (CRI), China Central Television (CCTV), CPC News, Takungpao, Fenghuang 
(the Phoenix) and Tianshanwang.16 News agencies must follow the order from higher 
                                                      
16 CPC News is an official website founded in 2006. The website serves as an authoritative 
platform that publicises information and archives about the CCP. Takungpao (大公报) is 
a left-wing newspaper published in Hong Kong under the leadership of the Liaison Office 
of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
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levels, speaking with one voice (P. Lu 2006, 7). As a result, the reports on the same 
incidents are highly repetitive. These reports were tracked down to the original 
reports by the major state-owned media, and repetitive reports by other commercial 
news agencies such as Sina or NTES have been removed from the data.17  
The data selection also involved considerations regarding the authenticity of the 
sources. This thesis borrows Michael Swaine’s categorisation of sources.  
Authoritative: sources that are explicitly “speaking for the regime” (Swaine 2012, 1), 
including the Information Office of the State Council, Ministry of Public Security of the 
People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Supreme Court, Supreme People's 
Procuratorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of National Defence of the 
People's Republic of China. People’s Daily and CPC News are authoritative as they 
represent the official views explicitly. Interviews with government officials are also 
considered authoritative.  
Quasi-authoritative: sources that indirectly and implicitly represent the official view. 
Anonymous articles and commentaries appearing in the state media are considered 
quasi-authoritative in the sense that they are intended to represent the view of the 
media and are usually written or approved by senior editors.  
Non-authoritative: low-level commentaries and signed articles appearing in the state 
media. They do not stand for the official view as these sources tend to be more 
explicitly nationalist. Commentaries published on Huanqiu are examples of radically 
nationalist views, but they provide important information on how the friend/enemy 
distinction is embedded in the official discourse of terrorism.  
Authoritative sources are given more weight in understanding the CCP’s official view. 
Quasi-authoritative sources are less representative of the official view, but the 
commentaries provide more insights into political elites’ rationale. Non-authoritative 
sources do not stand for the official view, and are thus weighed even less in terms of 
authority. Constrained by the iron rule, non-authoritative sources seldom challenge 
the authoritative sources. However, they offer a broad spectrum of diverse reactions 
to explain, interpret and defend the authoritative sources, which helps to analyse how 
intellectuals reproduce the official discourse of terrorism.  
Occasionally local government officials and scholars seek to reflect on the existing 
policies, but their voice is not strong enough to be noticed in a broader context in 
which the state is keen to demonstrate the “achievements” of its counter-terrorism 
                                                                                                                                                           
Tianshanwang is a local state-own website in Xinjiang, co-founded by the Propaganda 
Department of XUAR and People’s Daily. 
17 Sina: 新浪; NTES: 网易, 
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policy. More often different sources are in line with the official view, the difference 
lies only in the degree of the alignment. For example, local governments are required 
to adjust the policies made at the central level so that they are appropriate to the 
local conditions. Under pressure to demonstrate competence, local governments 
would come up with harsher regulations. This observation is best exemplified in the 
Ordinances on de-radicalisation in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which is 
considerably harsher than the Anti-Terrorism Law, due to the ban on a large number 
of activities among the Uyghur community.  
The use of quantitative data involves considerations of the limitations of basic facts. 
Taking the number of foreign fighters as an example, it is almost impossible to identify 
the “real” number based on the triangulation of reports from the CCP (around 300 
combatants), scholars (20 to 30 people), Syria’s ambassador to China (around 5,000 
Uyghurs) and non-governmental organisations (114 fighters). The number of foreign 
fighters has been manipulated to the extent that the claims that the numbers are used 
to support are more important than the number per se. Some Uyghur dissidents have 
accused the CCP of exaggerating the number to justify suppression, citing Uyghur 
expert Sean Robet’s estimation of “20 to 30”, while others accuse the CCP of 
suppression, which has led to 5,000 Uyghurs fleeing China, citing the Syria’s 
ambassador to China. This highlights the importance of investigating the political 
context in which the number is discussed.  
Using qualitative data raises some questions regarding the objectivity of the data. 
From an interpretivist perspective, this thesis does not claim to pursue absolute 
“objective” knowledge about the counter-terrorism discourse. Rather, it seeks to 
understand the political context in which concepts and ideas are embedded. As 
Jackson (2006, 3) argues, “discourses are never neutral or objective; they are always 
an exercise in social power – the power to ascribe right and wrong, knowledge and 
falsehood, and the limits of the reasonable”. As the data for this thesis is highly 
political and ideological, it is important to differentiate the “knowledge” obtained 
from patriotic education and the knowledge that has been tested. This research does 
not seek to eliminate all of the personal values of the researcher from the enquiry. 
Rather, the researcher reflects upon her subjectivity and maintains vigilance regarding 
the impact of the subjectivity on the outcome of the research. In doing so, the 
researcher aims at minimising the bias caused by personal experience.  
The researcher received 13 years of education in China, during which she participated 
in school trips to the patriotism education bases. The impact of personal experience 
on the researcher has two dimensions. First, the political education relies 
overwhelmingly on the Marxist interpretation of the state, society and history. 
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Inevitably, the Chinese culture, which prioritises collective interests, has partly shaped 
her perception of the relationship between state security and civil liberties. Second, 
the monopoly of the official interpretation of the social reality means that China’s 
political education is not under pressure of competing with alternative social and 
political theories. As a result, the textbooks repeat the conclusion, without addressing 
the alternative theories. To mitigate this problem, the researcher attended training on 
research methods and read extensively on alternative political theories before making 
the decision regarding the methodology for this thesis. It was decided that critical 
theories are particularly helpful to examine the political context in which China’s 
counter-terrorism discourse is embedded.  
Identifying the impact of personal experience and values helps minimise their 
influence on the objectivity of this research. In addition, personal experience is also 
helpful in identifying the linkages between China’s counter-terrorism discourse, policy 
and practice and its quest for legitimacy and historical continuities.  
3.3 Fieldwork in China 
The fieldwork in China aimed at verifying the observations obtained from the analysis 
of the official discourse and Chinese scholarship. Funded by the International 
Research Collaboration Awards of the University of Leeds, the fieldwork provided an 
opportunity to visit the School of International Studies of Peking University. From 25 
June to 3 September 2016, the researcher visited Beijing and Xi’an. Beijing is the 
centre of academic exchange and its abundant academic resources provide a solid 
foundation for research. Xi’an is home to the first counter-terrorism research centre 
at the local level. The Northwest University of Political Science and Law, the home 
institution of the centre, allowed the researcher the access to its archive. From 3 July 
to 24 July 2017, the researcher embarked on a trip to Xinjiang, after a brief stay in 
Shanghai. This trip provided some more insights into the presence of the police, mass 
surveillance, and propaganda materials in everyday life. 
The visits allowed the researcher to interview around 30 participants, including civil 
servants, police, students, experts and scholars. Her conversation with officials from 
the Complaints Bureau, China’s Think Tank at the State Council and police officers at 
the local level provided some insights into the “insiders’ view” on ethnic conflicts and 
political violence in Xinjiang, and their link with external supporters. Students from 
Minzu University of China and Northwest University of Political Science and Law 
discussed the impact of education policy on ethnic relations, especially the “Xinjiang 
Class”. Scholars from the Institute of International and Strategic Studies in Peking 
University (Beijing), People’s Public Security University of China (Beijing), and 
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Northwest University of Political Science and Law (Xi’an), and East China University of 
Political Science and Law (Shanghai) offered their insights into the relationship 
between ethnic conflict and the “hostile forces” abroad.  
The identity of the researcher as someone who was working at a “Western” institution 
may have created some obstacles when approaching interviewees. In China’s political 
context, the extent to which the interviewees were willing to participate was largely 
determined by their awareness of the sensitivity of the topic of counter-terrorism in 
China. The CCP views education as being at the forefront of the ideological battlefield, 
and young researchers are considered vulnerable to the “infiltration of the hostile 
forces” (China News 2015a). In particular, the distrust felt among Chinese officials and 
scholars of “Western” scholars is worsened by the “lies”, “distorted facts” and 
“unfounded claims” in “some Western media” about the 2009 Urumqi Riots (People’s 
Daily Online n.d.). If the interviewees had considered the researcher as being 
influenced by the “wrong viewpoints of the West” (China News 2015a), it is likely that 
the researcher might have been be viewed with hostility in China. The researcher’s 
intentions to obtain information about criminal cases and legal cases would also have 
raised concerns about whether such a research project would undermine the 
legitimacy of the CCP. The discussion of sensitive topics such as human rights 
violations may have resulted in an impression that the researcher had been influenced 
by the “Western values” and was using them to justify “Western” interference in 
China’s domestic affairs.  
The "sensitivity" of this topic and the relevant data also posed challenges to data 
collection. Legal documents provide a set of rather vague criteria for what exactly a 
“sensitive” topic entails. Generally, the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Guarding State Secrets stipulates that all citizens have the obligation to guard state 
secrets (People’s Congress 2010). Article 111 of the Criminal Law of the People's 
Republic of China stipulates that providing classified information or intelligence to an 
overseas institution, organisation, or individual shall be punished as a “crime 
endangering state security” (National People’s Congress 1979). In some cases, some 
policy documents are not categorised as “classified”, but it is at the hands of the 
officials to decide whether they can be shown to a researcher based at a foreign 
institution. Experienced practitioners and officials are usually more vigilant than 
scholars in identifying “state secrets”, as a result of regular training on the situation, 
laws and regulations, and the technological aspects of “secret keeping” at all levels of 
the government, according to Article 7 of the “Regulation on the Implementation of 
the Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets” (State Council 
2014). As a result of such training, some practitioners and officials would simply 
refused to give the information that was not officially “classified” to the researcher. In 
 
 
 
 
69 
some extreme cases, it is likely that a researcher’s attempts to obtain such data were 
interpreted as spying on a state secrets. Such a political climate resulted in the self-
censorship of many officials and scholars, which limited the expression of personal 
opinions in the interviews.  
To mitigate this problem, it was made clear before the interview that the purpose of 
the research was to improve the understanding of China’s counter-terrorism approach, 
and the research were not biased towards Uyghur dissidents and human rights 
activists outside China; they were framed so as to be as neutral as possible. For 
example, many Uyghur dissidents consider the CCP’s suppression of the Urumqi Riots 
in 2009 a “genocide”. This kind of framing was avoided so that the interviews would 
not provoke the officials and distract them to issues that are not directly relevant to 
the interview questions. It was also stressed at the beginning of the interviews that 
the interviews were not designed to obtain any information that was not publicly 
available from the interviewees. Interviewees were also advised to be vigilant in 
regard to disclosing the information that could potentially put themselves in danger. 
Considering that the use of the consent form and a recorder may have constituted a 
potential barrier to obtaining in-depth and genuine data, they were not used in the 
interview. However, verbal consent was obtained before the interviews commenced. 
The interviews were recorded in the form of written notes. Pseudonyms were used to 
identify the interviewees. The key to the identifying code was stored in an encrypted 
file on a server hosted at the University of Leeds so that unauthorised access was 
impossible without a secure VPN. All of the manuscripts were destroyed after the 
interviews.  
Notes from the interviews were analysed in Citavi, a computer assisted qualitative 
analysis software. The notes were saved as word documents and imported to Citavi. 
Relevant texts were highlighted for Citavi to trace relationships between them. 
Computer-aided qualitative analysis helped the researcher to bring together related 
information from different interviewees for comparison and analysis, and to challenge 
the existing assumptions and first impressions of the data, thus helping address and 
critique the research questions (García-Horta and Guerra-Ramos 2009). 
3.4 Clarifications of ambiguous concepts 
Two controversial concepts used in this thesis require clarification. First, it can be seen 
throughout the thesis that the “West” is often used in the friend/enemy grouping to 
indicate the other, the entities and individuals that hold traditional liberal/democratic 
values and that hold a grudge against the Communist regime. The “West” is often 
used as a label, rather than an indication of specific countries, in the counter-
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terrorism context. It is an oversimplification of the complicated international system 
in which “Western” countries vary in many ways and certainly do not have the same 
agenda for foreign policy. The use of this concept per se risks further entrenching the 
existing division between the so-called “West” and China. This thesis acknowledges 
the implications of using the “West”, and seeks to examine the use of this label in a 
broader political context. The “West” is an integral element of the Chinese political 
discourse, which became embedded in the history when China fell prey to colonialism 
and imperialism. Replacing the “West” with another word may result in the 
compromising the meaning of the original texts. Acknowledging the “West” as a label, 
this thesis critically examines the underlying assumptions regarding the use of the 
term. The specific meaning of the “West” in a different context will be explained in the 
thesis when clarification is needed. 
Second, the concept of “propaganda” has a different connotation in China’s political 
discourse. Propaganda is generally associated with the selection of facts and the use 
of loaded language to produce a one-sided conclusion and to induce an emotional, 
rather than rational response (B. L. Smith 2016). The morality of propaganda is often 
questioned due to its deceptive and manipulative nature and the use of tactics such as 
meaningless association to persuade people (Jowett and O’Donnell  2012, 5). In the 
Chinese context, there is no pejorative connotation attached to the idea of 
propaganda per se. In Chinese, the corresponding word xuanchuan simply means to 
publicise.18 Xuanchuan is an essential instrument with which to examine the CCP’s 
normative position – its perception of “correctness” – as well as how it publicises, and 
even imposes it upon the public. As the CCP enshrines the socialist path with Chinese 
characteristics as the only “correct” path for China (Research Centre of the Theoretical 
System of Socialism with Chinese characteristics of the Central Party School of CPC 
2011), its xuanchuan is inevitably selective, promoting the “correct” ideology while 
denouncing the “wrong” one in the form of “guidance” (Brady 2010, 20). As it is 
already acknowledged in the academia that propaganda is at the core of the CCP’s 
claims for legitimacy (Brady 2010, 1), it would be confusing to use other words such as 
“publicity” instead. However, to make sense of the role of China’s counter-terrorism 
propaganda, it is important to understand that xuanchuan itself is a neutral term in 
China’s political context, and that Chinese political elites do not associate it with 
negative connotations.  
3.5 Considerations of the limitations of the research design 
                                                      
18 Xuanchuan: 宣传 
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The analysis of the empirical data is based principally upon publicly available data, 
supplemented by interviews to verify the observations from such an analysis. Given 
the opacity of the counter-terrorism policy-making process, materials on intelligence 
cooperation and statistics regarding the funding allocated for counter-terrorism are 
not accessible even to Chinese scholars (Shun Zhang 2013, 12). The limitation in terms 
of the accessibility of the data partly shaped the design of the methodology. The 
research was therefore designed to concentrate on the official discourse and 
academic interpretations, in order to identify the links between the quest for 
legitimacy and the counter-terrorism strategy. In doing so, the lack of information at 
the operational level did not pose a fundamental challenge to the understanding of 
the overall counter-terrorism approach.  
Secondly, this project focuses mainly on the justifications of the CCP and Chinese 
scholars. It may be questioned whether the lack of contact with the opposition group 
might result in bias on the issue of Uyghurs’ claims of independence. Contact with the 
opposition group was avoided for two reasons. First, it is not the aim of this project to 
provide an answer in terms of the legitimacy of Uyghurs’ claims. Second, contacting 
the Uyghur émigré community could well have eroded the trust between the 
researcher and the Chinese government. Critical comments published by human rights 
organisations, the UN and English language media is adequate to analyse the response 
of the political elites and Chinese scholars.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Focusing on Chinese sources, this thesis examines the ways in which the CCP, its 
political elites and Chinese intellectuals frame terrorism. An analytical model was 
designed to answer the research question. To examine the ways in which political 
elites perceive, frame, and respond to terrorism, this thesis looks at a wide range of 
attitudes, beliefs and sentiments based on the social construction of the collective 
memory of the Century of Humiliation. The analytical model provides a framework to 
examine the view of political elites and intellectuals that national unity should be 
placed above diversity. The focus on unity helps the CCP to extend state power to 
tackle separatism.  
The analytical model helps to analyse how the CCP frame, define, and deal with 
“terrorism” by revealing the underlying friend/enemy distinction in China’s political 
discourse. It helps to analyse how the framing of terrorism and counter-terrorism 
draw on the narratives of the Century of Humiliation and various assumptions and 
labels to legitimise China’s approach to terrorism.  
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The analytical model also helps to examine the political violence in Xinjiang. By 
analysing the underlying assumptions and labels used in China’s de-radicalisation 
policy, the analytical model helps to reveal the friend/enemy distinction that has 
enabled the CCP to justify its hard and soft approaches to terrorism.  
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Chapter 4 Unity and the enemy  
The question of friend and enemy often arises when examining China’s counter-
terrorism documents, speeches and academic writings. This question was posed by 
Mao Zedong (1925) nearly a century ago: “Who are our enemies, who are our 
friends?”. Terrorist attacks are often attributed to “hostile forces”, but who are the 
“hostile forces”? What have they done? When political elites and scholars talk about 
“separatism”, what sort of “separatism” is it? What sort of “unity” is it that a territory 
is “separated” from? When linking terrorism with “hostile forces”, are political elites 
and intellectuals referring to the same enemy that China was fighting a century ago?  
This chapter will approach these questions by providing a brief account of the 
evolution of the concept of unity and enemy. The first section is a short chronological 
study of the conceptualisation of “unity”. It will draw on ancient philosophical debates 
over the causes of instability to explain why China’s rulers in both ancient and modern 
history consider unity the key to the governance of China. It will discuss the 
arguments of Mozi and Laozi regarding the causes of instability and their 
understanding of “unity”. These in understanding Chinese political thoughts beyond 
Confucianism. The influence of the Confucianism on the contemporary Chinese 
politics remains dominant, as the Confucianist obedience to order and hierarchy is 
more likely to be favoured by Chinese rulers.  
The first section will also discuss a related concept, the “Grand Union”. This concept 
helps to understand the linkages between the concept of unity and the historical 
continuities since the Century of Humiliation. The debate between advocates who 
wanted to abolish the use of minzu such as Gu Jiegang and Fu Sinian, and their 
opponents such as Fei Xiaotong and Jian Bozan is very relevant to Chinese elites’ 
rationale for the integration model and the framing of separatism in China’s political 
discourse.  
The second section will discuss the perception of the enemy in modern and 
contemporary Chinese political discourse. It will highlight the changing assumptions 
attached to the phrase “hostile forces” and seek to identify who the enemies are in 
China’s political discourse. It will investigate the assumption that the “West”, 
especially the US, has never given up on undermining communist regimes, instead 
turning to more “peaceful” means, such as cultural and ideological infiltrations to 
influence the Chinese public. This assumption has been used to justify Xi Jinping’s 
focus on “ideological work” in recent years. The Party views itself as being responsible 
for helping individuals to distinguish between “correct” and “wrong” ideologies.  
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The third section will focus on the politicisation of history. It will explain how the 
Century of Humiliation and the following period of division have been used to justify 
the emphasis on unity in the CCP’s political agenda and to distinguish between friends 
and enemies. Political elites and intellectuals have developed a “correct” version of 
history, which allows limited alternative interpretations of the history of Xinjiang. The 
“correct” version of history assumes that Xinjiang has been “an integral part of 
Chinese territory” (People’s Daily Online 2017a), and that the enemies have been 
undermining China’s national unity by “distorting” the history of Xinjiang (State 
Council Information Office 2002b). Those who negate this assumption are at risk of 
being put in the category of the “wrong” and could potentially be considered as 
separatists.  
The fourth section will then discuss how the concept of separatism is conditioned by 
the assumptions of unity and minzu. By defining the “correct” outlook on history and 
minzu, the CCP has constructed alternative interpretations as separatist. The framing 
of the “correct” version of history allows the CCP to establish unity as a legitimate 
political agenda and separatism as illegitimate claims that are often supported by 
external enemies.  
The fifth section will provide a critical analysis of the framing of unity and the enemy 
in the counter-terrorism discourse. It will examine the assumptions regarding friends 
and enemies and how these assumptions have been framed in Chinese official 
documents and scholarly works. It will explain how the use of the label “hostile forces” 
allows the speakers to attribute blame to the enemies they have designated. It will 
also discuss how these assumptions have resulted in tightened control over non-
governmental organisations and the internet.  
The sixth section will discuss how the label “East Turkistan forces” has been used to 
boost the legitimacy of the CCP. The ambiguity of the use of the label and the lack of 
transparency and due process in terrorism designation have made “East Turkistan 
forces” a highly politicised label. This section will attempt to reveal the assumptions 
underlying the label and explore how the concept of the enemy has helped the CCP to 
maintain its legitimacy. This section will also discuss the issue of foreign fighters from 
Xinjiang in order to further unravel the assumptions underwriting China’s counter-
terrorism discourse. In particular, the counter-narratives on hijrat have portrayed 
those who fled China as individuals who were deceived or coerced. This case 
demonstrates the ways in which the CCP has sought to gain support from the majority 
and omitted the possibility of genuine grievances among the Uyghurs. 
4.1 Chronology of the concept of unity in Chinese political philosophy 
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The concept of unity lays the foundation for understanding other issues such as 
nationality, ethnicity and the state in China’s quest for legitimacy. It helps to explain 
political issues such as the degree of autonomy that ethnic minorities are entitled to in 
China. This section also shows how the Chinese political elites and intellectuals have 
developed the integration model of “diversity within unity” which prioritises “unity” 
and limits the minorities’ ability to claim autonomy.  
4.1.1 Debate of unity in ancient China 
The concept of unity can be traced back to ancient debates on how a state should be 
governed. For thousands of years since the Xia Dynasty (around 21st century BC – 16th 
century BC), China has been a “family-governed monarchic country”, or a country with 
a “patriarchal clan system” (Zhonggeng Chen 2011, 53).19 In contrast to a “family-
governed monarchic country”, what the elites are pursuing today can be categorised 
as a “public governed country”. The notion of “da yitong” (Grand Union) originated 
from the discussion between two types of governance. In ancient Chinese, “da” 
means respect, the phrase meaning having respect for unity, but in contemporary 
usage, it is translated as “Grand Union”, with “da” as an adjective meaning “grand”. 
The notion of “Grand Union” still exerts an influence on today’s politics (N. Yang 2010, 
294; Qi 2015, 31). It is considered as the foundation for many other political ideas, 
such as maintaining national sovereignty, social stability, and economic development, 
defending the nation against external invasions, organising water conservancy 
projects, preventing separatism, and increasing communications between ethnic 
groups (Qi 2015, 33). Since the Qing Dynasty, the idea of “Grand Union” has been 
reinforced through various policies. According to Yang (2010, 296), it has not only 
been used to limit the way  in which China is governed, but has also shaped Chinese 
mentality. Although throughout history Chinese society has seen a constant cycle of 
division and unification, the ideal of “Grand Union” is built firmly on in the cultural 
tradition that underpins the Chinese national mindset (Xibo Chen and Han 2005, 60). 
Philosophers in ancient China had different views on the relationship between unity 
and instability. This section focuses on the arguments of two philosophers, Mozi and 
Laozi. Mozi was an advocate of unity. According to him, violence is the result of the 
untrammelled pursuit of individual interests because people follow different moral 
standards (C. Zhou and Qi 1995, 87; 90). The solution, therefore, is to select a “wise 
man“, or a “Philosopher king” in Plato’s words, to govern the state (C. Zhou and Qi 
1995, 89). The “wise man” has the responsibility to build the consensus on morality in 
                                                      
19 family-governed monarchic country: 家天下; family-governed monarchic country: 宗法制; 
public governed country: 公天下. 
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a state in order to prevent chaos (C. Zhou and Qi 1995, 89). This framework 
emphasises benevolent governance and the moral exemplifying role of the ruler (G. 
Zhou 2007, 40). Mozi’s proposal of the “wise man” is Hobbesian in the sense that an 
absolute monarchy is necessary to allow people to leave the State of Nature, but it is 
different in that Mozi’s argument links the legitimacy of the ruler with his own 
morality, i.e. his virtue of being “wise”, while the Hobbes’ argument ties legitimacy 
with legal constraints.  
On the contrary, Laozi was a major opponent of national unity. He did not oppose 
benevolent governance per se, but the way it was used by the rulers. According to 
Zhang Songhui’s (S. Zhang 2006, 193–97, cited in Luo 2016, 89) study, Laozi believed 
that advocating benevolent governance per se marks the corruption of morality; 
benevolent governance has become the instrument the ruler uses for their own 
agenda, and publicly advocating benevolence will corrupt the nature of benevolence. 
He advocated an alternative model of governance – “a small country with a small 
population”.20 Laozi’s argument resonates with the libertarian scepticism of authority 
in his attitude against the rule by one. He believed that atrocities are caused by 
tyranny – “people die from famine because of heavy tax; people are difficult to govern 
because of what the rulers do; and people despise death because the superior seeks 
to live a life of luxury” (Rao 2006, 180). According to Laozi, people no long fear death if 
violence becomes inevitable to end the tyranny of the ruler. Laozi’s solution, therefore, 
is to minimise the power of the authority by limiting reliance on social institutions:  
A state should be small, and so should the population. People shall have 
various instruments, yet they feel free to ignore them; people shall be 
afraid of death so that they would not travel afar; people do not see it 
necessary to use the carriage or the boat, even though they are available; 
people do not feel the need to display their weapons to deter their enemy, 
even though they are also available… people in neighbouring countries 
shall be able to see each other and hear the sound of their livestock, yet 
do not feel the need to communicate until they die (Rao 2006, 190).  
The utopian picture of a simplistic human society that Laozi portrayed reflected his 
ideal, which, in essence, contravenes the idea of a powerful central authority. In an 
era of turmoil, Laozi went to another extreme and depicted an idealistic society where 
there was minimal political structure, a limited number of government officials, and 
little or no interference in people’s ordinary life (C. C. Zhou 2009, 2). In this ideal world, 
the “us and them” dichotomy is not obvious simply because the small government 
does not need to promote its political agenda by identifying an enemy, and thus there 
is no need for the people to choose sides. Laozi’s argument challenges the concepts of 
                                                      
20 a small country with a small population: 小国寡民 
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unity, and a strong government is seen as an impediment to the wellbeing of the 
people. In a society where “unity” is not necessarily seen as beneficial, “separatism” is 
naturally not a crime.  
It is clear that Laozi’s view of the government does not fit well with the CCP’s rationale 
for prioritising unity. Some Chinese scholars have politicised the study of Laozi’s 
philosophy, and criticise his utopia as a “regression”, a sign of “backwardness” (Rao 
2006, 189). Others have acknowledged the undeniable significance of Laozi’s political 
thoughts in Chinese philosophy, but have sought to downplay the incompatibility 
between Laozi and the current mainstream political thoughts. For example, scholars of 
the Pei Laozi School deny the link between the idea of “a small country with a small 
population” and separatism (X. Zou 1997; Jing Li 2003a).21 Li Jing (2003b, 80), a 
researcher based at a local Party School, argues that despite Laozi’s preference for 
less state interference, the seemingly “separated” groups in his utopia are in fact 
“unified” under the Dao (literally translated as “the way”, indicating certain patterns 
and rules to govern in the context of politics, the violation of which results in tyranny), 
meaning that all the rulers must be the executants of the Dao, thus achieving a 
“unification of diversity and homogeneity”. The far-fetched interpretation of the Pei 
Laozi School demonstrates the close ties between academia and the political circles, 
and the anxiety about any ideas that might justify separatism.  
In comparison, the Confucian ideas that value “unity” are more likely to be accepted 
by the rulers, as is evident from the booming of Confucianism in the Han dynasty. 
Dong Zhongshu, a Confucian philosopher in the Han dynasty, took Mozi’s argument on 
unity a step further (G. Liang 2009, 51–52). In the Warring State Period, the 
establishment of vassal states enabled resource mobilisation on a larger scale which 
intensified existing conflicts, causing heavy loss of life. Dong’s conceptualisation of 
“Grand Union” was based on the lessons from studying the causes of violence in this 
period (W. Wei 2009). “Grand Union” projects political elites and intellectuals’ 
obsession with unity. The influence of this concept can be seen throughout China’s 
political history (N. Yang 2010, 294; Qi 2015, 31).  
Dong Zhongshu promoted the ideal of the “Grand Union” as a solution to the conflict 
caused by separation. The core of the “Grand Union” in ancient China was to avoid 
separation (caused by warlords taking up territories), strengthen the power of the 
central authority and establish Confucianism as the national ideology (G. Zhou 2016, 
3). Although the current leadership does not officially promote Confucianism as a 
national ideology, Dong’s argument still affect contemporary scholars in terms of 
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viewing unity as positively correlated with prosperity throughout Chinese history (see 
Xingliang He 2011). The following passage from scholar Zhou Guidian’s (2016, 3) 
article in People’s Daily clearly illustrates how traditional ideas are still relevant today:  
The key to Dong Zhongshu’s political philosophy is the Grand Union theory 
which incorporates territorial integrity, political unity and ideological 
unity…Only by strengthening the centralisation of authority can we 
prevent separatism, appease unrest, and let people live and work in peace 
and contentment. The centralisation system established two thousand 
years ago is the most advanced system in the world at that time… Since 
then, the unity of China has become the consensus of all ethnic groups, 
together with Confucianism as the core value, laying the foundation of the 
Chinese spirit.  
4.1.2 Debate of minzu in modern China  
The discussion of the necessity of unity in modern China can be found in the debate 
over minzu among political elites and intellectuals. The dramatic political change in 
Chinese society since the Opium War has changed the framing of unity. 22 In ancient 
China, the Grand Union implied the ambition and aspiration of bringing peace to the 
world, while in modern China, unity is framed in the context of the national crisis and 
defence against imperialist invaders (Y. Wei 2016, 74).  
In this context, ethnic minorities are important because they form a part of the 
collective identity of the Chinese nation against the same enemy. The debate over 
minzu involves how to incorporate different ethnic groups into the unified Chinese 
nation. Although scholars disagree on the major causes of separatism, they share the 
view that national unity is the priority in regard to ethnic issues.  
In the late Qing dynasty, political activist Kang Youwei (1981) used the “Grand Union” 
to refer to the unification of five ethnic groups, i.e. the Manchus, Han-Chinese, 
Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans (G. Zhao 2006, 21). In 1912, Sun Yat-Sen put forward 
the idea of the “Republic of Five Nationalities” (Fei 1992, 601) upon the founding of 
the Republic of China.23 The “Three Principles of the People” of the democratic 
revolution, according to Sun Yat-sen (1986, 9:394), will lead people to “the world of 
Grand Union that Confucius had expected”.24 
During Mao’s revolution, Mao Zedong sought to link the notion of the “Grand Union” 
with the communist ideal, which was alien to many Chinese at that time. Li Aihua 
                                                      
22 Minzu can be translated as nationality and ethnicity. The ambiguity of this word is relate to 
a debate over ethnic studies in China, which will be explained later in this section. 
23 Republic of Five Nationalities: 五族共和 
24 Three Principles of the People: Nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood (民族，民
主，民生) 
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(2016, 69) argues that in Mao Zedong’s article “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship”, 
he uses the discourse of “Grand Union” to refer to the communist ideal. However, 
although there are traces of the “Grand Union”, this concept failed to provide a 
practical guideline for Mao’s revolution, which explains why he stopped using the 
phrase from 1937 to 1949 (Aihua Li 2016, 69). According to Li (2016, 74), Mao’s use of 
the “Grand Union” served to promote the concepts of communism which were alien 
to intellectuals at that time.  
In the late 1930s, there was been an important debate over minzu between two 
important scholars in China. Advocates for the abolition of the use of minzu such as 
Gu Jiegang and Fu Sinian, and their opponents such as Fei Xiaotong and Jian Bozan 
debated over how the framing of “minzu” may have an impact on the actual unity of 
the Chinese nation. This debate is discussed in Ma Rong’s (2012, 1) study on the 
concept of the “Chinese nation” in 1939. Gu Jiegang’s article, entitled “The Chinese 
Nation is One” published in Social Welfare on 13 February 1939, argued that the 
framing of Chinese communities as five “nationalities” instead of “ethnic groups” was 
a plot by the imperialists to divide and dismember China (R. Ma 2012, 2).25 Ma (2012, 
2) comments that in an age when Imperial Japan had established Manchukuo (State of 
Manchuria) and was inciting the “autonomy of Inner Mongolia”, Gu’s concern was not 
groundless. His assimilationist argument was partly shaped by his fieldwork in Xining 
where he saw the slogan of “national self-determination” all over the street (Zhiyan 
Zhao 2008) and the consequences of ethnic conflicts (J. Gu 1939c). He was worried 
that separatists such as Ma Bufang would be able to divide China in the name of 
“national self-determination” (Zhiyan Zhao 2008). 26   
Gu linked the framing of a part of Chinese territory as “China proper” with a plot by 
the imperialists to divide China. In his article “The Name of ‘China Proper’ Should Be 
Abandoned Immediately”, Gu wrote: 
What pains us the most is that the imperialists created some nouns in 
order to divide us, and we fell into their trap when these nouns were 
disseminated into China. We talked about them and wrote about them 
every day, and these nouns have served their purpose of dividing us, as if 
they were able to divide the territory and the people into several parts, 
making it more difficult to work for the unity [of the Chinese nation]. We 
                                                      
25 The Chinese Nation is One: 中华民族是一个); Social Welfare: 益世报 
26 Ma Bufang was an important member of the Muslim Ma clique warlord during the Republic 
of China era. The Ma clique controlled the Qinghai province which borders Xinjiang, Tibet 
and Gansu.  
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cannot but to blame the foolishness of our intellectuals which put the 
country in an unprecedented crisis (Gu 1939; cited in Ma 2012, 3). 27 
Gu’s concern was that the framing of “China proper” would create the very reality the 
imperialists hoped to achieve. He worried that in adopting this framing, Chinese 
intellectuals were unwittingly acknowledging the legitimacy of the occupation by the 
imperialists in those regions outside “China proper”, such as Xinjiang and Tibet. In 
particular, Gu’s subsequent article on this subject elaborates the implication of the 
framing of Xinjiang as “East Turkistan” for on the unity of China.  
Foreigners call our Manzhou as Manchuria, the people of Manzhou as 
Manchus; Menggu as Mongolia, and the people of Menggu as Mongolian, 
Xinjiang as East Turkistan, and the Hui as Mohammadans; our 18 provinces 
were called China proper, and the Han the Chinese. [They] simply divide us 
into five countries, and exclude Man, Meng, Hui and Zang outside of 
China! We had a name Xiyu for what is currently called Xinjiang province. 
They use neither of them [Xiyu or Xinjiang] and insist on calling it “East 
Turkistan”, with a clear intention to connect it [Xinjiang] to Turkey in its 
West, and estrange it from its own government in the East (Gu 1939b; 
cited in Ma 2012, 3).  
This quote is very relevant to the concerns of the current leadership about framing 
“Xinjiang” as “East Turkistan”. The CCP sees those who adopt this framing as having a 
separatist agenda, and groups all those who speak of “East Turkistan” under the 
banner of the “East Turkistan forces”. Gu’s writing explains that this framing is not 
simply a matter of name, but one matter of sovereignty.  
In addition to the World Uyghur Congress which has already been designated a 
terrorist organisation by the Ministry of Public Security, some other Uyghur 
organisations outside China are also using the name “East Turkistan”, including the 
Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization (2015), the Uyghur American 
Association, the International Uyghur Human Rights & Democracy Foundation, the 
Uyghur Human Rights Project, and the Eastern Turkistan Education and Solidarity 
Association. Among them, the Eastern Turkistan Education and Solidarity Association 
is under close watch by the CCP because of its support for foreign fighters from China 
to Syria (Global Times 2013a).  
Gu’s patriotism had an impact on his view of minzu. Fei Xiaotong disagrees with Gu on 
considering the naming or framing as the major reason for the weakness and division 
of China at that time. Fei Xiaotong held that groups with different ancestors, 
languages and cultural traditions should be regarded as different nations, and the 
objective existence of different nations should be respected (Zhiyan Zhao 2008). He 
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argued that it is possible to form a unified political entity based on the common 
interests of stability and security (Zhiyan Zhao 2008). Jian Bozan, a Uyghur historian, 
criticises Gu’s view of minzu as Han Chauvinist (Kewu Huang 2016). He acknowledges 
the importance of “unity”, but rejects Gu’s renunciation of the existence of other 
nations (Kewu Huang 2016).  
Gu responded to Fei’s criticism by questioning the training he received in the UK. The 
following quote implies that Gu was suspicious about whether scholars trained abroad 
understood the real situation in China.  
I would advise bluntly those who studied anthropology and ethnology that 
you should examine how many ethnic groups are there within the Chinese 
border in practice. Do not blindly follow others’ view that China has five 
nations, and attract a bunch of followers, boost the credibility of the 
imperialist propaganda, and put the country in a status of brokenness (Gu 
1939b; cited in Ma 2012, 6).  
Fei’s study in the UK was influenced by scholars such as Sergei Mikhailovich 
Shirokogorov and Bronislaw Kasper Malinowski, who attached great value to 
individuality and diversity, while Gu’s experience as a traditional historian made him a 
persistent believer in the Chinese nation as a political entity (R. Ma 2012, 6).  
Fei was not convinced by the argument that “an empty noun” alone may lead to the 
dismemberment of China. Fei was more concerned about domestic problems at that 
time, implying that threat to the survival of China as a state was from the inequalities 
within, rather than the imperialist invasion from outside.  
If our country can truly achieve “Republic of Five Nationalities”, every 
citizen can enjoy equality, everyone’s vital interests can be satisfied, the 
country will certainly be supported by its people. It would not be divided 
by any empty noun, and its people will stand up and fight together if there 
is an invasion by a powerful state. If an empty noun can divide a 
community, then this community itself must have been unhealthy. An 
unhealthy community may be able to prevent its enemies’ strategy of 
division, but a more important solution lies in improving its own 
organisation (Fei 1939, cited in Ma 2012, 6).  
It is important to emphasise that although Fei Xiaotong and Jian Bozan disagree with 
Gu’s assimilationist view of minzu, neither of them challenged the concept of “unity”. 
Fei developed the paradigm of “diversity within unity”.28 Recognised by the CCP, the 
“diversity within unity” paradigm laid the foundation for ethnic studies in China. Fei 
Xiaotong (1988) put forward the paradigm of “diversity within unity” in his 1988 
Tanner lecture in Hong Kong. This paradigm is based on the Marxist Materialist 
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Dialectics, positing that everything in existence is a combination of ultimately 
contradictory forces. Reflected in history, China as a state is experiencing a repeating 
cycle of unity and division. The cycle is concurrent with the changing status of the 
contradiction between unity and plurality. When China is in a state of unity, cultural 
diversity can be manifested to a reasonable level; whereas in times of turbulence, 
political unity is often prioritised in the whole nation (Y. Lin 1991, 9–10). This laid the 
foundation for Fei’s argument that there are multiple layers of social identities, and 
that the unity of the Chinese nation is based on shared experience, shared destiny, 
and a shared sense of dignity and humiliation at the top layer (Fei 1999, 13). 
This paradigm is both a description of, and a prescription for China’s integration model. 
It illustrates Fei’s understanding of the hierarchical relations between the Chinese 
nation as a unified political entity and the diverse ethnic groups that inhabit China, 
and describes the ways in which the relationship between the central authority and 
local ethnic groups has been negotiated previously. It is adopted by the CCP in dealing 
with ethnic issues to prioritise “unity” over “diversity”, which allows the CCP to adopt 
extraordinary measures to safeguard national unity. This academic debate again 
demonstrates an apparent political function of Chinese academia echoing the Lei Laozi 
School’s far-fetched interpretation of Laozi’s liberalist ideas.  
Fei’s design of “diversity within unity” also reflects his contractarian view of the 
relationship between the unity at the state level and the diversity at the individual 
level. Ma (2012, 7) points out that Fei’s emphasis on equality is more relevant today, 
as China has already achieve the “unity” that was in crisis in modern China, and the 
compromise of diversity might risk undermining the legitimacy of the authority.  
If the central government and the mainstream society cannot properly 
handle the question of political rights, education resources, employment 
opportunities and social mobility between communities, then [individuals 
or communities] at the “diversity” level will gradually withdraw their 
identification with the “unity”. Such estrangement will surely threat the 
maintenance and the stability of the “unity”. Today we must emphasise 
the “unity” of the Chinese nation, and at the same time, we must pay 
attention to the “diversity” of the 56 ethnic groups, safeguarding the equal 
rights of the 56 ethnic groups in all aspects.  
The above discussion shows that the academic debate over minzu has reinforced the 
centrality of the concept of “unity” in China’s political discourse. At the same time, it 
has worsened the confusion over the discussion of China’s minzu in English. “Minzu” is 
usually translated as either “nationality” or “ethnicity”. In a political context, the 
ambiguity surrounding this term is particularly problematic because in English, 
“nationality” and “ethnicity” entail different political rights. If the 56 minzus are 
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translated as “nationalities”, are they entitled to the right to national self-
determination?  
To answer this question, the concept of “nation” has to be examined in the Chinese 
context. Some argue that the entire concept of “nation” itself was “imported” in the 
late 19th century (Jieshun Xu 2008, 109–10). Zhao Suisheng (2004b, 16) argues that 
this notion was brought into China as “an instrument for China’s regeneration and 
defence”. In the late Qing Dynasty, the crisis that the Chinese society was faced with 
has made nationalism a mainstream ideology, and state-building a shared mission of 
the Chinese nation (K. Liu 2016, 79). Because the motivation for state-building is 
deeply rooted in national liberation from imperial powers, the notion of the “nation-
state” was assigned great importance (K. Liu 2016, 79). The rise of the concept of 
modern states requires the reconstruction of the relationship between individual 
rights and state power (Jingya Li 2009, 1).  
While the fluidity of the meaning creates an obstacle for understanding the subject in 
non-Chinese contexts, He Shutao (2009, 11) gives credit to its flexibility in reflecting 
the meaning - and interaction of the meanings - in various circumstances. He argues 
that the term “minzu” refers to a subject that is different from what is widely 
accepted as ethnicity research in the West; therefore it is unnecessary and confusing 
to replace “minzu” with “ethnic group” (S. He 2009, 11–13). 
The question of self-determination is politically sensitive for it undermines the claim 
about national unity. Ma (2013, 3) worries that influenced by an international 
awareness of the right to national self-determination in the de-colonisation period, 
the reassertion of ethnic identity among minority groups is increasingly entangled 
with territorial claims. He approaches the translation of “minzu” by differentiating the 
two layers of the meaning of the term. When used in phrases such as “minority 
ethnicities”, minzu refers to the people, or ethnicity; when used as Chinese nation, it 
assumes that China is a territorial state, where all of the ethnic groups within the 
territory of China are considered integral parts of the whole nation.29 Accordingly, the 
implication of the term is two-fold. When viewing ethnic groups as political entities, 
the government emphasise the integrity of the Chinese nation, especially against 
separatism in bordering provinces. When viewing them as cultural groups, the 
government regards ethnic relations as cultural interactions (R. Ma 2013, 6).  
Wang Lian (2010, 33) proposes a model that differentiates between a “political nation” 
(state) and “cultural nations” (ethnic groups). He argues that the core of nationalism is 
a political nation, while the core of separatism is a cultural nation. He sees the 
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legitimacy of the state as self-evident by considering the state as a “political nation”, 
and only challenges the legitimacy of the independent aspiration based on a “cultural 
‘nation’”. It can be seen that his criteria for distinguishing legitimate claims of 
independence are highly political and serves the political agenda of maintaining the 
unity of the existing state, while denouncing the attempts of ethnic groups to form 
new states. His argument reinforces the existing power relations between academia 
and political circles.  
The close ties between academia and political circles result in a state-centric view of 
minzu which serves to promote national unity. In this context, the term “minzu” is not 
linked to the “state” as the way that “nation-state” is perceived in the West 
(Mackerras 1995, 3). Confusing these terms is considered as having a political agenda. 
According to Huang Yusong (2016, 31), neither “state” nor “nation” can accurately 
describe China, and the confusion has given others reason to dismember China into 
various “nation-states” that are used in a modern sense. 
Many Chinese scholars (see L. Wang 2010, 30; Hao 2002, 7–8; Hou 2009, 24–25; Pang 
1996, 5) remain sensitive to the political implications of framing the 56 “minzu” within 
the Chinese state as “nationalities”, especially when this is entangled with the claims 
of the pursuit of a “nation-state”. Some question the role that “nation-state” plays in 
separatist movements. Hou Wanfeng argues that the conflicts in Kosovo, Kashmir, 
East Timor and Chechnya demonstrate that the concept of “nation-state” is nothing 
more than an ideal (Hou 2009, 24–25). According to Hao Shiyuan (2002, 9) Western 
countries, especially the US, encouraged separatism in the former Soviet Union by 
exaggerating the existing friend/enemy division. 
Some other scholars, while admitting the confusion caused by the translation of 
“minzu”, maintain that there is no need to change the translation just to reduce 
confusion for English readers. Although the political implications of the term “nation” 
are different in the Chinese discourse of unity and minzu, Hao Shiyuan (2016, 308) 
argues that the translation of minzu as “nation” is consistent with China’s national 
conditions because it is used “in the sense of the historical origins of a people (ethos), 
and it is necessary to keep using the term nationality, which indicates a shared 
citizenship and national characteristics. To Hao (2016, 308), different “nationalities” 
are part of a “unified state nation – the Chinese nation”. His understanding of the 
relationship between the state and nation is in line with the paradigm of “diversity 
within unity” – a person’s nationality, in other words, the identity of being part of the 
Chinese nation comes first and the ethnic identity is secondary to the status of being 
“Chinese”. In other words, he prioritises “Chineseness” over ethnic identity.  
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Still others approach minzu from a cultural relativist perspective, arguing that cultural 
groups across the world have different understandings of nationality and ethnicity, 
and the validity of the translation should not be judged based on how the term is 
understood in the Western context. Zhu Lun is a major advocate of the validity of 
referring to the 56 ethnic groups as nationalities, He argues that other countries, 
including Spain, have increasingly accepted the use of nationality, as the term is 
increasingly linked with autonomy, rather than independence (L. Zhu 1996, 12). 
Ironically, the Catalan independence movement in 2017 showed that “nationality” is 
still understood predominantly in the Western context, as the word has been linked 
closely to separatist claims as a result of growing ethno-nationalist movements in 
Europe (Pazzanese 2017). This highlights the importance of disambiguating minzu in 
order to clarify the role that “unity” plays in China’s political discourse.  
4.1.3 The legacy of the debates of unity and minzu in contemporary China 
The two sections above laid the foundation for understanding the role of the concepts 
of unity and minzu in the contemporary Chinese political discourse. the ideal of 
“Grand Union” is woven into the CCP’s pursuit of the “socialist path”. The following 
quote justifies the link between the “Grand Union” and the commitment to national 
unity of the current leadership by framing the “Grand Union” as the shared pursuit 
and the “highest social ideal” for the Chinese nation.  
We all know that the Grand Union based on the idea of “all under heaven 
are equal” is the social ideal pursuit by the Chinese nation. The idea of 
“Grand Union” put forward in the famous “Book of Rites” has a profound 
influence on successive generations of politicians…many philosophers 
have turned the nostalgia for the past [the Grand Union in the Yao and 
Shun era] into the pursuit for the future. For example, in The Book on 
Grand Union, Kang Youwei believes that society will continue to evolve 
into the ultimate “Grand Union” of the world. The pioneer of democratic 
revolution, Sun Zhongshan [Sun Yat-sen] also regards “all under heaven 
are equal” as his ideal and pursuit. It is safe to say that throughout Chinese 
history, the “Grand Union” based on the idea of “all under heaven are 
equal” has become the highest social ideal for this [Chinese] nation. And 
the “Grand Union” based on the idea of “all under heaven are equal” is the 
very “fundamental cultural genome of the Chinese nation” that General 
Secretary Xi Jinping talked about. 
It is exactly because the Chinese nation has such a pursuit and such a 
cultural genome when the scientific Socialism founded by Marx and Engels 
came into China, Chinese people were exceptionally willing to accept such 
a social ideal. It can be argued that the reason we chose the Socialist path 
has much to do with the “Grand Union” based on the idea of “all under 
heaven are equal” that the Chinese nation has pursued (Xinhua 2015f).  
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This quote also demonstrates a typical tactic in the Chinese political rhetoric of 
inducing frame alignment by recounting the past. It illustrates how the old notion of 
unity has been translated into a source of legitimacy by linking it to respected political 
activists such as Kang Youwei and Sun Yat-sen. The second paragraph then links the 
notion of the Chinese “cultural genome”, which priorities unity with socialist values of 
equality. Although the notion of the “Grand Union” is no longer frequently used today, 
it has been included in the political discourse to justify the legitimacy of the “socialist 
path”. The following quote shows how the “Grand Union” has been modernised by 
combining it with what the CCP considers “Western values”. 
Since the Opium War in 1840, the entire Chinese nation had been placed 
on the brink of the elimination. The Chinese nation was faced with two 
historic tasks, survival and development. To this end, China has started the 
historical process of national rejuvenation. In this process, Chinese people 
has combined the “Grand Union” based on the idea of “all under heaven 
are equal” and the values such as democracy, human rights, and science 
forged since the Western renaissance, in order to find out the path for 
survival, development and national rejuvenation (Xinhua 2015f).  
The linkage made between the “Grand Union” and “Western values” per se is 
particularly interesting in the context of the increasingly apparent hostility towards 
“Western values” under Xi Jinping. It is possible that the CCP is aware of the negative 
connotations of the notion of the “Grand Union”, and has attempted to whitewash 
the notion by linking it to the values that are more likely to be accepted by ordinary 
citizens. According to Yang Nianqun (2010, 57), while the notion projects a sense of 
national pride in the harmonious coexistence of various ethnic groups across 
geographically distinctive regions, the practice related to the “Grand Union” evokes 
memories of tyranny, dictatorship, and feudalism, as a high level of centralisation risks 
power abuse by the rulers. The centralised structured required to establish the “Grand 
Union” resembles a totalitarian regime in that it ties the destiny of a whole nation to 
the judgement of the emperor, making political decisions highly arbitrary. In addition, 
Yang (2010, 57) points out that the notion empowered the ruler with a sense of 
responsibility and superiority, which became an obstacle to social evolution. 
Furthermore, extreme forms of obsession with the “Grand Union” have resulted in 
speech crime or the literary inquisition in the Chinese context. Considering these 
connotations, Yang proposes to understand the notion as a political cultural ideal, 
rather than to put it into practice.30 
                                                      
30 The literary inquisition (文字狱) refers to official persecution of intellectuals for their 
writings. For details, see Zhang and Zhang 2010 “A Review of the Studies on Literary 
Inquisition of the Qing Dynasty”  
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Despite the criticism, the notion of the “Grand Union” remains crucial to the 
understanding of national unity in relation to separatism. It establishes a point of 
reference against which “separatism” is understood. The “Grand Union” conditions 
the perception that separatist claims are at odds with the unity of the state. For 
example, the notion of the “Grand Union” is included in the training course for 
“patriotic believers” from Xinjiang to study mandarin Chinese (Central Socialist School 
2018). The course is provided by the Central Socialist School and functions as 
propaganda for the “sinicisation of religions” and the resistance against an extremist 
ideology (Central Socialist School 2018). The training of “patriotic believers” is part of 
the de-radicalisation measures aimed at preventing separatism through religion.  
The “diversity within unity” paradigm, designed to prioritise unity, has become the 
core of the CCP’s perceptions on ethnic relations. An official document on the 
development of Tibet highlights the “correctness” of this paradigm in dealing with 
ethnic groups by requiring cadres from different ethnic groups to  
correctly understand the diversity within unity paradigm of the Chinese 
nation, consciously resist narrow national awareness, resolutely oppose 
ethno-separatism, enhance the identification with great motherland, with 
the Chinese nation, with Chinese culture and with the Socialist path with 
Chinese characteristics” (People’s Congress of the Tibet Autonomous 
Region 2011, 22).  
Given the emphasis on unity, the political discourse in Xinjiang reflects the alignment 
of the local authority with the central authority in ensuring the political loyalty of 
Xinjiang to the state. On the 1st October 2015, Zhang Chunxian 2015), the then Party 
Secretary in Xinjiang, gave a speech on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Summarising the progress of the government in 
the past 60 years, the following quote is a typical example of the counter-terrorism 
propaganda at the higher level in Xinjiang, which is embedded in the political 
discourse that prioritises unity, and characterised by a state-centric problem-solving 
mentality. The speech touches upon a wide range of topics, such as legal rights, ethnic 
integration, and religious policy. “Socialist core values” at the end of the quote were 
used to bring all of these aspects together in shaping a climate that is conducive to 
patriotism, unity, productivity and progress.  
We unswervingly followed the correct path with Chinese characteristics to 
solve the problems of ethnicity, gave full play to the advantages of the 
system of regional ethnic autonomy, protected the legal rights and 
interests of all ethnic groups, promoted exchanges and integration 
between different ethnic groups, so that the socialist ethnic relations 
based on equality, unity and mutual assistance could be strengthened and 
developed. Adhering to the basic principles of the Party’s religious work, 
we protected the legal, prevented the illegal, curbed extremism, resisted 
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infiltration, combated crime, and actively guided the religious work to suit 
the socialist society. Religious freedom was ensured, and the legalisation 
of religious work continued to be improved. We put the socialist core 
values into practice, promoted the Xinjiang spirits, and vigorously 
developed the unified and diverse, integrated and open modern culture 
with Xinjiang characteristics. “Five identifies” has been enhanced, and the 
love to China and Xinjiang, unity and dedication, diligence and mutual 
help, openness and progress have become the mains theme of Xinjiang. 31  
4.2 Political leaders’ perception of the enemy 
This section provides a brief account of the concept of the enemy. Before the term 
“terrorism” was widely used in the Chinese political discourse, the notion of the 
enemy was framed in various other ways. This section focuses on the use of the 
concept of the enemy as a label to examine the shifting friend/enemy distinction from 
the Mao era up to now. It illustrates how the concept of the enemy has enabled 
political elites to identify the threats to the legitimacy of the CCP according to the 
political needs of different times. This section shows how the label functions as a 
language device to delineate the boundary between “friends” and “enemies”. 
Attributing blame to “hostile forces” allows the speaker to obscure the identity of the 
accused perpetrator, deflecting the audience’s attention away from domestic causes 
of terrorism without referring to a specific political entity.  
The phrase “hostile forces” initially appeared in the Chinese translation of The Brief 
History of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshvik) in 1938. This book was 
initially used as a text book for “Party construction” in China (G. Qian 2015, 31; Le 
1959, 12).32 The phrase was imported from the Soviet Union under Stalin to refer to 
his political opponents (G. Qian 2015, 31). The book itself has been criticised by some 
Chinese scholars for advocating a “personality cult and subjectivism” (Le 1959, 13), 
but the phrase “hostile forces” – an ideologically charged term – has remained an 
importance part of the Chinese political discourse. 33 
The meaning of “hostile forces” is contingent upon which political entity is considered 
by the CCP as the most formidable threat to its legitimacy of the CCP. In the early days 
of the founding of the PRC, the “enemies” were the Nationalist Party under Chiang Kai 
                                                      
31 “Five identifies”: identify with the motherland, identify with the Chinese nation, identify 
with Chinese culture, identify with the CCP, identify with socialism with Chinese 
characteristics (CRI 2015).  
32 Party construction: 党建 
33 Subjectivism: 主观主义 
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Shek, bandits and anti-China forces in the international community (Fang 2013). 
During the Great Famine (1959-1960), the CCP used “hostile forces” to refer to all 
dissidents (G. Qian 2015, 31). The vague usage of the term resulted in criminalising 
those who were dissatisfied with the CCP leadership (G. Qian 2015, 31). The failure of 
the Great Leap Forward and the revolutions of 1989 resulted in anxiety among 
political elites about their ideological and political opponents (G. Qian 2015, 32). 
During the Cultural Revolution, the phrase was used to demonise the “five black 
categories”, meaning landlords, rich farmers, counter-revolutionaries, bad-influencers, 
and rightists (Fang 2013), reflecting the theme of class struggle under Mao.34 After the 
Party decided to give up Mao’s “class struggle as the guiding principle”, the “enemies” 
became “anti-democratic forces”, i.e. dictatorship (G. Qian 2015, 32).35 However, such 
usage was immediately criticised by Deng Xiaoping. The term was abandoned at the 
14th National Congress when Deng called upon the Party to be vigilant against the its 
Left-leaning tendency of the Party (Y. Shao 1992).  
Today, the term “hostile forces” is often used with various qualifiers – 
“foreign/international/Western hostile forces”. It is also used interchangeably with 
“anti-China forces”. Political elites and intellectuals assume that separatists rely on 
Western supporters to promote their separatist claims, and these supporters often 
share common interests with separatists due to the same “anti-China” stance (Yaxin 
2008). In the eyes of Nur Bekri, the chairman of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, 
Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress are desperately trying to join the “anti-
China chorus of the Western hostile forces”, and “vociferously defame and attack 
China in the international community”(Yaxin 2008). The following sections focus on 
the concept of the enemy in different leadership periods and its legacy in China’s 
counter-terrorism discourse.  
4.2.1 Mao Zedong: “peaceful evolution” and two types of contradiction 
Some of Mao’s views of security seem to have faded away with time, and no longer 
frequently appear in the current political discourse, but in essence, they remain the 
foundation upon which the current security discourse is constructed. Some ideas have 
been internalised and the users of the narratives are aligned with Mao’s underlying 
assumption without being fully conscious of such an alignment. This section focuses 
on Mao’s idea of “peaceful evolution”, which still influences China’s behaviour as an 
international actor (Gong 1994, 268–70).  
                                                      
34 five black categories: 黑五类 
35 class struggle as the guiding principle: 阶级斗争为纲 
 
 
 
 
90 
Formulated by United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles at the onset of the 
Cold War in the 1950s, peaceful evolution entails a series of peaceful tactics to 
weaken the Sino-Soviet bloc and undermine socialism (Ong 2007, 717–18). Since the 
Mao era, peaceful evolution has been considered a major threat to the regime (Z. Wu 
2012). After the Second World War, the conflict in the ideological sphere intensified as 
the Soviet Union and the US sought to expand communism and capitalism.  
Mao’s anxiety about peaceful evolution can be traced back to the time when John 
Foster Dulles was encouraged by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Sino-
Soviet split of the 1960s (Z. Liang 1992, 2). Mao’s speech at a small conference in 
Hangzhou in November 1959 reflected his concern that the US would not give up its 
plan to expand capitalism, but instead, it has turned to peaceful means to convert 
socialists into capitalists (L. He, Yao, and Xiao 1995, 10). On 8 August 1966, the 8th 
Central Committee passed the Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP 
Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which quoted Mao’s comment 
from the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee that addressed the 
importance of ideology in peacefully winning over the hearts and minds of the 
Chinese people. Mao believed that it is a general rule that in order to overthrow a 
political power, it is necessary to start from the ideological sphere, and manipulate 
public opinion (Central Committee 1966). To resist this ideological threat, Mao 
emphasised the importance of adhering to Marxism (P. Wang 2006, 13). Mao’s 
perception of an ideological threat is closely relevant to the ideological control under 
the current leadership. The anxiety about the impact of “Western values” on the 
legitimacy of the CCP has resulted in a cascade of criticism of them (S. Li 2009; Wenlin 
Tian 2017; J. Dong 2012; J. Guo 2012; S. Ling, Hu, and Chen 2017).  
Peaceful evolution is the linchpin of how Chinese political elites and intellectuals 
understand Sino-Western relations. In the context of the ideological conflict between 
communist China and the capitalist West, “terrorism” is understood as an extreme 
manifestation and the legacy of the confrontation in the Cold War. During the Cold 
War, both the Soviet Union and the US pursued a hegemonic expansionist policy, 
supporting the opposing sides and engaging in a proxy war (Mastanduno 1997; Hong 
Zhang 2004, 19). The US was accused of supporting the anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, 
and anti-Socialist movements that used terrorism as a tactic (J. Sun 2010, 6–8; Hong 
Zhang 2004, 10). The numerous attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro are considered as 
an example of the US’ engagement in terrorist attacks against communist countries 
(Sen Yang and Hu 1990). On the other hand, the Soviet Union was also accused of 
supporting left-wing terrorism in West Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and 
Southern Africa (Hong Zhang 2004, 19).  
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Chinese scholars see terrorism in the post-Cold War era as a continuation of the 
ideological confrontation in the Cold War (S. Wang and Hu 1998b, 31). Wang and Hu 
attribute terrorism to the changing world order and the ensuing instability. In 
particular, they blame the US’ involvement in the Revolutions of 1989 and its military 
intervention to promote democracy, linking them with regime instability, unrest and 
civil war in some Third World countries (S. Wang and Hu 1998a, 63). The expansion of 
democracy, the enlargement of the NATO towards the East, as well as the plans to 
transform the Middle East have convinced Chinese scholars and officials that China 
will be the next target of the “colour revolution” (Jianming Huang 2013, 126; H. Dong 
2001, 1; Aimin Li 2015, 59; 61), as the collapse of the Soviet Union has left China as 
the biggest Socialist country (Y. Gu 2009, 304), inviting the “end-game of the historic 
capitalist-communist struggle” (G. Wang 2014, 217). 
In this context, Chinese scholars believe that Islamic fundamentalism is a ramification 
of the tensions in Islamic societies that resulted from Western expansion in the form 
of direct or indirect interventions accompanied by the output of Western cultural 
values (Gou, Xiao, and Shen 2014, 239). The US’ failure to prove the existence of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq undermined the credibility of its counter-
terrorism agenda (M. Yu et al. 2003, 133), and convinced Chinese scholars of the 
hegemonic nature of its War on Terror (M. Yu et al. 2003, 133).  
Mao’s argument about friends and enemies is at the core of China’s quest for 
legitimacy. He differentiates between two types of social contradictions: the 
“contradictions among the people”, which is in essence are the contradictions with 
friends, which should be dealt using soft measures, such as education and persuasion; 
and the “contradictions between ourselves and the enemy”, which are essentially 
irreconcilable, and should be treated with more radical measures such as deprivation 
of political rights and coercion (Z. Mao 1957, 1949).36 Those who were deemed “one 
of us” (people) would have democratic rights, whereas those who were deemed the 
“enemy” would be the object of dictatorship (K. Yu 2002, 182).   
We have always advocated adopting two different methods – dictatorship 
and democracy – to solve different types of contradictions… Against our 
enemies, we should adopt methods of dictatorship, meaning when 
necessary, depriving them of political participation, forcing them to obey 
the law of the people’s government, forcing them to engage in labour 
work, and transforming them into a new person through labour. On the 
contrary, as for the people, [we should] use democratic methods… do not 
                                                      
36 contradictions among the people: 人民内部矛盾; contradictions between ourselves and 
the enemy: 敌我矛盾 
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coerce them to do this or that, but educate and persuade them using 
democratic methods (Z. Mao 1957).  
Mao’s categorisation of friends and enemies is particularly problematic in the context 
of his black-and-white view of Imperialism and Socialism. In a time when the 
ideological conflict was intensifying, he considered it necessary to choose sides 
between imperialism and socialism (Z. Mao 1949). “There is no third way” (Z. Mao 
1949). The radical friend/enemy distinction underwrites other writings by Mao himself 
and his followers.  
Mao (1957) admitted that it is very easy to mistake good people for bad, and it is the 
very policy of drawing a sharp line between ourselves and the enemy that helps 
rectify mistakes from the past. He realised the risks of “making mistakes” by labelling 
someone as an enemy; however, he insisted giving excessive power to those who are 
making the decision of who is the enemy. Although he did emphasise the importance 
of making the correct decision and rectifying the mistakes of the past, he did not 
specify the criteria for making these decisions. The decisions regarding “who is our 
enemy” justify the use of extraordinary measures against the designated enemies.  
Combining the label “hostile forces” and “contradictions” and two types of 
contradictions, the official counter-terrorism discourse attributes right and wrong, 
links attacks to the broader ideological conflict between China and the West, and 
justifies extraordinary measures against the designated enemy. After several terrorist 
attacks in Xinjiang in 2013, Ismail Tiliwaldi, former vice-chairman of the National 
People's Congress Standing Committee, made the following statement on the nature 
of the attacks. 
Several consecutive violent terrorist attacks took place in Xinjiang once 
again revealed the insidious nature of the violent terrorists – they split the 
country, endanger the society, kill innocent people, and plan crimes. Once 
again, they proved that domestic colluded with foreign hostile forces 
colluded. They never gave up their intentions to put China into demise or 
turmoil. They do everything they can to cause trouble and stir up unrest. 
Once again, the attacks show that violent terrorism challenges the 
common bottom line of human civilisation, and endangers the common 
order of human society. Our struggle with the violent terrorist forces is by 
no means a contradiction among the people, but an irreconcilable life-and-
death contradiction between ourselves and the enemy. It is by no means a 
question of ethnicity or religion, but a serious political struggle between 
separatism and anti-separatism, between infiltration and anti-infiltration, 
between subversion and anti-subversion (Tianshanwang 2013).  
 
 
 
 
93 
A commentary on the Huanqiu clearly demonstrates how individuals aligned with the 
CCP frame the problem of “terrorism” as a “contradictions between ourselves and the 
enemy”. 37  The writer calls for more decisive actions against China’s ”enemies”, and 
bluntly encourages the CCP to learn from “our old opponent America”, and to “blast 
off” “hostile forces” and the organisations protected by anti-Communist governments 
or those governments that are hesitant to disavow “terrorism” (X. Gao 2014). “It is 
time to ask the entire world to declare their position, you are either with us, or against 
us!” (X. Gao 2014). The second half of this sentence is a direct quote from the English 
version of Bush’s speech on terrorism, indicating the applause for the US’ resolute 
crackdown on the supporters of terrorism abroad. This shows how the friend/enemy 
distinction underpins the antagonism that encourages hard approach.    
4.2.2 Deng Xiaoping: developmental approach to security and bourgeois 
liberalisation  
Deng’s governance was characterised by his focus on development. Unlike Mao, Deng 
did not envision an immediate war (F. Zhong 2015, 121). He believed that the most 
urgent crisis that the CCP was facing was not a physical war, but a legitimacy crisis 
caused by economic backwardness. This means that Deng was relatively less radical in 
terms of identifying and eliminating the “enemies”. Instead, he was more concerned 
with economic development which gives legitimacy to the CCP. The class struggle as 
an ideological concept of the Mao era is officially over (Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova 
2018), but the friend/enemy distinction based on class remains, as exemplified by 
Deng’s crackdown ofnbourgeois liberalists.  
As underdevelopment was considered to be a more urgent security threat, Deng 
shifted the security paradigm from “war and revolution” to “peace and development” 
(Jianhui Liu 1995, 74). This transition can be clearly seen through the shifting focus of 
the CCP’s national strategy and its attempts to redefine the relationship with other 
countries. In a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Eduard 
Shevardnadze, Deng said that in order to create a peaceful international environment 
to enable development, China must improve its relations with some important 
countries (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee 1998, 419). 
Beginning in 1978, together with the reform and opening-up policy, the CCP 
committed to focusing on economic development and modernisation without 
producing a new bourgeoisie (Deng 1993a). The following 12th Congress that followed 
in 1982 is seen as a historic turn of the CCP to turn towards economic development 
                                                      
37 Huanqiu (Global Times) is a nationalist tabloid newspaper affiliated to the People’s Daily 
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(CPC News n.d.). In a speech in 1987, Deng (1993b, 232) confirmed the “correctness” 
of the focus on to economic development.  
The shift from “revolution” to “development” under Deng laid the foundation for the 
understanding of security centred on development. Zhong Feiteng (2015, 105) calls it 
a “developmental approach to security”, which entails several premises. 38 
First, development is at the core of Deng’s theories on governance. Economic 
development, according to Deng (1993c, 3), is the “foundation to solve international 
and domestic problems”. Because it provides solutions for political problems, 
“development is not only an economic issue, in fact, it is a political issue“ (Deng 1993c, 
354).  
Second, development is the source of legitimacy. Deng acknowledged that the 
legitimacy of the CCP not only comes from “thought work”, but also the speed of 
economic growth. His slogan “development is the absolute principle” reflects his 
approach to security, which focuses on economic development (Cheng and Li 2000; D. 
Li 2000).39 The key to surviving under hegemonism “is whether we could achieve our 
developmental strategy by gaining rapid economic growth” (Deng 1993c, 356). 
Learning lessons from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Revolutions of 
1989, Deng (1993c, 345) further affirmed the centrality of development: “the 
problems took place in some of the countries in the world, in essence, are caused by 
economic backwardness…why do the people support us? It is very clear that it is 
because of the development in the recent decade”.  
Third, development is the primary task for the CCP. National defence should be 
subordinated in favour of economic development (F. Zhong 2015, 117) (Deng 1993c, 
355–56). The purpose of national defence is to serve the “overall situation” of 
economic construction (Deng 1993c, 99). 40 
Fourth, to allow China to develop, the CCP must make peace with the international 
community. “To concentrate on domestic construction, China needs at least twenty 
years of peace” (Deng 1993c, 50). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Deng made 
great efforts to ease the tensions and normalise the relations between China and the 
Soviet Union and improved relations with neighbouring countries (J. Tang 2011). Deng 
played an important role in toning down the friend/enemy distinction that had been 
hyped during the Mao era and made efforts to avoid war (J. Tang 2011). He was 
optimistic about the prospect of long-term peace. “We must not scare ourselves and 
                                                      
38 A researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
39 development is the absolute principle: 发展才是硬道理 
40 overall situation: 大局 
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deliberately cause tensions. If we always emphasise that a war is about to occur 
immediately, and devote all our energy to the war, then it will affect the Four 
Modernisations”. 41  
Deng’s developmental approach to security is essential to understanding the CCP’s 
rationale for dealing with the alleged terrorist threat in Xinjiang. Political elites (C. 
Zhang 2015) consider development the “foundation and key to solving all the 
problems“ in Xinjiang. However, the oversimplification of the causes and the 
subsequent solutions to the political unrest in Xinjiang resulted in some controversial 
policies, which have had mixed consequences for ethnic relations. On the one hand, 
actual improvements in wellbeing prevent those who have benefited from 
development policies from resorting to violence. On the other hand, some well-
intended policies may result in entrenching existing ethnic divisions due to the 
assimilationist assumptions embedded in China’s political context.  
Although Deng disagreed with Mao and shifted the focus of the CCP from revolution 
to development, he did not deny Mao’s assumptions about the enemy. He agreed 
with Mao on the existence of ideological enemies and their intentions to undermine 
the foundation of the legitimacy of the CCP by peaceful means. Although Deng 
emphasised democracy, as opposed to Mao’s focus on centralism, he agreed with 
Mao that China should never follow the Western model of democracy which 
represents the capitalist class (K. Yu 2002, 184). His concerns about the peaceful 
evolution of the West against China can be seen from the following quote.  
America, and some other countries in the West is carrying out peaceful 
evolution against socialist countries. Now there is a proposal in America: 
to fight a war without gunpowder. We must remain vigilant. Capitalism 
wants to defeat socialism eventually. In the past, it uses weapons such as 
the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb, which was opposed by the 
people of the entire world. Now they are carrying out peaceful evolution 
(Deng 1993c, 325–26). 
Deng developed Mao’s idea of enemy by focusing on a domestic tendency of 
bourgeois liberalisation. The term “bourgeois liberalists” refers to those who were 
influenced by the West through peaceful evolution. Deng considered their call to 
democratise China as being influenced and supported by the US. For example, the 
Tian’anmen Square protest in 1989 was considered the result of the all-round US 
hegemony in the political, economic, cultural and ideological realms (Z. Liang 2014, 
23). Deng worried that these people would take advantage of the economic reform 
                                                      
41 The Four Modernisations were national strategy set forth by Deng Xiaping to encourage the 
modernisation in four areas – agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and 
technology.  
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that started in 1978 and gradually turn China into a Western capitalist society that is 
subordinated to the West (Z. Liang 2014, 23). To Deng (1989, 1993c, 207), the real aim 
of the rebels who participated in the Tian’anmen Square protest was not anti-
corruption as they claimed, but to “subvert our country and our party… they have two 
slogans, one is to bring down the Communist Party, the other is to overthrow the 
socialist system”. He stated that their goal was to “establish a capitalist republic that is 
subordinated to the West” (Deng 1989, 1993c, 207). 
Deng was cautious about labelling the protesters. Whereas he maintained a hard-line 
attitude towards anti-government activists, he was also trying to win over some of the 
students by showing some tolerance. He (1993d, 327) clarified that those who had 
participated in the hunger strikes and demonstrations and signed petitions were not 
to blame. Only those leaders who had “ulterior motives” and violated the law should 
be investigated (Deng 1993d, 327). 
For those who participated in the protest and signed the petition, 
including overseas student, we adopt a forgiving attitude and do not call 
them to account. We gave necessary punishment to only a few people 
who had the ambition and attempt to subvert the Chinese government. 
We cannot tolerate turbulence… I am not talking about Western 
governments, but at least some people in the West are seeking to subvert 
socialism in China. (Deng 1993c, 331) 
The above quote conflicts with other speeches and writings by Deng in that he 
avoided attributing the blame directly to “Western governments”. This quote is taken 
from the transcript of Deng’s meeting with Richard Nixon. He put the blame on the 
media, especially the Voice of America, for lying about the Tian’anmen Square protest 
(Deng 1993c, 331). This reflects Deng’s insistence on improving China’s relations with 
other countries, and shows that he did not want to risk a deterioration in Sino-US 
relations, which were vulnerable at the time.  
The tactic of attributing the blame to only a small number of people who have 
“ulterior motives” is also seen frequently in today’s political discourse, as is evident 
from the customary use of the phrase “the masses who are ignorant of the truth” to 
avoid antagonising the majority of those who participate in large-scale 
demonstrations.42 As Chapter 6 will demonstrate, the state media used the same 
tactic to portray the Uyghurs who fled China as victims who were deceived by real 
terrorists.  
The shift towards a market economy undermined the socialist ideology that Mao 
committed to adhering to. Worrying that the confusion in the ideological realm would 
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result in instability, Deng stated that “stability overrides everything” (1993c, 284–87). 
He was concerned that adopting the Western democracy would plunge China into 
chaos and result in a “full-scale civil war” (1993c, 285). The following quote explains 
his rejection of adopting Western democracy characterised by multi-party elections.  
China must not allow demonstration at will. If people demonstrate for 365 
days a year, then nothing can be done, foreign investment will not come 
into China…We must make it clear to domestic and foreign audiences that 
strengthening control is for the purpose of stability, it is for better reform 
and opening-up and making ways for modernisation. (Deng 1993c, 287) 
Deng’s idea of stability maintenance remains a central theme of China’s political 
discourse, particularly in Xinjiang. As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, political elites have 
created a number of slogans that extend the scope of stability maintenance to every 
aspect of life. The chapter will show how the theme of stability maintenance 
securitised a number of ethnic issues, such as marriages and divorces, halal food, and 
wearing full-face veil.  
4.2.3 Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao: the transition period 
In comparison, the rapid economic development under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao 
allowed the two leaders to reduce the reliance on the concept of the enemy as a 
source of legitimacy. Both leaders continued to focus on economic development and 
opening up to the global market and toning down the ideological friend/enemy 
distinction. The phrase “hostile forces” was rarely used. There is no obvious difference 
between the two leaders in terms of how they perceived the enemy. Therefore, Jiang 
and Hu’s approaches are explained in one section. 
During the transition period under Jiang and Hu, the friend/enemy distinction 
remained an underlying assumption. Jiang said that although class struggle was no 
longer the major contradiction in our society, it would exist for a long time and 
possibly be accelerated (Z. Jiang 1992a). Jiang maintained that some Western 
countries had connived with ethno-separatism and religious extremist, which had led 
to regime instability in certain countries, jeopardising their sovereignty and unity, and 
thus posing a threat to international security (Z. Jiang 2000). Jiang acknowledged the 
threat posed by bourgeois liberalisation, and attributed it to “international hostile 
forces” who seek to induce regime change by means of peaceful evolution (Z. Jiang 
2016).  
Some Western countries use ethnic questions and religious questions as 
the pretext for promoting hegemonism and power politics and 
interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. They always involved in 
and took advantage of ethnic disputes and religious disputes, connive at 
and support ethno-separatism and religious extremism, which complicated 
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ethnic questions and religious questions. The activities of ethno-
separatists and religious extremists have endangered regime stability and 
even sovereign and territorial integrity in some countries; seriously 
hampered the economic development in these countries; and often 
caused instability in the region, posing threats to the alleviation of 
tensions and stability of the international situation (Z. Jiang 2000). 
A difference between Jiang and previous leaders was is his concerns for religious 
extremism. These were likely to have been due to the spread of Falun Gong, which 
had started in 1992. In 1999 the development of this group caused concerns for its 
ability to undermine the stability of the regime by challenging the authority at 
Zhongnnhai, the central headquarters of the CCP (A. Niu et al. 2007; Martina, Scott, 
and Johnson 2015). Jiang’s suppression of the group has resulted in its group 
members undertaking anti-CCP activities across the world, which still continue today. 
Their website, Epoch Times regularly posts anti-CCP reports. The group has attracted 
some sympathisers from the West, as is evident from the criticism of the Amnesty 
International (2016), Freedom House (2015), and the Diplomat (Browde 2016) about 
organ transplant operations and torture. The legitimacy of Falun Gong’s claim is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. What the case shows however is it is framed as a 
conspiracy orchestrated by Western hostile forces (Commentator of People’s Daily 
2001).  
Although Jiang agrees with Mao and Deng on blaming the West for causing instability 
and its involvements in ethnic and religious disputes in other countries, his 
assumption of the enemy functioned to mobilise domestic development. The above 
quote is taken from a speech entitled “The Dual Historical Task of our Military is 
Mechanisation and Informationisation”, which reveals the purpose of using the 
concept of the enemy – to introduce the call for modernising the military.  
Jiang’s perception of the threat was shaped by some cases of Western involvement in 
ethnic or religious conflicts in other countries (see Z. Jiang 2000). One of these cases 
was the “humanitarian intervention” in the conflict in Kosovo. As many analysts 
(Choedon 2005, 54; Jing Chen 2009, 158; Z. Pang 2005, 88; Snetkov and Lanteigne 
2015, 128; Hirono and Lanteigne 2011, 248; T. Liu and Zhang 2014, 406; Xiao 2003, 28) 
have pointed out, the unauthorised use of force for humanitarian intervention in 
cases such as Kosovo caused concern for the CCP about Western intervention in the 
separatist movements in Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan. These cases convinced Jiang of 
the “long-term struggle between hegemonism and anti-hegemonism” (see Z. Jiang 
2000). Jiang’s solution to this struggle, like Deng’s, was to keep a low-profile in the 
international arena in order to create the environment conducive to development (Z. 
Jiang 2000).  
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Like Mao and Deng, Jiang insisted on the non-interference principle in developing 
relations with other countries and considered independence and sovereignty 
unnegotiable. “We will never impose our own social system and ideology onto others. 
Likewise, we will never allow other countries to impose their own social system and 
ideologies on China” (Z. Jiang 1992b). “On issues of ethnic interests and national 
sovereignty, we will never submit to any external pressure” (Z. Jiang 1992b). An 
irreconcilable attitude towards national unity and sovereign and territorial integrity 
can be seen in the current counter-terrorism discourse.  
Rapid economic development under Jiang led him to suggest an end of the class 
struggle and an invitation to the bourgeois class. With the continued efforts towards 
opening up, in 2001, Jiang suggested that the “CCP’s long-standing goal of class 
struggle had been abandoned, and said that the Party must open its door to the “new 
classes” of private business people and professionals (Brady 2010, 30).  
Following Jiang, Hu Jintao proposed a multi-dimensional understanding of the security 
threat, including economic, financial, nuclear, ideological, cultural and political 
security (Y. Zhu 2012, 96). Under Hu, the CCP began to pay attention to the security of 
the people, giving rise to the consideration of the “People First” policy, which echoes 
the Human Security paradigm (X. Ren and Li 2013, 35). As the cost of development has 
became increasingly apparent, Hu (2006) started to highlight that development could 
not be “undertaken at the expense of spiritual civilisation, ecological environment, not 
least human lives”. Regarding the Xinjiang problem, Hu Jintao called for a bottom-up 
control system by sending cadres to work in remote villages (Nathan and Gilley 2003, 
221). This policy has clearly been consolidated in the “Visit, Benefit and Gather” 
project under Xi, which aimed to send 200,000 cadres to the local levels in three 
years.  
A major feature of the security discourse under Hu was an emphasis on peaceful 
means to conflict resolution (The State Council 2011). Compared to his predecessors, 
Hu was much more cautious about using the phrases “peaceful evolution”, “foreign 
hostile forces” and “bourgeois liberalisation”, which might undermine economic 
cooperation with other states. He was still concerned about “hegemonism and power 
politics”, as is evidenced in his report at the 17th National Congress, but did not 
specifically point out the forms of threat that “hegemonism” posed to China’s security 
directly (J. Hu 2007). In a speech at the Propaganda and Thought Work Conference, 
while addressing a smaller group of audience, Hu cautioned all of the Party members 
to “keep their eyes peeled” for ideological infiltration of various hostile forces (J. Hu 
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2003).43 Although the frequency of the appearance of terms “peaceful evolution”, 
“foreign hostile forces”, and “bourgeois liberalisation” in core official documents has 
largely declined under Hu, some scholars still interpret his arguments in the context of 
the complicated international security environment. For example, according to Wei 
Xinghua, Hu’s emphasis on combining Marxism and China’s national conditions means 
that the CCP should insist on economic reform, while resisting “peaceful evolution” at 
the same time (X. Wei 2008).  
4.2.4 Xi Jinping: re-emphasising ideology enemies  
Recent years have seen a resurgence of the discussion over ideology infiltration, which 
underpins the friend/enemy distinction in the current counter-terrorism discourse. 
Since the economic reform, the theme of development and modernisation has toned 
down the confrontation between different ideologies, and the boundary between 
capitalism and socialism has been blurred. Xi’s governance marks a return to the 
primacy of politics after years of focus on economic performance (Brown and Bērziņa-
Čerenkova 2018). Economic slow-down, accompanied by other issues such as 
corruption and pollution, has forced political elites and intellectuals to re-emphasise 
the concept of the enemy. Ren Jie (2012), a researcher at the Marxism Institute at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that Western hostile forces have not given 
up their cultural infiltration and are seeking to undermine communism by means of 
“cultural propaganda”. He identifies a number of new enemies - neo-liberalism, liberal 
democracy, and historical nihilism – that distort and defame historical figures and 
leaders in Party history and pose threats to people’s identification with the 
mainstream authoritative ideology. 
Since the re-emphasis of ideology during the Hu Jintao era, as Holbig (2013, 2009) 
observes, Xi Jinping has further consolidated the importance of ideology. On 18 
August 2013, not long after he took over the administration, Xi Jinping delivered a 
speech at the National Conference on Propaganda and Ideological Work, in which he 
re-emphasised the importance of ideology after focusing on economic development 
for almost four decades. According to Xi, “ideology work is extremely important” 
(Jingyue Xu and Hua 2013). “It is essential to the future and fate of the CCP, long-term 
security of the state, national solidarity and cohesiveness” (CPC News 2013b). By 
linking ideology with core national interests, Xi prioritised the “ideology work” in 
China’s security agenda. Associating ideology with security, he has established a 
regime of truth that dismisses alternative ideas as “wrong”. This way of framing is 
                                                      
43 keep their eyes peeled: 保持高度警戒 
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evident from his proposal to “help the cadres and the masses to distinguish between 
right and wrong and clarify vague understanding” (CPC News 2013a).  
Under Xi, “Western” values are less tolerated due to their potential to lead to 
democratisation in a way that might threaten the legitimacy of the CCP. Those values 
are identified as “wrong”. The CCP is acutely aware of the risks posed by Western 
values, particularly in an era when China is exposed to various intensified social 
contradictions, and the Chinese people are exposed to various ideologies via the 
internet (Commentator of People’s Daily 2013b). In this context, the CCP considers it 
necessary to “firmly grasp the leadership, management and the discourse of ideology 
work” (Commentator of People’s Daily 2013b). The CCP frames Marxism, communism 
and socialism as the “correct direction of ideology”. The emphasis on distinguishing 
between the “correct” and “wrong” ideologies make it possible to group those who 
follow the “wrong” ideology as the enemies.  
In the context of the concentration of personal power, Xi’s speech has led to a nation-
wide political movement to re-focus on ideological work. His speech has been 
repeatedly studied and cited by Chinese officials and intellectuals and disseminated to 
all levels of government. The following quote by Lu Yan, a lecturer at Shandong 
Provincial Party Committee, indicates a full alignment of intellectuals with the framing 
of the threat by the CCP.   
The collapse of a regime usually starts from the realm of ideology. Political 
instability and regime change can happen overnight, but the evolution of 
ideas is a long-term process, which needs our special attention to prevent. 
Once the defence of ideas is breached, other defence will hardly hold up 
(Yan Lu 2016). 
Academics joined Xi Jinping in identifying the ideological enemy. Zhang Guozuo (2015, 
1) relies on the Marxist assumption of ideology as the superstructure of society. 
According to his interpretation of this assumption, an economic base is an objective 
reality; therefore, the ideology determined by the economic base is also an objective 
reality. He (2015, 1) warns against the “ideological warfare” waged by “some Western 
political forces” who  
flaunt Western values, subvert traditional ideological system, demonise 
the history and current situation of some authorities, confuse right and 
wrong, provoke ideological disputes, upset social psychological balance, to 
achieve the ultimate goal of creating political turmoil in order to subvert 
the regimes they dislike or the regimes they conceive as political rival of 
their own. 
Li Xiguang (2014) identifies the “wrong” ideas as those that  
 
 
 
 
102 
negate China’s development model and development path, advocate to 
capitalise China, make judgements based on Western criteria, fight China’s 
ideology with Western ideology, replace China’s regime with a Western 
regime, deny the revolution history and the regime legitimacy of the 
Chinese Communist Party.  
Similarly, Zhang’s (2015, 1) definition of the “wrong social ideologies and views” 
covers a wide range of alternative interpretations of history and politics. He identifies 
those who “advocate extreme ‘democracy’ and absolute ‘freedom’” as ideological 
enemies, which is particularly relevant to China’s counter-terrorism discourse. Articles 
on the state media demonstrate that Chinese political elites and intellectuals consider 
many human rights activists as ideological enemies because of their criticism based on 
the Western model of democracy and freedom (see for example Pang 2016; Chen 
2016; Pang 2015; Xinhua 2012).  
It can be seen from the above academic interpretations of ideological enemies that 
Xi’s focus on ideology has entrenched the existing friend/enemy distinction between 
China and the “West”. The concept of the enemy has been broadened to include 
various kinds of dissent. In doing so, academics have reproduced the morality that the 
CCP has created based on the assumption of the threat to the regime. They have 
reinforced the necessity of maintaining legitimacy through ideological means (A. Tang 
2016).  
The re-emphasis of ideological enemies under Xi is framed differently. As China grows 
into an important actor in the international community, the CCP has begun to adjust 
its language when framing the enemy to cater for the international audience. Li 
Zhiguo (2013) observes that the theoretical framework has been preserved by using 
the words of “the masses”, “contradiction”, “struggle”, and “hard work”, while the 
notion of the enemy has been de-emphasised. According to an official at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the translation of official documents has been adjusted deliberately 
to tone down the discourse of ideology for a foreign audience (Zhiguo Li 2013).44  
However, although political elites avoid directly using the language of Mao and Deng, 
their assumptions regarding the intentions of the enemy remain fundamental to the 
policies on ideological security. These assumptions enables Xi to further require the 
loyalty of the Party media – the “Party media must use the Party as its surname” 
(People’s Daily Online Forum 2016). 45 Based on the assumption of Western discourse 
hegemony, Xi considers it necessary to have China’s own discourse power, as is 
                                                      
44 the masses: 群众; contradiction: 矛盾; struggle: 斗争; hard work: 奋斗 
45 Party media must use the Party as its surname: 党媒必须姓党 
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evident from his report at the 19th National Congress in 2017 (Y. Long 2017).46 He 
proposed to improve the competitiveness of China’s discourse so that it tells 
convincing “Chinese stories” (Jingyue Xu and Hua 2013).  
By controlling the state media, the CCP promotes the “correct” ideology and China’s 
security discourse to counter-balance the dominance of the Western security 
discourse in the international community (A. Tang 2016). Xi inherited Deng’s ethos 
that “stability overrides everything”, prioritising social stability and long-term peace as 
the “overall goal of Xinjiang work” (Xinhua 2014a). He frames solidarity and stability as 
a “blessing”, and separation and turmoil as a “curse” (Research Centre on the 
theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics in Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region 2017).47 The Party media frames the minzu regional autonomy 
policy as a perfect policy. The following quote from Xinjiang Daily, the Party media of 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, shows how the Party media demonstrates 
loyalty by uncritically praising China’s ethnic policy.  
[minzu regional autonomy policy is] a perfectly correct good system that 
respects history, suits national conditions, complies with the aspirations of 
the people, which realised the fundamental interests of all ethnic groups 
and gained sincere support from all ethnic groups in Xinjiang. (Xinjiang 
Daily 2015b) 
Emphasising that such a perfect policy must be adhered to and implemented “without 
any hesitation” (Xinjiang Daily 2015b), the Party media contributes to the monopoly 
of the CCP in the security discourse in China, further marginalising alternative 
narratives from the Uyghur community. The Party media wrote the “correct” version 
of the history of Xinjiang, which assumes that “Xinjiang is an integral part of Chinese 
territory” (People’s Daily Online 2017a), rendering all those who challenge this 
assumption “wrong”. This categorisation precludes alternative interpretations of 
Xinjiang history in China, as the CCP endeavours to “eliminate the influence of the 
wrong ideas in the aspects of history, culture, ethnicity and religion” (People’s Daily 
Online 2017a). 
4.3 The politicisation of the past  
Forgetting history means betrayal. 
                                                                                            ---- Xi Jinping (Xinhua 2015e) 
                                                      
46 discourse power: 话语权 
47 solidarity and stability as a blessing, and separation and turmoil as a curse: 团结稳定是福，
分裂动乱是祸 
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History and the framing of history are an important part of China’s quest for 
legitimacy. They function to encourage alignment with the official political discourse, 
internalise the friend and enemy distinction, and convince the public of the need for 
the political agenda to be promoted by the current leadership. China’s counter-
terrorism discourse draws on the assumptions derived from the narratives of 
humiliation. The narratives of the Century of Humiliation are at the core of the 
legitimacy of the CCP’s claims of delivering the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation” (Millar 2015). In Powers’ (2004) words, history is used as “propaganda”. This 
section discusses how the past is framed and used to justify the present security 
agenda.  
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the suffering of the Chinese nation due to colonial and 
imperialist invasion between 1839 and 1949 has been established as a source of 
legitimacy for the governance of the CCP. Political elites and intellectuals today 
continue to utilise the notion of the Century of Humiliation as a reminder of the 
weakness of China at that time. Reliving the trauma in the collective memory serves to 
mobilise the public to contribute to the CCP’s agenda of strengthening China in order 
to blot out humiliation. Revisiting traumatic events such as the Nanjing Massacre 
helps to construct a sense of national identity and downplay the differences among 
ethnic groups within the Chinese nation. In this context, the CCP sees it as necessary 
to repeatedly remind the Chinese people of the past (People’s Daily Online 2017b). 
Mao Zedong (1939b) identified imperialism as the “the foremost and most ferocious 
enemy of the Chinese people”. Mao (1939c) believed that Chinese society had 
become a “semi-colonial and semi-feudal” society since the Opium War of 1840, the 
influence of which on the development of Chinese society could still be seen in the 
following century. He (1991a, 9) specified that the enemies are “all those in league 
with imperialism - the warlords, the bureaucrats, the comprador class, the big 
landlord class and the reactionary section of the intelligentsia affiliated to them”. Mao 
also reflected upon the impact of the naming of China’s territories as part of the 
imperialists’ plan to “carve up China”. The following quote shows Mao’s view on how 
the enemies had caused the humiliating loss of Chinese territories.  
On April 17 of this year [1934, author’s note], the Japanese imperialists 
openly proclaimed that China belongs to Japan, Japan is the master in East 
Asia, and Japan opposes any other country “plundering China” under any 
pretence. Meanwhile, the selling out of North China and the Japanese 
imperialists’ attempt to monopolize China naturally prompted other 
imperialist countries to speed up their efforts to carve up China directly. In 
the vast areas of Xinjiang, Qinghai, Xikang, and Tibet, the British 
imperialists are now establishing their “Tibetan State”. The areas of 
Banhong and Canglan in Yunnan have also been occupied by the British. 
 
 
 
 
105 
The French imperialists are invading and plundering in Yunnan, Guizhou, 
and Guangxi. The American imperialists are also making frenzied efforts to 
establish their rule over China. Neither the unity between these imperialist 
countries (such as the British-Japanese alliance) nor the clashes among 
them (such as the conflicts between Japan and the United States) are 
aimed at helping China. They are only designed to carve up China more 
quickly and turn China into a colony of the imperialists. (Z. Mao 1939a) 
[translated by John King Fairbank, Center for East Asian Research] 
The above quote reveals the actual enemies to which Mao was referring to – 
imperialist countries including Japan, Britain, France and America, as well as the Kuo 
Min Tang (KMT, also Guomindang) which, according to Mao had colluded with the 
imperialist countries. Mao (1939a) pronounced the claims of imperialist countries 
over Xinjiang, Qinghai, Xikang and Tibet to be illegitimate imperialist invasions, further 
shaping the concept of unity in the context of imperialist invasion – the “completeness” 
of China means the successful reclaiming of all of the territories that have been taken 
by imperialist countries.  
To link the agenda of the current regime with historical events, the CCP has carried 
out various measures, such as requiring mandatory participation of students in the 
Patriotic Education Bases – tourist sites that reflect the history of the Century of 
Humiliation and the resistance of the Chinese people.48 These sites are published by 
the Department of Publicity, and the selection of these sites reflects the politicisation 
of history for the purpose of propaganda.  
In the context of counter-terrorism discourse, the narratives of the Century of 
Humiliation are also associated with the CCP’s commitment to the non-interference 
principle. The CCP attributes terrorism to external enemies – the “hostile forces”. This 
attribution attaches a negative connotation to all of the sympathisers of the Uyghurs’ 
separatist claims because their sympathy and the subsequent support are considered 
as part of the plot to interfere with China’s domestic affairs and undermine the 
legitimacy of the CCP, as discussed in Section 4.2. The label “hostile forces” functions 
to embed the friend/enemy distinction discussed earlier in the discourse of counter-
terrorism. This distinction contains a package of assumptions regarding who the 
enemies are. Applying the friend/enemy distinction in the current counter-terrorism 
discourse allows the speaker to imply the link between the perpetrators of a particular 
terrorist incident and the enemies in the West. Based on the assumption that these 
enemies collude with terrorists in China, the CCP has put terrorism in the context of 
the antagonism between China and the West.  
                                                      
48 Patriotic Education Bases: 爱国主义教育基地 
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In the contemporary political discourse, the history of humiliation has shaped the 
shared identity – the “national ethos” of the Chinese people, and stories of heroic 
sacrifice are referenced to construct a shared victimhood. The shared historical 
experience serves as a “shortcut” for understanding the friend/enemy distinction in 
contemporary politics; the identity of the enemy is left unclarified because it is 
considered “common sense” (K. Huang 2015).The narratives of the Century of 
Humiliation enable the CCP to channel the shared sense of victimhood to project all 
ethnic groups as a unified whole to resist the same enemy. Based on the assumptions 
of political leaders about the West’s attempt to westernise and divide China discussed 
in Section 4.2, the CCP sees ethno-separatism as part of the enemy’s plot.  
To justify the present, Xi argues that “reality is rooted in history” (Xi 2014b). For Xi, 
history explains the rationale for the behaviour of the state (Xi 2014b). The following 
quote highlights how Xi has framed the “correct outlook on history” as something that 
the entire nation is expected to follow.  
History will gradually fade away. But the implications and lessons of 
history are always there, whether recognised or not. Everyone, including 
those who bravely fought against the invasion and the people of the 
country which had launched the invasion, including those who had gone 
through that era and who were born after that era, has to adhere to the 
correct outlook on history, and remember the implications and lessons of 
history (Xinhua 2015e). 
Denying the correct outlook on history is considered a “betrayal” (Xinhua 2015e). An 
imaginary line is drawn between those who are aligned with the correct outlook on 
history and those who are not. 
4.3.1 The impact of the politicisation of history on the perception of ethnic 
relations 
In this context, the issues of ethnicity and ethnic relations are important to political 
leaders from Mao to Xi, because of the role they play in curbing or promoting 
separatism (Xi 2017). As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the issue of ethnic relations is 
highly political. A discussion over “diversity” without acknowledging ”unity” as a 
precondition could potentially be considered subversive. The very policy that is 
supposed to ensure autonomous rights is openly framed in the context of unity. A 
commentary (Shengmin Yang 2017) on People’s Daily makes it very clear that the 
minzu regional autonomy system serves to promote national unity. Patriotic believers 
have been trained to treat diversity as secondary to unity (Q. Cui 2016).49 
                                                      
49 minzu regional autonomy system: 民族区域自治 
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Within the integration model, which prioritises unity, a certain degree of diversity is 
allowed with some corresponding preferential policies that positively discriminate 
against ethnic minorities in terms of the one-child policy, education, language, career 
path, subsidy, and leniency for criminals. The impact of preferential policies on inter-
ethnic relations in Xinjiang has not been studied in detail, with one exception 
(Sautman 1998). Sautman is rather optimistic, stating that the preferential policies in 
Xinjiang have actually helped to produce substantial equality, and improve economic 
efficiency and have not created inter-ethnic tensions. However, as Chapter 5 will 
demonstrate, the reverse discrimination has, in some cases, entrenched the existing 
divisions and reinforced the self-awareness of some Uyghurs as a distinctive group, 
thus contributing to the dichotomy between state-orchestrated nationalism and 
ethno-nationalism. 
The categorisation of “correct” and “wrong” ideas is also reflected in the official view 
of ethnic relations. The CCP denounces those who question the identification of 56 
ethnic groups in China (CPC News 2015). It frames the criticism that the Uyghur is 
artificially created by the CCP as an ethnic group as a distortion of history (CPC News 
2015). 
It is clear that no matter how the term minzu is translated, the official view of ethnic 
relations is underpinned by a hierarchy of three levels of identity. Loyalty to the state 
comes first, before identification with the Chinese nation and the identification with 
ethnic groups. It is not always necessary to distinguish them, but if a person has to 
discuss them in the same context, “the state must come first, and then nationality, 
and then ethnicity” (CPC News 2015). “Local nationalism goes against the logic of the 
state; therefore it is something we should oppose” (CPC News 2015).  
4.3.2 The impact of the politicisation of history on the framing of terrorism in 
Xinjiang  
In the context of counter-terrorism discourse, the “correct outlook on history and 
ethnicity” is the precondition for understanding the Xinjiang question” (Y. Sun 2009). 
50 The conference on several historical issues regarding Xinjiang (People’s Daily Online 
2017a) provides the Party line on the history of Xinjiang.  
Xinjiang is an integral part of Chinese territory. The paradigm of the unity 
of various ethnic groups [referring to the paradigm of “diversity within 
unity”, author’s note] is a historical tradition and unique advantage 
formed since Qin and Han dynasties in China (People’s Daily Online 2017a).  
                                                      
50 correct outlook on history and ethnicity: 正确历史观和民族观 
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The CCP’s claims of the only “correct” version of Xinjiang history have of course been 
questioned by many scholars in the West (for example, see Gladney 1998; Millward 
2006; Bachman 2004; Palmer 2013). Their criticism has been dismissed as “historical 
nihilism” rooted in the Western discourse, which distorts Chinese history (China Daily 
2017).51 In response, the CCP has placed the claims of “correct” history in the context 
of the struggle against the influence of Western discourse. Chinese scholars consider 
historical nihilism as serving the political agenda of Western countries, which is aiming 
for the cultural infiltration of American values in Asia (Zengzhi Wang 2016). The 
correct outlook on history envisions the concepts of unity as being related related to 
the rejuvenation of China after the Century of Humiliation. Without this context, the 
concept of separatism cannot be fully understood.  
According to the “correct” version of the history of Xinjiang, although there were two 
short-lived East Turkistan Republics, in 1933 and between 1944 and 1949, the 
founding of these republics is considered by Chinese scholars and the government to 
have been supported by foreign powers. In 1865, Khanate of Kokand (a Central Asian 
state existed from 1709 to 1876) sent a troop led by Yakub Beg to invade Xinjiang (M. 
Fan and Meng 2010, 33). When Yakub’s invasion started to gain momentum, British 
India supported Yakub in attempting to expand its sphere of influence in Xinjiang. The 
“puppet state” that Yakub established in Xinjiang opened the door for Britain and 
Russia (P. Liu 1993, 183). The Second East Turkistan Republic was considered the 
result of direct involvement of the Soviet Union – including the provision of weapons 
and military training and harbouring of the rebellion’s leaders (E. Han 2013, 42). Later, 
the Russian expansion in Central Asia posed a challenge to the British rule (N. Li 2003, 
58). In 1869, Britain and Russia negotiated the “carving up” of Xinjiang in Petersburg 
(N. Li 2003, 58). The CCP believes that many of the claims of the East Turkistan 
Republic are illegitimate, because their ideological and theoretical system were 
“fabricated” in the context of the Great Game between Britain and Russia. The 
perception of the CCP explains why the phrase “East Turkistan” always appears with 
quotation marks in Chinese official documents and academic work, which indicates 
the CCP’s denial of its legitimacy.  
The adherence to the “correct” version of history makes it difficult to separate the 
study of Xinjiang history and politics. As the correct outlook of history treats “East 
Turkistan” as a geographical term rather than a political term that implies the 
independence of Xinjiang, alternative interpretations of Xinjiang history could be seen 
as attempts by “old colonists” to “dismember China” (State Council Information Office 
2002b). For example, the East Turkistan History written by Muhammad Amin Bughra, 
                                                      
51 historical nihilism: 历史虚无主义 
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a separatist designated by the CCP, is considered a distortion of history (Y. Sun 2009). 
The use of history as propaganda for separatist claims is considered the 
“politicisation” of an otherwise “non-existent nation”, and a manifestation of the 
“ulterior motives” of those who have political agendas (Y. Sun 2009).  
Making connections between the history of foreign involvement in establishing the 
two East Turkistan Republics and the CCP’s sovereignty over Xinjiang, the CCP has 
constructed the external enemy as a major cause of terrorism in China. According to 
the 2009 Xinjiang Development White Paper, since the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), the “East Turkistan forces” have received support from 
“foreign forces” to instigate riots and armed conflict in Xinjiang, and since the 1990s, 
have begun to resort to terrorism as a tactic to separate Xinjiang from China (The 
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2009).  
4.4 The construction of the concept of separatism  
As discussed in previous sections, the affinities between academia and the state result 
in the alignment of academic work with the Party line in defining unity. Similarly, 
academics adopt the “correct outlook on history” and the label “hostile forces” to 
remain aligned with the Party in regard to identifying the enemies. Those who refuse 
to align are considered “wrong” and must be “eliminated”. Alternative interpretations 
of history are considered a “distortion” of history, or “distorted history” (People’s 
Daily Online 2017a).  
The concept of separatism is constructed based on the above assumptions.  
First, the concept of separatism is constructed by defining what “unity” is. Unity has 
been framed by the rulers as conducive to stability. Laozi’s idea of minimum 
government intervention was considered as “regression” and “backwardness” (Rao 
2006, 189). In China’s political discourse, the concept of “unity” is rooted in the ideal 
of the “Grand Union”, rather than the Westphalian “nation-state”. Accordingly, the 
“unity” that the CCP advocates is the unity of a multi-national state comprised of 56 
minzu, rather than the unity of a “nation-state” of the Han Chinese. This assumption 
explains the morality of ethno-separatism in China – the attempts to split China are 
linked to the collective memory of China being “carved up” by imperialists. The 
politicisation of history created a shared sense of victimhood that feeds into Chinese 
nationalism and is intertwined with the aspiration to take back the lost territories.  
Second, the concept of separatism is contextualised in the debate on the 
naming/framing of minzu. Gu believed that the everyday practice of using the 
language used by foreign imperialists creates its own reality, which is separation. 
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While others disagreed with his assimilationist assumption that negates other minzu, 
they did not challenge the official view, which prioritises nationality over ethnicity. Fei 
Xiaotong developed the paradigm of “diversity within unity” to help the public to 
make sense of the hierarchical relationship between national identity and ethnic 
identity.  
The minzu regional autonomy policy, which prioritises national unity and prohibits 
separatist activities, is written into the Chinese Constitution (National People’s 
Congress 2004). Like the “correct outlook on history”, the CCP promotes the “correct 
outlook on minzu” (Hao 2015), which implies that those who sympathise with the 
separatist claims are not only are “wrong”, but could also potentially be illegal.  
In the context of growing awareness among the Uyghurs, the CCP is particularly 
concerned with believers as religion transcend national borders. To ensure their 
loyalty, the CCP has provided training for patriotic believers so that they will accept of 
the paradigm of “diversity within unity” and the “sinicisation of religions” (Central 
Socialist School 2018). This paradigm implies that the growing ethnic self-awareness 
must be subordinate to national unity. It also implies the extent to which religious 
freedom should be limited – those who follow conservative interpretations of Islam 
must exercise their religious freedom on the condition that they acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the secular government of the CCP. Some believers prefer to adopt the 
religious custom of marriage and divorce instead of registering with administrative 
departments, and reject secular and bilingual education. The official documents on 
de-radicalisation (The Party Committee General Office of the XUAR and The People’s 
Government of the XUAR 2014; People’s Congress 2017) categorise the disregard for 
the secular administration system for education, marriage and language as a sign of 
radicalism (The Party Committee General Office of the XUAR and The People’s 
Government of the XUAR 2014; People’s Congress 2017).  
Third, the concept of separatism is constructed by defining the “correct outlook on 
history”. The CCP monopolises the discourse of counter-terrorism as it is the most 
powerful agency in China that has the defining power. The CCP does not officially ban 
alternative accounts of history. However, as can be seen from the discussion in the 
previous section, it is particularly hostile towards the kind of historical studies that 
might challenge the legitimacy of the CCP’s control over Xinjiang.  
4.5 A critical analysis of the framing of unity and enemy in counter-
terrorism discourse  
It can be seen from the above discussion that China’s quest for legitimacy is 
characterised by a high level of state-centricity. Political elites and intellectuals have 
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incorporated the ideas that are conducive to justify the unity of the state. A closer 
look at the dubious assumptions underlying the discourse of unity and separatism 
indicate a similarity with Edward Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan’s (1989, 37–38) 
criticisms of the state’s bias in the counter-terrorism discourse. The following 
assumptions are summarised from the discussion in previous sections in this chapter: 
1. China is an innocent target and victim of imperialism. The CCP led the Chinese 
people to fight against the colonial and imperialist invasions. Terrorism in 
China is part of a broader conflict between China and the West and is 
supported by China’s enemies in the West.  
2. The West dislikes communism and continues seeking to undermine communist 
regimes through ideological and cultural infiltration. After a number of cases of 
Western involvement in regime change, China will be the next target.  
3. Underlying the efforts to undermine the communist regime of China is 
American support. 
4. External enemies have not given up undermining the CCP regime. These efforts 
were initially in the form of military warfare. In peaceful times, the West has 
adopted peaceful means to “Westernise and divide” China.  
5. Therefore, it is necessary to tighten the grip over education, ethnic issues and 
religion to ensure national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
The state-centric approach to security posits that the unity of the state provides 
stability, which is the precondition for the development of different ethnic groups. 
Framing the state as an innocent victim of separatism justifies extraordinary measures 
taken to protect the state from the overt and covert attempts of separatism 
supported by “hostile forces”. The intentional ambiguity in the use of “hostile forces” 
enables the speaker to attribute blame without clarifying the identity of the enemies 
and justify its counter-measures against them. From a critical perspective (Jackson 
2007, 245), the affinities between the state and academia mean that the body of 
knowledge is little more than a reproduction of the state’s discourse of terrorism 
based on the narratives of the history of humiliation and the assumption of the 
enemies. 
The underlying assumption regarding external enemies in China’s security discourse 
can be understood as what Snow and Benford (1988) call “diagnostic framing”. In 
particular, in more recent studies in China, Western hegemonism has been 
conceptualised as “neo-interventionism” in the name of liberal/democratic values 
such as human rights (Y. Fan 2000, 41). Many scholars believe that the discourse of 
human rights has been used as the “weapon” by the “Western hostile forces” to carry 
out ideological infiltration (Y. Fan 2000, 37; Y. Yao 1996, 33; Jian Peng 2000, 100). The 
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Party media hold that neo-interventionism takes the forms of both military 
intervention and “ideological export”, with the latter including the dissemination of 
Western value of human rights, democracy and capitalism (Qiushi 2012). Some 
Uyghurs recruited by the CCP as ethnic cadres are aligned with this framing.52 One 
Uyghur senior official, Nur Bekri delivered a speech at a cadre conference in Xinjiang 
which aimed at tackling the problem of “three forces”. He (2008) said that “Western 
hostile forces” support and collude with separatist movements, as well as Falun gong 
and other civil movements, in order to undermine the regime and system, weaken the 
basis of legitimacy of the CCP, damage the image of the CCP, and sabotage national 
security and social stability. He agrees that the ultimate goal of the enemies is to 
subvert the CCP’s rule and socialist system and divide and weaken China (Nur 2008). 
The term enemies generally refer to the “West”, but the specific assumption about 
who the enemies are has varied across different leadership periods and in different 
contexts. Like the concept of “terrorism”, the label “hostile forces” has been used so 
broadly, as discussed in Section 4.2, that it becomes impossible to identify them 
without context. The following summary is an attempt to clarify the use of “hostile 
forces” to understand the friend/enemy distinction in the counter-terrorism discourse. 
First, the label “hostile forces” refer to international terrorist organisations that are 
covertly supported by the “West”. In a commentary on Xinjiang Daily (2011), the link 
between “three forces” and international terrorist activities immediately follows the 
blame being placed on the “Westernise” strategy, which suggests a connection 
between Western hostile forces and international terrorist activities. The article 
asserts that the current counter-terrorism is, in fact, a continuation of the 100 years of 
struggle between the Chinese people against the imperialists’ plot to “split” China.53 
The article alleges that the “essence” of the “three forces” is the attempt of the 
Western hostile forces to annihilate China and the attempt of the ethnic separatists to 
cause disturbances in China.54 The article concludes with a prognostic framing, calling 
for the people to have a “clear-cut stand to fight against ethnic separatism, resolutely 
safeguard the unity of the motherland, and resolutely safeguard the supreme 
interests of the state and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation”. The 
framing of terrorism in this article is clearly underpinned by the antagonism between 
China and the West, posting the “West” as a monolithic entity with a coherent anti-
China goal.    
                                                      
52 ideological export: 意识形态输出 
53 split:分裂 
54 西方敌对势力亡我之心不死，民族分裂势力乱我之心不变 
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Second, “hostile forces” refer to “Western” media that serve to promote the political 
agenda of the “Western hostile forces”. Radio Free Asia, based in Washington, is 
regarded as one of the major actors that “spread rumours” and “even encourage 
violent terrorist thinking within China” (Xia, Wang, and Qing 2014a). Some journalists 
of Huanqiu, the nationalist tabloid newspaper affiliated with the People’s Daily, claim 
that there is conclusive evidence that Radio Free Asia has become the megaphone of 
the “East Turkistan forces”, as evidenced by decades of propagating “anti-Han” 
sentiment and “Xinjiang separatist” movements and the direct involvement of some 
journalists in inciting violent attacks in China (Xia, Wang, and Qing 2014a). Quoting a 
journalist from the Uyghur department of Radio Free Asia, they stated that “some of 
us are learning suicidal bombing techniques that allow one person to fight against 100 
people. The CCP cannot protect everyone on the street” (Xia, Wang, and Qing 2014a). 
They accused Radio Free Asia of producing a large amount of “distorted reports” on 
the Urumqi Riot in 2009. According to Xia and his colleges (2014b), RFA has been 
broadcasting in Uyghur language for 2 hours a day, 7 days a week and the narratives 
used on Radio Free Asia are based on distorted Uyghur history; they demonise the 
CCP’s ethnic policy as “colonisation” and “massacre”, and mobilise Uyghurs to fight for 
independence (Xia, Wang, and Qing 2014b). The article listed Voice of America, BBC, 
Radio France Internationale, and Deutsche Welle as other “Western media” that have 
been fuelling anti-China sentiment (Xia, Wang, and Qing 2014a). In addition, YouTube, 
iTunes, Facebook, Google and Twitter have been accused of providing a platform for 
the separatists (Xia, Wang, and Qing 2014a). Not surprisingly, those platforms are all 
blocked in China. 
Third, “hostile forces” refer to human rights organisations. As discussed in earlier in 
this section, Chinese political elites and intellectuals frame Western involvement in 
other countries in the name of human rights as part of the Western hegemonic 
mentality that aim at undermining the regimes it dislikes. They are highly sceptical 
about the political agenda behind the international criticism of China’s human rights 
record. An article published in 2008 stated that Reporters Without Borders is 
“extremely anti-China”. Chinese officials and scholars have also criticised Amnesty 
International w for its support of “sex worker’s rights” (H. Liu 2015), and Human 
Rights Watch for its selective reports, double standards, and bias against the Chinese 
government (X. Pang 2015).  
Accusing external actors of being “hostile forces” has been heavily criticised by 
activists and scholars outside China. Shichor (1994, 79) suggests that the so-called 
“enemies” are merely imagined because it is not clear which entities “hostile forces” 
are referring to. Debata (2010, 55) has also questioned the very existence of such 
entities, as he believes that many states are reluctant to confront China, as its role in 
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the international economy becomes more important. An article on the Human Rights 
Watch indicates that the current focus on “hostile forces” is in line with Xi’s emphasis 
on ideology, which raises concerns that some domestic organisations that are deemed 
to have connections with “hostile forces” may face “renewed harassment and threats 
from the authorities” (Human Rights Watch 2016). He Qinglian (2014) wrote on the 
Voice of America that the making of the enemies serves to deflect people’s attention 
away from the CCP’s failure in regard to the domestic economy, real estate bubble, 
and environmental pollution.  
In the context of the counter-terrorism discourse, the phrase “hostile forces” is not 
used to give a clear meaning in terms of who the speaker is referring to. It is difficult 
to identify a particular political entity merely from the text in which it is used. This 
highlights the importance of considering the framing in the context of the political 
antagonism that China has been reinforcing in its pursuit of legitimacy. It contains a 
package of ready-made assumptions that save the audience from thinking deeply 
about the causes of terrorism. The package of assumptions draws on the narratives of 
the Century of Humiliation, which makes the irreconcilable attitude towards 
territories sound more palatable. 
Chinese political elites and intellectuals have reinforced this political antagonism by 
drawing links with other cases of Western involvement in regime changes in socialist 
countries. 
First, they consider NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 evidence of US hegemony, 
as well as the “News invasion” or “propaganda invasion” in the name of “freedom of 
the press” (Husheng Zhang 1999, 19). Zhang Ruizhuang (2002, 111), a scholar at 
Nankai University, argues that the West, especially the US, framed the “small-scale, 
low-intensity civil war” as “ethnic cleansing and genocide” to justify the intervention 
of NATO. The CCP did not hesitate in expressing its opposition against the intervention 
in Kosovo for fearing that it could be established as a precedent for intervention in 
separatist movements in Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan (Choedon 2005, 54; Jing Chen 
2009, 158; Z. Pang 2005, 88; Snetkov and Lanteigne 2015, 128; Hirono and Lanteigne 
2011, 248; T. Liu and Zhang 2014, 406; Xiao 2003, 28). This concern is reflected in the 
link that some scholars (Y. Fan 2000, 41) made between the Kosovo conflict and the 
independence claims of Lee Teng-hui, a former political leader in Taiwan. Officials’ and 
intellectuals’ anxiety about the framing of ethnic conflict might have been intensified 
when the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan framed the CCP’s response to 
terrorism in Xinjiang as “genocide” (Reuters 2009), which could be used to justify 
humanitarian intervention in China.  
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Second, Chinese political elites and intellectuals believe that Western media are 
aligned with “Western hostile forces” in toppling socialist regimes. Zhang Husheng 
(1999, 19) alleged in 1999 that “Western mainstream media are close allies of 
Western monopoly capitalist class in launching invasion, intervention, subversion and 
peaceful evolution”. As discussed earlier, they believe that Western media have 
played an important role in inciting ethnic conflict by targeting the Uyghurs and 
framing China’s governance as colonisation. Chinese political elites and intellectuals 
are concerned about the impact of the media like Radio Free Asia, because Radio Free 
Europe influenced the Revolutions of 1989 (J. Qian 2008; Y. Hu 1994; Y. Wu 2013). 
Huang and Gu (1991) articulated the ability of the Free Radio to manipulate public 
opinions and its impact on subverting socialist regimes. Liu and his colleagues (1991) 
and the Journalism Research Centre of Xinhua News Agency (1993) elaborated the 
causal relationship between the Revolutions of 1989 and the American strategy of 
peaceful evolution. Similarly, Liu Ming (2006) and Bi Bo (1991) discussed the catalysing 
effect of the mass media on the collapse of the Soviet Union. In short, Chinese 
political elites and intellectuals are highly vigilant about the media such as Radio Free 
Asia due to its ties with the alleged Western hegemonic strategy of causing 
disturbances in socialist countries by supporting their separatist movements (E. Han 
2013, 8). 
These assumptions have led Chinese political elites and intellectuals to believe that 
the West has been, and will continue working on inducing regime change by 
encouraging a “colour revolution” in China (Y. Gu 2009, 304; X. Mao and Hu 2010). Gu 
Yiqun argues that following the democratisation in the Middle East, the US will turn to 
promote a “colour revolution” in China (Y. Gu 2009, 304). Ma Xinjuan (2006, 107) 
argues that colour revolution has had an exemplary effect for the radicalisation of 
nationalism in Xinjiang (X. Mao 2006, 107).  
The possibility of intervention has always been a source of anxiety for Chinese officials 
and intellectuals. Zhang Ruizhuang (2016), a scholar at Nankai University, views the US 
military strikes in the name of human rights in Libya and Syria as the main cause of the 
ensuing violence after the colour revolution. Chinese political elites and scholars 
believe that human rights accusations serve a hegemonic agenda, as they are aligned 
with political issues such as most-favoured-nation-treatment, accession into the WTO, 
economic aid, technical cooperation, family planning, religion, national self-
determination, arms control, judicial system and China’s bid for the Olympic Games (Y. 
Yao 1996, 33). In addition to the case of Kosovo, the Western involvements in 
Chechnya (Y. Fan 2000, 41) is also seen as a precedent in regard to using human rights 
as a pretext for intervention.  
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Human rights issues are at the forefront of the Uyghurs’ claim for independence. To 
Chinese political elites and scholars, the affinity between some Uyghur organisations 
and the US indicates an alignment based on the same interests in undermining the 
unity of China. Some Uyghur organisations have been receiving financial support from 
the US government in the name of human rights. The National Endowment for 
Democracy provided the Uyghur Human Rights Project and World Uyghur Congress 
with a total of $ 610,000 to support the human rights activities (National Endowment 
for Democracy 2016). The indirect support Uyghur and Tibetan organisations outside 
China reminds Chinese scholars of the peaceful evolution of Poland and Hungary (G. 
Tian 2008, 32), which once again convinced China of the Western intention to induce 
a peaceful evolution in China after the Revolutions of 1989.  
The anxiety about human rights activities has partly contributed to the tightened grip 
over non-governmental organisations in China. In 2012, the China Charity Information 
Center, affiliated to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, published a report on the activities of 
NGOs based in the US. The report questions the intention of the National Endowment 
for Democracy because many of the receivers are “organisations opposing the Chinese 
government and attempting to separate Xinjiang and Tibet” (Jianmei Peng and Liu 
2012, 22). According to the report (Jianmei Peng and Liu 2012, 64), the financial 
support from the National Endowment for Democracy has “sabotaged the national 
security, unity, peace and solidarity” by providing financial support to civil movements 
(民运, minyun), Tibet separatism and the “East Turkistan forces”. When asked about 
the news about the National Endowment for Democracy providing $ 96,520,000 
financial support to 103 anti-China organisations, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua 
Chunying replied that this proved the need for the Law on the Management of the 
Activities of Overseas NGOs within Mainland China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2016).55 The law (National People’s Congress 2016) denounces the activities of non-
governmental organisations that “undermine national reunification or subverting 
State power”.  
The strict control over non-governmental organisations has limited the ability of 
human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to 
obtain information legally in China, particularly because many of these groups are 
already considered “hostile”, as discussed earlier. This makes it more difficult for third 
parties to function as mediators, as they can only seek information from those who 
are already unsatisfied with the Chinese government. This has further reinforced the 
                                                      
55 Law on the Management of the Activities of Overseas NGOs within Mainland China: 境外非
政府组织境内活动管理法 
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perception of Chinese political elites and intellectuals that human rights groups have a 
political agenda because they only speak for dissidents one-sidedly.  
The CCP’s framing of the Uyghur issue is confronted with other framings, which are 
compounded by the internet. The CCP’s security discourse has to compete with the 
discourse provided by the Uyghur exile community for the alignment of the 
individuals. According to Gladney’s (2003, 15) research in 2003, there are over 25 
international organisations under the banner of the independence of “East Turkistan”, 
whose target readers and contributors are mainly from Turkey, the US, Canada, and 
Australia. Throughout the years some have merged into one under the umbrella 
organisation – the World Uyghur Congress, which is based in Germany (World Uyghur 
Congress 2010). Some organisations, such as the Uyghur American Association and 
the Uyghur Human Rights Project, are supported by the US, either through the 
exemption of tax (The Uyghur American Association n.d.) or grant from the National 
Endowment for Democracy (Uyghur Human Rights Project n.d.). Most of these 
organisations use “East Turkistan” instead of “Xinjiang” to imply the legitimacy of the 
independent claims of some Uyghurs. Chinese scholars such as Gu Liyan (2013, 3) 
believe that the “internet infiltration” of these organisations has sustained separatist 
movements and escalated ethnic tensions.  
The control over the internet placed the CCP in an advantaged position in the 
competition of framings in China. The state is, as liberal/democratic regimes are, 
under pressure to convince the individuals of the legitimacy of the heavy-handed 
counter-terrorism measures. But unlike them, the CCP has limited the presence of 
alternative framings in China by promoting the “correct” outlook on history and minzu. 
In doing so the state has reinforced the line between friends and enemies and 
suppressed what could potentially be peaceful demonstrations over genuine 
grievances, precluding the possibility of understanding and dealing with Uyghurs’ 
concerns.  
4.6 The “East Turkistan forces” 
As discussed in earlier, anxious about the separation of Xinjiang from China, political 
elites and intellectuals label those who have separatist aspirations as “East Turkistan 
forces” – a group of anti-China forces that conspired with other external hostile forces 
to divide China. As Chinese political elites and intellectuals do not want to endorse the 
idea of “East Turkistan” as a political concept, when referring to the political struggle 
for “East Turkistan” as a state, they always put the phrase in quotation marks to 
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indicate its illegitimacy. 56 In this section, “East Turkistan forces” are put in quotation 
marks together to indicate its function as a label. This section provides a background 
of “East Turkistan forces” and how the Chinese government perceive them.  
In history, the area known today as Xinjiang has shifted between a protectorate of 
China and an independent state. After 1759, the Qing Dynasty strengthened its 
control over Xinjiang by sending troops and encouraging migration (The State Council 
Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2009). The shared sense of Turkic 
and Muslim identity and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo encouraged the Uyghurs to 
envision their own independence (Bovingdon 2010, 3). Two short-lived “East Turkistan 
Republics” were founded in 1933 and 1944 respectively (The State Council 
Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2009). The tensions between the 
CCP and the Uyghurs became increasingly irreconcilable as the assimilationist policies 
created a situation where the Uyghurs had little freedom to express their identity. The 
Baren Township Riot in 1990 and the Yining incident (also known as the Ghulja 
incident) in 1997 are two cases of the confrontation between the Uyghur separatism 
and the Chinese policy of assimilation (Bhattacharya 2003, 363).  
The CCP believes that the East Turkistan forces have never stopped their conspiracy 
against China. According to the CCP, the “East Turkistan forces” fled China after they 
were cracked down on and continued to be involved in violent uprisings in China (The 
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2009). The CCP 
claims that after the 9/11 attacks, the “East Turkistan forces” sought to get away with 
the punishment by framing their cause around the narratives of “human rights”, 
“religious freedom” and “ethnic interests” in order to rally international support (The 
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2009).  
Uyghur separatist movements have gained various support from the international 
community and the ways in which they frame political incidents in Xinjiang are 
sympathised with outside China. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan showed 
great sympathy towards Uyghur separatism because of the Turkic ties – “Eastern 
Turkestan is not only the home of the Turkic peoples but also the cradle of Turkic 
history, civilisation and culture… The martyrs of Eastern Turkestan are our martyrs” 
(Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe 1995). Uyghur organisations, such as the Uyghur 
Association of America, Uyghur Human Rights Project and World Uyghur Congress, 
promote the use of “East Turkistan” instead of “Xinjiang” (The Uyghur American 
Association n.d.; World Uyghur Congress 2017; Uyghur Human Rights Project n.d.). 
                                                      
56 Chinese political elites and intellectuals believe that “East Turkistan” should be used only as 
a geographical term.  
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This support from abroad has added to the anxiety of the CCP that framing the 
Xinjiang issue in the context of human rights would will continue to undermine its 
legitimacy.  
Uyghur militants not only target China but also work in broader international terrorist 
networks. In China, most of the attacks have taken place in Xinjiang, but recent years 
have seen an increase in the fatalities in inland cities such as Beijing (2013) and 
Kunming City in Yunnan Province (2014). 
 
Figure 11 Fatalities in terrorist attacks by location from 1990 to 2016 (author’s data 
compiled from English and Chinese media reports) 
Nodirbek Soliev (2017) produced a detailed report on the link between Uygur militant 
and international extremist networks. He observes that Uyghur militants are mainly 
fighting in Syria and Afghanistan. The Syrian division of the Turkistan Islamic Party is 
reportedly fighting with protection and support from al-Nusra Front, while he division 
in Afghanistan is much weaker and struggling to survive (Soliev 2017). The US forces’ 
attacks against the ETIM in Afghanistan in 2018 further weakened the Taliban training 
camps that supported operations by the ETIM (Reuters 2018a). In addition to Syria and 
Afghanistan, Uyghur militants are also reported to operate in Pakistan (Ramachandran 
2018), Indonesia (RFA 2016), the Philippines (Banlaoi 2016), and Thailand (Fuller and 
Wong 2018).  
The CCP attributed at least 200 terrorist attacks from 1990 to 2001 to the “East 
Turkistan forces” (State Council Information Office 2002a). The framing of these 
incidents has always been consistent with the assumptions of how external enemies 
have conspired to divide China, driven by ulterior motives. Building on the 
assumptions discussed in Chapter 4, a number of specific assumptions about the “East 
Turkistan forces” can be summarised as follows from official documents on terrorism 
in Xinjiang.  
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1. The “East Turkistan forces” have a history of colluding with other “foreign 
forces” or “anti-China forces”.  
2. They are connected with international terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda. 
In particular, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement cooperated with Bin Laden 
to establish a caliphate in Xinjiang. 
3. They advocate the use of force in achieving their goal.  
4. They have contempt for development and the improvement of living standards 
in Xinjiang.  
5. Terrorist attacks are usually organised and premeditated outside China; they 
send terrorists who have received training outside China to carry out terror 
attacks in China. 
However, as Chinese officials and academics do not usually differentiate between 
“East Turkistan forces” and individual terrorist groups, there has always been some 
confusion, especially considering that the media outside China usually refer to them 
separately. The state describes the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as an 
organisation that aims at separating Xinjiang from China and setting up an “East 
Turkistan” by means of violence (United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs 
2014). The ETIM has been listed as a terrorist organisation by the UN (United Nations 
Security Council Subsidiary Organs 2014), the EU (eur-lex.europa.eu 2002), the US 
(Office of the coordinator for counterterrorism 2004), the UK (Home Office 2017, 17), 
Pakistan (Dawn.Com 2013), Kyrgyzstan (Ansari n.d.) and Turkey (CNTV 2017). Yili Xiati 
(also known as Dilshat Rishit), the spokesperson of the WUC, indicated on the Boxun 
website that the organisation ETIM has been “fabricated” by the Chinese government 
(Yili 2010). 57 
The accusations of the World Uyghur Congress partly explained why the CCP put it in 
the same category as the ETIM. On the Epoch Times, an anti-CCP media outlet, Yili 
Xiati went further, saying that “as long as the terrorist CCP is not eliminated, East 
Turkistan will never live in peace...Because the CCP which controls the Chinese regime 
is a terrorist organisation, they know how to produce terrorist organisations and 
terrorists!” (Yili 2010). This statement threatens to eliminate the CCP, and completely 
denounces it by calling it a “terrorist organisation”. This is something that would be 
considered “inciting ethnic hatred” and “subversive”, which the CCP seeks to ban.  
Contrary to the CCP’s designation, data from the Global Terrorism Database based on 
reports from various open media sources indicate that in China, from 1989 to 2016, 
                                                      
57 Boxun website was partly funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (Associated 
Press in Beijing 2012). 
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more than half (57%) of the time, the identity of the perpetrator was unclear. 41% of 
the incidents were (suspected to be) carried out by Uyghurs and Muslims.  
 
Figure 12 Identity of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks from 1989 to 2016 in China. 
Source: Global Terrorism Database 
In addition to the terrorist attacks that have already taken place, a large number of 
individuals and entrepreneurs have been arrested or detained for a lack of proper 
preparedness plan for terror attacks. Furthermore, the criminalisation of non-violent 
separatist activities has also been criticised by human rights analysts (Becquelin 
2004a, 43). Some scholars also question the grouping of non-violent separatist 
activities as terrorism. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis (2008a) has stated that: “[t]here is no 
single Uyghur agenda”. Nicolas Becquelin (2004a, 39) questions the labelling of “non-
violent resistance” as terrorism.  
Although the CCP claims to have “conclusive evidence” of the criminal acts (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2001), it is not always in a position to disclose the details of the 
evidence in order to protect the source of intelligence. This has added to the existing 
speculation that the CCP uses its counter-terrorism strategy to suppress dissent. In 
response to the doubts of the international community about the nature of the 
terrorism in China, the CCP has highlighted the link between “non-violent resistance” 
and the terrorist attacks in China. The CCP has made provides based its claims 
regarding the terrorist nature of Uyghur dissident groups for two reasons.  
First, according to the CCP, the networks of the two are closely connected (Xinhua 
2003a). As the World Uyghur Congress (2010) claims, it was formed based on the 
merging of two organisations, the East Turkistan National Congress and the World 
Uyghur Youth Congress (Xinhua 2003a). The East Turkistan Information Center has 
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been accused by the CCP of planning the attacks on the railway from Lanzhou to Hami 
in 2003, in addition to planning the attacks against oil and gas pipelines and the 
railway (Xinhua 2003a). The founder of the Center, Abdujélil Qaraqash, took the roll of 
Vice-President of the World Uyghur Youth Congress (Xinhua 2003a). The CCP ascribes 
the two bombings in Kashgar and Shache in 1993 to the East Turkistan Youth League, 
affiliated to the World Uyghur Youth Congress.  
Second, those who were convicted for terrorism-related crimes took important 
positions in these Uyghur organisations after they fled China. Dolkun Isa, a co-founder 
and current president of the World Uyghur Congress, is among the first 10 terrorists 
designated by the Ministry of Public Security (Xinhua 2003a). Abudujelili Kalakash was 
convicted of providing terrorist training, including the use of toxic chemical weapons 
and bombing techniques, in preparating and planning a terrorist attack in China 
(Xinhua 2003b). He is also believed to be the founder and first president of the East 
Turkistan Information Center and a key member of the World Uyghur Youths Congress 
(Acharya, Gunaratna, and Wang 2010, 87). 
In addition to these two reasons, the close ties between the “East Turkistan forces” 
and other anti-China forces has exacerbated the anxiety of political elites. In 2009, the 
Dalai Lama formed the Chinese Alliance for Democracy – an “anti-China, anti-CCP 
community” in the eyes of the CCP. The group include the Overseas Chinese 
Democracy Coalition and the Uyghur, Mongolian, and Taiwan separatist organisations 
(People’s Daily Online 2010).58 According to Zhao Guojun, the World Uyghur Congress 
deliberately linked their claims with human rights issues, catering for a Western 
audience by adopting their values to rally support from politicians and anti-China 
forces (Hao Li 2009). In response to the efforts of the Uyghur dissidents in rallying 
support from human rights activists, a Xinhua commentary (2009c) argues that any 
form of support for the World Uyghur Congress is “extreme short-sighted and 
irresponsible”.  
Framing external enemies as a threat, the CCP has deflected people’s attention away 
from domestic causes of terrorism. The framing of the “East Turkistan forces” 
demonstrates the CCP’s rationale for grouping different criticisers as its enemies. 
China’s official discourse of “East Turkistan forces” shows that the political elites 
perceive terrorism differently, compared with officials in liberal/democratic countries. 
They believe that separatist movements, together with other so-called democracy 
movements, pose a severe threat to the regime’s security; and these movements are 
often supported covertly by external enemies who share the same agenda to 
                                                      
58 Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition: 中国海外民运联席会议 
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undermine or even subvert the CCP. Considering other cases of democratisation, the 
CCP has very little tolerance for any forms of separatist ideology.  
4.6.1 Foreign fighters from Xinjiang to Syria 
The different ways in which the issue of foreign fighters is framed in Chinese and 
Western media demonstrate the different assumptions that underpin these frames. 
Some critics describe the journey to flee China as the result of a “political awakening” 
and the backfiring of the CCP’s repression against religious freedom (Page and Peker 
2015; Sulaiman 2015). In the eyes of the CCP, the fact that the terrorist networks were 
able to assist the Uyghur who fled China is evidence to support its claim that domestic 
terror attacks are remotely controlled by “external hostile forces”. The following 
analysis will demonstrate the framing of the issue of foreign fighters in the Chinese 
political discourse. 
As discussed in Section 3.2, the official media dictate the discourse of counter-
terrorism and ensure that alternative “wrong” accounts of terrorist incidents cannot 
spread via the Chinese media. The discussion over the issue of foreign fighters relies 
heavily on the investigation conducted by a war correspondent Qiu Yongzheng, the 
chief correspondent of the Global Times. Based on his investigation, Qiu has identified 
the routes of foreign fighters from Xinjiang into Syria. According to Qiu and his 
collegues (2014), those who wanted to join the self-proclaimed ISIS saved money for 
the journey by doing business themselves, and through donations. Most of them 
chose to sneak out of Yunnan, Guangdong or Guangxi, three border provinces in the 
south. Qiu and Xing quote intelligence from Indonesia, showing that the 4 suspects 
first sneaked out into Cambodia, and then into Thailand, where they each spent 1,000 
USD to purchase fake Turkish passports. They flew to Kuala Lumpur, and then to West 
Java, before transferring to the Makassar port of South Sulawesi (Qiu and Xing 2014).  
They were taken care of all the way to Turkey, which shows that the IS has 
already established their networks in Indonesia… they were offered free 
accommodation in Palou, and were assigned the next task. At the 
Makassar airport, a 29-year-old local teacher brought the 4 suspects to the 
terrorist camp led by Santoso [also known as Abu Wardah, author’s note], 
the highest leader of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, who publicly pledged 
allegiance to the IS in July [in 2016, author’s note] (Qiu and Xing 2014). 
After entering Turkey, they flew to airports near Hatay, Gaziantep and Antalya and 
were picked up by an “intermediary” (Qiu and Xing 2014). The counter-terrorism 
operations in Turkey forced them to alter their routes towards Syria (Qiu and Xing 
2014).  
As discussed in previous chapters, some organisations abroad, especially a number of 
East Turkistan groups based in Turkey, are on China’s watch list. The CCP is vigilant 
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about the support for “East Turkistan forces” received from the Turks, as they share a 
similar Turkic language and culture. Xu Jianying (2014), a researcher at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, believes that the shelter and even support that the Turks 
have provided make Turkey the “base camp” of the “East Turkistan forces”. Indeed, 
the East Turkistan Education and Solidarity Association (ETESA) has publicly praised 
militant attacks and the assassination of a pro-Communist imam in Kashgar (Jacob 
2014; Qiu 2014c). Political elites and intellectuals also question the role that the 
Turkish government has played in the growth of “East Turkistan forces”. Qiu and his 
colleague accuse the Turkish government of deliberately loosening up the border 
control to allow pro-opponent journalists and militant opponents to enter via the 
Syrian border, as evidenced by an interview with a local in Syria: “it is not hard at all to 
cross the border” (Qiu and Xing 2014; Qiu 2014c). The official report on the visit of 
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan repeatedly emphasises that Erdoğan does 
respect China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that Xinjiang is 
an integral part of China (Tianshanwang 2012). The CCP wanted to have the support 
of the Turkish government, especially considering Erdoğan’s framing of the 2009 
Urumqi Riot as “genocide”. However, the resemblance of Erdoğan’s alleged remarks 
to the Chinese official position suggests that this statement might have been no more 
than a self-deceiving propaganda, particularly in the light of the reports on Turkish 
support for Uyghur refugees (Pamuk 2015; Xinhua 2015d). 
Official media link the far-right groups, politicians and Western anti-China forces in 
Turkey with the East Turkistan separatists, aiming at containing China’s rise by 
undermining the Belt and Road Initiative and creating disturbances in Xinjiang 
(Heiniyati 2015; Global Times 2013b). The following quote fleshes out China’s 
response to the Turkish support for Uyghur separatists.  
The so-called “support for Xinjiang Muslim” farce in Turkey… shows the 
attempts by some Turkish far-right politicians with ulterior motives to 
relive the dream of the “dual-pan” [pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, 双泛, 
shuangfan, author’s note] which had been cast aside… For many years, 
these “East Turkistan” separatists have taken advantage of the far-right 
organisations in Turkey to carry out activities to split China (Heiniyati 2015).  
In relation to the number of foreign fighters, there is no agreement on the number of 
Uyghurs who have joined the IS. The estimation of the scale of foreign fighters differs 
according to the source and the political agenda of the source. China’s official 
estimation of the number of foreign fighters from Xinjiang is based on Qiu 
Yongzheng’s investigation. His interview with senior officers from Iraq, Syria and 
Lebanon reveals that there are around 300 combatants in the “ETIM battalion”, in 
addition to their families (Qiu 2014b). This estimation has been questioned by Uyghur 
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dissidents and some scholars. Alim Seytoff, the President of Uyghur American 
Association, has stated that this is a “baseless propaganda”, designed to “justify 
China’s cruel suppression of Uyghurs” (Si 2015a). Dru Gladney says that the intent is 
“to make the Uighurs look as if they’re a threat, an Islamist terrorist organization” 
(Drennan 2015). Nicholas Bequelin, who works with Human Rights Watch, comments 
that the number is “implausibly high” (Drennan 2015). Sean Roberts said “I assume 
there are Uighurs joining IS, but I also assume the numbers are quite small in 
comparison to other groups throughout the world. We’re probably talking about 20 to 
30 people max.” (Drennan 2015) 
Other sources outside China show that the number is likely to be much higher than 
Sean Roberts’ estimation. A Reuters report (Blanchard 2017) quote Syria’s ambassador 
to China Imad Moustapha, who stated that there were up to 5,000 Uyghurs fighting in 
Syria. A report by the Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (2014, 
49) estimates that there are around 100 Uyghurs fighting alongside the rebels in Syria. 
Nata Rosenblatt’s (2016, 23) research on foreign fighters found that from mid-2013 to 
mid-2014, there were 118 combatants from China, 114 of which were from Xinjiang, 
who joined IS, almost entirely via the Turkish-Syrian border. Clint Watts used four data 
sets from 2014 to 2015, and estimated that between 0.6 to 4.3 percent of the foreign 
fighters in Iraq and Syria were Chinese nationals (Watts 2016). The estimation of 114 
fighters based on Nate Rosenblatt’s analysis makes Xinjiang “the fifth highest source 
of foreign fighters in the Muslim world” on a provincial basis (Rosenblatt 2016, 26).  
The difficulty in reaching an accurate estimation of the number of foreign fighters 
from Xinjiang highlights the political element in the discourse of the Xinjiang issue, not 
only regarding the Chinese government, but also its critics. The number helps the 
speaker to justify counter-measures (the Chinese government), and accusations 
(Uyghur dissidents). The latter is evident from the fact that regardless of the actual 
number, Uyghur dissidents have linked the number to the same conclusion about the 
suppression of the Chinese government. On the one hand, Dilixiati Rexiti, 
spokesperson of the World Uyghur Congress, has criticised the CCP for exaggerating 
the number to justify the suppression of Uyghurs (The News Lens 2017). On the other 
hand, The Uyghur Human Rights Project posted an article citing Imad Moustapha’s 
estimation of around 5,000 foreign fighters to argue that such a large number of 
Uyghurs were trying to escape to Turkey from the CCP’s suppression (Uyghur Human 
Rights Project 2017). Given that none of the other observers gives an estimation that 
is over 500, Moustapha’s estimation still needs to be verified. Considering that his 
statement highlights the shared interests between China and Syria and that China 
“should be extremely concerned”, it is likely that the number of Uyghurs in Syria has 
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been exaggerated in order to drag China into the conflict to counteract the influence 
of the West (Blanchard 2017).  
China’s counter-terrorism propaganda on the issue of foreign fighters can better 
understood by considering it as an example of de-glamorisation. Gordon Clubb (2016, 
851) discussed de-glamorisation as a tactic of de-radicalisation. The concept of 
glamorisation refers to the ways in which violence is “glorified” and the perpetrators 
are constructed as heroes in the terrorist narrative (Clubb 2016, 851). In the context 
of terrorism in China, extremists use a distorted and glorified interpretation of the 
hijrat to incite “religious revenge” (Zang 2016b, 77). They used the Uyghur word hijrat, 
which originated from the Arabic “hegira” or “hijrah”, to refer to the migration from 
China to a place where they joined the jihad. In attempting to de-glamorise terrorism, 
the state media provide competing narratives to counteract extremist propaganda. To 
this end, the state media retold the story of how innocent people were deceived by 
terrorists and bankrupted because of the journey, showing the disillusion of those 
who chose to join the hijrat. The counter-narrative serves to de-glamorise the story of 
heroic acts of hijrat. Framing those who joined hijrat as innocent people who only 
committed the crime because they were deceived also helps the CCP to highlight the 
importance of the correct guidance from the CCP. The following section provides a 
summary of the counter-narrative provided by the state media and intellectuals. Such 
a narrative also allows the state media to manipulate the concept of the enemy, and 
justifies that the capturing of these individuals does not end the war on terror, and 
thus further counter-terrorism measures are needed to deal with the real enemies.  
4.6.2 Counter-narratives on hijrat 
According to the state media, beginning in 1996, ethno-separatists and religious 
extremists fled China, and colluded with international terrorist organisations in 
fabricating stories of religious persecution (Xinjiang Daily 2015a). They encouraged 
believers to carry out hijrat and instigate jihad (Xinjiang Daily 2015a).  
Since 2012, there have been reports on Uyghurs in Xinjiang travelling to Syria to join 
the self-proclaimed Islamic State (Qiu 2013). The counter-narrative on hijrat 
emphasises that a large number of individuals were deceived and forced into the 
hijrat. The CCP is portrayed not as a suppressing regime but as a helping hand that 
offered help for rehabilitation. By emphasising the “evilness” of the real enemies, the 
official discourse has downplayed the differences between those who pursue hijrat 
blindly and ordinary citizens.  
The explanation provided by Yang Shu (Xinjiang Daily 2015a), senior consultant to 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, is an example of how the framing points to the 
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conclusion about the real enemies. He has made the following three points which 
explains the logic of the framing.  
1. Many convicted terrorists have not read the Quran and do not have much 
knowledge of religion – they are not the real enemies.  
2. They committed crimes simply because of the influence of religious extremism 
– the crimes were masterminded by the real enemies. 
3. Most of the convicted terrorists are less educated, and they lack knowledge 
about law and Islam – those who were captured are simply the puppets of the 
real enemies. 
The story of a farmer called Alim on The Last mile demonstrates this rationale in more 
detail (MqMsMx 2015a). 59 According to the report, Alim was struggling to make ends 
meet when he met Aijiamali who told him about how heavenly it was outside China. 
With little knowledge about geography and law, Alim thought that Turkey bordered 
China, and it would be very easy to get back if things went wrong. He was determined 
to bring all of his family to Turkey. However, during the journey, they were not 
provided with enough food. Before long, they had spent all of their money. But the 
traffickers kept asking for more money from them. He, together with his family, was 
arrested in Afghanistan and deported back to China after serving sentence of 17 
months. Considering that he was deceived and had already served the sentence, he 
was exempted from penalty that he would have received otherwise in China. But 
without a place to live and no land to farm, Alim and his family were desperate. 
Village cadres helped him to apply for government-subsidised housing and redeem 
the land he had sold for the journey. He was able to start a new business because a 
policeman offered to be his guarantor. In this story, Alim is portrayed as a nice but 
naïve farmer who simply wanted to go to Turkey to make more money. He is not 
considered one of the enemies, and even received help from the government and the 
police. The story highlights his disillusion of the “heavenly” place outside China and 
that some of those who joined the hijrat did so because their lack of basic knowledge 
made them easy targets for human trafficking.  
Another story of Tursun (MqMsMx 2015b) shows how educated young Uyghurs could 
also be deceived and coerced into joining the hijrat. Tursun is a candidate for College 
Entrance Examination in Xinjiang. He was among the six students in his school who 
were admitted into the Xinjiang Class in inland China. Before the College Entrance 
Examination, he got acquainted with a person called Mexmut who told him: “I have no 
                                                      
59 The Last Mile (最后一公里, zuihou yi gongli ) is the WeChat Official Account for Xinjiang 
Internet information office (新疆互联网信息办公室). 
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objection against you pursuing knowledge. But you can’t go to ‘pagan’ university 
which will drive you further and further from religion. Let me get you a passport for 
you to go to a college in Egypt”. Soon afterwards, Tursun came to the realisation that 
Mexmut had deceived him into joining the jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria. When he 
wanted to withdraw, Mexmut threatened to kill him. Faced with this threat, he told 
his own parents that he had been admitted into a university in inland China, and asked 
for 30,000 RMB from them to pay Mexmut for his journey. He was forced to assist the 
terrorist network to facilitate human smuggling. Stories of those who died from 
escaping scared him. When he was arrested in February 2015, he was overwhelmed 
with remorse. This story again highlights that it is not those who joined the hijrat, but 
those who deceived them into it, that are the real enemies. They are, in fact, victims 
of terrorists who hate the secular CCP regime.  
A third story on People’s Daily (Qiu 2013) reveals the role of East Turkistan groups in 
facilitating human trafficking. In 2011, Memet Eli left Xinjiang to pursue further 
education in Turkey, where he was offered “help” by the East Turkistan Education and 
Solidarity Association (ETESA). After a background check and a series of brainwashing 
sessions, he was selected as an official member of the East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) to fight in Syria. Brainwashed by ETESA and ETIM, he considered it 
an “honour” to be able to fight in Syria.  
Memet travelled from Istanbul to Hatay Province in Turkey, and entered the Syrian 
border from Reyhanli to Aleppo, where he received a seven days’ intensive training 
under the Al-Nusra Front, a coalition of Uzbekistani, Caucasian and Russian foreign 
fighters that has existed since May 2014, and pledged allegiance to IS in July 2014 (Qiu 
and Xing 2014). Memet’s experience in Syria disillusioned him.  
According to Memet, their lives was under constant threat due to the lack of food, 
medical care and attacks by the Syrian government. In addition to the plight from 
which they suffered physically, the disillusion of the jihad was a heavy blow to their 
faith.  
What is worse than the harsh living conditions was the indifference and 
despise we suffered from the Syrian people. We used to believe that our 
arrival into Syria for the cause of “Jihad” would be welcomed by the locals. 
However, many people in Northern Syria said to us: “you are welcome to 
subvert Bashar, but you are not welcome to stay here after the war! We 
don’t want to change our lifestyle inherited from hundreds and thousands 
of years ago” (Qiu and Xing 2014). 
Because the terrorist networks in Syria hardly care about the survival of the Uygur 
militants, they have suffered heavy casualties. Memet had to return to Istanbul after 2 
months of fighting in Syria, with the hope of continuing his education in Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
129 
However, the ETIM and ETESA assigned him the new task of continuing the “jihad” in 
Xinjiang. “They made it clear that I should return to Xinjiang to create disturbances, 
and improve our ‘fighting skill’”. 
The state media portrays the Uyghur militants in Syria as “cannon fodder” whose lives 
are not valued at all by local terrorist networks. When they die, they are “buried as if 
they are trash” (Guanchazhe 2014). Quoting a senior member of personnel in Iraq’s 
intelligence system, Qiu Yongzheng (2014d), said that the Uyghur militant members 
were treated as “second class citizens”. He also argued based on intelligence that 
“newcomers” such as the ETIM struggled to gain the trust of the seniors (Qiu 2014d). 
They were dragged into war reluctantly (Qiu 2014a). At least one Uyghur militant 
member was captured and decapitated upon escaping (Qiu 2014a).  
The three stories above share a number of assumptions. First, unlike the Uyghur 
dissidents’ claims that the Uyghurs fled China as a result of suppression (The Guardian 
2015), the Chinese state media focus on the personal purpose, rather than the 
political purposes of those who joined the hijrat – economic benefit and education, 
rather than freedom from suppression. Second, they were disillusioned with their 
(voluntary or non-voluntary) experience in the terrorist networks. Third, the real 
enemies masterminded these crimes outside China, and the capture of those who 
were the de facto victim cannot eliminate the possibility of future terrorist attacks. 
The ramification of this assumption is that the CCP needs to continue fighting against 
terrorism.  
Given the dominance of the official counter-terrorism discourse and the government’s 
insistence on the “correct” narratives, Chinese citizens have little access to alternative 
accounts of the stories of those who fled China. Through the counter-narrative on the 
hijrat the state sought to establish credibility by incorporating stories of individuals 
and Uyghurs’ voices in the official counter-terrorism discourse. Third, hardly any 
alternative accounts of these stories have been found in Chinese mainstream media, 
which reflects the CCP’s efforts to “occupy the ideological high ground” (Wan 2014) 
and keep the party line as the only legitimate source of counter-narrative. The framing 
of these stories reinforces a dichotomy between the “terrorist” narrative and the 
counter-narrative. The dichotomy becomes problematic when the separatist narrative 
that does not instigate violence is also categorised as a “terrorist” narrative. The 
following section will focus on the mass mobilisation especially against the separatist 
propaganda that is not explicitly advocating violence.  
4.7 Conclusion 
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This chapter problematised the concepts of unity and the enemy in China’s political 
discourse, policy and practice. These two concepts are at the core of China’s political 
history. In imperial China, political philosophers developed different theories about 
the causes of political unrest and the role of unity. As times has gone by, the 
mainstream political elites and scholars have gradually pushed the concept of unity to 
the core of China’s politics. The ideal of the “Grand Union”, albeit controversial due to 
its associations with tyranny and dictatorship, has been important in social 
mobilisation both during the Republic China and contemporary China in creating an 
imagined community with which to differentiate Chinese people, including all its 
different ethnic groups, from the external enemies. The discussion over friend and 
enemy became more contentious in the late 1930s when scholars began to question 
the translation of minzu.  
The discussion over minzu is important to understand how Chinese political elites and 
scholars perceive unity and separatism in the context of Xinjiang’s separatist 
movements. Minzu can be translated into either “nation” or “ethnicity”, which gives 
rise to a series of question relating to the legitimacy of the Uyghurs’ claim to national 
self-determination. Modelled on the Soviet experience, China’s followed the Soviet 
Union in naming its minzu nations; at the same time, Chinese political elites and 
scholars refuse to see minzu as a distinctive nation based on which a group can form a 
state. This ambiguity has rendered all of the separatist aspirations illegal, as it is 
clearly unacceptable for Chinese political elites and scholars to challenge the CCP’s 
claim of sovereignty over Xinjiang. Those who dared to do so are considered 
“separatists”, who colluded with “external enemies” driven by “ulterior motives”. To 
counter-act this, Chinese scholars have developed the paradigm of “diversity within 
unity”, through which to approach ethnic relations in China. Adopting this paradigm, 
the CCP has constructed unity as the prerequisite for the diversity of ethnic groups – 
ethnic groups can only enjoy diversity if they submit themselves to the CCP’s authority 
and recognise that the unity of China must not be undermined.  
The ways in which the CCP defines its enemies in the context of its counter-terrorism 
strategy are contingent upon its understanding of China’s national unity. As the CCP is 
hostile towards all attempts to facilitate the independence of Xinjiang (what Uyghur 
dissidents call East Turkistan), anyone who sympathises with this goal is deemed 
suspicious. The concept of the enemy has differed throughout in China’s political 
history in order to justify different political agendas, but overall, there has been a 
fundamental distinction between China and the West. The discussion surrounding the 
enemy has always been revolved around the concern that the West, les by the US, will 
continue its Marshall Plan in other forms to contain communism. The anxiety about 
peaceful evolution has played a central role in Chinese political elites’ and scholars’ 
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attitudes towards ideas and views that pose a challenge the CCP’s legitimacy. As the 
history of humanitarian intervention demonstrates, interference in the state’s 
sovereignty has always been intertwined with human rights. Learning lessons from the 
intervention in other parts of the world, the CCP is particularly strict in controlling the 
discourse regarding how Uyghurs are treated.  
In order to control the discourse, the CCP has relied on history as the source of its 
legitimacy with regard to the claim of sovereignty over Xinjiang. History has been 
politicised and used by the CCP as the criteria to test one’s loyalty. Establishing an 
official version of the history of Xinjiang, the CCP has monopolised the counter-
terrorism discourse and alienated all those who question the “correct” outlook on 
history.  
Against this backdrop, the ways in which the CCP frames and defines terrorism is a 
source of contention between Chinese elites and observers outside China. The 
labelling of the “East Turkistan forces” demonstrates how Chinese political elites and 
scholars deploy the concept of the enemy in China’s counter-terrorism discourse. The 
CCP has loosely grouped all individuals and groups that challenge its rule in order to 
facilitate the independence of “East Turkistan” under the umbrella of “East Turkistan 
forces”, blurring the line between the Uyghurs who have genuine grievances and the 
“East Turkistan Islamic Movement”, which has been designated a terrorist 
organisation by the UN and many countries.  
While the issue of foreign fighters was politicised by the CCP, the dissidents equally 
demonstrated their bias against the CCP. The self-contradictory citation of different 
numbers of foreign fighters indicates that they are concerned primarily with putting 
the blame on the CCP, rather than discussing the real situation of the Uyghurs with 
verified sources. This shows that the hostility of the Uyghur dissidents is not entirely 
imagined by the CCP, although it is undoubtedly an exaggeration to link Uyghur 
dissidents with violent terrorist attacks without clear evidence and a transparent 
designating process.  
Mao’s two types of contradictions provide a guideline for the CCP to treat friends and 
enemies. Nevertheless, when it comes down to practice, the CCP is aware of the 
danger of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy by labelling too large a population as its 
enemy. The manipulation of the concept of the enemy is evident in the case of 
counter-narratives on the hijrat. In order to isolate “real” separatists from the 
majority of the Uyghur population, the state media has portrayed those who joined 
the hijrat as being deceived or coerced. In doing so, the state media has been able to 
still categorise them as “one of us”, who were just in need of proper guidance. As they 
were not the enemies, the CCP’s treatment was merciful and benevolent, as it helped 
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them reintegrate into society. This rationale also helped the CCP to justify its policy of 
transformation through education, through which it imposed indoctrination upon the 
Uyghurs in the name of proper guidance and education.  
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Chapter 5 China’s overall counter-terrorism approach 
This chapter will demonstrate how different aspects of China’s counter-terrorism 
policy are embedded in its quest for legitimacy. The discussion over China’s counter-
terrorism strategy in this chapter will demonstrate the links between the framing of 
the counter-terrorism policy and the prioritisation of national unity, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. On the one hand, the ways in which China’s counter-terrorism 
approach is carried out demonstrate some authoritarian characteristics of the 
governance of China. It is highly state-centric and condescending, which can be seen 
from the discussion of the overall security principle, the counter-terrorism discourse, 
the counter-terrorism legal framework, the actors involved, the development policy 
and the religious policy. On the other hand, there is some evidence of political elites’ 
and intellectuals’ awareness of the deficiencies of the state-centric approach and 
attempts to share power and engage the public. This can be seen from the revision of 
the Anti-Terrorism Law, the adoption and development of the Mass Line approach in 
counter-terrorism, and the mobilisation of the community and family members for de-
radicalisation purposes. However, under the single-party regime, these efforts had 
limited success, because much of the criticism that could have helped to improve 
them has been deemed hostile and therefore silenced by the CCP. Although the CCP 
has been encouraging the participation of ethnic minorities within the Party, Uyghurs, 
particularly those within the Party system, are not invited to challenge the “correct” 
views. 60 Under Xi Jinping, China’s counter-terrorism discourse has become more 
hostile to views that do not fall under the category of “correct”. By laying out China’s 
overall counter-terrorism approach, this chapter will highlight the dilemma with which 
it is struggling with in the context of counter-terrorism. Like liberal/democratic 
countries, China faces pressure to justify its counter-terrorism measures to the public 
to maintain its legitimacy. However, instead of improving the transparency of policy-
making and terrorism designation, it relies on propaganda, mass mobilisation and 
coercion.  
5.1 Guiding principle: Overall Security Outlook 
This section focuses on the overall principles that guide security policy-making. The 
Overall Security Outlook is a loose framework that guides China’s counter-terrorism 
                                                      
60 A recent example of the CCP’s efforts to improve the participation of ethnic minorities can 
be seen from the National Human Rights Action Plan (2016-2020) [国家人权行动计划
（2016-2020）], available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-
09/29/c_129305934_5.htm. 
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discourse and policy.61 It is sometimes used interchangeably with the New Security 
Concept.62 The development of the overall principles of security reflects China’s 
attempt to put forward a non-Western framework to understand the security threat, 
in order to counter-balance the dominance of the traditional Western security 
paradigm. The latter, in the eyes of Chinese political elites and intellectuals, constructs 
a one-sided and zero-sum reality of security, and is inadequate to understand China’s 
security approach (G. Pan 2004, 4).  
Jiang Zemin raised the New Security Concept at the Conference on Disarmament 
(1999). He proposed a “new security concept” as a solution to the conflict that 
resulted from the security paradigm that prevailed during the Cold War. The following 
quote demonstrate his understanding of the causes of the conflict and the inadequacy 
of the traditional security paradigm:  
History tells us that the old security concept based on military alliances 
and build-up of armaments will not help ensure global security, still less 
will it lead to a lasting world peace. This then requires the cultivation of a 
new security concept that meets the need of the times and calls for 
vigorous efforts to explore new ways to safeguard peace and security. 
[official translation, author’s note] 
The initial proposal for the New Security Concept emphasises four core tenets – 
mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation (Z. Jiang 1999). Jiang also 
highlighted the five principles of peaceful coexistence that reflect China’s concerns 
about its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 63 The attempts by Chinese political 
elites to broaden the concept of security roughly coincided with the rise of critical 
approaches to security outside China (Buzan 2009; Crawford 1991; Haftendorn 1991, 
15; Baldwin 1995). Like critics such as Krause and Williams (1996), some scholars in 
China also questioned the excessively broadened scope that rendered the concept 
meaningless (L. Han 2000, 64; Y. He 2004, 117).  
Jiang raised the New Security Concept again at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 
200,2 to highlight China’s cooperative attitude towards security. The attempt to 
promote security cooperation with neighbouring countries reflects Deng’s emphasis 
on creating a peaceful international environment to allow China to continue 
developing. In 2005, when the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was formed, this 
                                                      
61 Overall Security Outlook: 综合安全观, zonghe anquan guan 
62 New Security Concept: 新安全观, xin anquan guan 
63 Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-
existence.  
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new security paradigm became popular. Hu Jintao followed Jiang Zemin in broadening 
the scope of security by constructing a multi-dimensional understanding of if, 
including economic, financial, nuclear, ideological, cultural and political security (Y. 
Zhu 2012, 96).  
Some Chinese scholars such as Pan Guang (2004) see the shift in the security paradigm 
as a critical turn from the focus on state security to the consideration of individuals, 
groups and communities. Indeed, Hu developed the New Security Concept and 
constructed a more cooperative and multi-dimensional approach to security, 
signalling a transition from the unilateral security outlook under Mao, Deng and Jiang, 
to a multilateral one under Hu. Some may argue that such a concept is over-idealistic, 
but the normative impact it imposed on policy-makers cannot be dismissed entirely. 
Such a shift signifies the realisation among political elites’ and intellectuals’ that to 
gain support from the masses, it is no longer sufficient to emphasise state security, as 
in a relatively peaceful era it is the threats to human security that might be linked 
more directly with the CCP’s legitimacy.  
At the first meeting of the National Security Commission in April 2014, Xi Jinping 
proposed the Overall Security Outlook, which became an overarching guiding doctrine 
for China’s approach to security (Xi 2014a). A month later in May, he promoted its 
variation, the “New Asian Security Concept”, which advocated common, 
comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security in Asia (Xi 2014). 
The current version of the Overall Security Outlook is all-encompassing. Xi points out 
China’s approach to security, stating that a “national security path with Chinese 
characteristics” must pursue the following aspects: 64 
• external security through peace, cooperation, and mutual benefit 
• internal security through development, reform, and stability 
• security of the national territory 
• security of the citizens  
• both traditional and non-traditional security, including security in the following 
areas: politics, territory, military, economics, culture, society, science and 
technology, information, ecology, resource, and nuclear 
• both development and security 
• both security of China and security of the community 
The counter-terrorism strategy guided by the Overall Security Outlook has several 
features.  
                                                      
64 national security path with Chinese characteristics: 中国特色国家安全道路 
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First, it reflects an attempt to shift the state-centric security paradigm to a more 
human-centric approach. Xi (2014a) stresses the importance of a “people-oriented” 
and “human-oriented” security approach, and that the officials must “adhere to the 
principle that national security serves the people, relies on the people, and truly 
achieve a solid mass foundation for national security”. The view that policy should 
serve the people and rely on the people reflects the Mass Line approach inherited 
from the Mao era. By emphasising a “solid mass foundation” he acknowledges the 
significance of support from the masses for the national security policy. However, as 
the Outlook is only normative, in practice the state can still target its own political 
enemies by including them in a terrorist list.  
Second, Xi has further reinforced the perception of the relationship between 
development and security inherited from Deng (1993c, 354). “Development is the 
basis of security, and security is the condition of development” (Xi 2014a). Convinced 
of the link between development and security, political elites rely on economic 
development to tackle political unrest. However, this over-simplified understanding 
has had unintended results such as the intensification of ethnic tensions.  
Third, the emphasis on the five principles of peaceful coexistence indicates China’s 
willingness to engage in international counter-terrorism operations, particularly in 
protecting its overseas interests. It also functions to remind other countries, especially 
in the West, of China’s irreconcilable attitude towards national unity, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. In the context of counter-terrorism, political elites and 
intellectuals are highly vigilant about the interference of the Uyghur separatist 
movements in the name of human rights.  
The Overall Security Outlook, of course, is normative and does not reflect how 
counter-terrorism policies are carried out at the local level. However, it reflects three 
important aspects of China’s counter-terrorism approach – the revival of the Mass 
Line approach, the developmental approach to dealing with socio-economic 
grievances, and hostility towards external intervention.  
5.2 Political discourse of counter-terrorism 
This section examines the framing of China’s counter-terrorism discourse and the 
friend/enemy distinction that underpins that framing. Based on the assumptions of 
external enemies, the CCP has always condemned Western intervention since the 
founding of the PRC. As discussed in Chapter 4, Chinese political elites and 
intellectuals see cases of Western intervention as causes of political unrest in many 
Third World countries. He Wang (2016) believes that these cases have led to a 
sustained imbalance and instability in some regions, which has provided a “warm bed” 
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for terrorism. According to the state media, Western countries, led by the US, sent 
troops to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria in the name of establishing a “so-called 
democratic country”, but instead found themselves opening a “Pandora’s box”, 
causing endless atrocities (People’s Daily 2016). Yang Qingchuan argues that those 
developing countries that copied the Western system eventually ended up in “hunger 
democracy” “poor democracy” “order-less democracy” and “bloody democracy”.  
Some frame Western humanitarian intervention as “neo-interventionism” which is 
hypocritical and poses a threat to world peace. Gao Wanni has criticised Western 
intervention on the state media, saying that the “so-called” human rights violations 
are rooted in complicated historical circumstances, and it is unfair that the West 
attributes all of the blame to the government regardless of the circumstances. He has 
accused the West of ignoring the historical facts and “recklessly” and “arbitrarily” 
interfere in the domestic affairs of the countries in question, exacerbating the very 
problem they purport to solve, throwing countries into turmoil, and leading to regime 
instability, struggles between different parties, grave casualties and the displacement 
of civilians, thereby exacerbating the humanitarian crisis (W. Gao 2017). Similarly, 
People’s Daily (2001b) frames humanitarian intervention as the pretext for the 
interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. According to People’s Daily (2001b), 
the essence of neo-interventionism is acquiescence and support for ethno-separatism, 
which makes it possible for the latter to become one of the major forms of terrorism 
in the new century. An article in Xinhua (Hong Zhang 2017) states that “experts 
generally agree” that the wave of rampant terrorism that Europe has seen in recent 
years is closely related to Western neo-interventionism. Huang Shaoyu (2013) has 
criticised Western countries for putting those who disagree with Western values and 
globalisation onto the list of “not democratic” or “failed” states and implementing 
economic sanctions and suppression against them.  
In the context of domestic terrorism in China, as discussed in Chapter 4, the 
underlying friend/enemy distinction is crucial to understanding the ways in which the 
CCP attributes blame. The collective memory of China being carved up by imperialists 
has had great influence on political leaders, from Mao to Xi. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
anxiety over a regime change through cultural or ideology infiltration has been seen 
throughout the almost 70-year history of the PRC. Mao believed that the struggle in 
the ideological battlefield was part of the efforts to subvert a regime (Z. Mao 1962). 
Deng shifted the focus from a “class struggle” to economic development (Yue 2012, 
49), while still paying attention to bourgeois liberalisation. According to Deng (1993c, 
344), although the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union was over, another two 
cold wars had started: the cold war upon the Global South, and the cold war upon 
socialism. Under Jiang and Hu the government concentrated on economic 
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development, but political elites and scholars did not forget the potential threat posed 
by “hostile forces”. The mainstream media portray 
Western/international/foreign/anti-China hostile forces as those who are “against the 
people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist system” (Y. Gu 2009, 304), and 
“anti-Party”, “anti-Socialist” activists, usually in the disguise of businessman, students, 
tourists, NGOs, scholars, funding projects, associations, religious groups and charities 
(Y. Yao 1996, 34–35; Y. Gu 2009, 304), who seek to carry out peaceful evolution by 
means of espionage activities in the Party, the Chinese government and the People’s 
Liberation Army (Huanqiu 2016). 
In this context, ethno-separatism is yet another case where the friend/enemy 
distinction is more pronounced. The following quote demonstrates how the CCP 
attributes ethno-separatism to Western intervention in the name of human rights, 
which serves the agenda of “Westernising and dividing” China:  
Western hostile forces have been attempting to westernise and divide 
China in the name of ethnicity, religion and human rights. Such a 
conspiracy has not changed. separatist forces within and outside China will 
continue to instigate and conduct separatist activities… the struggle 
between separatism and anti-separatism is not a matter of ethnicity, nor a 
matter of religion, but a matter of national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Hostile forces have always instigated violent criminal activities 
under the banner of ethnicity and religion, which to some extent further 
complicated the issue (United Front Work Department 2009). 
In the state media, the articles about separatism and terrorism that have taken place 
in China are often associated with “hostile forces”. Although the CCP conflates the 
concepts of terrorism and separatism, the degree to which they are associated with 
the idea of external enemies is slightly different. In the online version of the People’s 
Daily, from 199565 to 2018, “separatism” was more likely to be associated with 
“hostile forces” than “terrorism”. The search for “separatism” and “hostile forces” 
provides 51 results, while “terrorism” and “hostile forces” are found in 24 results. 
Unlike terrorism which can be at least distinguished by the use of violence, the 
supporters of the separatist movements in Xinjiang have a more apparent link with 
the West. According to Li Wei (2009), one of the most eminent counter-terrorist 
experts in China, support from a “third party” (implying the Western “hostile forces”) 
is one of the most important factors that has sustained terrorism. Liu Guozhu (2010, 
28) considers the support for dissidents against communist countries in the name of 
human rights and democracy as part of the US’ “Covert Strategy”. In the case of the 
2009 Urumqi Riots, Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang stated that there was 
                                                      
65 People.cn is the online version of the People’s Daily which was founded in 1995.  
 
 
 
 
139 
concrete evidence for the involvement of the World Uyghur Congress and its leader 
Rebiya Kadeer (Liao, Xu, and Li 2009). The group had received funding from the 
National Endowment for Democracy (World Uyghur Congress 2016b), which 
convinced the CCP of the link between dissidents and Western supporters. 
A reoccurring theme in China’s counter-terrorism discourse is the attribution of terror 
attacks to “hostile forces”. The phrase “hostile forces” serves to ascribe terrorism to 
the enemies, the essence of which is contingent upon the political antagonism 
between China and the West. In the context of counter-terrorism, this label alone tells 
hardly anything about the identity of the perpetrator. As discussed in Section 4.5, the 
use of “hostile forces” does not provide an actual answer to who the “terrorists” are. 
Instead, it is used loosely as a signifier of all those who align with the separatists’ 
framing and sympathise with their aspirations. By highlighting the connection 
between terrorism/separatism and Western acquiescence, the CCP puts terrorist 
threats in the context of China-West antagonism. In this context, the phrase “hostile 
forces” directs individuals towards a package of ready-made assumptions (provided in 
Section 4.5) so that they gradually, and unwittingly, align with the frames provided by 
political elites and intellectuals when they adopt the narratives and labels in the 
master frame. Using the phrase “hostile forces” allows the government to focus on 
the “external enemies” and omit the domestic dynamics that have led to the Uyghurs’ 
grievances. By linking what happens now with the master frames that have been used 
for a long time to explain the suffering of the Chinese people, the users of the master 
frames help individuals to make sense of atrocities that are otherwise too horrible to 
understand, such as the 2009 Urumqi Riots. This diagnostic framing then provides the 
pretext for the CCP to take extraordinary measures against the sympathisers and 
supporters of those it deems to be the enemies. Adopting Mao’s categorisation of two 
types of contradictions, officials can justify their heavy-handed treatment by 
categorising their targets as enemies. According to Zhu Zhijie (2017), director of the 
research centre at XUAR Bureau of Prisons, “the contradiction between us and ‘three 
forces’ is one of the confrontational contradictions between us and the enemy which 
must be dealt with through struggle”.66 In the context of counter-terrorism in China, 
labelling a person or a group as “hostile forces” means that the person or group is 
deprived of the status of a “friend” and marked as “enemy”. If the sympathisers are in 
China, they become the “enemy within”. If they are outside China, they become 
“external hostile forces”. 
There are several implications of the concept “hostile forces”. First, as will be 
discussed in Section 5.3.1, the CCP has a broad definition in terms of who can be 
                                                      
66 Struggle: 斗争 
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designated as a terrorist, what activities or ideologies can be seen as terrorism and 
how the designation of terrorism should be carried out. This means that the label 
“hostile forces” may alienate those who are aligned with the frames provided by the 
Uyghur separatist movements but do not endorse terrorism. Second, antagonising the 
“West” as a monolithic political entity with a coherent agenda simplifies the causes of 
political unrest in Xinjiang, and undermine the trust that is the basis for counter-
terrorism cooperation with Western countries. Third, labelling human rights groups as 
“hostile forces” may hamper the development of human rights in China and prevent 
them from functioning as third parties to mediate the conflict between the CCP and 
the Uyghur dissidents, taking away the opportunity for peaceful settlement through 
dialogue, the very tenet promoted by the CCP. Fourth, labelling overseas Uyghur 
organisations as “hostile forces” without presenting “concrete evidence” (Liao, Xu, 
and Li 2009) increases the feeling of injustice, and undermines the credibility of 
China’s counter-terrorism approach.  
Another related theme in the Chinese counter-terrorism discourse is the “double 
standards” of the West. According to many Chinese scholars and officials (M. Wang 
2004, 14; Y. Ma and Wang 2003, 44; Gou, Xiao, and Shen 2014, 239; Hong Zhang 2004, 
25; Y. Chen 2007, 25; Kong 2003, 43), the West, led by the US, does not live up to its 
commitment to international peace and adopts double standards in defining terrorism. 
Some (Shen 2014; Juyuan Li et al. 2013) argue that the US only defines terrorism 
according to its own interests. This is partly because the definition of terrorism itself is 
open to interpretation. The CCP expressed shared indignation when the US 
governmental officials met Chechen rebels (People’s Daily 2001a). Similarly, Beijing is 
concerned about the affinities between the US government and the Uyghur dissidents, 
as evidenced by the meeting between the then US President Bush and Rebiya Kadeer, 
when Bush called her a freedom fighter against tyranny (Polo 2012; The White House 
2007). 
Based on similar experience with Russia in fighting against dissident groups that were 
supported by the US, Chinese analysts (People’s Daily 2001a; Juyuan Li et al. 2013) 
have great sympathy with the Russian government on issues such as Chechen 
separatism. Some journalists (Juyuan Li et al. 2013) have pointed out that the US 
changed its attitude towards Chechnya after the Boston Marathon bombing. They 
argue that the US had criticised Russia for its crackdown in Chechnya before the 
Boston Marathon bombings, considering that Chechnya is the gateway to rich 
reserves of oil and natural gas in Central Asia. After the attacks, the US began to 
question whether the conflict would threaten its own security. Similarly, according to 
the Chinese media, the US had supported the Taliban in the anti-Soviet guerrilla 
warfare, as well as Saddam Hussain, but it turned against them when this no longer 
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served its interests (Polo 2012; Y. Chen 2007, 25; Hui An 2011). According to Yu 
Jianhua (2013, 116), out of the considerations of ideology and their own political 
interests, Western countries often frame the “terrorists” in the Third World countries 
as “freedom fighters”, while they frame the “national liberation movements” in 
Algeria, Vietnam, Cambodia and China as terrorists. In the eyes of Chinese officials and 
scholars, the US has a record of glorifying anti-Socialist activists as freedom fighters 
and human rights fighters, offering them asylum and hampering international 
cooperation (Hong Zhang 2004, 22). 
According to a commentary on Xinhua (Gui and Lü 2014), American “double standards” 
can also be seen in the ambiguous attitudes towards terrorist attacks in China. After 
the terrorist attack in at Kunming railway station in March 2014, the US described the 
incident as a “horrific and senseless act of violence”, causing rage among Chinese 
netizens about the double standards of Western media (BBC 2014a; AFP 2014; BBC 
2014b). Gui and Lü (2014) accused the American government of being reluctant to call 
the attack a “terrorist incident” when there was “sufficient evidence” (Gui and Lü 
2014). In contrast, America did not wait to label the Boston and Nairobi attacks 
terrorist attacks (Gui and Lü 2014). According to Chinese analysts, this is evidence for 
the argument that America defines terrorism based on whether it suits its interests.  
The CCP’s concerns about the double standards of the US are not entirely groundless. 
The terrorism designation process in the US does suffer from inconsistent standards 
because of its competing priorities in foreign policy (Cronin 2003). China’s response 
clearly demonstrates how this inconsistency is amplified to reinforce the existing 
China-West antagonism. The self-interested terrorism designation process in the US is 
further supported by the “The Guantanamo Files” posted on WikiLeaks. During the 
Afghan War in 2001, the US army captured 22 Uyghur suspects and detained them at 
the Guantanamo Bay detainment camp. According to the “The Guantanamo Files”, 
detainees are either directly involved in terrorist activities or “vulnerable to future 
recruitment”.  
Detainee [Yusef Abbas, author’s note] has had some level of terrorist 
training, as confirmed by associations with known terrorist group(s), and is 
highly vulnerable to future recruitment by terrorist groups targeting the 
US and its allies (Miller 2004, 2).  
[D]etainee [Bahtiyar Mahnut, author’s note] is assessed to be a member of 
the East Turkistan Islamic Movement and the Al-Qaida global terrorist 
network. Detainee received training at an Al-Qaida sponsored terrorist 
training facility established for use by the East Turkistan Islamic Party. 
Detainee provided direct assistance to the Taliban engaged against 
coalition forces in Northern Afghanistan. It is assessed this detainee is a 
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MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies 
(Hood 2005).  
In 2008, Ricardo M. Urbina, a Federal District Court judge, ordered the Bush 
administration to release 17 of the detainees on the ground that they had never 
fought the US and denied that they did not pose a security threat to it (Glaberson 
2008). Declining to grant them political asylum, the US had great difficulty in finding a 
country that would take them. As Sabin Willett, a Boston-based attorney who was 
trying to defend for the released Uyghurs, asked, if they were innocent, “why don’t 
you take them?” (Taylor 2007). 
Chinese political elites and intellectuals see this as further evidence for the hostility 
and hypocrisy of the US. An article in People’s Daily states that, “as long as these 
people do not sabotage America, they are not ‘terrorists’ in the eyes of America” (X. 
Wen 2014). Shen Dingli (2014) asks why, if the US government truly believed that they 
were innocent, why did it refuse them entry into the US. The reason given by the US 
State Department for refusing to send the Uyghurs back to China was the concerns 
that they would face torture and abuse (Ackerman 2013), which only added to the 
irony, since prisoners were tortured at Guantanamo Bay (People’s Daily Online 2004; 
Shiping Ji 2014).  
5.3 Discourse of stability maintenance in Xinjiang 
This section provides a review of the theme of stability maintenance in Xinjiang. It 
brings together the discussion in previous sections and demonstrates how the 
rationale for prioritising unity, maintaining control, and ensuring “correct” views is 
woven into the official discourse of stability maintenance.  
Xinjiang is the main target of terrorist attacks. As Figure 19 indicates, out of a total of 
247 cases from 1989 to 2016, 79 (32%) of the terrorist incidents took place in Xinjiang. 
The governance of Xinjiang, therefore, is central to China’s counter-terrorism 
approach.67 As Zhang Chunxian puts it, “Xinjiang is the main battlefield of national 
counter-terrorism and stability maintenance” (Yaxin 2015). The level of control is 
unprecedented, with huge expenditure on public security (Buckley 2011), increased 
police presence (Zenz and Leibold 2017), mass surveillance (Associated Press 2011) 
and biodata collection from all “focus personnel” who are considered more vulnerable 
to radicalisation (Human Rights Watch 2017c). 
                                                      
67 The governance of Xinjiang: 治疆 
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Figure 13 Number of terrorist attacks by province (1989-2016). Source: Global 
Terrorism Database 
A glance at the reports on the level of control in Xinjiang makes one wonder what sort 
of discourse the government is employing in order to justify to the public the necessity 
of these harsh measures. The answer to this question may be found from the 
development of the slogans used for the governance of Xinjiang. 
Stability maintenance is a theme that has run through the past three decades of the 
governance of Xinjiang. The contemporary history of the governance of Xinjiang can 
be roughly divided into the following three periods according to the political leader at 
the time.  
• Wang Lequan Period (1991-2010) 
• Zhang Chunxian Period (2010-2016)  
• Chen Quanguo Period (2016-now) 
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The Wang Lequan Period featured two themes: “stability overrides everything” and 
the “three economic strategies of black, white, and red”68 (Juntao Liu 2010). His style 
of governance can be categorised as a “hard approach”, which was given credit by the 
CCP for the absence of large-scale terrorist attacks during 1887 and 2008 which led to 
his promotion into the Political Bureau (W. Wang 2010). Unsurprisingly, his “hard 
approach” was also criticised by what the CCP see as external hostile forces. An article 
in Voice of America (Hua An 2016) accuses his “hard approach” of being a major cause 
of the Urumqi Riots in 2009.  
In the aftermath of the 2009 Urumqi Riots, Wang’s ruthless crackdowns were 
questioned. His successor, Zhang Chunxian distanced himself from Wang Lequan by 
advocating a “soft approach”. He started by loosening up the control over the Internet 
after a complete shutdown of the internet access after the attacks; at the same time, 
Zhang Chunxian maintained the high-pressure clampdown on terrorism (J. Wang and 
He 2016). Naming his style of governance a “soft approach” did not give Zhang a 
reputation for being less repressive outside China. His hard line towards the “three 
forces” was interpreted as “brutal suppression” by Rebiya Kadeer (Hua An 2016). 
Under pressure to respond resolutely to terrorist threats, some observers do not 
believe that Zhang’s “ruthless” approach departed substantially from that of Wang 
Lequan (Choi 2012).  
In 2016, Zhang Chunxian was succeeded by Chen Quanguo, who had previously 
worked in Tibet for 5 years and gained experience in stability maintenance in an 
ethnically diverse border region. He brought his innovative policing strategy from 
Tibet to Xinjiang, and established a network of “convenience police stations” that 
were part of the “grid-style social management” (Zenz and Leibold 2017).69 According 
to Zenz and Leibold’s analysis, it was Chen’s firm grip and his close tie with Xi Jinping 
that had won him the position in Xinjiang. It follows that Chen was not very likely to 
advocate a softer approach which would have required him to relax the control over 
Xinjiang. Chen’s governance soon manifested his tendency to further strengthen the 
control in every aspect of life, as discussed in previous sections.  
Regardless of variations in the ways in which the leaders branded their approaches, 
the friend/enemy distinction remains the same. The government has always 
advocated the need to respond decisively to terrorism/separatism, especially after a 
series of major terror attacks in 2014 in and outside Xinjiang. In 2014, Xi Jinping’s 
(Xinhua 2014b) call to build “walls made of copper and steel” and Zhang Chunxian’s 
                                                      
68 refers to the economic strategy that prioritise the economic growth brought by oil (black), 
cotton (white) and tomato (red). 
69 convenience police stations: 便民警务站; grid-style social management: 社会网格化管理 
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(2014a) call for a People’s War on Terror pointed to a strategy that was decisively 
intolerant towards any hint of terrorism. Considering the conflation of terrorism and 
separatism, the war narratives make it particularly difficult and dangerous for the 
Uyghurs to show any sign of sympathy towards separatism.  
Xi’s speech at the 14th Collective Study Sessions of the Politburo set the tone for the 
CCP’s position on counter-terrorism. The use of terms “decisive action”, “high level of 
pressure”, and “resolutely” in the following passage demonstrate clearly 
demonstrates the resolution of the CCP in fighting terrorism and maintaining stability 
in Xinjiang: 
The fight against terrorism is a matter of state security, a matter of the 
vital interests of the people, a matter that concerns the overall situation of 
the stability of reform and development; it is a fight to maintain national 
unity, social stability, and people’s wellbeing. [We] must take decisive 
action, maintain a high level of pressure, and resolutely crush the 
arrogance of terrorists (Xinhua 2014b). 
This quote frames terrorism as an existential threat to state security, and highlights 
that what the state is most concerned about its collective interests (“overall situation 
of the stability of reform and development”), reflecting the quest for legitimacy and 
the emphasis on national unity, and calls for extraordinary measures (“resolutely 
crush”).  
In the following Xinjiang Work Conference on 28 May 2014, Xi reiterated the strategic 
importance of the governance of Xinjiang, which needs to be put into a broader 
context and viewed from a long-term perspective. This quote emphasises the 
importance of the “Xinjiang work”, which, according to the discussion in previous 
sections, is characterised by a high level of control in various aspects of life.70 Xi 
continued to praise this approach as “correct” and asked the government to adhere to 
it. 
Doing Xinjiang work well is a major issue for the whole Party and the 
whole state. [We] must consider the situation from a strategic and overall 
perspective, seek long-term solutions, identify the root causes, build up 
the momentum of long-term peace, and endeavour for long-term 
governance. The Party Central Committee has always attached great 
importance to Xinjiang work, and has made a series of major decisions and 
plans to promote the reform and development, ethnic solidarity, social 
progress, improvements of wellbeing, and border defence, where the CCP 
has made historic achievements. The practice has proved that our Party’s 
strategy of governing Xinjiang is correct. [We] must stick to [this] and 
maintain our strategic composure. At the same time, we must consider the 
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situation of Xinjiang to enrich and improve the Party’s governing strategy 
in Xinjiang, insist on multi-pronged approach and long-term governance of 
Xinjiang, laying a solid foundation for future work, for social stability and 
long-term peace and security (Xinhua 2014e). 
In line with Xi’s view on counter-terrorism in Xinjiang, Zhang Chunxian gave a speech 
at the 7th session of the 8th Party Committee Plenary session (enlarged session) of 
the XUAR (C. Zhang 2014b). He emphasised the “grand strategy” of the Xinjiang work: 
rule according to law, unity and stability, and the long-term construction of Xinjiang to 
build “a unified, harmonious, prosperous, civilised, advanced and peaceful socialist 
Xinjiang” (C. Zhang 2014b).71 In terms of a hard approach, Zhang proposed an “iron-
fisted” and proactive approach to contain the spread of terrorism. Echoing Zhang’s 
proposal, the one-year proactive Strike Hard campaign (23 May 2014 – 30 April 2015) 
was reported to have destroyed 96.2% terrorist criminal gangs “at the premeditation 
stage” (Yanan Li 2015). 72 
In terms of soft approach, he highlighted the need to “unify thoughts and behaviour” 
on the judgement of the central authority of the situation of Xinjiang and on the task 
of cracking down “three forces”.73 The basic principles of the Xinjiang work, as 
summarised by Zhang, reflect the government’s obsession with promoting the 
“correct” views and gaining legitimacy through the Mass Line approach – “to adhere 
to [correct, author’s note] political direction, focus on the overall situation; to rely on 
the masses and win over their hearts and minds”. To do so, he elaborated on a variety 
of policies aimed at improving the wellbeing of the people, such as “Employment 
First”, education policy, development policy, sustainable development, and ideology 
work that promotes diversity (within unity) and a secular lifestyle, so that the masses 
become more secular and “modernised”. As discussed in previous sections, political 
elites have a very specific/narrow understanding of what can be considered as open, 
secular, modern Uyghur culture – a culture characterised by singing, dancing and 
colourful fabrics.  
The political discourse of stability maintenance in Xinjiang has evolved and produced a 
range of sweeping political slogans. Zhang Chunxian (2014b) advocates strengthening 
“four identifies”, which clearly reflect the emphasis on national unity.74 The “four 
identifies” mean identifying with the mother land; identifying with the Chinese nation 
(the unity of the 56 ethnic groups, rather than the Han); identifying with the Chinese 
                                                      
71 to build a unified, harmonious, prosperous, civilised, advanced and peaceful socialist 
Xinjiang: 依法治疆、团结稳疆、长期建疆 
72 at the premeditation stage: 预谋阶段 
73 unify thoughts and behaviour: 统一思想和行动 
74 four identifies: 四个认同 
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culture (the unity of the 56 ethnic groups, rather than the Han culture); and 
identifying with the socialist path (T. Mao 2014).  
Zhang Chunxian also emphasised that ethnic solidarity should be included in school 
education, family education and social education, and that people from each ethnic 
group should learn about the “three cannot do withouts” (C. Zhang 2014b, 2), which 
were modified from “two cannot do withouts” in 1981. The modified version included 
“ethnic minorities cannot do without ethnic minorities” in addition to “Han cannot do 
without ethnic minorities, and ethnic minorities cannot do without Han” (L. Dong 
2009). 75 
Another slogan, the “five keys” approach demonstrates a high level of state 
intervention in private sphere in counter-terrorism.76 At the 8th session of the 8th 
Party Committee Plenary session (enlarged session) of the “five keys” approach was 
put forwar. It includes five dimensions in preventing radicalisation: 
Ideological problem should be tackled with ideological methods, cultural 
problems should be tackled with cultural methods, issues regarding 
custom should be tackled with respect, issues regarding religion should be 
tackled according to religious regulations, terrorism should be tackled 
according to law and Strike Hard77 (M. Jiang 2014).  
Apart from the slogans at the strategic level, the government has also developed 
slogans at the operational level which reflect a limited degree of caution in regard to 
power abuse. For example, when dealing with illegal religious activities, the 
government is required to “correctly distinguish normal believer and religious 
extremists”, and ensure law-abiding believers’ religious needs while fighting against 
religious extremism (C. Zhang 2014b). To balance the heavy-handed practice of the 
Strike Hard campaign at the local level, the CCP highlights the need to “combine 
inducements and repression” (C. Zhang 2014b), paying more attention to the role of 
education in counter-radicalisation (Xinjiang Daily 2014a). 78 
However, as discussed in previous sections, the concern for the broadened scope of 
counter-terrorism is very limited, particularly in terms of counter-radicalisation, when 
certain indicators are necessary for security services to identify potential risks. A 
typical example is the Ordinances on de-radicalisation in XUAR and several documents 
                                                      
75 three cannot do withouts: 三个离不开 
76 Five keys: 五把钥匙 
77思想的问题用思想的方法去解决，文化的问题用文化的方式去解决，习俗的问题用尊
重的态度去对待，宗教的问题按照宗教规律去做好工作，暴恐的问题用法治和严打
的方式去解决 
78 combine inducements and repression: 疏堵结合 
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on differentiating “illegal religious activities” (Appendix 1 and 2). Preoccupied with 
national unity and stability, local governments tend to include a wide range of daily 
practices as signs of radicalisation, which has led to criticism from Uyghur dissidents 
abroad. Rebiya Kadeer claimed that the fifteen forms of radicalisation would be seen 
as “joke” by people from any country (Y. Tian 2017). According to her, the Ordinance 
shows “utter contempt” for any religion, different culture, and the rule of law (Y. Tian 
2017). 
The government’s attempts to contain counter-terrorism measures have been 
ineffective because as discussed in previous sections, the state continues to promote 
the “correct” ideas and views and denounce the “wrong”, while the criteria for 
identifying this “wrong” are underpinned by self-evident differentiation constructed 
upon assumptions in China’s political discourse. As discussed in Chapter 4, these 
assumptions are embedded in China’s counter-terrorism discourse and function to 
identify who are the “enemies”. The depiction of China as an innocent victim of 
external hostile forces, political officials and intellectuals seeks to justify the use of 
extraordinary counter-terrorism measures, combining hard and soft approaches, and 
facilitate frame alignment among the public through mass mobilisation.  
5.4 Legal framework 
This section discusses how the framing of counter-terrorism is translated into law. The 
political nature of “terrorism” raises many questions regarding the scope of the Anti-
Terrorism Law. It examines the expansion of the power of the executive in designating 
terrorist individuals and organisations. This expansion allows the executive to function 
as an evidence-providing agency, which undercuts the power of the judiciary in 
reviewing the decisions made by the executive. This section also highlights some 
attempts to revise the law to share the designation power with the judiciary and to 
minimise the political character of the definition of terrorism, as well as the 
effectiveness of these revisions. In addition, this section analyses the scope of the 
Anti-Terrorism Law by examining the terrorism designation practice at the local level.   
The first legal document on counter-terrorism, the Decision of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress on Issues concerning Strengthening Anti-
Terrorism Work was passed at the 23rd meeting of the Standing Committee of the 11th 
National People’s Congress (National People’s Congress 2011). 79 
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On 27 August 2013, the National Counter-terrorism Leading Group held its first 
conference (The Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China 2013a), 
marking the increased visibility of counter-terrorism practice in China. 80 
Several serious terror attacks in 2014 prompted the Group – which was later renamed 
the National Counter-terrorism Work Leading Organ – to draft an Anti-Terrorism Law 
with the help of experts from various departments, including the National People's 
Congress Law Committee, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, the People's Bank of China, the Legal Affairs Office of the 
State Council, and the Armed Police Headquarters (Lang 2014).81 The Organ became 
the institution that bears the responsibility for identifying terrorist activities, 
organisations and individuals and managing inter-agency counter-terrorism 
coordination across the country (Xinhua 2015a).  
In November 2014, the draft Anti-Terrorism Law was tabled for discussion for the first 
time at the 11th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s 
Congress (The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China 2014). The 
second deliberation of the draft law took place on 25 February 2015, when the 
People’s Congress amended the articles on the definition, designation, and prevention 
of terrorism, as well as counter-measures and human rights protection at the 13th 
meeting (China News 2015b). The third deliberation on 21 December 2015 at the 18th 
meeting further clarified the definition of terrorism (W. Zou and Chen 2015). The 
official Anti-Terrorism Law was finally passed at the 18th meeting on 27 December 
2015 and came into effect on 1 January 2016. The evolution of the Anti-Terrorism Law 
reveals the struggle of the CCP to allow maximum flexibility for the executive to 
designate its enemies while demonstrating some respects for due process.   
The National Counter-terrorism Leading Organ has issued three lists of terrorist 
organisations and individuals which include 4 organisations and 25 individuals. The 
designation of some entities and individuals, such as the World Uyghur Congress and 
Dolkun Isa, is highly controversial. The legitimacy of China’s terrorism designation has 
been challenged by dissidents and rights groups, raising the question of power abuse 
by the executive and the appropriation of the counter-terrorism discourse to 
eliminate political opponents. 
5.4.1 Definition of terrorism 
                                                      
80 National Counter-terrorism Leading Group held its first conference: 国家反恐怖工作领导
小组 
81 National Counter-terrorism Work Leading Organ: 国家反恐怖工作领导机构 
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In the Chinese political discourse, the concept of terrorism is often conflated with that 
of separatism. The doctrine document Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, 
Separatism and Extremism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China 2001) popularised the phrase “three forces” – terrorism, separatism and 
extremism. “Three forces” is frequently used collectively to refer to the “real” power 
behind the actual perpetrators (e.g. Commentator 2013; Permanent Mission of the 
People’s Republic of China to the UN 2009). According to a booklet compiled by the 
Propaganda and Education Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department, the 
Ideological and Political Division of the Ministry of Education, and the Policy and 
Regulation Division of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (2010), “three forces” are 
part of the “peaceful evolution” of the “Western hostile forces”, to look for “holes” at 
Chinese border regions.  
The definition of terrorism provided by the SCO convention (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2001) draws on existing definitions in the 
following treaties.  
1970 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft  
1971 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation 
1973 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents  
1979 The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages  
1980 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material  
1971 The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
serving International Civil Aviation (1988) as a supplement to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation  
1988 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation  
1988 The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf  
1997 The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings  
1999 The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism  
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Building on these treaties, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2001) defines the “three forces” that are 
frequently used in China’s counter-terrorism discourse.  
 Terrorism is defined as follows.  
[an] act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or 
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict or to cause major damage to any material facility, as well as 
to organize, plan, aid and abet such act, when the purpose of such act, by 
its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, violate public security 
or to compel public authorities or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act, and prosecuted in accordance with the 
national laws of the Parties.[official translation, author’s note] 
In comparison, the definition of separatism is more related to territorial integrity.  
"separatism" means any act intended to violate territorial integrity of a 
State including by annexation of any part of its territory or to disintegrate 
a State, committed in a violent manner, as well as planning and preparing, 
and abetting such act, and subject to criminal prosecuting in accordance 
with the national laws of the Parties. [official translation, author’s note] 
And extremism is defined as  
an act aimed at seizing or keeping power through the use of violence or 
changing violently the constitutional regime of a State, as well as a violent 
encroachment upon public security, including organization, for the above 
purposes, of illegal armed formations and participation in them, criminally 
prosecuted in conformity with the national laws of the Parties. [official 
translation, author’s note] 
Some (Aris 2009; Human Rights Watch 2006) translate the phrase “three forces” as 
“three evils”.82 This translation is inaccurate because the phrase itself does not 
contain the same pejorative connotation as “three evil forces”.83 It is true that the 
phrase “three forces” is often associated with “evil” in commentaries, such as 
nationalist commentary published in the People’s Daily on the 92th Anniversary of the 
founding of the CCP (Commentator of People’s Daily 2013a). It is inaccurate to 
conflate the CCP’s official position with nationalist interpretations of its position.  
Human Rights Watch accuses the counter-terrorism cooperation within the 
framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation of reinforcing “members’ worst 
practices”, that is, human rights violations, by conflating peaceful advocates of 
independence with terrorists (Human Rights Watch 2006). Indeed, these definitions 
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make it difficult to draw a clear-cut line between terrorism, separatism and extremism. 
A violent incident carried out by members of a separatist organisation in attempting 
to intimidate citizens and challenge the secular system of the state can be considered 
terrorism, separatism and extremism at the same time.  
In addition, the definitions enable the governments in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation to target enemies according to their own national laws. Like “hostile 
forces”, the concept of “three forces” is equally vague. In the aftermath of the 2009 
Urumqi Riots, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang held a press conference at 
which he was asked to clarify whether the Chinese government actually suspected 
some “foreign governments” of being behind the World Uyghur Congress. Qin Gang’s 
reply was simply a re-emphasis of China’s position on foreign support for the “three 
forces”.  
We resolutely oppose any foreign country and foreign force to connive at 
and support the Three Forces and we urge them to immediately stop their 
support to the Three Forces including the East Turkistan Islamic Movement 
forces (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN 
2009). [official translation, author’s note] 
When he was asked again which countries he was referring to, he once again replied 
with an affirmation of the connection between the “three forces” and some foreign 
countries, without naming those countries. He emphasised that there was evidence, 
but the government never presented actual evidence to the public.  
Substantial facts have proven that in recent years, the Three Forces in and 
outside China have been engaged in activities undermining China's 
national security. Some countries have harbored and even financed these 
groups. We hope and strongly urge these countries to stop their assistance 
and support in whatever form (Permanent Mission of the People’s 
Republic of China to the UN 2009). [official translation, author’s note] 
The state media always provide “substantial facts” and “conclusive evidence”, but 
human rights groups often challenge these allegations, stating that there is a lack of 
supporting evidence. Undeniably, publicising terrorism-related information could put 
the sources of intelligence at risk. These phrases are often followed by assertions such 
as the link between the East Turkistan Islamic Movements and international terrorism 
organisations, and the link between anti-China groups and Western support, in which 
case actual evidence is particularly crucial. The inability or unwillingness to present 
actual evidence undermines the credibility of the CCP.  
An increase in the number of terrorist incidents in 2013 and 2014 prompted the CCP 
to speed up legislation. In 2014, under the leadership of the National Counter-
terrorism Work Leading Organ, the expert group started drafting the Anti-Terrorism 
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Law based on their research and advice from the National Security Council and other 
relevant departments, local officials and scholars, as well as the lessons learnt from 
Anti-terrorism legislation in other countries (Lang 2014). The draft defines terrorism as 
follows.  
Any thoughts, remarks or activity that, by means of violence, sabotage, or 
threat, aims to create social panic, influence national policy-making, create 
ethnic hatred, subvert the regime, and separate the country (The National 
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China 2014).  
This definition raises a few questions about the terrorism designation. First, it 
criminalises thoughts and speech, which contravenes Article 35 of the Chinese 
Constitution regarding freedom of speech. Those who express sympathy with 
“terrorism” can potentially be subject to the terrorism designation. This means that 
the authorities do not differentiate between “cognitive” radicalisation and 
“behavioural” radicalisation. In addition, what the authorities consider as “inciting 
ethnic hatred” might be seen as simply expressing opinions on the separatist 
movements. In 2015, a Uyghur was convicted of “inciting separatism” and was 
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of three years and deprived of their political 
rights for two years (China Judgements Online, n.d.). He confessed that he had 
uploaded a map of China which did not include Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and 
Taiwan, to his Q-zone (a social networking website), implying that Xinjiang is an 
independent country. Although his conviction was based on the consideration of other 
evidence including pictures promoting jihad, the criminalisation of uploading pictures 
containing separatist ideas at least indicates the level of intolerance to any form of 
separatism. 
Second, the definition conflates terrorism and separatism, disallowing peaceful 
separatist claims. This means that those who have close ties with designated “terrorist 
organisations” may be punishable by law. These groups are listed as terrorist 
organisations in China for their alleged involvement in violent separatist/terrorist 
attacks in China, although some of these organisations are considered legal outside 
China. Groups such as the East Turkistan Education and Solidarity Association provide 
funding and training for Uyghur students overseas. As these groups are grouped under 
the “East Turkistan forces”, those who have been associated with them are also 
potentially subject to the terrorism designation in China (Su and Jin 2013).  
In 2015, the definition of terrorism was tabled for discussion and revised as follows. 
Some members from within the legislature contributed to the revision and advised the 
legislature to remove “thoughts” from the definition (R. Liu 2015a). In the second 
draft apparent conflation of terrorism and separatism was also removed by deleting 
“create ethnic hatred, subvert the regime, and separate the country”. The revised 
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definition demonstrates the considerations about society and individual rights to 
counter-balance the state-centred counter-terrorism approach. This is evident from 
the addition of “undermine public safety, infringe on personal and property rights” to 
the definition. The second revision was criticised by some members of the People’s 
Congress for omitting the political and ideological nature of terrorism, and the third 
draft thus stated that the aim of terrorism is to realise political, ideological objectives 
(W. Zou and Chen 2015). The revised definition has been published in the official 
version of the Anti-Terrorism Law as follows.  
Any advocacy or activity that, by means of violence, sabotage, or threat, 
aims to create social panic, undermine public safety, infringe on personal 
and property rights, or coerce a state organ or an international 
organization, in order to achieve political, ideological, or other objectives 
(The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China 2015; N. 
Zhu 2015). 
Although the deliberation of the Anti-Terrorism Law reflects a degree of 
consciousness of the potential danger of criminalising “thoughts”, Zhou Zunyou (2016) 
argues that the revised definition of terrorism is still vague enough to allow wide 
interpretation. “Advocacy” can still be referred to by the authorities to punish 
“thoughts” and “speech” (Z. Zhou 2016). 
The broad definition of terrorism has attracted fierce criticism. Human rights activists 
say that it can be used to suppress dissidents and religious minorities (BBC 2015; 
McKirdy 2015). Leibold commented that the ways in which the issue of terrorism had 
been framed in China in the past indicate that it mainly targets the Uyghurs, Tibetans 
and those who disagree with Chinese policies (McKirdy 2015). Bequelin argues that 
China’s claims of terrorism are highly politicised and include peaceful dissents 
(Anderlini and Shepherd 2015). Sophie Richardson (Human Rights Watch 2016), 
connects the vague interpretations of terrorism with the government’s crackdown on 
peaceful dissent, as reflected in the doubling of prosecutions for state security and 
terrorism offences in 2015. As a result of the Anti-Terrorism Law, according to human 
rights organisations (Amnesty International 2015; Human Rights Watch 2015, 2016), 
the human rights situation for the Uyghurs has considerably deteriorated. 
The conflation of terrorism and separatism means that sympathisers and supporters 
of the Uyghur separatist claims can be punished according to the Anti-Terrorism Law. 
Chinese political officials have on various occasions indicated that the Chinese 
government “resolutely oppose all forms of terrorism”, including the “dongtu shili” led 
by the East Turkistan Islamic Movements (Hua 2014; Bingxin Li, Li, and Yin 2015; Yi 
Wang 2002, 2002; Xinhua 2009f). The “dongtu shili” have been the target of China’ 
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counter-terrorism strategy from the very beginning and they remained the main 
target after the 9/11 attacks (G. Pan 2004, 4; 6). 
However, the phrase “dongtu shili” itself is source of confusion. Dongtu shili is literally 
translated as “East Turkistan forces”. According to the White Paper on the 
development and progress in Xinjiang (The State Council Information Office of the 
People’s Republic of China 2009), “East Turkistan forces” developed from a small 
group of fanatical separatists and religious extremists who politicised “East Turkistan”, 
an otherwise geographical term, in order to establish an ideological and theoretical 
framework to promote the independence of “East Turkistan”. As discussed in Section 
4.1.2, calling “Xinjiang” “East Turkistan”, or treating “East Turkistan” as a political 
entity rather than a geographical concept is seen as an indication of separatist agenda.  
According to official documents (The State Council Information Office of the People’s 
Republic of China 2009), in the 1930s and 1940s, the “East Turkistan forces” were 
supported by “foreign hostile forces”. The “East Turkistan forces” remained a serious 
concern for the CCP after the founding of the PRC (The State Council Information 
Office of the People’s Republic of China 2009). According to a White Paper, supported 
by “some foreign forces”, the “East Turkistan forces” continue to create disturbances 
in China. The discussion of “East Turkistan forces” is followed by the UN designation of 
the East Turkistan Islamic Movement as a terrorist organisation, which indicates that 
the CCP does not differentiate between “East Turkistan forces” and the East Turkistan 
Islamic Movement.  
The CCP (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2009) 
believes that in recent years, in order to get away with the crackdown, the “East 
Turkistan forces” have evolved and learnt to adopt the banners of democracy, human 
rights and freedom, in an attempting to legitimise their “terrorist cause”. Some 
scholars add that separatists emphasise these concepts in attempting to rally support 
from “Western anti-China forces” (Y. Gao and Li 2011). Therefore, in the eyes of the 
CCP, the World Uyghur Congress, which merged from several organisations of the 
“East Turkistan forces”, is definitely a terrorist organisation that is aligned with the 
“East Turkistan forces”.  
It can be seen from the above descriptions that the CCP uses the term “East Turkistan 
forces” loosely as an umbrella concept for many splinter groups and individuals that 
share the aspiration of “East Turkistan” becoming independent. The CCP does not 
differentiate between Uyghur groups that accuse the CCP of human rights violations 
and designated terrorist groups such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement. To the 
CCP, the banners of “democracy” “human rights” and “freedom” are used to disguise 
their true goal which is separatism (The State Council Information Office of the 
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People’s Republic of China 2009). In documents (State Council Information Office 
2002a) that attribute blame to the “East Turkistan forces”, the CCP does not provide 
specific information about the affiliation of individuals or organisations. Instead, they 
are grouped into the “East Turkistan forces” due to their shared separatist goals. 
However, in the official list of terrorist organisations, the CCP does clarify the 
organisations that comprise the “East Turkistan forces”. The first list identifies four 
organisations – the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, the East Turkistan Liberation 
Organisation, the WUC and East Turkistan Information Center. They are collectively 
referred to as the “East Turkistan forces”.  
The broad definition of terrorism, which uses “three forces” and “East Turkistan 
forces”, results in divergence between the CCP and the international community on 
which groups can be designated as a terrorist groups. The World Uyghur Congress is a 
typical example of this divergence. The CCP has listed it as a terrorist group (State 
Council Information Office 2002a), while the international community generally sees it 
as a legal organisation that advocates human rights. It is also recognised by the UN as 
the representative of the Uyghur people at the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 2011). The World 
Uyghur Congress also plays an active role in various forums at the UN Human Rights 
Council, including the 2016 Forum on Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law 
(World Uyghur Congress 2016c), the 2010 Forum on Minority Issues (Polias 2010), and 
the 2011 Forum on Minority Issues (Kadeer 2011). 
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Figure 14 The CCP’s perception of terrorist forces that are/were active in China 
In addition to the “East Turkistan forces”, there are a few groups that are motivated 
by radical Islamic extremism that concern the CCP. As the crackdown on the “East 
Turkistan forces” has begun to take effect, some remnants of the “East Turkistan 
forces” have merged into Hizbut-Tahrir, an international organisation that aims to re-
establish “the Islamic Caliphate” (Aierken and Abudumijiti 2013, 49). This group has 
been developing its network in Xinjiang since 1999 (Aierken and Abudumijiti 2013, 49). 
It differs from the ETIM forces in that it seeks to incorporate Xinjiang in the “the 
Islamic Caliphate”, whereas the “East Turkistan forces” envision the independence of 
“East Turkistan” itself (Y. Zhang 2009, 62). However, given their shared interest in 
separating Xinjiang from the PRC, the Hizbut-Tahrir has merged with the remnants of 
the ETIM, as well as other organisations such as Hezbollah, the Kuxilai gang, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Hijrat (Y. Zhang 2009, 64). 
The broad definition of terrorism means that there is a degree of flexibility in the 
designation of terrorist individuals and organisations. The designation of terrorism is 
of political importance in China. The state-run media and government websites have a 
monopoly over the accounts of an incident, as discussed in Section 3.2. One of the 
“iron rules” of the Chinese media is that sensitive issues involving important matters 
must cite the Xinhua agency to ensure “unified propaganda wording” (H. Shao and Du 
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2006). News agencies must follow the order from higher levels, and speak with one 
voice (P. Lu 2006, 7). This means that the commercial media must align with the 
mainstream media in the framing of terrorist incidents.  
The stringent control over the media reflects the CCP’s concerns about the plot of the 
“enemies” to induce peaceful evolution by promoting “Western values” in China. The 
CCP considers that framing political incidents from a Western perspective has a 
destabilising effect on its regime. Scholars (Jialu Zhang 2015; Hongcheng Yang 2015; Y. 
Yin 2008; Zeng 2004) have pointed out that the “Western” media such as CNN, the 
BBC, the Guardian, and the New York Times, have a record of demonising China 
through the biased selection and reorganisation of the sources. The political context 
paves the way for the translation from terrorism discourse into legal practice. Its 
control over the media means that the CCP has the advantage over the competing 
frames provide by Uyghurs dissidents and human rights groups. This means that 
terrorism designation is closely aligned with the interests of the state and the Party, 
and is less likely to be questioned by the public. 
The power over terrorism designation is firmly in the hands of the executive. The 
mechanism for terrorism designation developed from ad-hoc list-making to the 
“double track” system. 84  
The first list published by the Ministry of Public Security on 15 December 2003 
contains 4 organisations and 11 individuals (Department of Public Security 2003). They 
are grouped under the umbrella term “East Turkistan terrorist organisations”. The list 
was compiled pursuant to the Criminal Law (Amendment 3), National Security Law 
and its Rules for Implementation, and the international counter-terrorism conventions 
that China has ratified, including Resolution 1373 (Department of Public Security 
2003). An article on the state media gives detailed information about the designation. 
The article is in line with the Party line, claiming the legitimacy of China’s continuous 
rule over Xinjiang. It portrays the separatist movements in Xinjiang as the colonialists’ 
conspiracy to divide China and the “East Turkistan” terrorists as “vicious devils who 
indulge in all sorts of evildoings” (Leiming Wang, Shen, and Zou 2003).  
According to Zhao Yongchen, the then Vice-Director of the Ministry of Public Security, 
the designation of individuals must satisfy the following two criteria at the same time 
(Y. Zhao 2003): 
• Association with terrorist groups, and engagement in activities that endanger 
national security and the life and property of individuals.  
• Engagement in any of the following activities:  
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• Leading, organising, or participating in the proscribed terrorist group; 
• Organising, planning, inciting, propagating or instigating terrorist activities; 
• Funding or supporting proscribed terrorist organisations and individuals; 
• Receiving funding or training, or participating in the activities of the proscribed 
terrorist organisations or other international organisations.  
The first list also came with some legal ramifications – China issued “red notices” on 
all the 11 proscribed individuals. Among others, the list includes Dolkun Isa who is 
accused of theft, robbery and the series of bombing attacks in Khotan county, as well 
as propaganda, support and involvement with terrorist activities (People.com 2009). 
Known as a respected Uyghur activist in the West, Dolkun Isa received great sympathy 
from human rights groups and the Uyghur community in exile. Dilxat Raxit, 
spokesperson for the World Uyghur Congress, condemned the Chinese government 
for making such a serious allegation without providing any actual evidence (Reuters 
2018b). The accusation against him also led Human Rights Watch (2017b) to criticise 
China for abusing “red notices” against dissidents. The lack of actual evidence 
eventually resulted in Interpol’s revocation of the “red notice” on Dolkun Isa, which, 
according to Fair Trials (2018), highlights the political nature of China’s accusations.  
The Ministry of Public Security (2008) published the second list of eight “East Turkistan 
terrorist” individuals on 21 October 2008. The Spokesperson holds that the 
designation is based on actual evidence of their criminal activities directed at the 
Beijing Olympic Games pursuant to aforementioned domestic laws and international 
conventions.  
In 2012, the Ministry of Public Security (2012) published the third list of six members 
of the “East Turkistan Islamic Movement” – a terrorist organisation proscribed in the 
first list. The third list also added that relevant departments would freeze the assets of 
the proscribed individuals. Like the first two lists, the latest list provides a detailed 
description of the criminal activities of the proscribed individuals.  
The evolution of the lists reveals two tendencies of China’s terrorism designation. 
First, the Ministry of Public Security has downplayed the political function of the lists 
and started to use the lists as a legal instrument. The loaded language in the state 
media about the first list has been changed to a relatively objective description of the 
criminal activities of the proscribed individuals. The third list added the legal 
ramification to freeze the assets of the designated individuals.  
Second, no public information suggests that the National Counter-terrorism Leading 
Organ has issued “red notices” on the proscribed individuals in the second and third 
lists. This shows at least the increasingly “low-profile” character of the terrorist 
designation. The second and the third lists clarify the association between proscribed 
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individuals and an actual organisation. As discussed earlier, the vague use of “East 
Turkistan forces” to include all Uyghur dissents has been subject to much international 
criticism (Becquelin 2004a). Given that a number of political entities have added the 
“East Turkistan Islamic Movement” to their terrorist list, it is likely that the emphasis 
on the proscribed individuals’ association with this group, rather than the umbrella 
term “East Turkistan forces”, is a response to this criticism.85 
Instead of issuing “red notices”, the CCP has been exerting pressure through 
diplomatic leverage to limit Dolkun Isa’s access to other countries. In 2016, Taiwan 
blocked him from attending the Asia Pacific Religious Freedom Forum 
(Underrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization 2016). The World Uyghur 
Congress (2016a) published a response to this “particularly hostile statement”. In 
2017, when he was in Italy, he was briefly detained by the police. This was “severely 
condemned” by the Underrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization (2017). Dilxat 
Raxit accused China of being involved and warned that this incident “challenges the 
bottom-line values of Italian democracy” (Reuters 2017b). A Western diplomat based 
in Beijing holds that China “frequently asks European countries to arrest Isa, but has 
never provided evidence of the crimes it says he has committed” (Reuters 2017b).  
Institutional restructuring in the last decade has resulted in some development of the 
terrorism designation mechanism from ad-hoc list-making to a more comprehensive 
system. In 2011, the People’s Congress gave the National Counter-terrorism Leading 
Organ the power to oversee counter-terrorism in China in the form of the Decision of 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Strengthening the Work 
on Anti-terrorism (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 2011).86 
Initially power over designation was entirely in the hands of the executive. In 2015, 
the draft law was tabled for discussion, and the revised law gave the judiciary the 
power to designate terrorist organisations and individuals (Q. Sun 2015). Since then 
the designation system has been known as the “double-track system”, referring to the 
executive and the judiciary. Article 12 of the official Anti-Terrorism Law stipulates that 
the working body of the National Counter-terrorism Work Leading Organ shall 
designate terrorist individuals or groups, while Article 16 stipulates that the 
intermediate, or above people’s court, shall determine terrorist organisations and 
individuals pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Law (The National People’s Congress of 
                                                      
85 The designation of “East Turkestan Islamic Movement” in other countries is per se subject 
to criticism. For example, Eckholm (2002) points out that the US’ decision to put the 
group on its Foreign Terrorist Organization list is out of political considerations to soften 
Chinese opposition to its war in Iraq, rather than based on hard evidence. Some human 
rights activists even claim that the group does not actually exist (Tiezzi 2013a). 
86 全国人大常委会关于加强反恐怖工作有关问题的决定 
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the People’s Republic of China 2015). According to the revised law, competent courts 
at least of the level of the intermediate people’s court, are authorised to designate 
terrorist organisations and individuals pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Law (The 
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China 2015).  
Separating the designation power of the executive and the judiciary is a significant 
move in the Chinese context, considering that most Chinese political elites are 
sceptical about the Western model of separation of power. Emphasising the 
difference in China’s “national conditions”, Chinese officials propose the 
differentiation of the decision-making power, execution power and supervisory power 
with an emphasis on “restriction” and “coordination”, instead of “separation” 
(People’s Congress 2007). Some Chinese scholars (S. Xu 2016) argue that the executive 
and the judiciary are responsible for different aspects of terrorism designation. 
However, as terrorist cases often require cooperation between the executive and the 
judiciary, it is difficult to draw a clear line between their functions (M. Du 2017). This 
system could result in the overlapping, duplication and contradiction of the functions 
of the executive and the judiciary (M. Du 2016b).  
The double track system of terrorism designation relies heavily on the executive. 
According to Chapter II of the Anti-Terrorism Law (The National People’s Congress of 
the People’s Republic of China 2015), the National Counter-terrorism Leading Organ is 
responsible for terrorism designation and its office publishes the designation. To 
propose a designation, the departments of public security, and state security, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the provincial Counter-terrorism Leading Organ files an 
application to the National Counter-terrorism Leading Organ. Public security 
departments and security departments (executive) at all levels oversee, investigate, 
and gather evidence about the suspected entity, and escalate this to higher levels all 
the way to the Minister of Public Security who then reports directly to the Premier. 
The list is then signed by the Premier and published as an official gazette (J. Jian 2011, 
168). 
Chinese scholars are optimistic about the effectiveness of the double track system, 
which aims to reduce the pressure on the prosecutors to go through the entire legal 
procedure (M. Du 2016a, 2016b). Some argue that the double track system is effective 
because it helps the government to identify potential threats before the actual crime 
takes place (J. Jian 2011; M. Du 2016b). Jia and Li (2017, 51) argue that the executive 
designation is pre-emptive, which complements the reactive judicial designation, 
which is based on facts and evidence.  
Given the expansive power of the executive on terrorism designation, some questions 
about due process remain unanswered. First, the designation of the executive 
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contravenes the Criminal Procedure Law regarding the presumption of innocence (M. 
Du 2017; S. Xu 2016, 115). Article 12 of the Criminal Procedure Law (People’s Congress 
2012)stipulates that no authority can decide whether an individual is guilty without 
the judgement of the people’s court. Xu Shanghao (S. Xu 2016, 115) elaborated on the 
admissibility of executive designation as legal evidence. He invoked Section 52.2 of the 
Rules for Criminal Procedure of the People's Procuratorate (The Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China. 2012) which gives the executive the 
power to collect legal evidence, arguing that the evidence collected by the National 
Counter-terrorism Leading Organ is admissible in court. Second, the Anti-Terrorism 
Law does not specify the process through which the executive should accept and 
publish the judgements made by people’s courts. As the latter are made on a case-by-
case basis, it is questionable whether such a designation will have any effect on other 
cases. So far, apart from the three official lists, the National Counter-terrorism Leading 
Organ has not published any designation that was initially made by the people’s 
courts.  
This designation mechanism provides little support for appealing to review the 
designation. Article 15 of the Anti-Terrorism Law stipulates that designated individuals 
and organisations can appeal to the National Counter-terrorism Leading Organ – the 
designation body itself. The National Counter-terrorism Leading Organ shall make the 
decision about upholding or revoking the designation. The decision made after the 
review process is the final decision. Some Chinese scholars argue in favour of the need 
to establish a review process by an external body. Sun (2014) argues that, given the 
status of the National Counter-terrorism Leading Organ as the highest counter-
terrorism executive body in China, allowing the judiciary and society to participate in 
the review process would undermine its authority. Others hold that the judiciary is the 
last line of defence between power abuse and justice (S. Xu 2016, 118). Some (Y. Guo 
2015) have compromised and argue that the review process should be carried out by 
a different department within the National Counter-terrorism Leading Organ. Guo 
proposes the establishment of a committee comprising immigration officers, counter-
terrorism personnel from the army, security department personnel, political scientists, 
criminologists specialising in counter-terrorism and international law experts. Beyond 
the scholarly discussion, nothing has yet materialised. Without an independent review 
body, it is not surprising that no publicly available information reveals the reviewing or 
de-listing process, and no cases of successful or failed appeals have been found. 
Another problem with this designation mechanism is the encroachment upon the 
freedom of association. The official criteria that Zhao Yongchen provided require the 
designation to be based on both the membership and criminal activities of the 
individuals to be designated. Like Canada (Jarvis and Legrand 2018, 7), China does not 
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officially criminalise individuals merely for their association with designated groups. 
However, in practice, it is not clear to what extent these criteria are followed. A 
controversial case is the criminalisation of Ilham Tohti, a former professor at Chinese 
Minzu University. He was accused of associating with foreign separatist organisations 
and individuals and other offences such as spreading separatist ideology and inciting 
ethnic hatred. It is not clear what proportion of his association with designated groups 
and individuals accounts for his life sentence (Xinhua 2014g). He is highly respected 
among the Uyghur community in the West and he received an American human rights 
award for his efforts in “fighting oppression” (Publishers Weekly 2014). This shows 
that what China considers to be a serious offence may be considered a struggle for 
freedom in the eyes of the Western media. It also shows that it is likely that the 
official criteria are not strictly followed in practice.  
Overall, the development of China’s terrorism demonstrates its struggle between the 
effectiveness of its counter-terrorism policy and concerns about accountability. It 
reflects China’s political discourse, which prioritises national and collective interests 
over individual interests, and in the context of legal practice, substantive justice over 
procedural justice (J. Gao 2007, 740). Relying heavily on the executive for terrorism 
designation, the rules of procedure are lacking in the designation process (J. Jian 2011, 
167).  
5.4.2 Broadened scope of the Anti-Terrorism Law 
Since the Anti-Terrorism Law was drafted, there has been a spike in the number of 
individuals and organisations who have received a penalty for violations that would 
previously have been penalised under other laws. Among all the cases that are 
publicly available online, a large percentage (48%) of the cases in which the Anti-
Terrorism Law or the terrorism-related article in the Criminal Law have been invoked 
happened in places such as hotels and gas stations. In those cases, Administrative 
Penalties were incurred for failing to make preparedness plans or failing to equip the 
places with counter-terrorism facilities in accordance with Article 99 of the Anti-
Terrorism Law.  
In 2016, only 20% were directly related to advocating terrorism by distributing audio-
visual materials or releasing information to instruct and incite others to conduct 
terrorist activity [Article 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment (9)]. 3% were related to 
not cooperating with counter-terrorism work (Article 9 of the Anti-Terrorism Law). 11% 
of the cases were associated with advocating terrorism, but the circumstances were 
not serious enough to constitute a crime, so the perpetrators were given 
Administrative Penalties (Article 80 of the Counter-terrorism Law). 6% of the cases 
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concerned the possession of terrorism-related materials (often terrorism-related 
video clips).  
 
Figure 15 Percentage of types of offences under Counter-terrorism Law and Criminal 
Law Amendment in 2016 (9) 
It is worth noting that in 9% of the cases, postal or express services were penalised for 
failing to conduct a security check of the transported and delivered items as required 
by Article 20 of the Counter-terrorism Law. However, some of these cases do not fall 
strictly within the jurisdiction of the counter-terrorism legislature. For example, on 2 
August 2016, the Tianming Express company received a 150,000 RMB fine for failing 
to conduct security checks as required (Xinhua 2016a). Article 75 of the Postal Law 
also established the legal liability of postal or delivery entities in terms of 
implementing a security check system to prevent the posting or delivery of articles 
that are forbidden or restricted (The Central People’s Government of the People’s 
Republic of China 2009). The unclear boundary between the two laws makes it 
possible for the judiciary to make conflicting decisions.  
The framing of these cases of nonfeasance demonstrate, in the context of counter-
terrorism, indicates the broadened scope of the Anti-Terrorism Law. To tone down the 
friend/enemy distinction and avoid alienating those who were punished, the media 
introduced a catchphrase “counter-terrorism ticket”.87 Clearly cases of nonfeasance 
usually do not involve external enemies. The phrase “counter-terrorism ticket” 
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normalised terrorism by suggesting a parallel between terrorism and something as 
ordinary as a parking ticket.  
The broadened scope of the Anti-Terrorism Law is likely to make terrorism a “pocket 
crime” and the law enforcement will be able to label the irrelevant activities in the 
context of terrorism.88 A “pocket crime” is an unofficial legal term that describes the 
vague definition of an offence that blurs the boundary between different offences 
(Xun Zhang 2013). Drawing an analogy between an offence and a pocket crime, the 
phrase refers to such a definition of an offence that can be used to label more than 
one kind of criminal activity, just like a pocket that contains more than one items. In 
doing so, the Anti-Terrorism Law is broad enough to allow the CCP to not only 
criminalise political opponents, but also to strengthen its social control.  
5.5 Actors 
This chapter examines domestic and international actors. The discussion of the 
domestic actors indicates the tendency towards power concentration under Xi Jinping, 
the role of the media in counter-terrorism propaganda and the efforts of the People’s 
Congress to engage the public. The discussion of the international actors shows how 
the CCP promotes its counter-terrorism discourse in neighbouring countries based on 
the assumption of the friend/enemy distinction between Western and on-Western 
countries through counter-terrorism drills.  
5.5.1 Domestic actors 
In China, various sectors, industries, and departments are involved in the counter-
terrorism strategy and practice (G. Pan 2004, 6). Although the open-ended “relevant 
departments” can, in theory, include any institution and organisation, it is possible to 
identify some of the key actors that take most of the responsibility for counter-
terrorism practice.  
To begin with, as discussed in Section 5.3.1, the following departments were involved 
in the drafting of the Anti-Terrorism Law.  
Table 1 Departments that drafted the Anti-Terrorism Law (Lang 2014). 
Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee 
Legislative Affairs Office within the State Council 
Ministry of State Security 
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Ministry of Industry and Information Technology  
People's Bank of China  
Armed Police Force Headquarters  
New positions and institutions have also been opened to complement the existing 
security institution. The Central National Security Commission, established at the 3rd 
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee in November 2013, is responsible for 
the overall planning and coordination across departments. A new position, the 
“Counterterrorism Commissioner”, under the command of the Ministry of Public 
Security, was created in order to strengthen the leadership and organisation of 
counter-terrorism work (R. Liu 2015b). 
The major actors of counter-terrorism practice under the leadership of the National 
Counter-terrorism Work Leading Organ are defined under Article 8 of the Anti-
Terrorism Law. According to Article 8 (The National People’s Congress of the People’s 
Republic of China 2015), these actors include the public security authorities, the 
national security authorities, the people's procuratorates, the people's courts, the 
judicial administrative authorities, the People's Liberation Army, the People's Armed 
Police, the People's Liberation Army Militia and “other relevant state organs”.  
In addition to state actors, the state also sought to engage the public and 
communities. The CCP follows the principle of “combining specialised tasks with 
reliance on the masses”, which reflects the revival of the Mass Line approach that was 
central to Mao’s governance of China.89 To maximise the support of the “friends” 
against the “enemies”, the Anti-Terrorism Law identifies the following types of social 
institutions that participate in counter-terrorism practice, particularly in terrorism 
prevention and rehabilitation.  
Table 2 Social institutions involved in counter-terrorism practice 
village committee  
residents’ committee  
enterprise and public institution  
social organisation  
In addition to the Anti-Terrorism Law at the state level, the Mass Line approach is also 
reflected in regulations at the provincial level. In line with the Mass Line approach 
written in the Anti-Terrorism Law, the local Public Security Comprehensive 
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Management Office and Counter-terrorism Work Leading Organs in Xinjiang published 
the measures to motivate citizens to participate in counter-terrorism (Tianshanwang 
2016).90 According to the Measures for reporting terrorism-related clues in XUAR, 
those who provide the information on terror attacks shall be rewarded. Up to 2016, 
the local government rewarded 6 citizens in Baicheng and Luopu County a total of 2.2 
million RMB for reporting terrorism-related information (Chinadaily 2016).91 The 
public security departments in Beijing rewarded 5 citizens 23,000 RMB according to 
the Measures (China.com 2016).  
Table 3 Monetary rewards for those who report terrorism-related information 
(Tianshanwang 2016) 
Reward Content of information 
200,000-5,000,000 
RMB 
information on the activities, inside information, urgent 
information, or key information on the planning, 
organisation, premeditation, or implementation of terror 
attacks, hostage taking, assassination, poisoning, and the 
destruction of important infrastructure 
not more than 200,000 
RMB 
preventive information on terrorism-related unusual 
situations that involve social stability, security situations, 
safety in production, religious affairs, social situations, 
public opinion, online public opinion 
In addition to monetary rewards, the Measures also stipulate that reporters shall be 
allowed to apply for “non-monetary rewards”, including preferential treatment in 
regard to joining the army, enrolment in school, social welfare, land contracts and 
legal aid (Tianshanwang 2016). 92 
The institutional restructuring of the armed police reflects the concentration of power 
under Xi Jinping. The daily enforcement of the counter-terrorism policy is usually 
carried out by the People’s Armed Police, which was under the dual leadership of the 
State Council and the Central Military Committee. In January 2018, the Armed Police 
was brought under the control of the Central Military Commission completely (Xinhua 
2017). This means that the Party has absolute control over counter-terrorism 
                                                      
90 The Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security and its office 
was abolished on 31 March 2018 (Xinhua 2018b). 
91 Measures for reporting terrorism-related clues in XUAR :《新疆维吾尔自治区群众举报涉
暴恐犯罪线索奖励办法》 
92 policy reward: 政策性奖励 
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enforcement and the Armed Police Forces are not simply serving the “state security”, 
but more specifically, the “Party security”. 
The People’s Armed Police has two Special Forces that are known to deal with 
terrorism: the Snow Leopard Commando Unit (“People’s Armed Police Beijing General 
Corps” 2008), formerly known as the Snow Wolf Commando Unit, and the Falcon 
Commando Unit. The former participated in the Cooperation-2007 China-Russia 
counter-terrorism military exercise (Zuokui Wang and Guo 2007), and the latter is 
specialised in aircraft hijacking and participates in international exchange and training 
programmes annually (Ni 2014). Little information is available about the workings of 
these units or actual cases of their counter-terrorism practice. Also, given the distance 
between Beijing and Xinjiang, it is questionable whether they could respond in a 
timely manner to terror attacks that are statistically more likely to take place in 
Xinjiang. 93 Considering Xi’s emphasis on their loyalty to the Party (Zhi Cao and Zhang 
2014), it is likely that the Commando Units were established to deal with potential 
political coups rather than individual terrorists.  
The major development of counter-terrorism institutions at the local level has taken 
place in Beijing and Xinjiang. The Counter-terrorism Unit of the Beijing Municipal 
Public Security Bureau is equipped with riot guns and revolvers to ensure 24-hour 
patrol in the capital city. The Beijing police have also established a “one-minute 
response” system at 14 prosperous downtown areas to ensure quick response in less 
than one minute in the case of an emergency (Beijing Public Security Bureau 2014). In 
Xinjiang, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) bears the 
responsibility of border security, national unity, social stability and the prevention of 
terrorism and other crimes. Since the 1980s, the XPCC has focused on the prevention 
of, and crackdown on the “three forces” (State Council Information Office 2014). 
The Ministry of State Security bears the responsibility for intelligence collection and 
analysis. Due to political sensitivity, the organisation does not publicise any official 
information about its work online. This reflects that the single-party regime does not 
face the same challenges that are faced by liberal/democratic countries face. The CCP 
is able to justify its decision based on classified information without being challenged 
by an opposition party.  
The mainstream media and research institutes are also important actors at the 
frontline of counter-terrorism propaganda. They dominate the counter-terrorism 
                                                      
93 Some sources (Hei 2017) say that the Snow Leopard Commando Unit has moved to 
Guangzhou, but the state media has not responded to this speculation.  
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discourse in China in the form of the news report, commentaries, academic 
conferences, and research papers. Commercial media must use the wording in the 
mainstream media in reporting politically sensitive incidents. Scholars affiliated with 
state-owned research institutes produce a substantial proportion of the research on 
counter-terrorism. The People’s Public Security University of China and The Chinese 
Armed Police Force Academy are two of the academic institutes affiliated with the 
State Council. The former established a School of Counter-terrorism in 2014 with an 
emphasis on intelligence and counter-terrorism tactics. The Counter-terrorism 
Research Centre at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations was 
established in 2000, and focuses on research on international terrorism, extremism, 
transnational organised crime and weapons of mass destruction et cetera. 94 This 
centre has established its own database of the geographical information regarding 
international terrorism and it produces the Yearbook of International Terrorism and 
Counter-terrorism annually (2017). At the local level, there are two university-based 
research centres, The Centre for Counter-terrorism Research at Zhongnan University 
of Economics and Law, established in 2016, and the Counter-terrorism Research 
Centre at Northwest University of Political Science and Law established in 2014. The 
latter has its own website, Anti-terrorism Information, where it publishes terrorism-
related news, research reports and commentaries.  
The discussion on the domestic actors shows two characteristics of China’s counter-
terrorism policy. First, the state has the monopoly on the counter-terrorism discourse 
through the media and research institutes. However, due to the ambiguous definition 
of terrorism and the criteria for measuring the penalty, it is likely that similar offences 
could receive different punishment across provinces. For example, although the 
central authority provides basic legal documents that guide the local authorities in 
practice, the vague criteria in determining the “circumstances” of the crimes allows 
the local authorities to interpret the law as they see appropriate. An offender in 
Hunan province was given 13 days in detention and an 8000 RMB fine for uploading 
terrorist videos to a Wechat group, while in a similar case, an offender in Sichuan 
province was given 10 days in detention, and another offender in Shanxi province was 
given 5 days in detention for uploading terrorist video clips (Jiangxi Provincial Public 
Security Department 2017). This may be justified by the difference in the level of 
economic development across provinces. However, there are no official documents 
that provide the instructions on how the punishment should reflect the level of local 
                                                      
94 China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations is a think tank that provides 
reports for the government upon request.  
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economic development. Essentially, the criteria for the measurement of the severity 
of “circumstances” are not clear enough to prevent the abuse of power.  
Second, the revival of the Mass Line approach under Xi indicates some attempts by 
the government to engage the public. It is not clear to what extent this move is 
designed to balance the state/Party-centric counter-terrorism practice with a human-
oriented security paradigm. However, it does reinforce the norm that the CCP aims to 
attract support from the people , which was central to Mao’s governance. At the early 
stage of the counter-terrorism strategy, state institutions played an important role in 
drafting the Anti-Terrorism Law. The National Counter-terrorism Work Leading Organ 
oversees all of the work related to counter-terrorism. The revival of the Mass Line 
approach facilitated a transition from treating the people simply as the beneficiaries 
of the counter-terrorism practice to treating them as contributors to state security. 
The rhetoric of the Mass Line approach is accompanied by incentives for those who 
reported terrorism-related information.  
 
 
 
 
171 
 
 
 
 
 
172 
Figure 16 Structure of the counter-terrorism institutions in China 
5.5.2 International actors 
An analysis of China’s counter-terrorism cooperation with neighbouring countries 
shows that it has been promoting its counter-terrorism discourse through joint 
military drills. In particular, the cooperation within the framework of Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) highlights that the common interests between China 
and bordering countries helps to normalise its perception of the “three forces” among 
SCO member states. On the other hand, the lack of cooperation in the anti-terrorism 
military drills with the West also highlights the divergence between China and the 
West in terms of their attitudes towards terrorism and separatism.  
The CCP has been developing its counter-terrorism strategy from a domestic event-
driven emergency plan into a more comprehensive strategy that not only improves its 
capability to deal with domestic terrorism but also enables it to rally support from 
other countries. Pan Guang (2004, 4) observes that China’s counter-terrorism strategy 
has moved beyond simply fighting against the East Turkistan Islamic Movement to a 
more comprehensive mechanism that facilitates cooperation with neighbouring 
countries. This shift in attitude can be seen from China’s accession to international 
treaties. Since the 9/11 attacks, China has acceded to the International Convention on 
Stopping Terrorist Explosions and signed the International Convention on Severing 
Financial Aid to Terrorism (Yi Wang 2002).  
At the same time, China has sought to bring its own values to its cooperation with 
other countries. According to Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, 
on 29 June 2012, China expressed its full support for the UN Global Counter-terrorism 
Strategy, with an emphasis on respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial 
integrity, and abandoning double standards (Q. Lin and Wang 2012). The emphasis on 
national unity, sovereignty and territorial is consistent with its overall security agenda 
in the context of its political discourse. Wang’s statement also indicates the 
divergence between China and the West on issues such as Uyghur separatist 
organisations, which are considered legal outside China.  
From 2002 to 2018, 34 anti-terrorism drills involving China were identified, based on a 
triangulation of the state media, English-language media, and other commercial media. 
Among all of the drills, 38% were explicitly associated with the SCO. Among them, 
some (2009 China-Russia Peace Mission-2009 and 2017 China-Kyrgyzstan Tianshan III) 
were observed by SCO officials. 28% of all of the drills explicitly mentioned the “three 
forces”. The drills outside the framework of the SCO were driven by specific concerns. 
For example, the China-ASEAN anti-terror drill in 2016 was aimed at maritime security. 
In the 2016, the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, China was focused on anti-piracy. In the 
 
 
 
 
173 
Dragon Gold 2018 China practised its ability in terms of humanitarian assistance. 
Some drills (Hand-in-Hand China-India drill in 2015 and Red River No. 2 China-Vietnam 
in 2016) were carried out based on bilateral or multilateral cooperation, with more 
focus on maintaining or improving foreign relations.  
The anti-terrorism drills within the framework of the SCO are more closely associated 
with the concept of the enemy. The SCO has grown into an increasingly influential 
regional counter-terrorism body from the Shanghai Five group. Cooperation within 
the SCO framework covers a range of security issues, including border security, 
military cooperation, and counterterrorism with provisions for joint law enforcement 
operations, police training, and intelligence sharing (Xinhua 2016b). The SCO 
established the Regional Antiterrorism Structure in Tashkent as its standing body, 
which indicates that counter-terrorism is at the core of its agenda of SCO. The 
following table provides an overview of the major anti-terrorism drills between China 
and its neighbouring countries and their scale. The Peace Mission has become regular 
since 2005.  
Table 4 Major anti-terror drills between China and its neighbouring countries (2002-
2018) 
Time Name Participant countries Location 
Estimated 
number of 
troops 
2002 Exercise-01 China-Kyrgyzstan the border of the two 
countries 
Hundreds 
2003 Coalition-2003 China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia 
and Tajikistan  
border city of Ucharal and Ili 
in Kazakhstan, northwest 
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous 
Region, China 
1,300 
2004 Friendship-2004 China-Pakistan  Taxkorgan Tajik 
Autonomous County, 
Xinjiang, China 
200 
2005 Peace Mission-
2005 
China-Russia  Vladivostok-Shandong 
Peninsula 
10,000 
2006 Coordination-
2006 
China-Tajikistan Kulyab, Tajikistan 500 
2006 Friendship-2006 China-Pakistan  the hilly area of northern 
Abbottabad, Pakistan 
400 
2007 Peace Mission-
2007 
China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia 
and Tajikistan  
Chelyabinsk in Ural 
Mountains region in Russia 
and Urumqi 
4000 
2007 Strike-2007 China-Thailand Guangzhou, Guangdong, 
China 
60 
2007 Cooperation-
2007 
China-Russia Moscow, Russia Unknown 
2009 Peace Mission-
2009  
China-Russia  Far east area in Russia and 
the Shenyang Military Area 
2600 
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Time Name Participant countries Location 
Estimated 
number of 
troops 
Command in northeast 
China 
2010 Peace Mission-
2010 
China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia 
and Tajikistan  
Kazakhstan 5,000 
2012 Peace Mission-
2012 
Kazakhstan, China, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia 
and Tajikistan 
the "Chorukh-Dayron" 
shooting range near the 
Khujand city of Tajikistan 
2000 
2013 Peace Mission-
2013 
China-Russia  Chelyabinsk in Ural 
Mountains region in Russia 
and Urumqi 
1,500 
2013 Border Coalition 
Resolution-2013 
China-Kyrgyzstan the border between the two 
nations 
1075 
2013 joint military 
exercise 
China-India Chengdu Military Area 
Command  
160 
2014 Peace Mission-
2014 
China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan 
Zhurihe Training Base, in 
Inner Mongolia in North 
China 
7000 
2015 The Hand-in-
Hand 2015 
counter-
terrorism drill 
China-India Yunnan province in China 175 
2015 Red River No. 1-
2015 
China-Vietnam Hekou, China 170 
2016 Peace Mission-
2016 
China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia 
and Tajikistan  
Edelweiss training area in 
Balykchy of Kyrgyzstan  
1100 
2016 Red River No. 2-
2016 
China-Vietnam Hekou County, Yunnan 
province in China; Lào Cai in 
Vietnam 
Unknown 
2016 Blue Strike-2016 China-Thailand Sattahip Naval Base, Chon 
Buri province, Thailand 
Unknown 
2017 Cooperation 
2017 
China-Russia Yinchuan, Ningxia Hui 
autonomous region 
64 
2017 Tianshan III China-Kyrgyzstan in Artux, Kezilesu Kirgiz 
autonomous prefecture 
700 
2018 Dragon Gold 
2018 
China-Cambodia Maras Prov Mountains 496 
The anti-terrorism drills with neighbouring countries highlight the utility and 
limitations of the friend/enemy distinction in China’s counter-terrorism discourse. 
First, the lack of counter-terrorism cooperation between China and the West indicates 
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the lack of consensus on the definition of terrorism and its conflation with separatism. 
As Duchâtel and Ekman (2015, 1) point out, terrorism is understood mainly in the 
context of separatist movements in Xinjiang, while many Europeans perceive 
terrorism in the context of the attacks on values such as freedom of speech. In a word, 
the West does not agree with the friend/enemy distinction in China’s counter-
terrorism discourse. The general positive attitude towards separatists such as Rebiya 
Kadiya and the Dalai Lama in the West forestalls China-West counter-terrorism 
cooperation.  
Second, as Aris (2009, 457) argues, the focus on terrorism has won favour among 
other member states of the SCO. In particular, member states share an interests in 
tackling ethnic-based separatism and Muslim fundamentalism (Lanteigne 2005, 129). 
Among 13 SCO drills, 8 (62%) were associated with the goal of the “three forces”. 
Because member states share an understanding of separatism as potentially linked to 
external enemies abroad, they seldom challenge each other upon the designation of 
terrorist organisations, which makes it easier to target groups such as the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Jihad Union, the East Turkistan 
Islamic Movement, and the Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization as terrorist 
organisations, some of which are not recognised by the West.  
In addition, the cooperation between China and its neighbouring countries on 
terrorism underlines the shared anxiety over “colour revolutions” (Yuan 2010, 862). As 
Piekos and Economy (2015) point out, China and Russia have the same fear of colour 
revolutions that have overthrown several post-Soviet governments, and this has 
shaped the overall mission of the SCO. Russian and Chinese officials regard US-led 
democratisation as part of its “peaceful evolution” that threatens their interests 
(Weitz 2006, 161). According to Yuan Jingdong (2010, 863) the “colour revolution” in 
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and the 2005 Andijan incident in Uzbekistan have made 
Russia re-assess the role of the SCO and engage more actively in counter-terrorism 
cooperation. The SCO annual meetings in 2005 became an opportunity for its member 
states to “vent their frustration with the US in general and US critiques of their non-
democratic political systems in particular” (Olcott 2006, 2). A month before the 
military exercise of the SCO in 2005, Uzbekistan gave a notice to the US to leave its 
military base in Uzbekistan.  
Some observers (Turner 2005; Aris 2009) question whether the SCO constitutes an 
anti-Western bloc. Although it remains uncertain whether China’s aim is to seek to 
undermine the Western dominance in the international community, it is clear that it is 
utilising the shared anti-Western sentiment to rally support from its neighbouring 
countries to fight against terrorism. The development of the SCO and China’s active 
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participation in anti-terrorism drills illustrates China’s growing reliance on 
international institutions to justify and promote its own concept of security and 
terrorism. As Lanteigne (2005, 2) argues, doing so helps the CCP create a more 
effective foreign policy, and protect its valuable domestic interests. 
5.6 Development policy 
This section examines how the CCP has combined economic development with 
counter-terrorism efforts based on the assumption of a developmental approach to 
security discussed in Section 4.2.2. Political elites perceive development as a key to 
solving non-traditional security problems and have sought to temper the often-heavy-
handed counter-terrorism measures with economic growth. Wang Yi, China’s Foreign 
Minister, elaborated the CCP’s position on terrorism based on his perception of the 
causes of the threats at the Munich Security Conference. According to Wang Yi (2002) 
China’s security policy is designed in response to the causes of non-traditional security 
challenges that are rooted in its complicated historical background. In response, 
China’s security policy is primarily about national unity, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. It also serves to ensure stability and development, which in turn creates 
security. According to Xi Jinping (2014a), “development is the basis of security, and 
security is the condition of development”. 
The rationale of the developmental approach to security is also reflected in the short-
term and long-term counter-terrorism efforts. According to Wang Yi (2002), China’s 
counter-terrorism strategy deals with both the “symptoms” that are apparent at the 
present and the “root causes” in the long run. This means that political elites believe 
that there are more profound reasons for terrorism other than the causes that 
terrorist groups claim. In China’s political discourse, this implies that terrorism is 
caused by the complicated “international situation” in which some Western countries 
interfere in other countries’ domestic affairs in the name of ethnic and religious issues 
(see discussion on Jiang’s understanding of the “international situation” in Section 
4.2.3).  
In Chinese academic writings, the root causes are more explicitly associated with 
American hegemony, globalisation, colonialism and power politics (M. Yang 2002, 57; 
C. Wang 2006, 102). The scholarship on root causes of terrorism provides the context 
in which to understand what Wang Yi calls the “complicated international 
environment”. Yang Mingjie conducted interviews with a number of leading scholars 
specialised in terrorism research and ethnic studies. The opinions of the interviewees 
reflect the propensity of Chinese scholars to blame the West, especially the US for 
causing and exacerbating terrorism. Fang Jinying states that the nascence of terrorism 
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is to a large extent related to the colonialism of the European countries, and that the 
colonial rule in many countries sowed the seeds of ethnic and religious conflict. Li Wei 
adds that Western countries have always been more tolerant of the right wing than 
the left, which has partly led to the growth of extremist right-wing terrorism (M. Yang 
2002, 56). Chen Jiejun argues that the unjust in international politics due to some US 
foreign policies that impose its own values on others provided the pretext for some 
organisations to resort to terrorism (M. Yang 2002, 56). Wang Cungang highlights the 
direct and indirect US involvement in anti-communist activities that used terrorism as 
a tactic, which has resulted in retaliation by the victim countries (C. Wang 2006, 103). 
In the light of the “complicated international environment”, Xi established at the 
Second Central Xinjiang Conference that “the goal of Xinjiang work is social stability 
and long-term peace. We need to adhere to this goal, and use it as a guiding principle. 
All the other work needs to be developed around this goal” (Hongxiao Wang 2014). At 
the second session of the 9th Party Committee Plenary session the relationship 
between economic development and social stability was emphasised. It was 
explicated that economic development and the improvement of wellbeing should be 
the basis of governance in Xinjiang, which should contribute to the goal of social 
stability and harmony (Fenghuang 2017).  
 
Figure 17 Xinjiang GDP from 1978 to 2017 (Statistic Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region 2016; T. Sun and Gu 2018) 
The central authority pays great attention to the development of Xinjiang as a source 
of long-term stability. The achievements in economic development have been used as 
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a major source of legitimacy (see The Information Office of the State Council 2003). As 
the above figure shows, the GDP of Xinjiang has skyrocketed over the last three 
decades.  
The government’s emphasis on economic development in order to achieve peace and 
national unity can be seen from the two Xinjiang Work Conference. At the first 
Conference in May 2010, the CCP decided to reinforce the extant policy of “leapfrog 
development and long-term security”.95 Based on this, the second Xinjiang Work 
Conference emphasised the Counterpart Assistance to enhance ethnic solidarity at the 
national strategic level (L. Wu 2016, 10).  
Xinjiang is among the less developed regions in China and contributes to the high level 
of regional development imbalance. The government’s remedy for the imbalance is 
pouring resources into Xinjiang in the form of Counterpart Assistance to Xinjiang.96 
This national aid programme covers support projects regarding the economy, science 
and technology, education, health care and culture (China Youth Daily 2015). The 
Counterpart Assistance to Xinjiang is one of the major national programmes that 
targets a particular province over the long term. So far Xinjiang remains the only 
recipient region on this programme. Until 30 September 2013, 19 provinces and cities 
contributed 3.449 million RMB, which consists of 61.1% of the twelfth five-year plan in 
Xinjiang (2011-2015) (Statistic Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 2015). 
In line with the CCP’s developmental approach to security, political elites focus on the 
economic development as the core of the overall Xinjiang governance strategy 
(Xinhua 2014a).  
The rapid rate of economic growth in Xinjiang has improved the government’s 
legitimacy and counter-balanced the erosion of its legitimacy due to its heavy-handed 
counter-terrorism measures. An article in the South China Morning Post, a Hong Kong 
English-language newspaper, points out that “[e]conomic development alone will not 
solve the problem of terrorism” (Jun 2015). Despite the efforts to reduce the income 
inequality between the coastal east and the landlocked west in China, the inequalities 
within Xinjiang remain.  
Chinese scholars have sought to normalise the inequalities in Xinjiang by arguing that 
they are part of a broader problem in China. They see the inequalities in the context of 
economic growth which is rooted in the society that is in a period of transition 
(Wenwei Tian 2011; Houdi Yang 2006). Some scholars consider the problems caused 
by unequal development in Xinjiang within the broader social dynamics in terms of 
                                                      
95 leapfrog development and long-term security: 跨越式发展和长治久安 
96 Counterpart Assistance: 对口援疆 
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the regional gap between western China and the coastal areas, the gap between the 
urban and rural areas, and the differences between sectors and communities (Jie Li 
2012, 11).  
Framing the inequalities in Xinjiang as part of the inequalities in China deflects 
people’s attention away from the negative impact of the policies targeting Xinjiang. 
Indeed, according to official statistics (National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC 2017), 
the Gini coefficient in China in general is showing a general improvement in terms of 
equality. However, the uncritical acceptance of the developmental approach to 
security might over-simplify the causes of the violence in Xinjiang.  
 
Figure 18 Gini Coefficient in China from 2003 to 2016 (created from data by National 
Bureau of Statistics of the PRC) 
The government is not entirely insensitive to the inequalities within Xinjiang. In the 
context of counter-terrorism, a local official in Xinjiang, Zhu Xuebing said that de-
radicalisation is a “systematic project” that needs to be implemented in conjunction 
with other development policies (F. Chen 2015e). Local official Zhang Jisheng argues 
that young Uyghurs who wander on the streets are usually jobless and from a lower 
educational background, and have poor skills in mandarin Chinese, and low 
employability (F. Chen 2015e).  
To improve employment, the CCP has proposed “Employment First”, which aims to 
provide at least one person with a job in families in which no-one is employed (Xinhua 
2014d).97 The fact that the government support is provided to families, rather than 
individuals, reflects China’s culture, which prioritises collective interests over 
individual interests. “A family can receive almost 2500-3000 Yuan from national, 
regional or local government subsidies” (F. Chen 2015e). 
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The CCP has introduced some policies to improve the employability of individuals who 
are deemed vulnerable to radicalisation. Local governments have provided more job 
opportunities by opening clothing and carpet factories, and the locals are recruited by 
the public services, for example as security guards, sanitation workers, and urban 
management officers (F. Chen 2015e).  
Zhu Xuebing also raises the issue of gender inequality in de-radicalisation. He argues 
that jobless women are particularly vulnerable to religious extremism if they are from 
a lower educational background and enjoy a lower status at home. His argument 
demonstrates some limited attempts to improve women’s status, though their 
understanding of the problem is still based on the assumption of women’s role at 
home. Zhu states that these women are an important target for de-radicalisation 
because they “have a direct influence on children”.  
Zhu also implies that it is not enough to simply fund unemployed people; it is the 
responsibility of the government to cultivate people to be diligent. He states that the 
local government has done “everything it can think of”, and it is important to 
encourage people to “get rich from their own labour” (F. Chen 2015e). 
To encourage jobless young Uyghurs to improve their employability, the local 
government provides them with free vocational training (F. Chen 2015e). In some 
cases, the government even provides incentives to achieve this goal. Local official 
Zhang Jisheng designed an incentive mechanism to award each trainee a bursary of 10 
RMB per day. If they are able to obtain the certificate after three months of training, 
they will be awarded another 5 Yuan per day. The training usually takes place in the 
slack seasons when young labours are not likely to be recruited for farming. All of the 
trainees are gathered in November for a month of military training, and then half a 
month is spent on public policies, for example, on the Marriage Law, birth control 
policy, and prevention and treatment of AIDS, before they are given training on 
specific skills (F. Chen 2015e).  
In addition to vocational training, preferential policies in education have also been 
introduced to improve the employability of the Uyghurs. The preferential policy for 
college entrance varies slightly each year, but in essence it lowers the requirement for 
ethnic minorities to enter higher education. For example, in 2017, the 11 minorities in 
Xinjiang who took the exam in Chinese were given an extra 50 points out of 750 if 
both of their parents were from ethnic minorities. An extra 10 points were given to 
the examinee if one of his/her parents was from an ethnic minority (Admission Office 
of XUAR 2017).  
Despite the government’s intention to minimise the inequalities between ethnic 
groups, this positive discrimination has inadvertently reinforced the division between 
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the Han and the Uyghurs. Chen and others (2009, 110) argue that because of the 
lower entry requirement to the college, Uyghur students are less competitive in the 
job market than their Han counterparts. Some Uyghurs parents have also criticised 
such policies for making their children “sluggish” and “incompetent” (L. An 2011).  
The division caused by preferential treatment can be seen from a case of “inland 
Xinjiang class”.98 The “inland Xinjiang class” is a mechanism aimed at providing better 
access for Uyghur students to higher education and improving the integration of the 
Uyghurs into the current education system. Since 2000, 1000 middle school graduates 
from Xinjiang have been admitted every year into the cities, where more advanced 
educational resources are available (Ministry of Education 2000). High schools of good 
quality and with good facilities are selected to admit these students (Ministry of 
Education 2000). Priority is given to those students in less developed areas as well as 
ethnic minorities and girls (Ministry of Education 2000). The number of admitted 
students has increased by 11 times in the last decade. As of 2015, 37,000 students had 
graduated from the Xinjiang class (K. Ma 2015a). The official documents repeatedly 
emphasise that the function of the Xinjiang class is to improve national unity and state 
security. Some schools explicitly treat the Xinjiang class as the “opportunity to 
promulgate the Party’s ethnic policy and Xinjiang work” and set up a fund for 
education of political ideology (Jiangsu Kou’an Middle School 2018). Some schools 
emphasise their efforts in resisting the infiltration of the “three forces” into the 
Xinjiang class (Zhengzhou 7th School 2012).  
However, self-segregation remains after these students enter the inland school where 
they are surrounded by Han Chinese. According to an interview with a minority 
student in a school that has a Xinjiang class, compared to other students, those who 
are admitted into such a system enjoy better facilities in the same school, and have 
different teachers (Che 2016). Some students are not able to return home during the 
holidays because of the long distance between their home and the school, so the 
schools organise tours to local tourist spots especially for them. Uyghur students are 
usually gathered in a class that is separated from other Han students, though the 
official document does require mixing attendance with other students “when 
conditions permit” (Ministry of Education 2000). Some Uyghurs have experienced a 
change of perception of their own identity in such circumstances as a result of the 
Xinjiang class. As the interviewee observed, because they were gathered as a small 
group, the difference between themselves and the rest of the Han students was 
highlighted. In this context, some moderate Muslims have to behave radically in order 
to be able to better integrate into the Muslim community, due to peer pressure and 
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group polarisation. As a consequence, most of them become more radical in terms of 
religious inclination than they were before entering the Xinjiang class. This echoes 
another interviewee (Zhang Lili 2016) at the Minzu University, who stated that 
because Uyghur students are targeted as the key for the stability maintenance work, 
once there is an incident in the city, they are among the first to have their movement 
in and out of the university is to be limited.99 These interviews demonstrate that the 
impact of the Xinjiang class on ethnic relations remains controversial.  
Language is another aspect that has been assigned special importance in the context 
of de-radicalisation. The bilingual education in Xinjiang has been criticised by Uyghur 
dissidents such as Rebiya Kadeer. She (2011, 3) accused the Chinese government of 
eradicating the “religion, language and identity” of “her people”. Ilshat Hassan, 
spokesperson of the World Uyghur Congress, claims that the Chinese government 
aims to eliminate the identity, tradition, and belief of the Uyghurs through bilingual 
education (Si 2015b). As discussed in Section 2.2.1, scholars such as Smith (2002) and 
Dwyer (2005) also believe that China’s assimilationist language policy contributes to 
the exacerbation of ethnic tensions.  
However, from the perspective of Chinese political elites and scholars, language is the 
very key to improving the employment rate of young Uyghurs, which in theory should 
lead to the appeasement of the socio-economic grievances of the Uyghurs in general. 
This perception echoes a quantitative study on the income gap between the Uyghur 
and the Han in Xinjiang which shows that the language barrier is one of the causes of 
the low employment rate among the Uyghurs (Jiabin Han and Yu 2009, 75). To 
improve the employability of the Uyghurs, in 2014, 530 million RMB was allocated for 
bilingual education and relevant training (L. Zhang 2014). Both financial and human 
resources have been allocated to improve the bilingual education in Xinjiang (X. Zhao 
2016). A local official refuted the allegation of assimilation that promoting national 
language is not a form of Han chauvinism (F. Chen 2015b). According to him, bilingual 
education reflects the responsibility of government regarding the prosperity of the 
ethnic groups.  
We implement bilingual education from the kindergarten level. From the 
end of last year, all the children above three years old must attend 
kindergarten, all fees exempted. Where it is insufficient I use the budget 
(F. Chen 2015b).  
The local government provides free bilingual education and officials believe that this it 
is the key to facilitating better communication between ethnic minorities and the Han 
majority, and thus the key to improving the employability of the former. This reflects 
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the officials’ condescending rationale that the government knows better than the 
minorities themselves and therefore it is entitled to coerce individuals to receive a 
public service that is likely to be bundled together with patriotic education that 
emphasises national unity. This coerced patriotic education might be one of the 
reasons for the resistance of the Uyghurs.  
The government’s efforts to improve integration are not focused on the Uyghurs 
alone. Local government also require their officials to learn local minority languages in 
order to ease the existing tensions between the Uyghur masses and the Han cadres. 
An official document requires government officials at all levels in Xinjiang to learn the 
local ethnic language (XUAR People’s Congress 1993)100. The governments at the local 
level are required to support the ethnic minorities to learn the national language in 
order to improve their ability to engage in social affairs (XUAR People’s Congress 
1993).  
From the analysis above, it can be seen that although Chinese political elites and 
scholars do not see economic growth alone as the solution to the socio-economic 
grievances of the Uyghurs, they attach great importance to equality and the 
employment of the Uyghurs. Local officials have sought to improve the inequalities by 
introducing preferential policies, vocational training and language training. However, 
such efforts do not always improve integration and social cohesion. They reflect the 
condescending rationale of government officials in dealing with ethnic relations which 
has mixed consequences. The preferential policies in terms of the College Entrance 
Exam may also be counter-productive because lower standards for college admission 
risk making the Uyghurs less competitive in the job market. In order to improve the 
employability of the Uyghurs, local governments have implemented a series of policies 
that involve both coercion and incentive mechanisms. Officials discuss these 
development efforts in the context of de-radicalisation, which indicates that they 
place employment at the core of de-radicalisation at the local level.  
5.7 Religious policy 
The discussion of China’s religious policy helps to understand Chinese political elites’ 
and intellectuals’ understanding of the impact of religion on national unity, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as their perception of “illegal religious 
activities”.  
The religious policy in China is based on the assumption of an absolute separation of 
religious affairs and politics (National People’s Congress 2004). As discussed in Section 
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4.3.3, Jiang Zemin (1993) was especially concerned with Western sympathisers and 
support for religious groups that are hostile to the CCP. Jiang believed that with the 
support of external hostile forces, domestic separatists develop their underground 
networks and compete for the leadership with patriotic believers. According to Jiang 
(1993), the interference in the executive, the judiciary, education, marriage and life 
have hindered the development of some regions. Worrying about the ability of 
religious groups such as Falun Gong to rally support from sympathetic groups and 
publications such as Amnesty International (2016), Freedom House (2015), and The 
Diplomat (Browde 2016), the CCP has always been concerned about the loyalty of 
religious groups within China. Although the Constitution advocates religious freedom 
for all, the CCP officially forbids Party members from adopting any religious faith 
according to the Marxist view on religion. Jiang (1993) required Communist party 
members to “firmly establish the Marxist outlook on religion” and fulfil their 
obligations to promote atheism. Xi (2016) emphasised this at the National Religious 
Work Conference in April 2016, stating that “Communist Party members must be firm 
Marxist atheists”. The following quote from Sang Linfeng (2016) illustrates the 
difference between “citizens” and “Party members”. It implies that by pledging loyalty 
to the Party, an individual chooses to agree with the Marxist understanding of religion, 
reject religion and promote atheism.  
Citizens have religious freedom, but party members must not believe in 
religion, they must not take part in religious activities. This is determined 
by the nature of the Party and the worldview of the Communists. 
Many observers outside China have accused the CCP of violating religious freedom 
based on it banning its the Party members from fasting during Ramadan which 
resulted in increased ethnic tensions (VOA 2015; RFA 2015). Alim Seitoff, 
spokesperson of the World Uyghur Congress, argues that the ban targets all of the 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang particularly those who receive pensions from the government 
(VOA 2015). A report by the Uyghur American Association (2013) pointed out that the 
ban actually affects all of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Human Rights China (Meng 2014) 
points out that the extension of the ban to the entire Uyghur population started after 
the Urumqi Riots in 2009, indicating the government’s attempt to contain the spread 
of terrorism by restricting religious activities.  
In a broader context, political elites and intellectuals are concerned about the impact 
of the growing religiosity of Muslims on radicalisation. Their concerns can be 
understood in the context of the development of Islam since the Cultural Revolution. 
The global Islamic resurgence in the 1970s and 1980s (Esposito 1992, 11) coincided 
with the last few years of the Cultural Revolutions in China (W. Yan 2006, 138). The 
Cultural Revolution was notorious for the suppression of religious practice. According 
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to Shichor (1994, 77), the Cultural Revolution “victimised Muslims, hurt their feelings, 
ridiculed their beliefs and customs and upset their institutions”. Bhattacharya (2003, 
371) suggests that during the Cultural Revolution, the CCP pursued a brutal policy of 
destroying non-Chinese cultures.  
The end of the Cultural Revolution was not only the end of suppressive religious 
policies but also a turning point for inter-ethnic relations. Islam boomed when the CCP 
attempted to remedy the worsened ethnic relations due to the repression of religion. 
According to Yan Wenhu’s (2006, 138) study, after the Third Plenary Session of the 
11th Central Committee of the CCP in 1979, Islamic practice was gradually brought 
back to normal. The CCP has rehabilitated the reputation of 7,000 Muslims, provided 
economic compensation, and recruited believers in the People’s Congress, the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and encouraged their participation 
in religious groups (W. Yan 2006, 138). 15 million RMB was allocated to rebuilding 
religious venues that were damaged during the Cultural Revolution (W. Yan 2006, 138). 
In the interim period of relaxation of religious policy, Islam was able to develop at a 
high rate. According to Ma Pinyan (2003, 74), currently the number of mosques has 
exceeded far exceeds the normal needs for religious activities, and the density of such 
buildings exceeds that in many countries that have a large Muslim population, 
including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Iran. Until 1998, there were 24,000 mosques 
in Xinjiang (P. Ma 2003, 74).  
 
Figure 19 Number of mosques per capita, adapted from Ma’s (2003, 74) data 
Besides the number of mosques, the extravagant architectural style of the mosques 
has raised concerns among Chinese officials regarding the influence of the Islam on 
the Chinese secular political system (State Bureau of Religious Affairs 2017). Zhang 
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Yantong, Vice-Director of the State Bureau of Religious Affairs, expressed his 
opposition to mosques “blindly copying” foreign architecture. Yang Faming, the Chair 
of the Islamic Association of China, maintains that the Association must guide the 
Muslim masses to understand the importance of sinicising Islam in China. “Islam can 
take root in China only if it adjust itself to the Chinese society and integrates into 
Chinese culture” (State Bureau of Religious Affairs 2017). 
Although the number and architectural style of the mosques along cannot explain the 
radicalisation of China’s Muslims, some Chinese scholars consider the sheer scale of 
the demand for so many mosques an indicator of the increased degree of religiosity of 
China’s Muslims. They believe that the Islamic revival across the world is associated 
with the evolution of international Islamic organisations such as the World Muslim 
Congress (Jie Chen and Zhang 2016, 74). The revival has notably been marked by an 
increase in the Muslim population from 43 million, or 17.06 % of the world’s 
population (Kettani 2010), to 1.6 billion, or 23.4% of the world population (Pew 
Research Center 2011). Interviews with several scholars at Peking University indicated 
that many of them are concerned about the growing assertiveness of Chinese Muslims 
in identifying themselves with the international Muslim community. In particular,  
Scholar B argued that there has been an apparent tendency to align with Arabian 
culture in western provinces such as Xinjiang and Ningxia which might be linked with 
external funding from Arabian countries for building mosques. 
In the broad context of Islamic revival, the CCP was cautious about religious freedom 
in general. Fearing that ideological infiltration through the channel of religion could be 
utilised by external hostile forces to undermine the CCP, political elites and scholars 
considered religious infiltration a “political question”, rather than a religious one 
(Zhiping Wang 2010, 59). Citing internal archives from the Headquarters of the 
Xinjiang Military Region, Yan Wenhu argues that from 1996 to 2000, Xinjiang saw 270 
terrorist attacks and armed conflicts supported by international hostile religious 
organisations (W. Yan 2004, 61–62). This figure clearly points to the government’s 
understanding of religious activities as something that must be strictly regulated to 
prevent contact with external enemies.  
In recent years, the CCP has further strengthened its control over religious affairs in 
response to the increasing Islamisation and politicisation of Islam. On 22 and 23 April 
2016, Xi Jinping and other members of the political bureau attended the National 
Religious Working Conference (Xinhua 2016c). Previous conferences had usually been 
chaired by the Bureau of Religious Affairs. The sudden “level-up” of the religious 
working conference reflects that the leadership were paying more attention to 
religious affairs and sought to mobilise community members – who are believers 
 
 
 
 
187 
themselves – to work towards national unity (Xinhua 2016c). In 2018, the former State 
Administration for Religious Affairs was dissolved and religious affairs were brought 
under the control of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China (Xinhua 2018a). The restructuring served to “adhere to 
the direction of the sinicisation of religion… and take active measures to adapt 
religions to suit socialist society” (Xinhua 2018a). 
In this context, Chinese political elites frame religious extremism as the distortion of 
religion and even blasphemy. In response, China’s de-radicalisation programmes are 
framed as the efforts to protect legal religious activities and religious freedom. As 
Shewket Imin, a member of the Standing Committee of the Xinjiang committee (Q. Cui 
and Wang 2016) puts it, 
Religious extremism is not religion, nor is it a religious sect. It is a group of 
political forces promoting religious extremism under the guise of religion. 
The nature of it is anti-human, anti-social, anti-civilisation and anti-religion. 
In Xinjiang, the ideological basis of violent terrorist activities is religious 
extremism.  
Although there is not been a widely agreed definition of religious extremism even 
within China, it is generally agreed that religion has been utilised as a tool to spread an 
extremist ideology aimed at a regime change to a theocracy. Ma Pinyan has written 
extensively on Chinese religious policy. He argues that under the guise of religion, 
religious extremism is a set of social ideological trends and theoretical framework 
aimed at creating a theocracy by distorting religious doctrine, and inciting and 
instigating religious fanaticism, through the use of extreme methods (S. Liu 2014).  
Based on the assumption of the relationship between religion and terrorism, Chinese 
political elites and scholars are particularly vigilant about “illegal religious activities” 
and their impact on stability in Xinjiang. Many Chinese scholars had elaborated cases 
of illegal religious activities in Xinjiang. Chen Chao (2009, 104) observes that in 
Southern Xinjiang villages where religious tradition prevails, atheist party members 
were isolated and even forced to convert to Islam by means of slander and threats. A 
survey conducted in the county of Shule in Southwest Xinjiang shows that of 293 Party 
members, 160 (54.6%) converted to Islam; and 83.3% of the senior members were 
converted (W. Yan 2006, 148). According to Li Jiansheng (2004b, 33), since the 1980s 
there have been 9,000 cases where believers interfere in state administration, the 
judicial system, education and the marriage registration systems. Li’s (2004b, 33) 
study shows that from June 1996 to June 2006, the number of underground religious 
students increased by 8.84 times, and 80% of them were still attending school. In 1998, 
1,320 people were investigated for “underground religious study”, 892 of whom were 
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involved in various kinds of illegal activities linked to ethno-nationalist separatism 
(Jiansheng Li 2004b, 33).  
Their research highlights the link between illegal religious activities and terrorism. The 
following quote from Li (2004b, 33–34) is an example of both diagnostic framing and 
prescriptive framing. It identifies “underground religious classes” as opportunity 
factors that enable individuals to move a step further towards terrorism, and calls for 
stricter measures to ban them:  
[A]s long as the underground religious classes and unregistered religious 
students are not banned, they will continue producing cadres who will 
organise illegal religious activities, and even the successors of the “three 
forces”, which will greatly jeopardise social stability.  
Yan Wenhu (2006, 148) provides a more detailed account of the impact of religious 
infiltration in education among younger generations. The following quote not only 
elaborates the extent to which religious activities have affected the secular state 
system but also indicates the connection between illegal activities and radicalisation 
among young people:  
What is worrying is that some of the Tarqas101 members offer basic 
religious courses in kindergartens organised by believers contravene state 
policies, claiming “we should influence children with religious belief, and 
plant a seed of belief in their heart”. Schools have become an important 
battlefield where we fight against ethno-nationalist separatism. Extremists 
and separatists believe that students and intellectuals are the future of the 
“East Turkistan”. This is why they have intensified the ideological 
infiltration among university and college students and teachers. Many 
universities and colleges in Kashgar, Khotan, and Aksu witnessed students 
disseminating reactionary books and pamphlets and reproducing audio-
visual products. Some students even publicly wrote and disseminated 
reactionary pamphlets, articles and audio-visual products. Some teachers 
and staff supported and orchestrated these activities overtly or covertly. 
Islamic extremist separatists instil in these young students and teachers 
the so-called state of “East Turkistan”, “pan-Turkism”, and “pan-Islamism”, 
and lead them astray so that they would be the cat’s paw of violent 
incidents… Some students, influenced by the separatist propaganda, 
boycotted official education, and even participated in ethno-nationalist 
separatist activities, and became the cadres. Some students openly called 
the Xinjiang area in the Chinese map the “East Turkistan Republic”. In 
some schools in South Xinjiang, [we] often see middle school and primary 
school students writing reactionary poems and diary. Some teachers even 
                                                      
101 A tarqa is a school of Sufism that emphasises the mystical teaching and spiritual practices 
in seeking of Haqiqa (ultimate truth), brought to China in the 17th century (T. Ma 1989, 
117).  
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hold a concurrent post as an Imam. Reactionary propaganda and its 
infiltration among schools have greatly corrupted school students. Some 
students are increasingly affected by ethno-nationalist extremism. A 
student in Kashgar said he wanted to piss and shit on Han Chinese, “[I] 
want to fight the moment I see a Han student”. According to a survey, in 
recent two years, in Khotan area, 47 teachers were involved in separatist 
organisations, 380 teachers were involved in illegal religious activities. 
Among underground religious students investigated by the Xinjiang Public 
Security Departments, most are school students. In May 2003, Xinjiang 
security departments have uncovered a case in which a terrorist network 
led by Alapati Aierken instigated university students to go abroad to 
receive terrorist training. This case involved 23 people from universities 
including Xinjiang University (W. Yan 2006, 148).  
The narrative in Yan’s study clearly depicts a threatening scene where the religious 
outreach has begun to challenge the foundation of the rule of the CCP. His description 
of ethnic hatred reflects the anxiety among intellectuals about radicalisation among 
young generations of Uyghurs. The following assumptions can be identified from the 
quote.  
• Uyghur parents who are devout Muslims themselves may interfere in their 
children’s education by resisting secular education provided by the 
government.  
• Schools are ideological battlefields in which frames compete for legitimacy. In 
response to the enemies’ propaganda, the government must promote its 
correct ideology.  
• Enemies seek to influence young generations of Uyghurs by infiltrating China’s 
education system.  
• Framing Xinjiang as “East Turkistan Republic” is a sign of radicalisation. 
• Those aligned with the enemies’ framing receive training abroad.  
These assumptions reflect the fact that the threat posed by believers has been 
overstated by the government to justify its indoctrination. As religion is an essential 
part of the Uyghur identity, it is un likely that parents will bring up their children 
without any influence on their choice between religion and atheism of the latter. The 
assumption about schools as battlefields has changed the function of education from 
informing to indoctrinating. The friend/enemy distinction and the label “East Turkistan 
Republic” have served to reconfigure the political discourse in order to justify the 
marginalisation of religion.  
The sensitivity about the framing of Xinjiang is in line with the assumption that “East 
Turkistan” can only be understood as a geographic concept, and the politicisation of 
the terms poses a challenge to the regime (discussed in Section 4.1.3). The quote also 
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indicates that radicalised students receive “terrorist” training abroad. Although the 
author does not provide details about this, it is likely that he is referring to the East 
Turkistan Education and Solidarity Association which is known to have provided 
“scholarship” for Uyghur students to prepare them for joining the East Turkistan 
Islamic Movement (Qiu 2013). 
The government’s stringent control clashes with Islam. The government was 
concerned that the religious extremists were “coercing” women into wearing the veil, 
while the Uyghur activists were concerned with the government’s policy of “coercing” 
women to take off the veil (Meng 2013). Indoctrinating patriotism into believers 
through coercive measures may result in resistance among devout Muslims. Dissident 
Meng Yuanpei (2013) argues that requiring believers to be “patriotic” itself is a 
distortion of religion. Some human rights organisations and scholars outside China 
believe the label “illegal religious activities” is used to justify “religious oppression 
policies” against what they see as “peaceful criticism, dissent or dissatisfaction” 
(Boehm 2009, 94; Becquelin 2004a, 41; Amnesty International 2004, 5; Human Rights 
Watch 2005, 6). 
The confusion caused by labelling certain religious practices as “illegal religious 
activities” is also questioned within China. To clarify the concept, Li Jiansheng (2004a, 
32) advocates a two-fold definition: Type 1) interfering with the secular legal system, 
such as building mosques without formal formalities and not registering marriages 
and divorces in the administrative system;102 and Type 2) illegal activities that use 
religion to disguise other criminal offences. According to Li, Type 1) can be categorised 
as a “contradiction among the people”, and cases of Type 1) usually falls under the 
Marriage Law, the Land Administration Law, the Regulation on the Administration of 
Publishing, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Assemblies, Processions and 
Demonstrations, or the Regulations on Administration of Sites for Religious Activities. 
Treating them as a “contradiction among the people” shows that Li is aware that some 
of these cases could have been caused by a lack of knowledge about state laws and 
regulations, rather than deliberate resistance to authority.  
On the other hand, cases of Type 2 may involve both a “contradiction among the 
people” and a “contradiction between ourselves and the enemy”. These cases usually 
                                                      
102 Some Muslims tend to follow the Islamic tradition in holding weddings and funerals and do 
not register at the state’s administration system. This may impede the government’s 
ability to keep a record of demographic information. Without the record in the 
household system (户口制度), the government loses the track of many aspects of 
individuals’ life, such as how many houses can an individual purchase, and which school 
their children go to. It may also result in polygamy and child marriage.   
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fall under the Criminal Law or the Regulations on the Administrative Penalties for 
Public Security. Li (2004a, 32) believes that these cases are, in essence, political, given 
that such activities are often “manipulated” and “utilised” by ethno-nationalist 
separatists. The categorisation according to Mao’s idea of two types of contradictions 
indicates Li’s rationale in identifying “friends” and “enemies”. First, as discussed in 
Section 4.2.1, the categorisation justifies the different treatment based on the 
perception of the friend/enemy distinction, which contravenes the principle of 
equality before the law. Second, in the Chinese legal system, the penalty may vary 
according to the “circumstances” of the offence, as discussed in Section 5.3.2, which 
places pressure on the judiciary the pressure to maintain justice by correctly 
identifying the “circumstances”. Third, the judiciary follows the principle of 
“combining leniency with severe punishment”, and in the context of counter-
terrorism, some cases are subject to a “severe penalty” simply because of the alleged 
link with terrorism.103 This may also result in a violation of the equality principle and 
undermine due process.  
Some scholars believe that the cases that Li categorises as Type 2 should not be 
considered as “religious activities” at all due to their political nature. According to Ma 
Pinyan (P. Ma 2003, 73), if religion is only used to disguise the nature of the activity, 
then this activity cannot be defined as “illegal religious activity”. He identifies the 
following cases as “purely political activities”.  
• cultivating separatists and counterrevolutionary cadres in the name of religion 
• causing disturbances, and inciting the masses who are ignorant of the facts to 
have an illegal assembly and demonstrations, assaulting and robbing the Party, 
political, military, and public security departments in the name of religion 
• undermining ethnic solidarity and challenging national unity in the name of 
religion (P. Ma 2003, 73). 
In addition, Ma proposes that the fundamental difference between politically 
motivated activities and genuine religious activities is whether the believer is seeking 
to seize power and realise religious rule. Ma argues that we should pay attention not 
only to what the ideology says, but also to what it does; as long as it goal is the regime, 
it is not a matter of religion, but a matter of politics (S. Liu 2014).  
Although he attempts to separate politically motivated cases from purely religious 
activities, his criteria for identifying the political nature of the cases are still vague. 
Many activities can be interpreted as political in the Chinese political context, such as 
posting a video of kindergarten children reciting the Quran, using the halal logo on 
                                                      
103 combining leniency with severe punishment: 宽严相济 
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daily necessities such as water, paper, toothpaste and cosmetics, and using Arabic 
script on road signs. These cases are interpreted as signs of radicalisation in China (Ye 
2016b). Using Ma’s criteria, these cases can be considered as politically motivated and 
thus should be regulated, which clearly reflects the obsession with keeping every 
aspect of life under control.  
Scholars are aware of the deficiencies of the current policies that control religion as a 
political issue. Ma recognises the risk of blurring the boundary between a “religious 
issue” and a “political issue”. He is concerned that not making an distinction between 
politically motivated incidents disguised as religious activities and genuine religious 
activities puts the legitimacy of China’s counter-terrorism strategy at risk and feeds 
into the sentiment that separatists use to recruit sympathisers, which is the very aim 
of separatists (P. Ma 2003, 73). Furthermore, Feng Xiaozhi (2014) points out that 
criminalising all religious activities outside state-sanctioned religious venues 
contravenes the commitment to religious freedom written in the Constitution.  
However, undoubtedly, it is not always easy to draw a clear-cut line between religious 
activities and politics. For example, in many cases, an unregistered religious school is 
used as a venue for separatist and terrorist activities (Jiansheng Li 2004a, 33). Using 
Li’s categorisation, starting a religious school without registration is categorised as 
Type 1, while carrying out separatist and terrorism activities is categorised as Type 2. 
According to an estimation based on internal data, in 1998, among 1,320 unregistered 
religious students, 892 were involved in separatist criminal offences (Jiansheng Li 
2004a, 33). This concern is also seen in officials’ statements. According to Zhang 
Xiuming (2009, 142), former Secretary of the Central Politics and Legal Affairs 
Commission, from 1999, many of the underground religious schools have become the 
venues for terrorism.  
Data from China Judgements Online provide some information on the judgements 
regarding of illegal religious activities. Following several terror attacks in 2014, there 
was a major crackdown on illegal religious activities in 2015. According to the 
judgements available online, among all the cases involving illegal religious activities 
from November 2013 to January 2017, 29.63% were criminal cases, and 19% took 
place in Xinjiang. and 48% of these cases were judged in 2015, coinciding roughly with 
the one-year Strike Hard campaign against terrorism. In some cases, illegal religious 
activities are indeed closely connected to terrorism. In the case of Abudujielili 
Maitinasier, illegal religious activity refers to renting a house to store terrorist 
property – remote-controlled bombs (Higher People’s Court of Xinjiang Uygur 2014). 
In the case of Aini Aisan, it refers to watching and listening to violent terrorist video 
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and audio, terrorist training, inciting attacks on patriotic believers, and assign others 
to carry out terror attacks (Higher People’s Court of Xinjiang Uygur 2015). 
 
Figure 20 Number of cases involving illegal religious activities, created with data from 
China Judgements Online 
The anxiety about illegal religious activities among political elites and intellectuals is 
translated into various policies that tighten the control over religion. Local 
governments’ interpretation of the policy made by the central authorities 
demonstrates how the guidelines made at the state level can be translated into heavy-
handed regulations at the local level. Local authorities make more specific regulations 
based on the guideline provided at the state level, according to the local 
circumstances. On 19 March 1996, the central authority released the Memo of the 
Political Bureau on the Stability Maintenance of Xinjiang, also known as No.7 
Document of the Central Government, which targets illegal religious activities to be the 
major threat to the stability of Xinjiang. This document is no longer circulated on 
government websites, but its influence remains, as evidenced by the references made 
to it in other official documents (Organisation Department of the Communist Party of 
China 1996) and by Wang Lequan, former Party Secretary of Xinjiang (CCTV 2008). This 
document is the first attempt to clarify the concepts of “illegal religion” and 
“reactionary religious groups and forces” (CCTV 2008). It outlaws all religious activities 
that violate the state Constitution, laws, regulations, policies, ordinances, and rules at 
both the levels of the state and autonomous regions (Xiaoxia Li 2015).  
On 14 June 2017, the State Council passed the amended Regulations on Religious 
Affairs based on the 2005 version. The amended version increases the power of the 
government in regard to keeping track of religious groups, schools, venues, personnel, 
activities, and property (see State Council 2017). In essence the Regulations further 
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reinforced the dichotomy between legal and illegal religious activities laid out in the 
No.7 Document. 
According to Article 63 of the Legislation Law (People’s Congress 2015), the provincial 
People’s Congress shall enact local decrees according to the specific conditions of the 
jurisdiction. In 2013, the Xinjiang local government released Several Opinions on 
Governing Illegal Religious Activities and Curbing the Infiltration of Religious 
Extremism (Provisional) to guide counter-terrorism practice (The Party Committee 
General Office of the XUAR and The People’s Government of the XUAR 2014). In 
accordance with the Opinions, local governments issued various documents with the 
aim of addressing the question of how to identify “illegal” and “extremist” religious 
activities. Two documents were published, in 1997 and 2011, both of which were  
entitled Opinions on Defining Illegal Religious Activities, but only the one published in 
2011 can be found on the government website as part of another document, also 
known as the 26 Forms of Illegal Religious Activities (The Party Committee General 
Office of the XUAR and The People’s Government of the XUAR 2014). The translation 
of this document can be found in Appendix 2.  
What is new in this document is that offences that were previously regarded as 
interference in the secular administrative system can now be punished under the Anti-
Terrorism Law. Although the document clarifies that there might be cases in which the 
circumstances are relatively minor and do not constitute a criminal offence, the cases 
shall still be handled under the Anti-Terrorism Law and the Law of the Public Security 
Administration Punishments Law.  
Similarly, Turpan Prefectural Administrative Office published the “21 bans” based on 
the National Security Law, the Criminal Law, the Marriage Law, the Law of the 
Penalties for Administration of Public Security, the Administrative Penalties Law, and 
the Regulation on Religious Affairs (Tulufan Prefectural Administrative Office 2013). 
Another document published on the government website of United Front in Xinjiang 
lists 75 manifestations of “extremist religious activities”, starting with a declaration 
that “religious extremism is not religion”. In 2017, the Ordinances on De-radicalisation 
in XUAR (People’s Congress 2017) listed 15 manifestations of radicalisation that are 
banned, based on the Constitution, the Anti-Terrorism Law, and the Regulation on 
Religious Affairs. The translation of this document can be found in Appendix 1.  
Combined with the broad definition of terrorism and the wide range of legal liabilities 
outlined in the Anti-Terrorism Law, as discussed in Section 5.3, these documents 
target a wide range of religious practices as signs of radicalisation and have resulted in 
further expansion of the state’s power in terms of regulating religion by putting it in 
the context of counter-terrorism.  
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It is worth noting that many of these documents are not available on the government 
websites. Some of those that were once published have been deleted. A possible 
reason for this is that government officials realise that these documents are 
controversial, given that the published documents are always subject to criticism by 
dissidents and human rights groups abroad. However, based on the observation and 
interviews in Xinjiang, these documents were circulated. In particular, political 
departments (XUAR Party School 2017) and schools (Xinjiang Police College 2017; 
Xinjiang Normal College 2017) were active in studying and promulgating the 
Ordinances on De-radicalisation in XUAR. 
Other evidence also shows the extent to which these documents were circulated. A 
memo on a the “Religious Policy and Regulations Study Month” at the XPCC shows 
that 1,200 copies of the 26 Forms of Illegal Religious Activities were disseminated in 
the army, schools and religious venues within the first quarter of 2012 (Bureau of 
Religious Affairs of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation 2012).  
Despite limited access to the official de-radicalisation documents online, the attempts 
to identify specific manifestations of religious extremism have caused a firestorm of 
criticism among Uyghur activists and dissents outside China. As discussed above, the 
Chinese government’s attempts to identify “illegal religious activities” are sometimes 
interpreted as the repression of “peaceful criticism, dissent or dissatisfaction” (Boehm 
2009, 94; Becquelin 2004a, 41; Amnesty International 2004, 5; Human Rights Watch 
2005, 6). However, as the discussion of the scholarly works on the growing religiosity 
shows, scholars provide sufficient evidence for the government to tighten its control 
over religion. Therefore, in the eyes of political elites and intellectuals, these policies 
are a response to, rather than the cause of, radicalisation.  
Among other criticisms, Chinese scholars reject the criticism of China’s ban on the 
Jilbab.104 They point out the complexity of the situation in Xinjiang and the fact that 
other states, including Western countries, have banned the burqa. Article 9(7) of the 
Ordinances on de-radicalisation in XUAR (People’s Congress 2017) stipulates wearing 
or forcing others to wear the Jilbab is a sign of radicalisation. Dilxat Raxit, 
spokesperson of the World Uyghur Congress, states that the ban on the full-face 
Islamic veil is “a typical discriminatory measure…which add[s] to an increasing 
                                                      
104 Jilbab is a kind of long outer garment worn by some Uyghur women. The Chinese 
official media use it to refer to the black enveloping garment that covers the entire 
body except the eyes (People’s Daily Online 2014b) which is known as burqa in many 
Western countries. 
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confrontation between Uighurs and Beijing” (Agence France-Press in Beijing 2014). For 
Chinese officials, women wearing the full-face veil and men having beards implicate a 
social phenomenon that is much more complicated than the debate over religious 
freedom; rather, these symbols are used as a vehicle for the spread of extremism (F. 
Chen 2015d). Undoubtedly, most people do not intend to influence others in terms of 
wearing the Jilbab, and doing so is merely an act of piety. However, Chinese analysts 
believe that extremists have been entrenching the dichotomy between Han and 
Uyghurs by using appearance as a symbol of resistance (F. Chen 2015d). According to 
Pan Zhiping, many Western countries – including Belgium, France and the Netherlands 
and Germany – have enacted laws or regulations to ban Jilbab, while at the same time 
they judge other countries for having similar provisions. Chinese scholars believe that 
such an act reflects their hypocrisy and double standards (Shuangcheng Ji et al. 2015). 
5.8 Conclusion  
This chapter provided an overview of China’s counter-terrorism approach by 
examining several key aspects of its counter-terrorism strategy. The discourse, policy 
and practice in the context of China’s counter-terrorism strategy reflect China’s quest 
for legitimacy, as evidenced by its focus on state security. China’s counter-terrorism 
institution is designed to ensure, first and foremost, the security of the regime, which 
is constructed as a precondition for the prosperity of different ethnic groups in the big 
family of the Chinese nation. This assumption allows the CCP to reconfigure its 
political discourse to justify its heavy-handed counter-terrorism approach.  
China’s counter-terrorism strategy is guided by a set of overall principles regarding its 
security policy. These principles have been developed overtime by different 
generations of political leaders, and reflect a shift from a state-centric security outlook 
to a human-oriented one. However, China’s counter-terrorism policy and practice 
have demonstrated that such a shift remains normative. Under Xi, although China’s 
security agenda has sought to include almost everything, the counter-terrorism 
agenda has clear targets, which are any threat to national unity, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, all of which concerns mainly concern the state. On the other hand, 
the normative commitment cannot be dismissed entirely, as it demonstrates the 
struggle within the Party to balance the internal suppression of separatist movements 
and the external pressure to conform to international norms.  
A close examination of the political discourse of counter-terrorism reveals that the 
CCP’s framing of terrorism has been developed from the old friend/enemy distinction 
between “us” and the West. The latter is often portrayed as the source of instability in 
many Third World countries, which has resulted in chaos and conflicts that incubate 
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terrorism. The CCP is deeply concerned about the unauthorised use of force in the 
name of humanitarian intervention by the West, for fear that such interventions in 
other parts of the world may encourage the Uyghurs to seek help from the West. In 
the eyes of Chinese political elites and intellectuals, Uyghur exiled communities, 
human rights activists and some Western scholars, sometimes even backed up by 
Western governments, share the same political agenda of undermining the legitimacy 
of the CCP. In order to shore up its legitimacy, the CCP believes that “correct guidance” 
(read indoctrination) is necessary.  
Stability maintenance is an important part of the prevention mechanism in China’s 
counter-terrorism strategy. The CCP has developed various political slogans to guide 
practice. An examination of these slogans reveals that the current political discourse 
regarding stability maintenance has become more comprehensive and covers every 
aspects of people’s lives. The government has demonstrated its presence not only in 
the realm of politics but also in the realm of culture. The requirement to identify with 
the Chinese culture reflects the CCP’s hierarchical understanding of ethnic relations, 
wherein the national identity comes before ethnic identity.  
A legal framework has been developed to allow the CCP to cooperate with 
international organisations and other states internationally, and to provide legal 
ground for the designation and trial of terrorists domestically. The friction between 
justice and the government’s paranoia is highlighted in the context of the vagueness 
of the definition of terrorism and the broad range of activities that can be punished 
under China’s Anti-Terrorism Law. First, the revision of the definition of terrorism 
reflects a certain degree of willingness to move away from legalising the violation of 
freedom of thought. However, the current definition is still too broad to prevent the 
power of the executive from targeting political opponents whom the CCP deems as a 
threat. Second, nonfeasance offences can be punished under the Anti-Terrorism Law, 
which illustrates the potential overlapping of the functions of different laws. The 
punishment and the media report of these cases serve to alert ordinary citizens and 
constantly reminding them that everyone could be the target of the Anti-Terrorism 
Law if they fail to abide by these stringent regulations.  
Domestically, the inclusion of various social institutions, such as village committee and 
residents’ committee as important partners for counter-terrorism reflects an attempt 
to combine the mass line with the highly state-centric counter-terrorism strategy. 
Under Xi, the reemphasis of the mass line has encouraged policy-makers to co-opt 
with the grassroots in order to gain public support. Internationally, the cooperation 
with other, mainly SCO countries, has demonstrated the CCP’s willingness and ability 
to rally international support based on shared interests of anti-separatism.  
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Chinese political elites and scholars believe that development is the key to addressing 
non-traditional security threats. Linking instability to underdevelopment, the 
government has initiated various projects to boost Xinjiang’s economy. Such efforts 
have had mixed consequences. While GPD has soared, inequalities have also 
increased, particularly between the Han and ethnic minorities. Despite the various 
preferential policies in favour of the ethnic minorities, the assimilationist assumption 
that underwrites China’s integration model has exacerbated the already existing 
divisions between the Han and the Uyghurs. In this context, policies designed to 
improve employability through education and language training have raised some 
concerns among the Uyghurs about the assimilationist agenda to eliminate their 
culture.  
Chinese political elites and intellectuals have always been concerned about the ability 
of religious groups to collude with the sympathetic groups in the West to interfere 
with China’s domestic affairs. China has implemented a strict secularism which 
requires all of the Party members to be Marxist atheists. The CCP claims to protect the 
legal rights of religious believers in terms of their “normal” religious needs, and 
severely punishes “illegal religious activities”. The official criteria for the latter are 
extremely vague, and the analysis of the discourse surrounding “illegal religious 
activities” reveals that this perceived threat is, to a large extent, overstated to justify 
the control over religious practice.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
199 
Chapter 6 Mass Line and mass mobilisation 
Those who won the hearts of the people will win the world, while those 
who lost the hearts of the people will lose the world (Xi 2013).105 
The Mass Line strategy is key to the quest for legitimacy in China’s counter-terrorism 
approach. The above quote reflects Xi Jinping’s concern for mass support and the 
legitimacy of the CCP. The idea that legitimacy is rooted in mass support came from 
Mencius (Also known as Mengzi), an ancient philosopher whose status is only second 
to Confucius. This idea was theorised by Mao in the form of the Mass Line strategy, 
which was crucial to his revolution in China. This section discusses how the current 
leadership has reused this idea for mass mobilisation in the context of counter-
terrorism.  
The Mass Line approach has been conceptualised as one of the defining features of 
contemporary Chinese political thought. Initially raised by Li Lisan and theorised by 
Mao Zedong (W. Tang 2016, 5), the Mass Line approach is designed to reflect the 
Party’s commitment to “serve the people wholeheartedly”. Mao developed his theory 
of the Mass Line based on Marxist epistemology. The Chinese variation of Marxism 
focuses heavily on the interpretation of the role of the masses as makers of history. 
Mao connected the role of the masses with the Marxist view that knowledge should 
be tested through practice. Mao believed that the opinions of the masses should be 
gathered to inform the knowledge of the leaders and reflected in the policy-making 
process, and the policy made based on the knowledge gained from the masses should 
be tested among the masses, and this cycle should be repeated to enrich the 
knowledge of the leaders and to serve the people better (Z. Mao 1991b, 899) 
The idea of the Mass Line approach came to maturity at the 7th National Congress on 
24 April 1945, when Mao ascribed the uniqueness of the CCP to its close ties with the 
broadest masses of the people (Z. Mao 1945). Mao’s follower Liu Shaoqi further 
expounded the Mass Line approach and enshrined it as the “basic political line” of the 
Party (Central committee of documentation 2004). However, the death of Mao 
Zedong in 1976 brought a series of political changes in the Chinese political circles, 
including the end of the Cultural Revolution and the rehabilitation of those who had 
been unjustly persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. Within the Party, the 
reflections over Mao’s mistakes during the Cultural Revolution led to a debate in the 
Chinese political circles on Mao’s achievements and mistakes. Ultimately, the 
“Resolution on Certain Historical Questions since the Founding of the People's 
                                                      
105 Xi Jinping’s speech at the Party's Mass Line Education Practices Working Conference, 
adapted from Mencius 
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Republic of China” (CCP 1981) passed at the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1981 established that Mao is central to 
contemporary Chinese political thought. This Resolution established that the Mass 
Line is one of the “living soul” of the Mao Zedong Thought, the other two parts being 
seeking truth from facts and independence (China Daily 2013). 
A revival of the Mass Line approach has been seen under the current President, Xi 
Jinping. In June 2013, the Chinese government launched a one-year Mass Line 
campaign to “boost ties between CPC officials, members and the people” (Xinhua 
2013). At the Party's Mass Line Education Practices Working Conference, Xi revisited 
the Mass Line and re-emphasised that the close ties with the masses are what 
differentiates the CCP from all other political parties, the ties with the masses are the 
reasons for the progress of the party, and therefore the Mass Line approach is 
decisive in the success of the cause of the Party (Leading group of the Party´s Mass 
Line Education Practices 2013).  
Some observers argue that this top-down political movement is likely to be a response 
to the socio-economic grievances that threaten the legitimacy of the government in 
an era of economic slowdown. According to Heath (2013), the Mass Line education 
campaign can be seen as a “major effort to realign party leadership and theoretical 
concepts with structural changes in the political economy that is likely to persist 
through much of Xi’s tenure”. Tiezzi (2013b) points out that the Party is more 
concerned with legitimacy rather than according the people power and it could turn 
into a “mass dictatorship”.106 He also argues that the revival of the Mass Line 
approach is not a return to the Mao era, but a vehicle that Xi uses to promote his own 
legacy of Core Socialist Values.  
Regardless of what the real aim behind the revival of the Mass Line approach is, it is 
clear that the it has become a distinct rival ideology that the CCP proposes as an 
alternative to liberal democracy, which differentiates China from other surviving 
authoritarian regimes (Xi Chen 2012, 89). Xi is acutely aware of the benefit of the 
Mass Line approach in securing legitimacy. He frames the Mass Line as the “lifeline” 
and the “fundamental principle” of the party (Jingyue Xu and Zhou 2013). The 
following quote shows his understanding of mass support as a source of legitimacy for 
the CCP.  
People’s support concerns the life and death of the Party. Only by linking 
the heart, breath and destiny of the Party with the people, and always 
relying on the people to move forward in the history, can the Party be 
strong as a rock (Jingyue Xu and Zhou 2013). 
                                                      
106 mass dictatorship: 群众专政 
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The combination of the Mass Line approach and China’s security strategy has given 
birth to some security principles designed to create a sense of participation among 
ordinary citizens. The evolution of China’s security strategy described below 
demonstrates a shift in the government’s attitude towards de-centralisation. 107 
The founding of the National Security Commission headed by Xi Jinping at the third 
plenary session of the 18th National Congress in 2013 marked the further 
institutionalisation of the security strategy under Xi. The new commission aims to 
establish a “centralised, unified, highly efficient, and authoritative national security 
system” (CCTV 2014). In such a highly centralised system, the role of ordinary citizens 
may be easily omitted. The evolving nature of security threats, as highlighted by the 
9/11 attacks, urged the CCP to reform its security policy, starting with its the 
discourse, and slowly moving towards its practice. Against this backdrop, Xi advocated 
the Overall Security Outlook, which, at face value, echoes the concept of human 
security in the Western context, calling for a “human-oriented” approach to security 
(CCTV 2014), as discussed in Section 5.1. This principle resonates with the Mass Line 
approach in two aspects: a) national security is for the benefit of the masses; and b) 
national security relies on the masses (CCP 1981). 
The embodiment of the Mass Line approach in China’s counter-terrorism policy is 
most pronounced in the discourse of the People’s War on Terror. In line with the 
Party's Mass Line Education Practices Activities, Zhang Chunxian called for 
improvements in the party’s ability in regard to propagandising, educating, organising, 
and serving the masses, uniting all ethnic groups in a People’s War on Terror (People’s 
Daily Online 2013). The rationale was that the Mass Line approach would enable the 
CCP to fully mobilise the people, and thus contribute to the “consolidation of the 
foundation of national security” (G. Zhong 2017). Governments at all levels are 
required to “contact the masses strategically”, and organise, mobilise, educate, and 
guide the masses, in order to reinforce the momentum of the “people’s war on 
radicalisation” (Z. Zhu 2017, 2). 
Since the 18th National Congress in 2012, Xi Jinping has always emphasised the 
importance of the Mass Line approach. He calls it the “magic weapon” - “no matter 
how the situation develops, the magic weapons of the people’s war can never be 
abandoned” (Y. Han 2017). At the Politburo’s 14th collective study session in 2014, Xi 
Jinping brought the Mass Line approach into the counter-terrorism discourse (Xinhua 
2014b). His speech manifested the two aspects of the human-oriented security 
                                                      
107 Considering the limitations of a single-party regime and the CCP’s anxiety about keeping 
security under control, the attempts to de-centralise its security policy have been very 
limited.  
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approach. On the one hand, he emphasised that the Chinese national counter-
terrorism policy is for the benefit of the masses by linking counter-terrorism practice 
with the vital interests of the people. According to him, the counter-terrorism practice 
should aim at not only territorial integrity and social stability, but also “the happiness 
of the people” (Xinhua 2014b).  
In addition to security for the people, he emphasised that the Chinese counter-
terrorism policy relies on the masses, in other words, security by the people. Given the 
clandestine nature of terrorist networks, Xi believes that it is important to organise 
various forms of activities to mobilise the masses to participate in the prevention of 
terrorism and security governance. To this end, Xi proposed to build “copper ramparts 
and iron walls” out of the people and make terrorists “rats scurrying across a street”, 
with everybody shouting “beat them” (Xinhua 2014b).  
The metaphor of rats demonstrates the importance of the political context and 
historical continuities in which counter-terrorism discourse is embedded. Firstly, the 
metaphor of rats is symbolic in the Chinese political context. It evokes memories of 
“Eliminating the Four Pests” and the social structure in which ordinary citizens are 
empowered to fight against the enemy designated by the state.108 The Eliminating the 
Four Pests was a political movement that aimed at eliminating rats, flies, mosquitoes, 
and sparrows to prevent the transmission of pestilence and disease in the early 1960s. 
The “rat” metaphor is not necessarily used for its effects in evoking such memories – 
new generations might share little collective memory with those who experienced the 
Eliminating the Four Pests movement. However, it saves political elites the trouble of 
inventing phrases that are as mobilising as the “rat” metaphor (Orwell 1968, 130).  
Secondly, framing terrorists as “rats” helps reduce fear, as rats were constructed as 
something that could easily be defeated by ordinary citizens during the Eliminating 
the Four Pests movement. By comparing “terrorists” with something ordinary citizens 
might encounter in everyday life, Xi has turned “terrorism” into something that the 
public is more familiar with, thus reducing the fear caused by terrorist attacks, and 
encouraging the participation of ordinary citizens in counter-terrorism. In doing so, 
the metaphor of the rats helps the masses make sense of the reality that otherwise 
would be too horrible for them to understand, and develop a coping mechanism 
accordingly. The metaphor dehumanises “terrorists” and rejects the possibility that 
there might by a completely rational reason behind their seemingly insane behaviour. 
Thirdly, the use of the rat metaphor normalises the official accounts of terrorist 
incidents and the underlying friend/enemy distinction. When ordinary citizens adopt 
                                                      
108 Eliminating the Four Pests: 除四害 
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the rat metaphor, they unwittingly reinforce the dichotomy between friends and 
enemies and contribute to the political climate in which citizens are encouraged to 
identify the enemy within. 109 Turning ordinary citizens into intelligence collecting 
agencies may create a police state where it is very dangerous to sympathise with the 
separatist cause, considering the vague definition of terrorism and the broad scope of 
the Anti-Terrorism Law.  
Comparing the current counter-terrorism discourse with the Eliminating the Four 
Pests movement can help explain the “Great Round-up”.110 The Eliminating the Four 
Pests movement was also framed as a “People’s War”. It mobilised almost the entire 
population to a shocking extent, whereby participating in the killing of “four pests” 
became a way to maintain social bonds, and those who did not participate became 
“abnormal”, and might be isolated from others in the society. Although the political 
context in China has changed greatly under Xi (see discussion in Section 4.2), the 
following case provides a vivid illustration of the degree of mobilisation among the 
public.  
A violent incident took place on 28 July 2014 in Shache County in Xinjiang. Police 
stations and government offices were attacked by knife and axes wielding attackers. 
The state media framed the incident as a terrorist attack (Bai 2014). In the immediate 
aftermath of this incident, the state media was filled with reports about how over 
30,000 volunteers, who were ordinary citizens, had helped the local police to round 
up and capture the suspects in Karakax County. Later, during the investigation into the 
incident, over 70 local residents were reported to have provided tip-offs to facilitate 
the operation (Bai 2014; Xinhua 2014f).  
This case, as well as the propaganda associated with it through reports in the 
mainstream media, demonstrates the government’s intention to facilitate a transition 
of the role of the people in the counter-terrorism strategy – to turn the masses from 
the beneficiaries of the counter-terrorism policy into participants if the counter-
terrorism practice (Xinhua 2014f). This case is a result of the discourse of the People’s 
War on Terror, and it also contributes to reinforcing this discourse. According to Mei 
Jianming, the participation of the public in the war on terror is an integral part of the 
overall counter-terrorism strategy (Xinhua 2015b). In the briefing after the 
investigation, Zhang Chunxian re-emphasised Xi Jinping’s rat metaphor, and the need 
to rely on and mobilise the ordinary citizens to form a “mighty ocean of people’s war” 
(Dai 2014). 
                                                      
109 This often happens when individuals, especially government officials at the local level and 
students, are required to submit a reading/study note of state policies.  
110 Great Round-up: 大围捕 
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The Mass Line has been written into the Anti-Terrorism Law since 2014. Article 4 of 
the first draft law stipulates that state counter-terrorism organs shall combine 
“specialised efforts” (work done by counter-terrorism experts, practitioners, 
government officials and so on) with the Mass Line approach. The phrase “combining 
specialised efforts with the Mass Line” has been created as an abbreviation for this 
approach. To this end, the government shall rely on and mobilise “all the state organs, 
armed forces, social organisations, enterprises and public institutions, villagers’ 
(neighbourhood) committees and individuals” (The National People’s Congress of the 
People’s Republic of China 2014) as discussed in Section 5.4.1.  
In the first draft of the law, the focus in terms of the role of the public was placed on 
raising their awareness regarding the understanding of terrorism, and equipping them 
with relevant knowledge. At this stage, the public were not expected to do more than 
demonstrate a “correct” understanding of terrorism. According to Article 14, different 
departments would educate the public to equip them with the knowledge they would 
need in the face of terrorism. Some sectors, such as education, religion and 
propaganda departments, were required to guide the public on counter-terrorism. For 
example, schools were to include emergency drills into their curricula, and develop 
students’ knowledge on the Anti-Terrorism Law and the skills needed to prevent 
terrorism; ethnic and religious administrative bodies were required to guide believers 
to adopt a “correct” outlook on ethnicity, religion and the state, and to eliminate 
ethno-separatist and extremist thoughts; in addition, telecommunications, news and 
publication institutions, and broadcasting, film, television, and cultural institutions 
were required to propagate the government’s counter-terrorism policy to the public 
(The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China 2014). 
After three rounds of deliberation, the official Anti-Terrorism Law, which was passed 
in 2015, has further extended the role of the public. Article 5 stipulates that the 
“combining specialised efforts with the Mass Line” shall be centred on prevention and 
supplemented by pre-emptive and proactive measures against possible enemies, 
thereby urging the public to become more active in identifying enemies. Article 44 
specifies that security organs shall improve their work at basic levels and improve 
intelligence gathering by engaging the public. The combination of the prevention and 
proactive measures carried out by the public is known as “mass prevention and mass 
governance” for short. 111 
6.1.1 Channels of de-radicalisation propaganda 
                                                      
111 mass prevention and mass governance: 群防群治 
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This section focuses on de-radicalisation propaganda and the channels through which 
the propaganda is disseminated. It shows how the official counter-terrorism discourse 
permeates everyday life. The wholesale control demonstrates the CCP’s rationale of 
guiding the public to have a correct understanding of the signs of terrorism and who 
are the enemies are.  
De-radicalisation propaganda in China comes in various forms of cultural activities. 
According to Huang Sanping, a local government official at the Yili Prefecture, the de-
radicalisation strategy in the Prefecture is constructed through an annual Folk Festival, 
vocational training, and soccer and volleyball games (J. Zhu 2015). On 20 November 
2014, Xinjiang government held a De-radicalisation Peasants’ Art Contest which 
attracted 14,000 entries (W. Lin 2015). Li Yaotian, one of the judges of the Xinjiang 
Peasants’ Art Contest, linked the talents of the people with de-radicalisation, saying 
“our ethnic peasant comrades in Xinjiang are extraordinary. They are versatile, 
talented in both singing and dancing, and they express themselves by wielding their 
brushes. These talents are the sword that assails religious extremist forces” (J. Zhu 
2014). 
De-radicalisation propaganda is disseminated through several channels and actors. 
The Anti-Terrorism Law stipulates that the government, the education and 
communication sectors, and local villagers’ and neighbours’ committee shall carry out 
propaganda on the terrorism prevention (The National People’s Congress of the 
People’s Republic of China 2015).  
In addition to state departments and the local community, the CCP also seeks to 
engage Uyghur community members, particularly influential individuals. Xi has 
emphasised the role of “patriotic believers” in uniting believers against religious 
extremism (Xinhua 2014b). Other important actors are “opinion leaders”, “grassroots 
propagandists” (Q. Han and Zhu 2016), and “cultural workers” (Abudula and 
Wushouer 2014) from within the Uyghur community. The following quote is an 
example of an open letter by “cultural workers” (Abudula and Wushouer 2014). 
In the past, the cheerful sound of suona filled the air at countryside 
weddings, playful love songs were full of fun, and enthusiastic meshrep 
ran throughout the night…while today, excellent traditions and customs 
inherited from the elders have been wiped away. 112 “Those who sing will 
lose their voice”. “Those who play will be handicapped”. “To dance is to 
imitate the devil”. Such ridiculous arguments started and spread across 
[the Uyghur community]. Threatened by the “religious police”, beautiful 
                                                      
112 Suona: a kind of musical instrument. Mesrhep: a type of Uyghur gathering including poetry, 
music, dance and conversation. 
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ladies are afraid to go onto the street and show their faces. [They are] 
covered with jilbabs except for their eyes. Even the ancestors of the 
Muslims, as well as our ancestors, have never seen those black robes, 
while they are now worshiped as traditional clothes of the Uyghurs and 
Muslims. Some women, and even children are following this trend blindly. 
Confronted with this, how can we, cultural workers and artists, stand by? 
China is not the only country that pays attention to the voices of believers and 
community members for de-radicalisation purposes. For example, the contribution of 
community members is a “central and indispensable part of the UK’s Prevent 
strategy”. However, the way in which the partnership is implemented in China 
demonstrates a clear tendency to facilitate political conformity, rendering the 
partnership pointless in terms of improving the credibility of the official discourse. 
Presumably, the partnership with believers and community members is supposed to 
enhance the credibility of the official discourse by incorporating different voices. 
However, as the following discussion will show, their language closely resembles that 
of officials, which in fact undermines the credibility of the content. It echoes the 
government’s de-radicalisation policy, which puts strict restrictions on jilbabs, by 
pointing out the difference between “Uyghur culture” and extremist religious culture. 
It reinforces the stereotypical image that most Han Chinese have of the Uyghurs – a 
versatile people and beautiful women wearing colourful clothes.  
The governments promotes their perception of Uyghurs as the “correct” way that the 
Uyghurs should live by reinforcing this kind of stereotypical image. The following case 
of “Little Apple” is another example of reinforcing the “correct” lifestyle.  
The government takes advantage of popular culture to disseminate de-radicalisation 
propaganda. Since 2014, a song called “Little Apple” has gone viral and been adapted 
for “public square dancing”, a form of workout activity popular among the middle-
aged population, mostly the Han population in Xinjiang. Utilising its popularity, local 
officials believed that this would be an effective way to promote the counter-
terrorism message among the locals. They organised several collective dancing 
competitions, mainly for peasants who had just finished harvesting. A commentary on 
People’s Daily (D. Pang 2015) indicates that this is what people enjoy. It also 
demonstrates how the perception of the Uyghurs as a group of singers and dancers is 
constructed as the “correct way”, and the extremist religious culture is seen as 
“destructive” and backward.  
De-radicalisation is not difficult as long as the government combines it 
with what ordinary people enjoy, and guides the spirit of the people to the 
correct way with modern culture, so that other destructive forces will 
decline.  
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In one of the competitions, the town of Xiamalebage – the Outstanding Winner – 
presented their version of the song, in which “Villagers’ Convention” and de-
radicalisation policy had been added to the lyrics (Guanchazhe 2015). It’s Party 
Secretary said that they had asked the cadres to dance and sing with the peasants, to 
“lift the veils on their ideas” and to make de-radicalisation policy accessible to them 
(Guanchazhe 2015).113 
Local government officials believed that the peasants in remote villages were 
preoccupied with their livelihoods, therefore, linking de-radicalisation policy to their 
livelihoods in plain language would be effective. Officials in Yarkant County 
emphasised the link between national unity and wealth. The following quote is a 
typical example of how the concerns of peasants are linked with national unity.  
Our farming techniques are outdated…If we become more open to new 
technologies and learn from the farmers from the inland with an open 
mind, then we can apply new methods to farming, increase agricultural 
production, raise incomes, and attract more good farmers to contract the 
land and teach us new technologies, and then, all we need to do is to sit 
on the bed and count the money. So, national unity can fill your pockets 
(with money). 
This quote portrays “farmers from the inland” as a group of people with more 
advanced knowledge and techniques that can “help” the locals to improve their 
farming skills. This is in response to the resistance of local farmers who are hostile to 
those who have migrated from inland. This quote draws an over-simplified connection 
between national unity and wealth. The assumption that local peasants are simply 
backward and hostile indicates the condescending attitude of government officials 
towards Uyghur farmers in remote villages.  
In addition to plain language, propaganda workers use vivid stories and local language 
to engage the audience. In a remote village in Khotan Prefecture, propaganda workers 
realised that it is hard to engage the audience because they are exhausted from long 
days of labouring. So, propaganda workers used the method of story-telling and made 
connections with customs that are familiar to the locals. Azhati Sulitan, Vice-Secretary 
of the local Literature and Arts Association, used the language style of “Baogunang” to 
engage the audience (Duan 2016). Baogunang literally means a kind of local food. In 
the context of counter-radicalisation propaganda, this means using the language that 
peasants are familiar with in their everyday life to promote de-radicalisation policy. 
                                                      
113 “The veils on their ideas” is a metaphor for extremism that is like veils that cloud the 
judgement of ordinary people so that they do not identify with the “correct” way of life 
the government promoted.  
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Furthermore, the local governments in Xinjiang launched a series of programmes to 
provide training for all those who could potentially be recruited as propagandists, to 
promote de-radicalisation policy. In November 2014, Qitai County trained 45 bilingual 
propagandists on the minority policies and regulations regarding the differences 
between illegal religious activities and normal religious activities (Haitao Li and Wu 
2014). In January 2016, experts and respected “patriotic believers” provided a 20-day 
training on de-radicalisation for over 140 cadres at lower levels of the governments in 
Aksu and Kizilsu Kirghiz Autonomous Prefecture (Akenmuhali 2016). As of January 
2016, over 2,000 propaganda teams with a total of over 5,000 people have been 
organised to deliver over 30,000 propaganda talks in the Khotan region (Zainuran 
2016). In December 2017, the first de-radicalisation propaganda base was established 
in Urumqi, to target ethnic “stay-at-home wives”, and provide education and training 
for unemployed housewives who are relatively less educated, helping them integrate 
into society through participating in de-radicalisation propaganda (Shi 2015).  
6.1.2 Development of the Mass Line approach in practice  
As discussed above, government officials have adapted de-radicalisation propaganda 
at the local levels to suit the audiences who are villagers, peasants and women with 
little or no education. This requires them to simplify de-radicalisation messages and 
promote clear and bold slogans. However, due to the lack of understanding of the 
Uyghur culture, de-radicalisation efforts can be over-simplified and irritating to devout 
believers. For example, after the “Little Apple” dancing competition, the local 
government told the media proudly that they had revised the lyrics of the “Little 
Apple” to include words such as “lifting the veil and shaving the beard will save you” 
(Guanchazhe 2015). This is the epitome of the officials’ condescending attitude 
towards Uyghur culture. Rather than embracing the diversity of the Uyghur culture as 
the government claims, local officials are actually promoting their own understanding 
of it as characterised by singing, dancing and beautiful women wearing colourful 
clothes. They are in fact promoting this only the “correct” lifestyle which reflects 
officials’ stereotypical and narrow understanding of the Uyghur culture. Critics outside 
China have criticised such extensive, yet culturally insensitive de-radicalisation efforts 
at local levels, labelling them “religious suppression”, and stating that the dancing 
contest as a whole is an abuse of state power to “force” religious leaders to conform 
to the values that are regarded as “mainstream”, however distasteful these values are 
in the eyes of the believers (Desk 2015). Lu Rachel questions the efficacy of such 
efforts in an article on Foreign Policy. Quoting Uyghurs, he argues that this kind of de-
radicalisation is “useless”, and indicates that China’s de-radicalisation efforts such as 
banning veils and beards are sometimes heavy-handed and culturally insensitive, ad 
ineffective to calm the Han-Uyghur tensions (R. Lu 2015).  
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Officials within the Party have also acknowledged the inefficacy of these efforts. The 
Secretary of the Yarkant County, Wang Yongzhe, admits that the “little apple” 
approach is clearly not enough for the de-radicalisation in the cultural sphere. 
According to Wang Yongzhe, it is more important to meet the cultural needs of the 
common people in other ways, including building platforms, and providing venues and 
equipment for various cultural activities to counteract the influence of religious 
extremism. Although Wang is reflecting upon their de-radicalisation efforts, in 
essence, he is calling for a strengthening of the government’s function of guiding the 
people. The difference between critics outside China and officials like Wang is that the 
former suggest that tactics other than religious suppression should be employed, 
implying that the de-radicalisation policy should involve less state intervention, while 
the latter believe that more guidance and control are needed in the cultural sphere, 
implying the need for more state intervention (F. Chen 2015b).  
Local de-radicalisation efforts have amplified the guidelines made at the state level 
and more explicitly target a wide range of activities and individuals. The Ordinances on 
De-Radicalisation in XUAR have been disseminated widely at local levels. 
Maisumujiang Maimuer, Vice-Director of the Committee for Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs of Kazak Autonomous Prefecture of Ili, proposed “one-page propaganda” and 
“pocketbooks” to promote the dissemination of counter-radicalisation (Ding et al. 
2017). In addition, Dou Wangui, an official at the Aksu Prefectural Party Committee, 
clarified that people of different occupations should use different language to 
disseminate the policy – “party cadres should talk about policy, legal cadres should 
talk about law, believers should talk about religious doctrines, scientists should talk 
about science” to create an environment where “every individual participates in de-
radicalisation, every individual propagates de-radicalisation, and every individual 
assails religious extremism” (Ding et al. 2017). This echoes the “five keys” approach to 
de-radicalisation. The “five keys” requires ideological problems to be solved by means 
of ideology, cultural problems to be solved by means of culture, folk customs to be 
treated with respect, religious problems to be solved in accordance with religious 
rules, and violent terrorism to be combated according to the rule of law and by “iron-
fisted actions” (L. Wen 2015). The differentiation of target audiences indicates that 
local officials are adopting every possible method to make sure that every individual is 
aware of the illegal nature of some activities that otherwise would be considered as a 
normal expression of their Muslim identity.  
Considering the relative lack of economic development in many of the remote rural 
areas that are inhabited mainly by the Uyghurs, the local governments have come to 
see the inefficacy of the old, crude ways of propaganda that are characterised by 
preaching the same propaganda materials indiscriminately to all of the people. Some 
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local officials have begun to shift to the so-called “drip irrigation model”. Compared to 
the old “flood irrigation model” that overwhelmed the public with propaganda 
materials, the “drip irrigation model” emphasises adapting propaganda tactics 
according to the audience (Xinjiang Science and technology information service 2015). 
The Yining County government made a “drip irrigation plan” that specified the 
lecturer, audience, content and methods of de-radicalisation propaganda and 
education, which aim was to make sure that every individual fully comprehended the 
government policies (H. Ren and Yang 2015). 
In addition to the ability of the villagers to comprehend the de-radicalisation policy, 
the local governments are also concerned about the tensions between the cadres and 
masses, between the police and citizens, and between the Uyghur and the Han. To 
ease the tensions, the government encourages the cadres at each level to learn the 
local language spoken by ethnic minorities, and integrate into the local communities 
by “singing their songs, and dancing their dance” (Xinjiang Science and technology 
information service 2015). This means that officials are not only required to learn the 
actual minority language as opposed to mandarin Chinese, but also the way they talk, 
and their customs and worldviews. Since 2010, civil servants and staff of the public 
institutions have been required to have basic knowledge of both the Han and Uyghur 
languages, with the aim of “better service of the masses” and better integration 
(Zhiheng Cao 2010). The police are also provided with short courses on the Uyghur 
language by national and local universities, the Ministry of Public Security and the 
provincial Public Security Department (G. Peng and Li 2016). 
Another attempt to ease the tensions between the Han cadres and the ethnic locals is 
the three-year “Visit, Benefit and Gather” programme launched by Zhang Chunxian in 
2014. The title of the programmes means visiting the people to know their situation, 
benefit the people, and improve integration and social cohesion. The entire 
programme involves sending around 200,000 cadres at each level of the XUAR 
government to its lower levels of government, in order to be better informed of the 
real situations at the grassroots level (M. Li 2014). This is in line with the Mass Line 
principle of collecting information from the masses and using the information 
collected to make better policies to benefit the masses. In 2014 alone, the programme 
sent 43,800 working groups including 275,000 cadres (Xinjiang Daily 2017), covering 
over 8,000 administrative villages and over 700 state-owned farms (G. Du 2017). 
Officials who were sent to the grassroots levels were expected to address the socio-
economic concerns of the local villagers, such as improving their employability and 
helping them to identify more job opportunities (K. Ma 2015b). Additional support for 
the villagers was provided in the activity called “Ethnic Groups Unite as a Family”, 
where officials paired up with villagers, especially impoverished families, old veterans, 
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cadres, Party members, role models, believers, vulnerable communities, migrants, and 
less educated individuals, to provide one-on-one support (C. Xiong 2016). The duties 
of officials include visiting and meeting the target villagers at least once every two 
months, learning each other’s languages, understanding the difficulties in the families 
of the villagers, helping them to alleviate poverty, and propagating national laws and 
policies that benefited the people (C. Xiong 2016).  
The one-on-one support further ensured that the state policies reached individuals at 
the grassroots level, so that they were fully informed about the “correct” worldview 
and de-radicalisation policy. In recent years, these measures have become more 
forceful. In March 2018, to make sure that every family was covered, the Wensu 
County government requested that its cadres, who number over 20,000, each visit at 
least 6 families and stay for no less than 8 days with each family (B. Jiang 2018). 
Heshuo County required their cadres to stay with each family for more than 14 days, 
and maintain the pairing relationship for 1 year (D. Jiang 2017). This timing coincided 
with the publication of the Ordinances on de-radicalisation. It is also likely that 
because 2017 was the last year of the initial three-year plan of “Visit, Gather and 
Benefit”, the government was keen to show the public the results and “achievements” 
of this programme. Local officials, who were under pressure, were anxious to 
translate their work into tangible reports that propagate the government’s 
achievements quantitatively. Human Rights Watch criticised that this measure of 
surveillance, stating that it violated the privacy and cultural rights of ethnic minorities 
as many cadres posted photos taken with ethnic minorities, which showed intimate 
aspects of domestic life without their consent, and forced their children to learn 
mandarin Chinese and the national song (Human Rights Watch 2018).  
Although the efforts to deliver de-radicalisation messages are not always effective, 
and can even be counter-productive due to the lack of cultural sensitivity, the 
governments at the local level have realised the problems with the traditional crude 
methods of propaganda and started to reform their de-radicalisation policy with more 
focus on calming ethnic tensions. Combined with actual improvements brought by 
governments’ support in employment, the drip irrigation model of propaganda and 
the Visit, Benefit and Gather policy have helped local officials to justify their de-
radicalisation efforts, which has decreased the space for religious freedom. However, 
as a single-party government, the CCP is intrinsically less capable of or willing to allow 
the Uyghurs to express their diversity, for fear that some uninformed, less-educated 
citizens will identify with the wrong ideology of religious extremism. Promoting the 
stereotypical understanding of the Uyghurs as a versatile group that loves singing, 
dancing and beautiful clothes, the CCP is in fact tightening the restrictions on the ways 
in which Uyghurs can express their identity. On the one hand, the government 
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repeatedly clarifies that “the combat against religious extremism is neither an ethnic 
question, nor a religious question, but a combat to safeguard national unity and ethnic 
solidarity” (Q. Long and Wang 2016, 18). On the other hand, the government is 
politicising daily cultural events to serve de-radicalisation agenda. Adopting the Mass 
Line Approach, the CCP has effectively disseminated its de-radicalisation policy to 
almost every corner of society, asking individuals to demonstrate their loyalty to the 
Party.   
6.2 De-radicalisation through ideological control  
As discussed in Chapter 4, after focusing on economic development for a few decades, 
the CCP under Xi Jinping decided to re-emphasise ideology in an attempt to maintain 
its legitimacy (CPC News 2013b). Some Chinese scholars believe that China’s 
ideological security is under threat in the light of some Western countries’ promotion 
of their Western values.  
Most of these [Western, author’s note] values are under the guise of 
academic exchange. [The West] constantly disseminates Western values, 
viewpoints and propositions and opinions, such as democratic socialism 
and neo-liberalism. In addition, historical nihilism, dogmatism, neo-
Confucianism, and the New Left have gained momentum in China. The 
dissemination of these ideologies poses great challenges to the 
mainstream Marxism in China’s ideological and theoretical sphere (Ji 
Zhang and Zhang 2007, 53).  
Some scholars have discussed this threat in great detail. Niu Jinfang and Kong Dehong 
(2003, 57) argue that developed countries in the West use “maintaining world peace” 
as a pretext to exert political pressure on developing countries, and interfere in their 
domestic affairs, in order to ensure political control over these developing countries. 
Wang Yan and Mao Xiaosong’s (2009, 75–76) article warns against the Westernisation 
of China’s political system and ideology in the context of globalisation. They argue that 
the expansion of Western values as “universal values” is a new manifestation of 
“peaceful evolution”, which poses a severe threat to China’s ideological security (Yan 
Wang and Mao 2009, 77). This argument clearly links the anxiety of contemporary 
Chinese political elites and intellectuals about ideological infiltration with Mao’s 
prediction of peaceful evolution, indicating the same friend/enemy distinction that 
underpins China’s quest for legitimacy across generations of leaders.  
In the context of these ideological challenges, Wang Hongwei (2016) believes that 
terrorism in nature is a type of ideology based on which terrorists are able to justify 
their violent cause. The following quote discusses ideological confrontation as a form 
of war of soft powers, and warns against its “hard” effect, in other words, violent 
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terrorist activities. It also implies that to prevent radicalisation as a behaviour, it is 
crucial to first “seal the victory” in preventing radicalisation as an ideology. It further 
indicates that a hard approach such as Strike Hard may become counter-productive 
and cause resentment among the Uyghurs if the government does not first persuade 
them ideologically that the target of the government is doing something wrong, which 
underwrites the government’s strong control over radical ideas. Combined with the 
Ordinances on de-radicalisation, the vigilance against radical ideas may translate into 
real consequences.  
To some extent, the war of ideology is a war of soft power. But soft power 
always has a “hard” effect, or even a decisive effect. Counter-terrorism 
strategy needs to be comprehensive and needs to deal with root causes as 
well as “symptoms”. However, if we cannot seal the victory on ideology, 
we cannot eliminate the fundamental cause of terrorism.  
Counter-terrorism cannot go without the use of force. The prompt 
proactive strike is necessary to curb the spread of terrorism. However, if it 
is not in conjunction with powerful ideological tactics, hard strikes may fit 
in exactly with the wishes of those terrorists who hijacked the nation and 
religion.  
For a long time, the Party’s border policies have facilitated the economic 
and social development of the Xinjiang region. However, if the ideological 
problem remains unsolved, terrorists who “refuse to secularise” will create 
a hostile environment and distort the facts, interpreting policies that 
benefit people, such as “[counter-part] assistance to Xinjiang”, and “Great 
Western Development” as factors that “intensified exploitation” and the 
problems of normal corruption of some officials as “ethnic 
oppression”(Hongwei Wang 2016). 
The above quote highlights the two assumptions in China’s counter-terrorism strategy. 
First, ideology is considered a battlefield where the CCP needs to “win” in order to 
prevent the spread of an extremist ideology. The zero-sum assumption of the battle of 
ideology reflects the friend/enemy distinction that underwrites China’s counter-
terrorism policies. Second, in the eyes of Chinese political elites and intellectuals, the 
use of force, in other words, the hard approach, is necessary, but the hard approach 
alone may be counter-productive as terrorists may use it to criticise the CCP’s ethnic 
and religious policies. Therefore, the government must first “educate” and “guide” the 
public, to make them realise that some of their bandwagon religious practices are 
“wrong”, so that they will not resist the crackdown on those “wrong” ideas and 
behaviour.  
Local governments have paid much attention to the ideological battle. A report from a 
conference on Counter-terrorism Work in the Realm of Ideology at Karamay city 
shows that local officials believe that the control over ideology in the cultural industry, 
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the media, and the education sector through education and inducement is part of part 
of de-radicalisation. The following quote demonstrates that officials are keen on 
maintain a firm grasp on what sort of content goes into the minds of the youth.  
…[We should] insist on inducement and have a firm grasp of the leadership 
and voice in the realm of ideology. [We should] carry out lifelong de-
radicalisation education for vulnerable individuals, strengthen the 
construction of the review panel for literary works and primary school and 
middle school textbooks, so that different battlefields are dominated by 
mainstream ideology; strengthen the management of the cultural industry, 
propaganda material and publications; strengthen the management of the 
media and the internet; strengthen the management of the Party school 
and ensure correct [author’s emphasis] political inclination, ensuring the 
leadership of the Party school at the frontline of ideas and politics; 
strengthen the management of schools by consolidating leadership and 
team building, promoting righteousness on the campus, preventing the 
infiltration of religious extremism, thus ensuring the harmony and stability 
of schools. In addition, [we should] further strengthen the role of the 
Communist Youth League, unite and lead young cadres, mobilise them by 
carrying out featured activities and improve the charisma of the 
Communist Youth League (W. Hu 2017). 114 
The above quote depicts a situation where the ideological battle is intensified, and the 
Party is desperately seeking to maintain control in the realm of ideology by 
strengthening its leadership in education, the cultural industry, and Party schools. 
Officials want to make sure that the youth are surrounded by the “correct” ideology 
from various dimensions – team building led by the Party and featured activities 
organised by the Youth League.  
The friend/enemy distinction plays an important role in the narratives of the 
ideological battle. First, framing ideological confrontation as a war and assuming that 
external enemies are plotting to undermine China’s security allows the central 
authority to justify the strengthen its the control over ideology. In a meeting regarding 
the long-term stability of Xinjiang, Politburo did not hesitate to explicate the necessity 
in “occupying the battlefield of propaganda, culture and education” (Xinhua 2014d).  
The meeting aims to strengthen and innovate social governance, 
strengthen social prevention and control, strengthen the supervision of 
cyber security, and carry out in-depth legal propaganda and education, 
carry out focused crackdowns to maintain a high pressure on the “three 
forces”, in order to effectively prevent the frequent occurrence of terrorist 
activities and the spread of terrorist activities into inland China. [We 
should] strengthen ideological work, using a Socialist Core Values system 
                                                      
114 The Communist Youth League of China is the Party organisation that aims to ensure 
political conformity among youths aged between fourteen and twenty-eight.  
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to construct the shared spiritual homeland of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang, 
resolutely occupying the battlefield of propaganda, culture and education 
(Xinhua 2014d).  
The quote emphasises using propaganda and education in the social sphere to ensure 
political conformity among the majority of the population, and “focused crackdowns” 
against “three forces”, which clearly reflects the differentiation of friends and enemies 
in regard to counter-terrorism. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, this differentiation is 
underpinned by Mao’s legacy of two types of contradictions. Based on Mao’s 
understanding of the contradictions, officials seek to ensure the “correctness” of the 
ideology among the friends, and to use a hard approach and high pressure against the 
enemies.  
Second, framing ideological confrontation as a battle allows the CCP to promote the 
“correct political inclination” and denounce the wrong one. The dichotomy of right 
and wrong ideas reinforces an over-simplified understanding of the causes of political 
violence in Xinjiang. The intolerance of alternative ideologies prevents the 
government from understanding the ideas that are deemed “wrong”. Simply 
dismissing all separatist ideas as “wrong” undermines the government’s ability to 
understand the socio-economic grievances that underscore the Uyghurs’ resistance to 
the CCP rule and their sympathy towards and/or support for the separatist cause.  
In a broader context, as discussed in Section 5.6, the anxiety of Chinese political elites 
and intellectuals about the challenges posed by the increasing religiosity of Islam 
contributes to their obsession with controlling the spread of religious ideas. Alleging 
that the religious infiltration is a political issue rather than a religious one, the CCP has 
politicised its religious policy and justified its control over the expression of Muslim 
identity. In conjunction with the conflation of extremism, separatism, and terrorism, 
the CCP has dismissed the Uyghurs’ separatist claims as “wrong political inclination”. 
The dichotomy of right and wrong prevents the CCP from engaging with those who 
identify with a non-violent radical ideology. Forced to choose sides, these individuals 
may decide to be fully aligned with the frames provided by the separatists.  
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the role of the Mass Line strategy in 
the CCP’s quest for legitimacy. As discussed in previous chapters, the CCP considers it 
necessary to obtain support from the public as legitimacy is crucial to its survival. To 
this end, the CCP has developed a set of frames with which to give meaning to current 
events. These frames necessitate a friend/enemy dichotomy that allows the CCP to 
justify its policies.  
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In order to create an imagined community in which the masses of the Chinese people 
recognise the CCP as the legitimate representative of the unity of the Chinese nation, 
early communist theorists developed the Mass Line strategy based on the CCP’s 
commitment to “serve the people wholeheartedly”.  
Fleshed out in counter-terrorism practice, the Mass Line strategy emphasises forging a 
sense of participation among ordinary citizens. Using various methods and incentives, 
the CCP has facilitated a shift in the security paradigm from a focus on security for the 
people to security by the people. In theory, this paradigm will improve state-public 
relations as it seeks to include the public in the decision-making process. However, the 
implementation of the Mass Line demonstrates the difficulties in including democracy 
in a highly state-centric authoritarian system. As political elites have decided what the 
“correct” outlook on history, ethnicity and the state is, and does not accept challenges, 
the implementation of the Mass Line is top-down and condescending. Although the 
CCP seeks to co-opt high-profile community members, such as important religious 
figures and cultural workers, the high level of resemblance between their words and 
government propaganda has only served to erode their credibility among the Uyghur 
community.  
The cases in this chapter demonstrated how the Mass Line strategy is combined with 
the counter-terrorism agenda and carried out in practice. There have been some 
developments in the implementation of the Mass Line. Some government officials 
have realised that overwhelming the public with propaganda has not worked. 
However, as an authoritarian regime, the CCP has not given up indoctrination 
altogether. Instead, it has refined its counter-terrorism policy and tailored the 
language used for propaganda according to its target communities.  
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Chapter 7 De-radicalisation 
It is notoriously difficult to de-radicalise an individual – it is possible to change a way 
an individual behaves, but it is far from easy to change how an individual perceives the 
reality. The assumption that there is one, and only one true version of what has 
happened is dangerous in practice, as it gives the government a sense of obligation to 
promote the “correct” version and eliminate all those that challenge it. The CCP has 
emphasised the role of “education” in China’s counter-terrorism approach. In the 
context of China’s counter-terrorism strategy, “education” is less about providing the 
public with the knowledge they need to make informed decisions, and more about 
reinforcing conformity so that the public will be more receptive to the “correct” 
version of the truth that is being promoted in the official discourse, and resist the 
alternative version of the truth presented in the Western media.  
In the quest for legitimacy, China’s de-radicalisation strategy also includes the 
mobilisation of the masses through the media. Based on the assumption that the 
Uyghur exile community has colluded with the West to undermine the legitimacy of 
the CCP, Chinese political elites and intellectuals are concerned about how the issue of 
the Uyghur independence movement is framed in the media. Two types of 
propaganda are identified: a top-down approach and a bottom-up approach. The 
former facilitates the dissemination of pro-CCP information from the state media, and 
results in influencing individual behaviour. The latter encourages grassroots pro-CCP 
speeches, and brings them into the official discourse.  
This chapter will start with a discussion of the role of “education” in China and discuss 
its role in de-radicalisation. It will then provide a case study of mass mobilisation in 
the context of de-radicalisation in China.  
7.1 The role of education 
Education has been an important tactic that the CCP has used to intervene in the 
radicalisation process of individuals. As discussed in Section 2.1.3.2, authors such as 
Borum (2003, 8; 2011b, 39) Silber and Bhatt (2007) and Precht (2007, 34) identify 
several overlapping stages of radicalisation. Although the linear relationship of cause 
and effect might be oversimplified in practice and has led to unnecessary connections 
between certain traits or changes in behaviour and intensified radicalisation, the 
assumption that the radicalisation process is divided into stages helps in analysing the 
function of education in China’s de-radicalisation approach. The role of education can 
be seen in two stages of the radicalisation process. First, it functions as a prevention 
mechanism – it guides the public towards the “correct” views and intervenes where 
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needed to stop an individual from continuing to align with the frames provided by 
separatists. Second, it functions as a rectification mechanism – it guides the already-
radicalised individuals to adopt the “correct” views.  The following discussion will be 
structured to reflect these two functions of education.  
Government officials believe that education can help prevent radicalisation. A senior 
official in Xinjiang Shohrat Zakir directly attributed radicalisation to a lack of education. 
He stated that most of the radicalisation cases take place among those who are from a 
lower educational background. “The less educated a young person is, the more likely 
that he will be affected and poisoned by religious extremist ideology” (Guo Zhang 
2015). Considering that in the Chinese political context, education means to guiding 
the public towards the official political views, a “lack of education”, in the eyes of 
Zakir, indicates the non-alignment with the official framing of counter-terrorism.  
Officials are determined to establish a regime of truth through education. In order to 
“occupy the battlefield of education”, the Politburo requires the government to 
prioritise education, improve the overall quality of education across Xinjiang, increase 
the building of boarding schools for pastoral and remote communities, and implement 
free education for high schools in the whole of South Xinjiang (Xinhua 2014d).115 
The central authority provides support on education within the framework of 
Counterpart Assistance to Xinjiang (for example, the Xinjiang Class), in order to 
implement some more “powerful and effective” policies to promote the mainstream 
values and resist the spread of religious extremist ideologies (Guo Zhang 2015). The 
following case study of the education policy in Shufu County provides some detailed 
information on how the local governments seek to “occupy the battlefield of 
education”. 
One official of Shufu County, Zhu Xuebing, believes that the large number of drop-outs 
is an important factor that has caused radicalisation in this area. Accordingly, he has 
designed a series of mechanisms to solve this problem (F. Chen 2015e). According to 
him, those who do not finish junior high school or high school are particularly 
vulnerable to the infiltration of radicalisation (F. Chen 2015e). He has proposed to 
implement the following mechanisms in the following five aspects.  
                                                      
115 The national policy of nine-year compulsory education covers free education from primary 
school (six years) and junior high school (three years). High school consists of another 
three years of education before students applyfor the National College Entrance Exam.  
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Table 5 Education policies in Shumi County, adapted from “Secretary of the County 
Committee Talks about De-Radicalisation: Prioritising Law over Religion and 
Keeping the Party Secular Does Not Mean Not Studying Religion” (F. Chen 
2015e) 
Aims Mechanism Outcome 
Anti-drop-out  Township officials shall ensure the enrolment 
rate; village officials shall see to the turnout, and 
school staff shall ensure the maintenance of the 
turnout.  
To establish a “five-in-one” mechanism to ensure 
the participation of township officials, village 
officials, schools, tutors and teachers, and 
parents, clarifying each actor’s responsibility in 
writing. 
After the 
implementation 
of this 
mechanism, the 
turnout 
remains 96% 
for junior high 
school and 99% 
for primary 
school. 
Keeping 
students in 
schools 
To prioritise the development of high school 
education – scale up the schools, improve the 
quality of education, develop market-oriented 
and employability-oriented vocational training 
programmes, collocate with Xinjiang Agricultural 
Vocational Technical Institute to open a local 
campus in Shumi.  
Subsidy: 2,000 RMB for students with financial 
difficulties 
This plan 
increased the 
enrolment rate 
of Shumi High 
School to 93.1% 
in 2014. 
Making higher 
education 
affordable 
Subsidy: set up an annual fund of 10,000 RMB. 
 
4,420 students 
benefited. 
Ensuring 
employment 
To carry out cooperation projects with e-
commerce, logistics and clothing companies. 
 
Promoting bi-
language 
education 
To ensure the number of bilingual teachers is 
enough to cover the entire country by September 
2015.  
 
As well as improving the “hardware” – building more schools, providing more subsides, 
and allocating more teachers – the CCP has made sure that the content of education 
reflects the “correct” views on radicalisation. In the education sector, particularly 
colleges and universities, de-radicalisation is considered an “urgent task” (F. Jiang 
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2014). As discussed in Section 5.7.1, the CCP incorporates the voice from within 
communities to boost the legitimacy of its counter-terrorism policy. At Kashgar 
Normal College, 215 ethnic teachers wrote a joint letter to highlight the responsibility 
of ethnic minorities to oppose religious extremism, and resist the infiltration of 
religious extremist ideology into colleges and universities that may “poison” the minds 
of young students (F. Jiang 2014). Aligning with the frames provided by Chinese 
political elites and intellectuals, they contributed to reinforcing the dichotomy 
between right and wrong ideas.  
Zhao Fusheng’s (2015) study gives a detailed account of a case of de-radicalisation 
practice at Kashgar Normal College in Xinjiang. The case clearly shows that ideology 
control through education has been a key theme of the de-radicalisation activities at 
this college. When students officially enrolled, the teachers in charge of each class 
organised a one-week, recorded induction meeting, focusing on the condemnation of 
violent terrorist activities. Class meetings, organised by the teacher in charge, are held 
every Sunday evening throughout the academic year. Political study sessions are held 
on every Wednesday, and are inspected by the cadres of the Students’ Union. In 
addition, students are required to participate in counter-terrorism propaganda even 
when they are away from the college. Proof of participation from the residents’ 
committee is required to show that every student has engaged in the propaganda 
regarding the “facts” about terrorist incidents, especially to those “who were ignorant 
of the facts” (Fusheng Zhao 2015, 51). The proof should be accompanied by a 2,000-
word report. At this college, the allocation of dormitories is also political. Over 10,000 
students of both the Han Chinese and ethnic minorities live together in dormitories. 
There must be one Party member in every room. There are regular activities aimed at 
improving ethnic relations and integration, such as friendly basketball matches, one-
on-one language learning, and gala celebrations.  
In another stage of radicalisation, education is employed to ensure political 
conformity outside of schools. The CCP’s obsession with ensuring political conformity 
extends to family and society. Zhu Xuebing, a local official, highlighted that “family 
education” and “social education” must align with school education in order to 
consolidate the foundation for social stability and resistance against extremism (F. 
Chen 2015e). In particular, he pointed out that family and society are crucial to the 
rehabilitation of terrorists.  
In the domestic sphere, according to Zhu Xuebing, “we must help the family members 
of those who are sentenced. Otherwise, ‘others’ will help them. We must not drive 
them to the opposite side” (F. Chen 2015e). “If we do not promote a positive ideology, 
religious extremists will do it [promote an extremist ideology]” (F. Chen 2015e). 
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In the social sphere, Zhang Jisheng, another local official, accused religious extremists 
of encouraging the Uyghurs to live an “anti-modern” lifestyle. He believes that 
extremists induce the masses to follow religious customs in their marriages and 
funerals, and reject the secular administration system. In response, the village 
government has established a service team and a service centre to register marriages 
and funerals. To demonstrate that the government is not hostile to religion itself, it 
requires the villagers’ committee and the mosque management committee to 
organise religious rituals for some people.  
The efforts of local officials to justify their policies demonstrate the competition of 
frames between the CCP and Uyghur separatists. In remote villages the government is 
struggling to promote the official counter-terrorism discourse because the local 
Uyghurs are culturally more familiar with the frames that some Uyghur separatists 
promote. The fact that many of them do not speak mandarin Chinese constitutes 
another obstacle to understanding the government’s frames. To transform those who 
have already been radicalised, the government has to rely on family and society to 
promote the “correct” or “positive” ideology.  
This reliance on family and society reflects two features of China’s counter-terrorism 
approach. First, as discussed in Section 5.5, the focus on family reflects the Chinese 
culture, which emphasises the role of family in influencing individuals. Second, the 
reliance on social institutions such as villagers’ committees and the mosque 
management committee reflects the CCP’s determination in keep believers in control 
through imposing a secular administration system.  
Apart from family and society, the Anti-Terrorism Law accords more power to the 
government to extend the de facto detention of radicalised individuals. Article 30 of 
the Anti-Terrorism Law requires the detention centres and prisons to assess the level 
of risk that terrorists may pose to the community in which they live. For those who 
may endanger the society, after being released from detention centres or prisons, 
they should be referred to the intermediate people’s court for Settlement and 
Education (The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China 2015).  
Although there have been informal “re-education” programmes, the Settlement and 
Education policy is the first time that the Anti-Terrorism Law has formalised the 
mechanism of education as rehabilitation. The mechanism is in its early stage. Chen 
Zexian (2016), Chair of the Institute of International Law at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, pointed out that the regulations are “far from complete” in terms of 
the target, behaviour, procedure and mechanism. According to him, the 
implementation of Settlement and Education policy may result in negative evaluations 
and condemnation of the people in question.  
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Zhang Jisheng, a local official, observed that although the traditional hard-approach 
crackdowns showe the effect of counter-terrorism immediately, the government did 
not focus on education – the transformation of the minds of the radicalised Uyghurs – 
until the winter of 2014 (F. Chen 2015e). Zhang realised that some of those who were 
detained after the 2014 Strike Hard Campaign became more radical than they were 
before detention (F. Chen 2015e). In the detention centre, the Yining government 
divided detainees into 4 classes according to the “severity” of their “circumstances” of 
the detainees (F. Chen 2015e). According to Zhang, 70% of the detainees became 
more “positive” after the education (F. Chen 2015e), which means that these 
detainees were seemingly more aligned with the “correct” ideas and views promoted 
by the CCP.  
Table 6 Methods of education of detainees in Yining County, adapted from an 
interview with Zhang Jisheng (F. Chen 2015e) 
Method Explanation 
Religious 
education 
Detainees were influenced by an extremist religious ideology. In 
response (the government) should suppress religious extremists 
ideologies by a “positive belief”. 
Psychological 
support 
“They are human beings too; they may have some psychological 
obstacles.” 
Cultural 
education  
Promoted “real” Uyghur culture. 
Trip (The local government) organised trips for detainees to look at the 
changes that had taken place in Yining.  
One-on-one 
support 
Cadres paired up with detainees to provide one-on-one support. 
They lived, ate and studies together. The cadres were able to learn 
that in the past, they had also made many mistakes and 
ambiguous understandings. After the education, many Uyghur 
cadres became more confident in their de-radicalisation 
knowledge.  
The above methods provide some insights into how the government treats “enemies”. 
Many of these Uyghurs were detained after the Strike Hard campaign, which means 
that they were the target of the hard approach, and were categorised as enemies 
according to Mao’s ideas of two types of contradictions. The methods the government 
used also echo Mao’s idea of using coercion against enemies. The explanation of the 
methods also reflects the Chinese political context in which the government promotes 
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a set of “correct” and “positive” perceptions and expects all the individuals to 
manifest loyalty, especially those who are deemed as the enemies.  
It is interesting to note that Zhang Jisheng framed them not as the enemies, but as 
ordinary people that the government considers as prone to radicalisation. This 
contrasts with Xi’s dehumanising framing of terrorists as “rats”. It is likely that local 
officials like Zhang realise the number of “enemies” they have to face, and are trying 
to turn them into “friends” by framing them as individuals who are not entirely clear 
about what they are doing. This kind of tactic is also evident in the framing of those 
who joined the self-proclaimed ISIS as individuals who were deceived.  
The local government has provided more specific instructions in the “Measures of the 
Implementation of Anti-Terrorism Law in the XUAR” in Chapter 7 on Education 
management (Zhiyun Zhao 2016). The Measures specify that prisons, detention 
centres, and community-based rehabilitation institutes shall carry out the education 
and reform of those who are assessed as “in need” of Settlement and Education 
(Zhiyun Zhao 2016).116 The Measures also specify that vocational training shall be 
included in the content of the education (Zhiyun Zhao 2016).  
7.2 Mass mobilisation in the context of de-radicalisation 
This section focuses on how the government responds to the “terrorist” threat. 
Political elites and intellectuals perceive separatism as a severe threat that is 
associated with other anti-China forces and terrorist networks abroad who are 
secretly plotting to overthrow the CCP and/or establish a theocracy. To prevent this, 
the CCP has initiated a series of hard and soft measures to intervene in the 
radicalisation process of individuals. To understand the government’s approach, it is 
important to first examine its rationale in differentiating hard and soft approaches.  
7.2.1 Hard vs. soft approach in Xinjiang 
The implementation of the Mass Line approach is based on officials’ perceptions of 
the difference between passive and active radicalisation. Government officials believe 
that most of those who become radicalised are deceived or forced into extremism, 
and only a small number are “diehards”. It is, therefore, unfair to treat those who 
have been deceived or forced in the same way as the government treats its real 
enemies. The differentiation of hard and soft approaches in treating “friends” and 
“enemies” reflects Mao’s two types of contradictions – coercing the enemy, and 
persuading and educating the friends. However, as the following discussion will show, 
                                                      
116 community-based rehabilitation institutes: 社区矫正机构 
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even the so-called “soft” approach can sometimes become very harsh, because the 
CCP allows only the “correct” ideas and views and uses education as a tool for 
indoctrination.  
According to Xiaokaiti Yasheng, Secretary of the Political and Judiciary Commission of 
Yutian Country in Khotan, of those who have been affected by religious extremist 
ideology, 5% are “diehards”, and 15% are “followers”, while the other 80% of the 
people follow others blindly (F. Chen 2015a). Zhang Yun, Secretary of the Party 
Committee of Xinjiang Department of Justice, argues that based on his experience, in 
a village, usually 70% of the people who have been affected by extremist ideology 
were coerced by religious extremists, while the other 30% were “contaminated by 
religious extremist forces”, and very few people have committed crimes and plan to 
conduct terrorist activities.  
The categorisation of “friends” and “enemies” underpins China’s model of counter-
measures. As discussed in Section 2.1, the enemy-centric war model could be 
categorised as the hard approach and the population-centric methods could be seen 
as a soft approach. The hard approach relies heavily on the use of force. Linking 
terrorists with the “three forces”, political elites mobilise the Armed Police to make 
way for the soft approach. On 29 June 2013, Meng Jianzhu gave a speech addressing 
the Xinjiang Armed Police forces at the Anti-terror Oath-taking Rally, contextualising 
the security situations in Xinjiang with the assumption that the “three forces” had not 
given up causing disturbances in Xinjiang (see The Ministry of Public Security of the 
People’s Republic of China 2013).  
Considering the severity of the problem, local officials believe that the soft approach 
will not be possible without the hard approach to crackdown on the small number of 
“diehards”. According to several officials in South Xinjiang, 80% of the believers are 
from a lower educational background, and they do not have enough knowledge about 
the law and Islamic tenets (F. Chen 2015a). These people choose to follow whichever 
side that is more powerful. In areas where religious extremism overpowers the 
government, it is not surprising that people choose to follow an extremist ideology 
out of concerns for the negative consequences of doing otherwise. This is why, 
according to local officials, the “soft approach” has been abandoned since 2014 – 
“without the ‘Strike Hard’ to start off, there is no way to carry out other works, such 
as de-radicalisation and the mass work” (F. Chen 2015a).  
However, the officials do realise the inefficacy of adopting a hard approach alone. 
According to the local official, there is a 15-year history of radicalisation in Xinjiang, 
which dates back to the 2000s (F. Chen 2015c). The history of radicalisation makes it 
difficult to change the mentality of the locals, which was formed during the short time 
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of the “Strike Hard” campaign, and the extremist ideology is highly likely to rebound 
since the “Strike Hard” campaign (F. Chen 2015c).Two generations are needed to 
resolve the issues caused by religious extremism in Xinjiang (F. Chen 2015c). The 
official acknowledged that ignoring the need for the soft approach would lead to the 
broadening of the scope of counter-terrorism and inefficacy in preventing 
radicalisation (F. Chen 2015a). 
Self-reflection, however, does not lead to narrowing the scope of counter-terrorism. 
On the contrary, under Chen Quanguo, so-called “soft” measures were increasingly 
characterised by coercion and the restriction of individual rights.  
Since 2014, local governments have implemented various de-radicalisation 
“transformation though education” training sessions. Xinjiang’s judicial and executive 
system has trained 246 cadres from prisons, education centres, and the judicial 
departments (People’s Daily Online 2014c). As of 18 November 2014, Shumi County 
had trained 3,515 people, 88% (3,096) of whom had been “successfully transformed” 
(Tianshanwang 2014). One official said that the de-radicalisation education and 
training centre in Khotan, which can accommodate 3,000 people, had already 
completed 5 sessions of education and training in September 2015 (Q. Fu 2015). The 
“transformation through education” is formalised in the Ordinances on de-
radicalisation published in 2017.  
The places for transformation through education are often referred to as re-education 
camps in the Western media. Zenz identifies three types of re-education facilities: 
centralised transformation through education training centres, legal system schools, 
and rehabilitation correction centres based on the examination of related 
construction bids. The propaganda and implementation of the transformation through 
education at the local level reflects the characteristics of China’s counter-terrorism 
approach discussed in previous chapters – indoctrination of the “correct” ideology 
based on the assumption that the masses cannot distinguish between right and wrong 
because they lack knowledge about government policies.  
For example, the one-on-one, close-style training in Chabuchaer County focuses on 
promoting the Marriage Law, the Family Planning Law, the Education Law, the Law on 
the Protection of Minors, the amended Criminal Law, the Notices of the XUAR 
governments, the Notices on forbidding the spread of illegal audio-video materials, 
policies on anti-violence and adherence to law and order, compiled propaganda 
materials of the XUAR, local religious policy, and policies that benefit the people 
(Chabuchaer County 2015). Such a long list of materials must be fully ingrained into 
the trainees, which is ensured by requiring them to give presentations based on their 
own experience, and write about their insights and reflections. The County 
 
 
 
 
226 
government has also sought to ensure individual loyalty through activities such as flag-
raising, singing the national song, military training, learning “red songs” that praise the 
CCP, field trips, and patriotic films. After the training, each individual is required to 
write a personal conclusion, and they received a comprehensive appraisal. An official 
of the Chabuchaer Country said that the purpose of this “training” is to  
make them clearly recognise how they were wrong, raise their awareness 
of understanding and conform to law. Educate, guide them … [so that they 
will] abandon the evil and follow the good, rely on the Party and good 
policies of the government, [encourage them] to rely on their diligence to 
get rich, and become a qualified citizen. (Chabuchaer County 2015) 
The quote demonstrates that local officials perceive the “trainees” – who are in fact 
internees because they have no option to refuse the “training”– as a group of people 
who are unable to distinguish between right and wrong, and are following the “wrong” 
path without knowing it. They see them as intrinsically “evil” and believe that they 
must be “educated” and “guided” by making them aware of the truth so that they 
become a “qualified” citizen. These assumptions are profoundly disturbing, as they 
establish a regime of truth based entirely on the perception of government officials, 
which justifies treating “trainees” as something less than a normal citizen.  
It is clear that the so-called “soft” approach has already become what Mao Zedong 
(1957, 1949) used to deal with the enemies – deprivation of individual rights and 
coercion. This kind of “education” has become a recent focus for critics outside China. 
Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported several deaths of detained Uyghurs, which further 
intensified the resentment felt towards the CCP among Uyghur dissidents. Ayhan 
Memet, mother of Dolkun Isa, the current President of the World Uyghur Congress, 
died at a detention centre in Keping County (Han Jie 2018). Muhammad Salih Hajim, a 
Uyghur Islamic scholar died some 40 days after being detained, causing both the 
Uyghur Human Rights Project and the World Uyghur Congress to call for international 
pressure on China to reveal information about the conditions of detainees and release 
those who had been detained (Eckert 2018). Dilixat Raxit, a spokesperson of the 
World Uyghur Congress, accused the Chinese government of “murdering” this 
prominent religious leader (Eckert 2018). Another report involved the death of a 
teenage Uyghur boy who was detained for travelling overseas (A. Seytoff and Lipes 
2018). Another RFA report compared the re-education policy to “ethnic cleansing”, 
saying the number of detained Uyghurs exceeded the number of detainees in Nazi 
Germany (Wang Yun 2018).  
The news has also attracted the attention of other international critics. An article in 
the New York Times (Thum 2018) accused local officials of targeting Uyghurs based on 
discriminative and arbitrary criteria, making Xinjiang a more dangerous place for 
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Uyghurs than it was during the Cultural Revolution. Echoing Thum’s observation, Gay 
McDougall, a member of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, said that the Uyghurs are treated as “enemies of the state” solely 
based on their ethnicity (Nebehay 2018).  
Human Rights Watch (2017a) has criticised that the Anti-Terrorism Law and the 
Measures for implementation, stating that they do not clarify whether a person shall 
be deprived of their liberty under the Settlement and Education policy, or the time 
limit. This means that in practice, a person can be detained for an unlimited period of 
time even after serving a full sentence (Human Rights Watch 2017a).  
International pressure has once again forced the CCP to confront the dilemma of its 
own creation. On the one hand, the CCP seeks to improve the efficacy of its counter-
terrorism policy by strengthening its control, emphasising the government’s role in 
“guiding” the public towards the “correct” and “positive” ideas and views. On the 
other hand, the restrictions imposed on every respect and coercive “transformation” 
backfired and resulted in intensified tensions especially between the CCP and Uyghur 
dissidents abroad. As in China, few people would challenge the CCP’s counter-
terrorism approach from within; the deficiencies will remain repressed until they are 
exacerbated to the point that they cannot be hidden from the public.  
China’s response to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on 
14 August 2018 once against demonstrated its consistent position in blaming external 
enemies.  
Certain anti-China forces have made unwarranted charges against China 
for political purposes, and a few overseas media smeared China’s 
measures to fight terrorism and crimes in Xinjiang through their distorted 
reports of the CERD [The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, author’s note] review, which is out of ulterior motives… 
Any rumor and slander will turn out to be futile (K. Lu 2018) [official 
translation]. 
The blame on “Certain anti-China forces” and “a few overseas media” “out of ulterior 
motives” indicates the identity and motives of the enemies. The statement continues 
by justifying Xinjiang’s policy as being aimed at “stability”, “economic growth” and 
“harmonious coexistence”. A commentary in the Global Times (2018) attributes the 
“peace and stability” to its “high intensify of regulations”, and praises the government 
for “salvaging” Xinjiang from “massive turmoil”. However, this façade of peace and 
stability pales beside the numerous reports on human rights violations and forceful 
“transformation” of the Uyghurs (Zenz 2018).  
At the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the 
Chinese delegate referred to the informative reports that they had prepared to show 
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their hard-work in implementing the convention of the UN Committee and urged the 
members of the Committee to take a “comprehensive and objective approach to 
China’s implementation” (Hong Kong Free Press 2018).  
The government’s efforts in improving economic development and equality in Xinjiang 
indicate that the government is making efforts and has good intentions. It is also 
possible that sometimes statistics may have been exaggerated to show the public the 
achievements of the government in preventing terrorism. But the implementation of 
the “re-education camps” highlights some intrinsic characteristics of this authoritarian 
regime. First, China’s counter-terrorism approach is based on a number of 
assumptions that help political elites and intellectuals to distinguish “friends” and 
“enemies”, the criteria for which are rooted in modern and contemporary history and 
the nationalist sentiments against imperialist invaders. Second, the criteria are 
therefore irrational and serve the political function of maintaining legitimacy. Third, 
the assumptions derived from the friend/enemy distinction are dangerous and can be 
used to justify targeting more individuals than necessary.  
The following section focuses on another part of the “soft” approach – propaganda. In 
July 2009 a series of violent riots took place in Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang, 
resulting in 197 deaths and over 1,700 people being injured, according to the official 
report (Xinhua 2009e). As discussed in Chapter 5, the official accounts of this incident 
are radically different from what has been reported in the West based on Rebiya 
Kadeer’s account. According to Rebiya Kadeer, the incident started with a Han-Uyghur 
conflict117 in Shaoguan which resulted in at least two deaths, both Uyghurs; and the 
unjust treatment of the Uyghurs offended Uyghurs throughout China, which led to an 
initially peaceful demonstration that was brutally suppressed by the Chinese 
authorities (McCurry 2009; Kadeer 2009). According to a Chinese source, a senior 
member of the World Uyghur Congress edited a video about a violent incident that 
had taken place in Iraq, published on CNN, and renamed it “Uyghur girl got beaten”, 
inciting anti-Han sentiment among the Uyghurs, and reinforcing ethnic antagonism 
(Xinhua 2009d). The state media linked the riots directly with Rebiya Kadeer, claiming 
that the World Uyghur Congress was in direct contact with the perpetrators, and 
incited the people inside the Chinese border via the internet, telephone, and 
messages. After the attacks, according to “relevant departments” – possibly referring 
to intelligence departments – Rebiya Kadeer called for an emergency meeting to make 
a plan to “further instigate the riots and rally international support to exert pressure 
on China”, resulting in the attacks against the Chinese Consulate General in Munich 
                                                      
117 The conflict was triggered by rumours that Uyghurs had raped two Chinese women, 
according to Rebiya Kadeer.  
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and the protest in front of the Chinese Embassy in the Netherlands (Xinhua 2009b). 
Rebiya Kadeer denied the charges, linking the violence with the “decades of 
discrimination and persecution directed at Uyghurs, their religion and culture, by the 
ruling Chinese Communist Party” (Rachel 2014).  
7.2.2 Top-down de-radicalisation propaganda 
To improve the credibility of the official discourse, a month after the riots, on 3 August 
2009, Xinhua reported that Rebiya Kadeer’s son Khahar, Memet, and daughter 
Roxingul and 9 other close relatives had stated the following in an open letter 
addressed to Rebiya.  
…In earlier years, the Party and the government offered you so many 
opportunities, created so many convenient conditions to make you one of 
the richest people in Xinjiang. Afterwards, the Party and the government 
have treated you well. However, you ended up in jail because of others’ 
incitement. It is the tolerance of our government that made it possible for 
you to go to America. Before your. departure, you vowed to our 
government that you would not participate in any form of separatist 
activities, but in the end, you have broken your promise.  
… The big family of Xinjiang has never seen such a cruel violent event like 
the 7/5 riots [the 2009 Urumqi Riots, author’s note]. Because of you, many 
innocent people of all ethnic groups lost their lives in Urumqi on 5th of 
July, with huge damage to properties, shops and vehicles. How come? 
… Mum, after all you have done, the government treated us well.  
… No-one would hope to destroy this happy family. So please think about 
the happiness of us and your grandchildren. Please do not destroy the 
stable and happy life of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang. (Xinhua 2009a). 
The blunt propaganda phrasing in the letter portrays a façade of all ethnic groups 
living happily in Xinjiang. There are a number of assumptions in this letter.  
1. Those who are dissatisfied with China’s policy do not know what life is really 
like in Xinjiang.  
2. External enemies incited Rebiya Kadeer to cause trouble for China.  
3. The Chinese government is an innocent victim of Rebiya Kadeer’s plot and has 
been kind enough to grant her leniency.  
4. Working against the Chinese government, denying its achievements and 
undermining the peace and stability it created in Xinjiang make Rebiya Kadeer 
an enemy of all ethnic groups in China.  
These assumptions reveal that the letter reflects the position of the government, 
more than that of Rebiya Kadeer’s relatives. Instead of improving the credibility of the 
government, the publication of this letter in fact raised concerns about its authenticity 
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of the letter itself and the conditions that kadeer’s children and relatives had been put 
in. Phelim Kine, a researcher for the Human Rights Watch, said in a Guardian report 
that "what is striking is that the language is boilerplate propaganda department 
phrasing. It suggests the government authorities had a role in their formulation" 
(Branigan 2009). Dilxat Raxit, a spokesperson for the World Uyghur Congress, simply 
told Reuters that the letter was fake. "It's not possible that one of her family members 
would write such a letter" (Blanchard, Blanchard, and Hornby 2009). The authenticity 
of these letters has been questioned in the context of the reports of the ill-treatment 
of by Kadeer’s relatives. According to the World Uyghur Congress, as many as 30 of 
her relatives have been detained for various reasons, ranging from tax evasion to 
talking about sensitive issues publicly (Radio Free Asia 2017). A report by Amnesty 
International (2017) detailed how these relatives were tortured by the police, and 
called for “urgent action”. 
On the very next day, the Global Times, a nationalist newspaper owned by the 
People’s Daily, responded to the “vicious attack” by the Western media and published 
the original manuscript of the hand-written letter in the Uyghur language (Huanqiu 
2009). According to an official from the Xinjiang Public Security Department, “the 
Western accusation is ridiculous”, and this is not the first time that Rebiya Kadeer’s 
relatives and friends have written to the government to express their opposition 
against separatism and violence (Huanqiu 2009). “Even the government was surprised 
at the letter!” “As long as journalists follow the procedure, they can interview them 
[Rebiya Kadeer’s relatives] to find out whether this is true or not!” (Huanqiu 2009) 
In 2009, Rebiya Kadeer was invited to attend the Melbourne Film Festival to promote 
the film about her life, “The 10 Conditions of Love”, directed by Jeff Daniels. Before 
the event, the cultural attaché at the Chinese consulate in Melbourne, Chunmei Chen, 
phoned the executive director Richard Moore and urged him to withdraw the film 
from the festival, which was rejected without any justification. The “extraordinary 
arrogance” of such a “new arrival” was clearly not well received by Moore (Child 
2009a). Rebiya Kadeer said at the festival: “[t]he Chinese Government is trying to 
silence my voice by forcing my family and children to speak up against me. It’s hard to 
imagine what kind of psychological torture they are going through at the moment” 
(Child 2009a). On 7 of August, Rebiya Kadeer joined 150 or so other Uyghurs in their 
independence movement protest outside the Chinese consulate in Melbourne during 
which Kadeer accused the Chinese government of “massacring” Uyghurs during the 
crackdown in the aftermath of the riots (Donovan 2009). 
Chinese communities did not hesitate to fight back. On 27 July, 47 Chinese societies in 
Australia, headed by the Federation of Chinese Association of Victoria published a 
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joint statement condemning the politicisation of an art event by the organisers of the 
Melbourne Film Festival (Y. Jiang 2009). Chen Xiafeng, a journalist for the News of the 
World, dug into the background of the politicians who had invited Rebiya Kadeer, 
saying that her visit had been supported by anti-China politicians Michael Danby and 
Australian Greens Leader Bob Brown, both of whom are, according to a “senior 
journalist in Australia”, “typical problem-makers” (Xiafeng Chen 2009). To protest 
against the politicisation of a cultural event, three Chinese directors withdrew from 
the festival (Itzkoff 2009). In response to the suspicion that the withdrawal was due to 
government pressure, Chunmei Chen said this was “pure nonsense”, and that the 
government only knew this after seeing the report in the local media (China.com 
2009). One of the directors, Tang Xiaobai, withdrew her film after being telephoned by 
the Chinese foreign ministry and the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, 
Film and Television, saying that “it was her decision to boycott the festival” (Tran 
2009). After the programme of the film festival was publicised, pro-China hackers 
crashed the website of the festival, replacing the programme information with the 
Chinese flag and anti-Kadeer slogans (Child 2009b). A hacker named “oldjun” left the 
following message in English on the official website of the festival, which went viral on 
Chinese online platforms including Baidu Post Bar (Baidu Post Bar 2009) and Tianya 
Forum (Tianya 2009), two popular online platforms.  
We like film, but we hate Rebiya Kadeer! We like peace, and we hate East 
Turkistan terrorist! Please apologize to all the Chinese people! Hacked by 
oldjun! (original text) 
This case demonstrates how the official position, which is backed up by evidence that 
is far from convincing – letters by Rebiya Kadeer’s relatives – resulted in nationalist 
sentiments among Chinese communities. It is clear that the government’s role has 
extended from the purely political sphere into the culture sphere, and from state level 
into the life of ordinary people. Considering the style of the language, described as 
“boilerplate propaganda department phrasing” by Phelim Kine, as well as the level of 
state control in the entire terrorism discourse in China, it is highly likely that the 
government played a role in formulating the open letter to Rebiya Kadeer. Family 
members turning against each other is a phenomenon that was seen during the 
Cultural Revolution, during which the government encouraged individuals to “draw a 
clear line” between themselves and their “evil” relatives (Jinan Daily 2016). The 
revolutionary culture that characterised the Cultural Revolution led officials to believe 
that the “correct” official ideology should be indoctrinated to “transform” those who 
resisted conforming. Officials dismissed alternative accounts as entirely “wrong” and 
supported by external enemies to contain China. Therefore, they did not see how 
unconvincing it is was to ask Kadeer’s relatives to write a letter praising the Chinese 
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government. In creating an environment in which the official account of events 
dominates the discourse, the CCP does not focus on addressing the issues that Uyghur 
dissidents have. Instead, it groups all of the criticism it dislikes into hostile forces, 
making them the enemies, and undermining the ability of the government to engage 
in political negotiation to solve the problem.  
This case shows how official propaganda affects the public at the individual level. The 
message left by the hacker oldjun indicates that the government has effectively 
constructed the image of Rebiya Kadeer as an enemy of the Chinese people. The 
underlying friend/enemy distinction is translated into simple “hate” and “like”, 
indicating that even though the propaganda is hardly convincing, the Chinese public 
may have adopted the same assumptions that underpin the official counter-terrorism 
discourse – the Uyghur separatists represented by Rebiya Kadeer, as well as all those 
who support them, are our enemies. The dominance of the official discourse resulted 
in nationalist sentiments against the separatists and the hostility against Rebiya 
Kadeer among the public. 
7.2.3 Bottom-up de-radicalisation propaganda 
On 30 April 2014, the last day of Xi Jinping’s visit to Xinjiang, a knife attack and 
bombing took place at the exit of the Urumqi South Station. The CCP ascribed the 
attack to Ismail Yusup, a member of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (B. Gao 
2014). The Turkistan Islamic Party claimed responsibility for the attack (SITE 
Intelligence Group 2014).118 This attack became the focus of attention in China during 
the following days. According to a public opinion analysis by the official analysts from 
the People’s Daily, from the day of the attack to the 4 May, over 1,200 news articles 
and over 42,000 microblogs around this topic were published online each day (Xintian 
He and Shi 2014). On the 1 May, 11 Uyghur students at several universities across 
China posted a joint letter entitled “We cannot Remain Silent”, condemning this 
attack. The letter starts with a condemnation of the killing of innocent citizens, which 
is followed by 11 questions to the perpetrators. It then clarifies that the Islamic 
doctrines are against terrorist activities, with the wording echoing Xi’s analogy of rats 
(Dai and Hu 2014). The text concludes with a call for unity, which is emphasised by it 
being repeated three times, and a call for action against terrorists. 
                                                      
118 In the official Chinese counter-terrorism discourse, the Turkistan Islamic Party is 
considered the forerunner of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement  (see Li 2016). 
However, some question the link between the two (see Xu, Fletcher, and Bajoria 
2014). 
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Violent terrorist activities and violent terrorists will be forever nailed to a 
historical pillory… 119 [Those who] fight against the powerful state regime 
will only end up in death. [Those who] become the enemy of the whole 
peace-loving nation will certainly be destroyed….. We call upon our 
Uyghur compatriots to stand up and fight against evil extremism and 
extreme ideology… The enemies are afraid of our unity, which means unity 
is most powerful. The more the enemies undermine the unity, the more 
we need to maintain the unity. We need to unite, and all the ethnic groups 
need to unite!  
This quote shows a high level of political conformity. A historical pillory is a typical 
Chinese expression that is used to show strong opposition, indicating that the person 
in question is notorious and will be forever hated by future generations. The 
expression is seen in both CCP and anti-CCP propaganda. For example, pro-CCP 
individuals believe that historical nihilism must be nailed to a historical pillory (S. Guo 
2016). The metaphor of the pillory may be used to justify public humiliation and 
physical abuse that have been reported in the form of public trial (Lu Yang 2014) and 
torture (Thum 2018). Anti-CCP individuals believe that CCP leaders such as Deng 
Xiaoping and Li Peng must be nailed to a historical pillory (Zhou X. 2017). The quote 
emphasises both the correctness of the CCP and the power of the state. It explicates 
that those who fight against the state will die and be destroyed. It also portrays 
younger radicals as innocent children who are in need of guidance in regard to the 
“correct” ideology.  
This case demonstrates a bottom-up model of propaganda. The text was initially 
disseminated on social platforms such as Microblog, Wechat, and Tianya Forum 
(jzqtj123 2014). Soon after it gained popularity, a local official phoned one of the 
authors to express his support and asked for the Uyghur language version (Dai and Hu 
2014). Written by Uyghur students, the letter received much attention from the 
government. As discussed above, Uygur opinion leaders and the education sector are 
two of the important targets of the Mass Line approach. Uyghur students represent 
both Uyghurs and college/university students, and their opinions are supposedly more 
convincing than pure government propaganda. Therefore, it is natural that the state 
media would promote the letter to the entire nation. The state media highlighted that 
the public spoke very highly of the letter. According to an estimation by China Youth 
Daily, under the leadership of the Communist Youth League of China, over 70% of the 
comments praised and agreed with the authors that “both Uyghurs and Han Chinese 
are victims. Terrorists do not represent anyone”, and “terrorists have nothing to do 
with ethnicity”. 20% of the comment joined the authors in condemning terrorisms. 
                                                      
119 historical pillory: 历史的耻辱柱 
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And 10% followed up by clarifying that terrorist attacks are against religious doctrines. 
This view is, of course, subject to selection bias as a large proportion of those who 
read and comment on the state media are likely to already be at least partially aligned 
with the CCP’s framing.  
In June, 13 overseas Xinjiang-born students of different ethnic groups published an 
article entitled “Motherland, Xinjiang, I want to tell you”, expressing their indignation 
against terrorists and their love for the motherland (CRI Online 2014). At around the 
same time, 15 Uyghur intellectuals, in collaboration with over 200 writers and 
translators, published another joint open letter entitled “it is our responsibility and 
obligation to never remain silent – a joint open letter to Uyghur compatriots” (Sui 
2014). The letter emphasises that “a small group of mad, inhumane mob” cannot 
represent any ethnicity or religion, and that the Uyghurs remaining silent will result in 
the whole ethnic group being stigmatised by what the mob has done (Sui 2014). 
Portraying terrorists as a “mad, inhuman mob” fits well with the official discourse that 
demonises the enemy.  
In July 2014, a book named after the initial post by 11 Uyghur students was published, 
followed by other editions in the Uyghur and Kazak languages. The book contains over 
40 articles written by over 200 Uyghur writers, poets, and scholars, including the initial 
post by 11 Uyghur students, joint letters from different sectors and areas such as 
overseas Uyghurs students, academics from universities, social groups, government 
officials and believers (Xinjiang Daily 2014b). Its publisher, the Xinjiang science and 
technology press is state-owned, and affiliated with the Publishing Bureau of the 
XUAR. The publication of this book was supported by the Propaganda Department of 
the XUAR, who considered that it would to “unify the thinking” and “build consensus” 
(Xinjiang Daily 2014b), indicating the purpose of promoting political conformity and 
reinforcing the “correct” ideas and views. 120 
The high degree of similarity between the language used in these posts and the official 
counter-terrorism propaganda shows the uniformity of the language used by various 
actors, in this case, the Uyghur students and Uyghur intellectuals in China, and 
overseas students of different ethnic groups. The joint letter by 11 Uyghur students, 
which started as online posts on social media and then received support from a 
government official, became an exemplary act for other potential “propagandists” to 
follow, and was finally published by a state-owned publisher. The possibility of 
becoming famous through manifesting loyalty to the CCP stimulated other Uyghurs to 
follow. Because of their identities as Uyghur, students, and intellectuals, their voice is 
                                                      
120 unifying the thinking: 统一思想; building consensus: 凝聚共识 
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valued by the CCP as an important complements to the existing counter-terrorism 
discourse. Mobilising Uyghurs to align with the official framing helped the government 
to entrench the official counter-terrorism discourse and the underlying friend/enemy 
distinction among the groups they represent. It is unclear to what extent those who 
wrote these letters genuinely believe what they have written. But what is certain is 
that state propaganda did result in a behavioural conformity with the official discourse 
of counter-terrorism. The voice of the Uyghurs also serves to emphasise that the 
government is not targeting the Uyghur population, which, in the context of recent 
reports on the “re-education camps”, which are disproportionally directed at Uyghurs, 
only reveals the emptiness of the state propaganda.   
7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed China’s de-radicalisation strategy with reference to the role of 
education and a case study of mass mobilisation. Facing the same challenge of 
transforming the minds of an radicalised individuals, China’s approach seems to be 
particularly heavy-handed. Based on the assumption that only the official version of 
the truth should be promoted, the CCP has transformed education into an 
indoctrinating instrument. On the one hand, education is considered very important 
as part of China’s prevention strategy, and some local officials have developed various 
tactics to prevent students from dropping out. On the other hand, education is used 
to re-integrate former extremists into society. The education of these former 
extremists relies on community and family, reflecting the Mass Line principle of 
including citizens in security governance. However, recent reports regarding the 
incarceration of the Uyghurs in “vocational training centres” highlighted a tension 
between the Mass Line theory and its practice.  
China’s de-radicalisation can be categorised into hard and soft approaches. The 
categorisation reflects the friend/enemy dichotomy embedded in Mao’s theory of two 
types of contradictions. In contrast to the sweeping crackdown campaigns, mass 
mobilisation is considered part of the “softer” approach. However, government 
officials hold a narrow view regarding what is “correct”, which has turned the “soft” 
approach into a wholesale indoctrination programme. On the one hand, the 
government has facilitated top-down propaganda that started from the state media 
and ended with nationalist individuals hacking the Melbourne Film Festival website. 
On the other hand, pro-CCP speeches at the grassroots level, especially from within 
the Uyghur community have been widely disseminated and published.  
This chapter portrayed a paranoid party that is overreacting, driven by the anxiety 
about losing legitimacy. However, it is worth noting that China is not the only state 
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that overreacts when faced with terrorism and radicalisation. One of the tactics of 
terrorists is to provoke the state to overreact, so that its legitimacy, which is based on 
its commitment to democratic values and the rule of law is eroded. The global War on 
Terror, the PREVENT strategy in the UK, and the Center for Prevention, Integration 
and Citizenship in France, are all examples of governments’ “trial and error” in 
countering terrorism and radicalisation. There are some shocking similarities between 
some elements of the counter-terrorism strategies in China and the West. The use of 
the friend/enemy distinction can be seen in the global War on Terror discourse. The 
emphasis of the Chinese national identity resonates with the focus on “Britishness” in 
the UK. The efforts to transform an individuals’ minds by making them sing the 
national anthem are also observed in the Center for Prevention, Integration and 
Citizenship in France. Highlighting the difficulties in striking a proper balance between 
state security and civil liberty is by no means meant to justify China’s heavy-handed 
approach. It is important to not isolate China’s approach to terrorism as yet another 
example of intrinsic problems of an authoritarian regimes, as a similar dilemma is seen 
in democratic countries as well.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion  
This thesis sought to answer the question of why and how the CCP legitimises its 
approach to terrorism. Using Chinese official documents and academic publications as 
primary data, it thesis investigated the ways in which the counter-terrorism discourse, 
policy and practice are conditioned and shaped by China’s quest for legitimacy and 
historical continuities. It argued that the CCP is concerned about legitimacy as it 
provides stability and sustains its rule. The CCP’s quest for legitimacy in the context of 
terrorism has been characterised by the following aspects.  
First, the narratives of the Century of Humiliation are deployed as a source of 
legitimacy for the CCP’s focus on national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. 
Written by the CCP, the “humiliating” history of the colonial and imperialist 
intervention between 1839 and 1949 is crucial to the CCP’s claims about the centrality 
of unity to China’s political discourse. It is in the context of the history of a divided 
China that the CCP has constructed its legitimacy through its commitment to 
maintaining the complete ownership of, and full sovereignty over its territories. The 
narratives thus carry with them the connotation of “unity” as something that is 
specifically constructed by the CCP in the context of the history of “humiliation”. 
Second, the Chinese notion of “unity” lays out some assumptions that explain China’s 
attitude towards “separatism”. These untold assumptions are conveyed to the public 
by using labels such as “hostile forces”, “three forces” and “East Turkistan forces”, 
which enable the CCP to conflate separatism and terrorism. In deploying these 
narratives and labels, the CCP exercises its power as a defining agency to set the tone 
for an event, and political officials and scholars then reproduce the official discourse 
based on ready-made assumptions so that the CCP can propose a solution that 
requires a further curtailment of civil liberties, which would otherwise be difficult to 
justify to the public. The labels and narratives allow them to select, organise and 
interpret events in a way that is conducive to the legitimacy of the regime. 
Third, the investigation of the concepts of the “enemy” shows that the way in which it 
has been used makes it difficult to objectively identify what “terrorism” is, and 
underscores the fundamentally political nature of the concept and its usage. Political 
officials manipulate the friend/enemy distinction to ensure the stability and security 
of the regime. Throughout contemporary history, different generations of leaders 
have used “hostile forces” to refer to slightly different “enemies” who have been 
deemed as threats to the rule of the CCP. Under the current leadership, the notion of 
“three forces”, inherited from the Mao era, functions to allow the CCP not only to 
ascribe right and wrong, but also to mobilise the public to participate in its counter-
terrorism practice through mass mobilisation.  
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Fourth, political elites and scholars are concerned about the likelihood of a regime 
change because of external intervention. Cases of humanitarian intervention in other 
countries have reinforced their perception that external intervention infringes upon a 
country’s sovereignty and often results in the exacerbation of conflicts. Linked to this, 
China’s political elites and scholars view its counter-terrorism approach as one of its 
domestic affairs, and criticisms regarding issues such as human rights are seen by 
them as a form of interference. Accusations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang remind 
Chinese officials and scholars of interventions such as the case of Kosovo and the 
colour revolution in the Middle East. The CCP justifies its increasingly tightened 
control over ideology in the context of regime change, and dismisses human rights 
accusations as interference.  
Fifth, China faces the same challenges in handling the balance between state security 
and civil liberties, and the pressure to maintain the legitimacy of its often-abusive 
counter-terrorism regime. The development of the Anti-terrorism legal framework 
reveals the struggle between the pressure to conform to international norms and the 
single-party regime’s intrinsic need to consolidate power by curtailing civil liberties. 
Take the revisions of the definition of terrorism in China’s Anti-Terrorism Law as an 
example; the initial draft of the law criminalises “thoughts”, conflates terrorism and 
separatism, and is highly political and state-centric. The revised definition shows some 
limited attempts to conform to international standards by deleting “thoughts”, and 
adding an individual dimension into the definition of terrorism. This change indicates 
some awareness among political elites about the problems with the initial draft, and 
some attempts to shift the focus from state security to individual rights by 
complementing the state-centric counter-terrorism strategy with a dimension of 
human security on a normative level. In addition, the executive has started to share 
power with the judiciary in designating terrorist individuals and organisations. The 
National Counter-terrorism Work Leading Organ, the executive body that is 
responsible for coordinating counter-terrorism practice, has issued three lists of 
terrorist organisations and individuals. After the revision of the Law, China adopted a 
“double track” system, which allows the people’s courts to carry out the judicial 
procedure to designate terrorists. However, in practice, the designation still relies on 
the executive. 
Sixth, the Mass Line strategy has been applied widely in counter-terrorism 
propaganda and mass mobilisation. The application of the Mass Lines principles is a 
key illustration of how the quest for legitimacy has been reflected in counter-
terrorism practice, and an illustration of the historical continuities in the current 
counter-terrorism discourse. Developed initially by Mao, the notion faded from view 
for most of the post-Mao era. The current leadership has facilitated a revival of the 
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Mass Line principles in an attempt to draw support from the public. The combination 
of the Mass Line principles and counter-terrorism results in guiding doctrines such as 
“combining specialised efforts with the Mass Line” and “mass prevention and mass 
governance” in counter-terrorism, emphasising individuals’ ability and responsibility in 
regard to intelligence collection.121 Mobilised by the counter-terrorism discourse and 
economic incentives, ordinary citizens play an important role in China’s “people’s war 
on terror”. The case of the “Great Round-up” after the knife attacks in Shache County 
in 2014 provides evidence of how the CCP has mobilised the public, and how this case, 
in turn, served as part of the counter-terrorism propaganda.  
Seventh, based on the assumptions of a “peaceful evolution” and the “enemies’” 
attempt to overthrow the CCP through peaceful means, the CCP has been vigilant in 
regard to religion and education, as they are the main vehicles for spreading 
ideologies. In order to ensure the ideological foundation for its rule within China, the 
Communist Party has implemented stringent regulations that aim at controlling the 
“ideological battlefield”. 
The supranational religious aspirations, such as Ummah and the intervention in the 
secular administration such as with regard to marriage and divorce, have been 
deemed a threat to China’s ideological security as they are incompatible with its goal 
of maintaining national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Combined with the 
Mass Line strategy, the CCP seeks to engage community members by allying with 
“patriotic believers”. Similarly, education has been seen as a major battlefield for 
ideology. In the context of counter-terrorism, “education” has been used both for 
prevention and in rehabilitation as an instrument of indoctrination. To prevent the 
spread of extremist ideology among less-educated young Uyghurs, local government 
officials have carried out various measures to keep students from dropping out of 
school. In addition, the Anti-Terrorism Law requires detention centres and prisons to 
assess the risk of terrorists after they have served their full sentence. Depending on 
the result, they might then be referred to the “Settlement and Education” programme 
to be indoctrinated with the “correct” ideas and views and loyalty to the Party. Those 
who are deemed a risk are “educated” in prisons, detention centres, and community-
based rehabilitation institutes.122 As the current Anti-Terrorism Law does not specify 
the time limit, Human Rights Watch (2017a) points out that this may result in 
indefinite detention.  
                                                      
121 mass prevention and mass governance: 群防群治 
122 Settlement and Education: 安置教育. Human Rights Watch translation: education 
placement. 
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Eighth, the case study of the “East Turkistan forces” presents in-depth information 
about the manoeuvring of the frames, narratives, and labels of “terrorism”. The CCP 
uses “East Turkistan forces” as an umbrella term for all attempts to pursue 
independence in what is currently known as Xinjiang. Such an understanding conflates 
separatism and terrorism, criminalising the Uyghur communities in exile who 
sympathise with the cause of separatism. Despite the criticisms, the CCP claims to 
have conclusive evidence regarding the use of force by entities such as the World 
Uyghur Congress and the alleged link between “East Turkistan forces” and other 
“enemies” makes it possible for the CCP to explain the ongoing conflicts in Xinjiang 
with the same friend/enemy distinction that underpinned the previous security 
discourse. Based on these ready-made assumptions, the CCP has promoted the 
narratives of how innocent people have been deceived into joining the Hijrat, in order 
to counteract the extremist narratives. Informed by the Mass Line strategy, the CCP 
differentiates “diehard” terrorists from those who blindly follow an extremist 
ideology. To gain support from and engage the majority of the Uyghur community, the 
CCP incorporates community members into its propaganda system. While such a 
tactic echoes the engagement of community members in fighting against terrorism in 
liberal democracies, the Chinese Uyghurs’ voice is more visibly characterised by 
homogeneity with the Party line.  
The research question is sub-divided into the following three themes.  
8.1 How do Chinese political elites and scholars perceive “unity” and 
“separatism”? 
First, the propensity of the Chinese government to prioritise unity can be understood 
by examining the two major debates on unity that have existed throughout Chinese 
history. Ancient philosophers debated the relationship between stability and unity. 
Philosophers such as Mozi argued for strengthening the role of the ruler – the “wise 
man” – to establish a set of standards for morality, so that the people had a better 
understanding of right and wrong. Although scholars such as Laozi argued against 
strong government intervention, contemporary Chinese scholars who are loyal to the 
Party have sought to interpret his ideas as being in line with supporting the 
“unification of diversity and homogeneity” under the Dao (Li 2003, 80).  
Another debate in modern China involves how the framing of territories creates its 
own reality. In the context of the Century of Humiliation, the ideal of creating a 
“Grand Union” prevailed among early revolutionists such as Sun Yat-sen and Kang 
Youwei. The experience of imperialist invasions during the Century of Humiliation 
made intellectuals sensitive to the enemies’ intention to undermine China’s unity. 
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Scholars such as Gu Jiegang and Fu Sinian advocated abolishing the use of minzu, 
fearing that the name itself would help the enemies to divide China along ethnic lines. 
Their opponents such as Fei Xiaotong and Jian Bozan were concerned about the 
negative consequences of Gu Jiegang’s assimilationist view. This debate explains the 
vigilance of the Chinese government regarding calling Xinjiang “East Turkistan”. The 
priority of unity is reflected in China’s integration model – diversity within unity. This 
integration model projects an inevitable assimilation of different ethnic and religious 
groups towards the “correct” ideology of the socialist path. The expression of ethnic 
or religious identities is only allowed on the condition that the “unity” of the nation is 
respected.  
Second, a friend/enemy distinction underpins China’s political discourse. The label of 
“hostile forces” is used to distinguish between “friends” and “enemies”, and 
subsequently enables the government to decide how to treat them. Mao believed 
that an imminent war was inevitable. He believed that the enemies would use 
peaceful evolution to undermine the foundation of the legitimacy of China as a 
socialist country. Adopting a revolutionary view, Mao advocated that enemies should 
be treated with coercion and the deprivation of individual rights (1957, 1949). 
Therefore, a revolutionary struggle against the enemies in the Mao era was 
particularly violent. Deng was more concerned with the impact of economic 
backwardness on the foundation of the legitimacy of the CCP. He adopted a 
developmental approach to security, directed much attention to economic 
development, and laid the foundation for the government’s focus on economic 
growth to deal with the political unrest in Xinjiang. The two generations of leader that 
followed Deng continued the momentum of economic development, and the 
relatively high pace of economic growth reduced the government’s reliance on the 
friend/enemy distinction as a source of legitimacy. However, the assumption of a 
group of external enemies who share the same anti-China agenda remains important. 
These assumptions re-emerged in an era of economic slow-down, and resulted in Xi 
Jinping’s re-emphasis of ideological enemies.  
Third, the legitimacy of the CCP is partly built on the politicisation of the past. The 
term “hostile forces” used in the current counter-terrorism discourse resonates with 
the friend/enemy distinction that is central to the narratives of the Century of 
Humiliation. The official political discourse channels the sense of victimhood among 
the people to project all ethnic groups in their entirety as a unified nation, making any 
attempts of “separatism” illegitimate. In doing so, the CCP has established a regime of 
truth and decides what can and cannot be seen as “correct”. Accordingly, the 
“correct” view of history must admit that Xinjiang has always been an integral part of 
China; the “correct” view of ethnicity must prioritise the unity of the Chinese nation 
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over the diversity of ethnic groups; and the “correct” view of the state must 
acknowledge that the sovereignty of the state must be safeguarded against the 
interference of enemies in the name of human rights.  
Fourth, the concept of separatism is constructed based on the perception of unity and 
the friend/enemy distinction. Envisioning an ideal of a “Grand Union”, Chinese 
political elites and intellectuals assume a long list of territories that has always been 
an integral part of China until China was “carved up” in the Century of Humiliation. 
Separatists’ claims for these territories, are therefore considered illegitimate. Allowing 
a limited degree of diversity, the CCP has constructed a narrow understanding of what 
kind of lifestyle the Uyghurs should adopt, and sees the “sinicisation of religions” as 
inevitable and necessary” (Central Socialist School 2018). The expression of the 
Uyghur identity beyond the stereotype of the Uyghurs characterised by singing, 
dancing and beautiful women wearing colourful clothes might be considered “wrong” 
and subject to being “transformed”.  
Fifth, the assumptions that underpin China’s counter-terrorism discourse reveal the 
state-centric nature of its counter-terrorism approach. Chinese political elites and 
intellectuals are primarily concerned with the state as the referent object, and portray 
a variety of groups and individuals with different agendas as a monolithic group of 
enemies who share the same anti-China agenda. This perception is reinforced by 
intellectuals through seeing the cases of the Western intervention in Kosovo and 
other cases of intervention as the precedent to justify future intervention in China. 
The anxiety about human rights activities has led the government to strengthen its 
control over non-government organisations and antagonise groups such as Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International, making it difficult for third parties to 
function as mediators between the government and Uyghur dissidents.  
8.2 How does the CCP frame, define, and deal with “terrorism”?  
The second sub-theme that was discussed in this thesis involves how the CCP frames, 
defines, and deals with real and perceived terrorist threats.  
First, the official security principle put forward by political leaders indicates that the 
current leadership has inherited the assumptions about the causes of unrest and 
conflict in the world. Distancing itself from the hegemonic pursuit of power of the 
West, the CCP has put forwarded the Overall Security Outlook, which is characterised 
by a human-centric approach, a focus on development and five principles of peaceful 
coexistence. This security principle is, of course, largely normative, and is clearly not 
being followed strictly in the light of recent reports on “re-education camps”. But it 
highlights the three important aspects of China’s counter-terrorism approach – the 
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revival of the Mass Line approach, the developmental approach to dealing with socio-
economic grievances, and hostility towards external intervention. 
Second, the assumptions of external enemies are evident in the political discourse, in 
which the external enemies are seen as plotting to induce peaceful evolution and 
ultimately induce a regime change in China. Given the exemplary effect of the cases of 
separatist movements made possible by external intervention, Chinese political elites 
and scholars have always strongly opposed intervention in other countries, fearing 
that the separatist movements in China will employ the same tactic – appealing to 
Western supporters in the name of human rights and democracy. Attributing 
terrorism to “hostile forces” allows the government to utilise the ready-made 
assumptions about the enemies, and thus avoid clarifying the identity and motivation 
of the perpetrators. When citizens adopt the label of “hostile forces”, they unwittingly 
accept the assumptions that external enemies are responsible for the protraction of 
the fight against terrorism.  
Third, the obsession with unity and the assumptions about external enemies led 
policy-makers to broaden the scope of the counter-terrorism legal framework. 
Embedded in China’s political context, which prioritises national unity, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, the creation of the Anti-Terrorism Law was an attempt to 
consolidate the power of the government to designate its “enemies”. It reflects the 
struggle of an authoritarian regime between maintaining efficacy and sharing power 
with the judiciary. Concentrating power in the hands of the executive allows the 
government to put designated individuals on trial without, or before satisfying legal 
criteria. However, doing so also contravenes China’s own Constitution and Legal 
Procedural Law. The revised Anti-Terrorism Law did accord the judiciary more power 
in carrying out designations, but no restrictions have been put on the executive in 
regard to not intervening in the judicial process. Ultimately, the current “double track” 
system still provides excessive power to the executive which might be used to target 
political opponents, indicating that in China’s political context, “procedural justice” 
can be compromised when the state seeks to pursue “substantive justice”.  
The Anti-Terrorism Law also reflects an obstinate conflation between terrorist 
“thoughts” and behaviour, and between separatism and terrorism. Since the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation coined the phrase “three evils”, it has been frequently used 
in the official counter-terrorism discourse. Equally vague as the “hostile forces”, the 
phrase is equally problematic because it lacks defining power and opens up the 
concept of terrorism to political interpretations.  
Furthermore, despite the revision of the draft Anti-Terrorism Law, the definition of 
terrorism is still vague enough to be used to criminalise “thoughts”, as evidenced by 
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the imprisonment of advocates, such as Ilham Tohti. With regards to radicalisation, 
the criminalisation of “thoughts” means that the authorities pay attention equally to 
cognitive radicalisation, which can be seen clearly in the emphasis on “ideological 
work” and the efforts to “transform” those who are prone to radicalisation.  
The dramatic increase in the number of terrorism-related cases after the publication 
of the Anti-Terrorism Law shows that the local authorities have been able to invoke 
the Anti-Terrorism Law more frequently than is necessary. The case of the Tianming 
Express company shows that when an offence can be punished either according to the 
Postal Law or the Anti-Terrorism Law, the local government chooses the latter (Xinhua 
2016a). Invoking Anti-Terrorism Law whenever possible reflects a tendency to 
overstretch the scope of counter-terrorism strategy in legal practice. Anti-Terrorism 
Law is thus not only used against political enemies, but also to strengthen social 
control.  
Fourth, the departments and institutions involved in counter-policy-making indicate a 
tendency towards a concentration of power under the current leadership. Within the 
government, the Party departments have further consolidated their power by bringing 
Armed Police, ethnic affairs, and religious affairs under the Party’s control. To reflect 
the Mass Line approach, the Anti-Terrorism Law also seeks to mobilise the public and 
turn individuals into sources of intelligence.  
China’s cooperation with neighbouring countries reflects a growing assertiveness in 
promoting its own brand of security in the region and demonstrates the intention to 
highlight common interests, especially among SCO countries, based on dissatisfaction 
with the acquiescence or support of the West in regard to what are considered the 
“three forces”.  
Fifth, Deng’s legacy of a developmental approach to security is still influential in 
today’s counter-terrorism policy. Chinese political elites and intellectuals believe that 
terrorism is rooted in a complicated international situation in which there is a 
widened development gap as well as inequalities. The solution to terrorism, therefore, 
lies in the economic development of Xinjiang. Indeed, the rapid growth of the GDP of 
Xinjiang reflects the government’s efforts in this respect. Large-scale programmes 
aimed at economic improvements in Xinjiang manifest the underlying assumption that 
economic development will naturally reduce the socio-economic grievances that have 
been used for separatist claims. However, the simplistic understanding of the problem 
of terrorism has proved insufficient in dealing with the heightened inequalities that 
have accompanied the economic growth and intensified the ethnic tensions among 
both the Uyghurs and Han due to preferential policies in favour of ethnic minorities.  
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Sixth, Chinese political elites and intellectuals perceive the increasing religiosity of 
Islam a threat to the regime’s stability. Because they see the revival of Islam in the 
context of the relatively relaxed control after the Cultural Revolution, they have called 
for tightened control over religion and the sinicisation of Islam. Among others, the 
efforts to eliminate “illegal religious activities” have allowed the CCP to target a 
variety of religious practices such as the use of the halal logo on daily necessities such 
as water and paper. Official documents on distinguishing illegal religious activities and 
de-radicalisation have allowed the CCP to designate some religious practices as signs 
of radicalisation. 
Seventh, the implementation of the Mass Line approach reveals that although China’s 
counter-terrorism is centred on the masses normatively, the content and style of mass 
mobilisation is largely decided by government officials. The re-emphasis of the Mass 
Line approach under Xi reflects the CCP’s attempts to adjust its security policy to deal 
with non-traditional security threats. In accordance with Xi’s “Overall National 
Security Outlook”, the counter-terrorism policy not only addresses individuals as the 
receivers of security but also the participants of counter-terrorism practice.  
However, the implementation is problematic, as it is based on the war narratives and 
the assumption that the masses are passive receivers of information who must be 
educated and guided to construct the “correct” views. The language used in the 
counter-terrorism propaganda resonates with the historical political movement 
“Eliminating the Four Pests”, which was also framed as a “people’s war”. War 
narratives reinforce and normalise the friend/enemy dichotomy. The case of the 
“Great Round-up” demonstrates that guided by the Mass Line approach, local citizens 
were mobilised to join the counter-terrorism practice and the case itself was later 
used as propaganda as well.  
De-radicalisation propaganda comes in various forms, including cultural activities. The 
“Little Apples” dancing competition reveals the simplistic and black-and-white 
understanding that local officials have of the Uyghur culture. They consider the 
secular, sinicised Uyghur culture as modern, and some traditions that extremists have 
promoted as destructive and backward, and believe that who practice these traditions 
as people who must be “saved” by the government. Because extremists have 
promoted an interpretation of Islam that forbids singing and dancing and the jilbab, 
the CCP has focused on promoting the Uyghur culture, which is characterised by 
singing, dancing and beautiful women wearing colourful clothes, which is a simplistic 
and stereotypical understanding of the diversity of the Uyghurs. Promoting this kind of 
understanding to prevent radicalisation might result in further undermining the 
credibility of the official discourse due to a lack of cultural sensitivity.  
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Propaganda material is disseminated through the education sector, local 
communities, and religious communities. To engage community members to improve 
the credibility of the official discourse, the government has organised many training 
sessions for “patriotic believers” in order for them to manifest loyalty. Similarly, open 
letters by Uyghur cultural workers are promoted to add the Uyghur’s voice to the 
official discourse. However, the similarity of the open letters with the official discourse 
only demonstrates the narrow understanding of the “correct” views and lifestyle that 
the government allows.  
Eighth, the anxiety of political elites and intellectuals about the infiltration of Western 
values is reflected in the narratives of an “ideological battlefield”. The government’s 
attempt to maintain tight social control clashes with people’s desire to follow the 
values of democracy, human rights and freedom. In order to justify this control, the 
CCP frames these “Western” values as a threat to the regime’s stability. In 
incorporating ideological control into the de-radicalisation propaganda, the CCP has 
further established the “correct” views on history, ethnicity, and the state. The 
intolerance towards alternative ideas and views serves to prevent not only the spread 
of real terrorist propaganda, but also any ideologies that are might undermine the 
legitimacy of the CCP. 
Ninth, “education” in the context of China’s de-radicalisation functions to indoctrinate 
people with the “correct” ideas and views. To prevent the Uyghur youth from 
encountering the “wrong” ideology, the local government has designed various 
mechanisms to ensure that they attend public schools that promote the “correct” 
ideology. Importantly, the government has implemented the Settlement and 
Education policy to continue to “educate” those who have served their sentences but 
are still considered a risk to society. Extending detention without charge raises 
concerns about due process. The methods used to rehabilitate these detainees also 
demonstrate the obsession of local governments with indoctrinating people with the 
“correct” version of religion and Uyghur culture. 
Tenth, the discourse of stability maintenance demonstrates the CCP’s quest for 
legitimacy, which is characterised by an obsession with unity and a reliance on all-
encompassing control. To ensure stability, the government has established a regime 
of truth according to which only some assumptions are “correct”, and alternative 
interpretations of history, ethnic relations and the sovereign right of the state are 
considered a threat to the stability of Xinjiang. The political slogans indicate the 
various dimensions of control. The “four identifies” requires minorities to identify with 
the state, the Chinese nation, the Chinese culture, and the socialist path. The “three 
cannot do withouts” requires the public to recognise the mutual reliance of the 
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different ethnic groups. The “five keys” indicates that problems should be tackled 
through different channels.  
8.3 How does the CCP respond to the Xinjiang political violence? 
This thesis also examined more closely the case of “East Turkistan forces” – the major 
“enemy” that has been constructed in China’s counter-terrorism discourse. Anxious 
about Uyghur separatist movements and their ability to rally support from Western 
sympathisers, political elites and intellectuals use the label “East Turkistan forces” to 
justify the legitimacy of the crackdown on any separatist attempts, including non-
violent expression. The CCP has adopted hard and soft approaches to differentiate 
“contradictions among the people” and “contradictions between ourselves and the 
enemy”. However, sometimes the CCP has to manipulate the concept of the enemy to 
avoid making too many enemies for itself, and justify further measures against the 
real enemies. The stories of hijrat highlighted that most people have fled China for 
personal reasons – to make more money and pursue education – as opposed to 
political reasons – to escape from suppressive government. They portray those who 
sought to join the hijrat as less-educated individuals who were not capable of making 
the right decision.  
An examination of hard and soft de-radicalisation measures in Xinjiang reveals that 
even the so-called “soft” approach can be very harsh in an authoritarian state, based 
on the government’s narrow understanding of “correct” ideas and views. Recent 
reports on “re-education camps” demonstrate this point. Officials see coercive 
internment as “transformation through education”, believing that forcing innocent 
Uyghurs to “recognise how they were wrong”, “abandon the evil”, and learn the 
“good policies” of the government will forge loyalty (Chabuchaer County 2015). 
Without mechanisms to keep the power of the executive in check, an authoritarian 
state is intrinsically less capable of limiting what local officials can do to achieve the 
goal of unity and stability. The criticising reports, largely from “Western” media, have 
further reinforced the officials’ perception that the West sees China subjectively 
(Hong Kong Free Press 2018). The ready-made assumptions in the counter-terrorism 
discourse thus perpetuate a vicious circle that undermines the CCP’s ability to work 
with non-governmental organisations towards solving the problem of separatist 
movement through political negotiation.  
8.4 Broader implications 
The findings of this thesis have a number of broader implications for the debates 
about “terrorism” and China as a rising power more broadly.  
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For those who are interested in terrorism and Critical Terrorism Studies, this thesis 
contributes to the debate over the definition of terrorism, the state-centric approach 
to terrorism, the framing of “terrorism” and the close ties between the state and 
scholars.  
The difference in the ways in which states perceive real and/or constructed “terrorist” 
threats hinders governments’ ability to reach a consensus on the nature of terrorism 
and undermines international cooperation. Conditioned by China’s quest for 
legitimacy and historically continuities, China’s counter-terrorism approach shows 
some characteristics that are distinctive from liberal democracies. Based on the ready-
made assumptions in history, the current leadership constructs the concept of “unity” 
and “separatism” and the notion of the “enemy” in the context of the history of 
humiliation and the struggle against Western intervention. These assumptions 
contribute to the anxiety of Chinese political elites and scholars regarding the Western 
support for the separatist movements in the name of democracy and human rights. To 
achieve agreement on the definition of terrorism, China and the West need to address 
the key issue of the legitimacy of separatist movements. Western support for 
dissident groups that have a separatist agenda gives the CCP a reason to dismiss their 
efforts to exert pressure on human rights as an external intervention in China’s 
domestic affairs. Chinese political elites and scholars perceive Western support for 
separatist groups in the context of the “us and them” dichotomy inherited from the 
Mao era. They believe that such support is one of the main reasons for the prolonged 
conflict between the CCP and the separatists. China’s conflation of separatism and 
terrorism also exacerbates the problem, making it difficult to carry out peaceful 
political negotiation with “separatists” designated by the state.  
“Terrorism” is used as a label to ascribe right and wrong. China’s counter-terrorism 
discourse inherited the master frames in which the friend/enemy distinction has been 
accepted without question. Therefore, within this discourse, the CCP does not need to 
explicitly state who the “hostile forces” and “three forces” are. The phrase "hostile 
forces" is a package of ready-made assumptions that draws on the narratives of the 
Century of Humiliation. It allows the speaker and the audience to communicate their 
indignation regarding terrorism without pointing out the identity of the terrorist. The 
"terrorism" label is only meaningful in the context of the existing "us and them" 
divisions. 
Like other countries, the Chinese government is expected to justify its counter-
terrorism policy to its citizens. However, given that the official counter-terrorism 
discourse is seldom criticised due to the CCP’s tight control over ideology, it is easier, 
compared to democracies, to persuade citizens to accept the curtailment of civil 
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liberties. Therefore, China’s counter-terrorism propaganda is largely characterised by 
out-dated methods and an intolerance of cultural diversity. In comparison, the 
Prevent Strategy is highly controversial in the UK, which in its own right demonstrates 
the fact that a different voice is allowed in British society.  
The case of China has some implications for Critical Terrorism Studies more broadly. 
China’s counter-terrorism approach reflects its state-centric approach to terrorism. 
Chinese political elites and scholars base their understanding of the security threat on 
the historical continuities and the friend/enemy distinction inherited from the Mao 
era. They see the Western support for dissident groups in the context of a broader 
agenda to contain the rise of China. As they believe human rights are used to disguise 
the intervention, they are not likely to make a concession to allow Western human 
rights organisations to investigate in China. This attitude is further manifested in the 
Law on the Management of the Activities of Overseas Non-governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) within Mainland China, which was passed in 2016. The CCP has 
sent a clear signal that NGOs will be closely monitored so that their work does not 
pose a challenge to the regime’s stability.  
This thesis sympathises with the commitment of the CTS to examine “terrorism” as a 
social fact and highlight the state’s approach to terrorism in the context of its quest 
for legitimacy and historical continuities. Embedding counter-terrorism policy in a 
series of assumptions regarding what constitute security threats and how individuals 
should behave, the CCP allows and promotes the “correct” ideas and views about 
history, ethnicity, and the state, and restricts alternative narratives so that non-violent 
expressions of dissent based on genuine grievances cannot be voiced. Fearing that the 
“ignorant” masses will be influenced by the real enemies who are aiming to containing 
China, the CCP has made significant efforts in promoting counter-terrorism 
propaganda – the “correct” views on the issue of separatism – and adopted various 
coercive tactics, such as “re-education camps” and requiring cadres to stay at 
Uyghurs’ homes.  
This thesis also sympathises with the CTS perspective that views “terrorism” label as a 
rhetorical device through which to unveil the underlying friend/enemy distinction. The 
dominance of the official discourse – as opposed to alternative discourses provided by 
Uyghur dissidents, human rights groups and Western media – the vague and broad 
criteria, and the excessive power of the executive in designating terrorist 
organisations and individuals allows the Chinese government to be fully capable of 
determining “who are our enemies”. Resolute crackdowns on the enemies have 
helped the CCP to construct itself as a legitimate force that safeguards the interests of 
the Chinese people. 
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This thesis also verified the observation made by the CTS regarding the impact of close 
ties between the state and scholars. In regard to the issue of terrorism, many Chinese 
scholars uncritically accept the official discourse of terrorism, leaving issues such as 
human rights violations unaddressed. Although there have been some attempts to 
challenge the existing paradigm within Chinese academia, such as the criticism of the 
principle of “combining leniency with severe punishment” (Wang and Zhao 2016, 138), 
“pocket crime” (Xun Zhang 2013), the “ignorant masses” (Huo Huang 2008), the hard 
approach (F. Chen 2015a), and the Settlement and Education policy (Z. Chen 2016), 
they have not been influential enough to change the mindset of the majority of 
government officials. As a result, counter-terrorism practice at the local level has gone 
further in curtailing the Uyghurs’ individual rights. As they are not confronted or 
challenged, it is likely that local officials believed that it is reasonable to suppress 
“wrong” ideas and views using coercive methods.  
This thesis also appeals to experts in Chinese politics who are interested in how the 
state functions to legitimise its approach to terrorism. The authoritarian 
characteristics of China’s counter-terrorism approach limit the CCP’s ability to strike a 
proper balance between effective counter-terrorism and providing the rights and 
liberties that citizens are entitled to according to the Chinese Constitution. Like 
liberal/democratic countries, China faces the challenge of justifying its counter-
terrorism approach to the public. However, faced with the more urgent need for unity 
and stability – a need constructed by political elites and intellectuals through the 
narratives of the Century of Humiliation – the CCP is not constrained in implementing 
heavy-handed counter-terrorism measures at the expense of civil liberties. In this 
context, the CCP seeks to consolidate its legitimacy through ideology, repression, and 
co-optation – to promote the “correct” socialist values and frame separatist views as 
“wrong” and even “illegal”; to repress “wrong” and “illegal” views through 
development and religious policies, and the “re-education camps”; and to engage with 
community members by increasing the presence of their voice. In this context, 
propaganda does not necessarily serve to convince the public, but rather, it becomes 
a demonstration of the power of the state to create its own truth. This is evident in 
the language of open letters by Uyghur “cultural workers”, the relatives of Rebiya 
Kadeer and Uyghur students and intellectuals. The boilerplate propaganda phrasing in 
these letters is better understood as a demonstration of the state’s power, which adds 
to the already-dominating official discourse. It reveals that the government, which 
might have played a role in producing these letter, was more concerned with 
dominating the discourse with the official version of stories. Political elites and 
intellectuals are more concerned with facilitating frame alignment so that these 
influential Uyghurs frame the issue in the same way that the government does.  
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Prioritising national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the CCP reinforces the 
assumptions that collective interests come before individual interests – only by 
expanding the power of the state can individuals enjoy the stability that they are 
currently enjoying. In exchange for the further curtailment of civil liberties, the 
government promises stability and economic growth. However, as the power of the 
executive is not constrained, very little can be done to prevent local authorities from 
employing coercive tactics just to “hit the target”. The proud description of the 
number of individuals who have been “successfully transformed” is an example that 
the locals are more concerned with the achievements that are preferably quantifiable 
and reportable (Tianshanwang 2014). 
In the discourse of counter-terrorism in the Chinese political context, governance can 
be reduced to simply following the “correct” ideology and economic growth. 
Government officials have created an environment in which it is simply more practical 
and less dangerous to follow the “correct” ideology promoted by the state, even if 
that means to compromising ethnic and religious identity. Because the government 
tends to dismiss any harsh criticism as aligned with external enemies, it would take a 
long time for the government to reform its counter-terrorism policy from within. The 
façade of plurality stems from the implementation of the Mass Line strategy and the 
engagement with community members demonstrates the dominance of the official 
framing and discourse of counter-terrorism, rather than the genuine inclusion of the 
voice of the Uyghurs. The centralisation of power in the counter-terrorism discourse, 
policy and practice make fragmented authoritarianism – as Andrew Mertha (2009) 
describes it – an illusion.  
The decline in Chinese political rights and civil liberties, particularly among ethnic 
minorities in the context of counter-terrorism is part of the democratic backsliding 
across the world in the last 12 years (Abramowitz 2018). The most recent reports by 
Freedom House (Abramowitz 2018) highlights the consecutive decline of freedom in 
71 countries , including leading democratic countries such as the US. Between the 
9/11 attacks and 2012, more than 140 countries passed Anti-Terrorism Laws. Many 
countries are faced with the issue of the legitimacy of their anti-terrorism measures 
(Bianchi 2006). The fear of the “other”, be it “real” or socially constructed, poses 
major challenges for even the world’s most powerful democracies and their counter-
terrorism strategies.  
As China integrates into the world order, it is under the normative pressures to 
comply with the International Human Rights Law. The documents on the human rights 
of Xinjiang (2017), the three National Human Rights Action Plans and their reviews 
(The State Council Information Office 2011, 2016a, 2016b) and the report on the 
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implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (National People’s Congress 1988) indicate some 
efforts to reduce human rights violations and ensure due process. However, 
considering the restrictions on civil liberties discussed in this thesis, these documents 
remain more or less rhetoric. The latest National Human Rights Action Plan (2016b) 
envisions restrictions of the executive power and improved mechanisms against 
torture and illegal internment by 2020. However, cases of human rights violations, 
especially the “re-education camps”, mean that the implementation of this Action 
Plan remains to be examined.  
Adopting the Mass Line approach as an alternative to liberal democracy (Chen Xi 
2012, 89), the CCP has implemented various measures for participation and 
persuasion, as exemplified by the engagement of community members – patriotic 
believers, opinion leaders, cultural workers, and grassroots propagandists – and the 
reliance on community – residents’ committees, neighbourhood committees, 
workplaces and schools. However, as the discussion in this thesis demonstrated, the 
implementation of the Mass Line principles epitomises the further curtailment of civil 
liberties and highlights the limited level of “diversity” that the Uyghurs enjoys. Instead 
of reflecting the will of the masses, the implementation of the Mass Line approach 
demonstrates that the essence of the Mass Line ideology is associated with the highly-
centralised, paternal role of the Party and the manipulation of the masses (W. Tang 
2016, 7). The feedback of ordinary people is valued, but is strictly controlled and even 
manipulated in order to justify the legitimacy of China’s counter-terrorism approach. 
This observation furthers Graham Young’s (1980, 225) argument that Party leadership 
remains central, not only to Mao’s conception of the Mass Line, but also to Xi’s 
governance in the current era. 
In conclusion, this thesis sought to address the question of why and how the CCP 
legitimises its approach to terrorism by investigating the ways in which the counter-
terrorism discourse, policy and practice are shaped by China’s quest for legitimacy. It 
revealed important aspects of how the country functions by emphasising the linkages 
between its approach to terrorism and its quest for legitimacy through frames, 
assumptions, narratives and labels. In an era of economic slowdown, the CCP has put 
more emphasis on creating political conformity by promoting the “correct” ideas and 
punishing the “wrong” ones.  
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Appendix I 
Translation of the 15 manifestations of radicalisation in the Ordinances on de-
radicalisation in XUAR (People’s Congress 2017). 123 
1. Advocating and disseminate extremist ideology. 
2. Interfering in others’ freedom of religion, forcing others to 
participate in religious activities, forcing others to provide property 
or labour for religious venues and clergies. 
3. Interfering in others’ marriage, divorce, funeral, and inheritance 
succession. 
4. Interfering others’ association, integration, cohabitation with 
people from different ethnic groups or other religious belief, and 
expelling people of other ethnic groups or other religious belief to 
leave the place of residence. 
5. Interfering in cultural and entertainment activities, rejecting public 
products and services such as radio and television. 
6. Extending the concept of halal to other fields other than food, and 
excluding or interfering with others’ secular life in the name of 
halal. 
7. Wearing or forcing others to wear jilbab and extremist symbol. 
8. Growing a beard and giving [Arabian] names to children without a 
good reason in order to spread religious fanaticism. 
9. Disregarding legal procedure and getting married or divorced 
according to religious ritual only. 
10. Stopping children from receiving national education and hampering 
the implementation of the national education system. 
11. Threatening or inducing others to reject national policies, and 
deliberately damage legal certificates such as identity card and 
residence booklet, and Renminbi [the Chinese currency].  
12. Deliberately destroying or damaging public property. 
13. Publishing, printing, distributing, selling, producing, downloading, 
storing, reproducing, consulting, excerpting, and possessing articles, 
publications, and audio-visual products that contains extremist 
content.  
14. Deliberately interfering or hampering family planning policies. 
15. Any other extremist speech or act.  
                                                      
123 The Ordinances on de-radicalisation in XUAR: 新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例, 
xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu qu jiduanhua tiaoli 
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Appendix II 
Translation of the 26 forms of “illegal religious activities” (The Party Committee 
General Office of the XUAR and The People’s Government of the XUAR 2014). 124 
1. Activities that in the disguise of religion disrupt social order, impair 
the health of the citizens, sabotage national education system, 
interfere with administration and judicial processes, family 
planning policy and inheritance distribution, and other activities 
that undermine national interests, social and public interests and 
legitimate rights and interests of the citizens.  
2.  [Activities that] interfere with the freedom and religious belief of 
other people, force or in disguised form coerce others to convert, 
fast and worship; or interfere others’ normal production activities, 
business, and social life in the name of Ramadan, and compel 
women to pray in the mosques and wearing jilbab. 
3. Employing an unqualified person who is not recruited by patriotic 
religious groups to organise or preside over religious activities or 
ceremonies.  
4. Conducting activities outside their own religious venues without 
permission. Religious clergies and believers preach and gather for 
religious activities outside their own religious venues. 
5. Unauthorised recruitment of external clergies. Unauthorised 
recruitment of clergies from inland China to conduct religious 
activities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.  
6. Converting others arbitrarily by those who proclaim to be 
preachers. Unauthorised consecration of clergies. Unauthorised 
consecration by foreign (including Taiwan, Macau, and Hong Kong) 
religious organisations.  
7. Illegally setting up religious classes, praying classes and theology 
classes, and unauthorised admission of religious students.  
8. Setting up religious courses or conducting other religious activities 
in schools of different levels and other non-academic institutions 
without permission.  
9. Coercing, instigating, conniving at, or indulging juveniles to worship, 
study and fast at school.  
10. Interfering in marriage by performing the Nikah for people to enter 
into marriage instead of registering the marriage [at the local 
                                                      
124 26 forms of “illegal religious activities”: 非法宗教活动 26条界定, feifa zongjiao 
huodong ershiliu tiao jieding 
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government], and performing Triple Talaq instead of official 
divorce proceedings.  
11. Restoring or in disguised form restoring the abolished system of 
religious feudalism and oppressive exploration, advocating the 
succession of the religious leader, giving religious permission, 
dispatching Imams, and levying the religious tax. 
12. Setting up tweeters in religious venues to carry out religious 
activities.  
13. Utilising the opportunities of attending weddings, funerals, family 
gathering and meshrep125 to conduct the Tabligh preach. 
14. Advocating, disseminating religious extremism in the name of halal 
and haram.  
15. Illegal religious organisations in the inland China roping in believers 
in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, developing an 
underground network and founding illegal religious organisations 
through dispatching religious personnel, providing cadre training 
and funding.  
16. Unauthorised reincarnation of the Living Buddha without approval, 
and searching for and identification of the reincarnated soul boy 
across regions.  
17. Deliberately provoking disputes and causing chaos between 
different religions, denomination, or within the same 
denomination.  
18. Editing, translating, publicising, printing, reproducing, producing, 
distributing, selling, and disseminating illegal religious publications 
and audio-visual products without permission.  
19. Utilising digital platforms and medium such as the internet, mobile 
phone, and mobile storage device to advocate and disseminate 
religion without permission.  
20. Illegally listening, watching, and disseminating overseas religious 
radio and television programmes using satellite ground receiving 
facilities. 
21. Organising private pilgrimage or participating in an international 
pilgrimage that is not organised by national Islamic religious groups.  
22. Receiving religious donations by foreign (including Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan) organisations and individuals without 
permission.  
23. Attending training and conferences organised by foreign (including 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) religious organisations, and 
                                                      
125 A meshrep is a type of Uyghur gathering including poetry, music, dance and conversation.  
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contacting and associating with such organisations without 
permission. Attending training and conferences organised by 
domestic illegal religious organisations.  
24. Overseas organisations conduct preaching activities by donating to 
disaster-stricken areas, funding schools, providing poverty aids, 
and providing medical prevention and cure in the name of doing 
business, travel, teaching, studying, and cultural exchange.  
25. Unregistered and unauthorised religious venues. Building, 
transforming, or extending religious venues, or constructing other 
buildings in a disguised form to be used for religious activates. 
Manipulating temples in disguise of providing funding.  
26. Creating large outdoor religious statues outside of religious venues 
without permission.  
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Appendix III 
Interviews 
Cui Liu, Police officer, Xi’an, 25/07/2016 
Fan Shiming, Professor of the Peking University, Beijing, 21/07/2016 
Government official A, Beijing, 20/07/2016 
Government official A, Xi’an, 25/07/2016 
Government official B, Xi’an, 25/07/2016 
Government official C, Xi’an, 27/07/2016 
Government official D, Beijing, 26/08/2016 
Government official E, Beijing, 23/08/2016 
Government official, Xinjiang, 09/07/2017 
Minority student A, Beijing, 03/08/2016 
Minority student B, Beijing, 03/08/2016 
Police officer A, Guangzhou, 17/07/2016 
Police officer B, Xi’an, 24/07/2016 
Police officer C, Xi’an, 24/07/2016 
Police officer D, Xinjiang, 06/07/2017 
Police officer E, Xinjiang, 08/07/2017 
Police officer F, Xinjiang, 08/07/2017 
Scholar A, Xi’an, 30/07/2016 
Scholar B, Beijing, 2/08/2016 
Scholar C, the Peking University, Beijing, 3/08/2016 
Scholar D, the Peking University, Beijing, 14/07/2016 
Scholar E, the Minzu University, Beijing, 05/08/2016 
Scholar F, the Minzu University, Beijing, 06/08/2016 
Scholar F, Xinjiang academy of social sciences, Xinjiang, 04/07/2017 
Scholar G, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, 06/08/2016 
Scholar G, Xinjiang academy of social sciences, Xinjiang, 05/07/2017 
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Scholar H, Shanghai, 02/07/2017 
Scholar H, Xinjiang academy of social sciences, Xinjiang, 07/07/2017 
Scholar I, China Think Tank, Beijing, 04/08/2016 
Zhang Jinping, Director of the Counter-terrorism Research Centre at the Northwest 
University of Politics and Law, 24/07/2016 
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